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Preface
Effective public health surveillance is essential for detecting
and responding to emerging public health threats, including
terrorism and emerging infectious diseases. New surveillance
methods are being developed and tested to improve the time-
liness and completeness of detection of disease outbreaks. One
promising set of approaches is syndromic surveillance, in which
information about health events that precede a firm clinical
diagnosis is captured early and rapidly from existing, usually
electronic, data sources, and analyzed frequently to detect sig-
nals that might indicate an outbreak requiring investigation.
To provide a forum for scientists and practitioners to report
on progress in developing and evaluating syndromic surveil-
lance systems, the New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, the New York Academy of Medicine, and
CDC convened the second annual National Syndromic Sur-
veillance Conference in New York City during October 23–
24, 2003. The conference, supported by the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation, was attended by more than 460 public health
practitioners and researchers, who had the opportunity to hear
41 oral presentations and view 50 poster presentations.
The original papers and posters for this conference were
chosen by a scientific program committee after a review of
submitted abstracts. Senior researchers in the field were also
invited to address key concerns in surveillance for early detec-
tion of outbreaks. All participants who presented papers or
posters at either the conference or at a preconference work-
shop were invited to submit manuscripts based on their pre-
sentations for publication in this Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report Supplement. Each manuscript was then reviewed
by at least two peer reviewers and final publication decisions
were made by an editorial committee. Many of the articles are
considerably different from the material originally presented
at the conference. Certain authors updated their findings, and
others were asked to revise their papers into descriptions of
syndromic surveillance systems. Other presenters chose to
submit only abstracts. Papers are presented here in the follow-
ing order: system descriptions, research methods, evaluation,
and public health practice.
In addition to these reports, other resources on syndromic
surveillance are available. The proceedings of the 2002
National Syndromic Surveillance Conference were published
in the Journal of Urban Health (accessible at http://jurban.oup
journals.org/content/suppl_1/index.shtml). In May 2004, a
revised Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance
Systems for Early Detection of Outbreaks was published (MMWR
2004;53[No. RR-5]). An annotated bibliography of published
papers and other Internet-accessible materials has been devel-
oped and is maintained monthly on a CDC website (http://
www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/syndromic/index.htm). An Internet-
based forum (http://syndromic.forum.cdc.gov) was established
for discussion of topics related to syndromic surveillance and
was used to distribute answers to audience questions raised at
the conference. A related forum (http://surveval.forum.cdc.
gov) has been maintained for discussion of topics related to
surveillance system evaluation. Finally, the website of the
Annual Syndromic Surveillance Conferences (http://www.
syndromic.org) includes links to recent news and scientific
articles about syndromic surveillance, oral and poster presen-
tations and workshop materials from past conferences, and
notices of upcoming conferences. The third National
Syndromic Surveillance Conference is planned for November
3–4, 2004, in Boston, Massachusetts.
The editorial committee acknowledges the work of the sci-
entific planning committee: Dennis Cochrane, Christine
Hahn, Patrick Kelley, Martin Kulldorff, John Loonsk, David
Madigan, Richard Platt, and Don Weiss. The committee is
also grateful for the support and efforts of the following staff
members in conducting this conference and developing this
Supplement: Alan Fleischman, Irv Gertner, and Jessica
Hartman, New York Academy of Medicine; Rick Heffernan,
New York Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; and
Alan Davis, Division of Public Health Surveillance and
Informatics, Epidemiology Program Office, CDC; Valerie
Kokor, Division of International Health, Epidemiology Pro-
gram Office; and Stephanie Malloy, Jeffrey Sokolow, and
Malbea LaPete, MMWR, Epidemiology Program Office, CDC.
Special thanks are given to JoEllen DeThomasis, Division of
Applied Public Health Training and Division of Public Health
Surveillance and Informatics, Epidemiology Program Office,
CDC, who coordinated the preparation of these reports.
— The Editorial Committee
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What is Syndromic Surveillance?
Kelly J. Henning
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, New York, New York
Corresponding author: Kelly J. Henning, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 125 Worth Street, CN-6, New York, NY
10013. Telephone: 212-788-0234; Fax: 212-788-4473; E-mail: khenning@health.nyc.gov.
Abstract
Innovative electronic surveillance systems are being developed to improve early detection of outbreaks attributable to biologic
terrorism or other causes. A review of the rationale, goals, definitions, and realistic expectations for these surveillance systems is a
crucial first step toward establishing a framework for further research and development in this area. This commentary provides
such a review for current syndromic surveillance systems.
Syndromic surveillance has been used for early detection of outbreaks, to follow the size, spread, and tempo of outbreaks, to
monitor disease trends, and to provide reassurance that an outbreak has not occurred. Syndromic surveillance systems seek to use
existing health data in real time to provide immediate analysis and feedback to those charged with investigation and follow-up of
potential outbreaks. Optimal syndrome definitions for continuous monitoring and specific data sources best suited to outbreak
surveillance for specific diseases have not been determined. Broadly applicable signal-detection methodologies and response proto-
cols that would maximize detection while preserving scant resources are being sought.
Stakeholders need to understand the advantages and limitations of syndromic surveillance systems. Syndromic surveillance
systems might enhance collaboration among public health agencies, health-care providers, information-system professionals, aca-
demic investigators, and industry. However, syndromic surveillance does not replace traditional public health surveillance, nor
does it substitute for direct physician reporting of unusual or suspect cases of public health importance.
surveillance goals reach beyond terrorism preparedness.
Medical-provider reporting remains critical for identifying un-
usual disease clusters or sentinel cases. Nevertheless, syndromic
surveillance might help determine the size, spread, and tempo
of an outbreak after it is detected (5), or provide reassurance
that a large-scale outbreak is not occurring, particularly in
times of enhanced surveillance (e.g., during a high-profile
event). Finally, syndromic surveillance is beginning to be used
to monitor disease trends, which is increasingly possible as
longitudinal data are obtained and syndrome definitions re-
fined.
The fundamental objective of syndromic surveillance is to
identify illness clusters early, before diagnoses are confirmed
and reported to public health agencies, and to mobilize a rapid
response, thereby reducing morbidity and mortality. Epidemic
curves for persons with earliest symptom onset and those with
severe illness can be depicted graphically (Figure). The time
between symptom onset for an increasing number of cases
caused by deliberate release of a biologic agent and subsequent
patient visits to a health-care facility resulting in a definitive
diagnosis is represented by t. Syndromic surveillance aims to
identify a threshold number of early symptomatic cases,
allowing detection of an outbreak t days earlier than would
conventional reporting of confirmed cases. The ability of
syndromic surveillance to detect outbreaks earlier than con-
Introduction
The desire to expand and improve upon traditional meth-
ods of public health surveillance is not new. Even before the
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent
anthrax outbreak, public health officials had begun to enhance
detection of emerging infections and illnesses caused by bio-
logic agents. A primary objective of a 1998 CDC plan was to
develop programs for early detection and investigation of out-
breaks (1). CDC’s 2000 strategic plan for biologic and chemical
preparedness called for early detection by integrating terror-
ism preparedness into existing systems and developing “new
mechanisms for detecting, evaluating, and reporting suspi-
cious events” (2). Although the need for innovative surveil-
lance techniques had already been identified, the anthrax
outbreak after Bacillus anthracis spores were released through
the mail in 2001 (3) accelerated the implementation of
syndromic surveillance systems across the United States. An
overview of the location and scope of the earliest systems imple-
mented before and after fall 2001 has been published (4).
Goals and Rationale
Although syndromic surveillance was developed for early
detection of a large-scale release of a biologic agent, current
8 MMWR September 24, 2004
ventional surveillance methods depends on such factors as the
size of the outbreak, the population dispersion of those af-
fected, the data sources and syndrome definitions used, the
criteria for investigating threshold alerts, and the health-care
provider’s ability to detect and report unusual cases (6). CDC’s
framework for evaluating public health surveillance systems
for early detection of outbreaks should be useful for compar-
ing syndromic surveillance across jurisdictions and for evalu-
ating system performance (7).
Specific definitions for syndromic surveillance are lacking,
and the name itself is imprecise. Certain programs monitor
surrogate data sources (e.g., over-the-counter prescription sales
or school absenteeism), not specific disease syndromes. Mean-
while, certain well-defined disease or clinical syndromes (e.g.,
hemolytic uremic syndrome or Kawasaki’s syndrome) are not
included in syndrome definitions, often leading to confusion
about what “syndromic” surveillance actually monitors.
Diverse names used to describe public health surveillance sys-
tems for early outbreak detection include
• early warning systems (8,9);
• prodrome surveillance (10);
• outbreak detection systems (11);
• information system-based sentinel surveillance (12);
• biosurveillance systems (13–15);
• health indicator surveillance (16); and
• symptom-based surveillance (17).
However, syndromic surveillance is the term that has persisted.
In defining syndromic surveillance, certain authors have
emphasized the importance of monitoring the frequency of
illnesses with a specific set of clinical features (18), a defini-
tion that does not account for nonclinical data sources. Oth-
ers have emphasized the importance of prediagnostic data to
estimate a community’s health status, particularly by relying
on outpatient visits (19). Inherent in the use of existing elec-
tronic data to describe prediagnostic health indicators is the
central role of timeliness in the analysis, detection, and inves-
tigation of alerts. Perhaps the most comprehensive definition
to date, and likely the one to be broadly adopted, is provided
by CDC’s evaluation framework, which describes syndromic
surveillance as “an investigational approach where health de-
partment staff, assisted by automated data acquisition and gen-
eration of statistical alerts, monitor disease indicators in
real-time or near real-time to detect outbreaks of disease ear-
lier than would otherwise be possible with traditional public
health methods” (7).
Syndromic surveillance systems vary by their planned dura-
tion and their manner of acquiring data (Table). Short-
duration, event-based systems are usually used to provide
enhanced surveillance around a discrete event (e.g., the Olym-
pic Games or a national political convention) (20,23). His-
torically, these short-term syndromic surveillance projects,
sometimes termed drop-in surveillance, have required medical
providers or others to collect nonroutine information (20).
More recent event-based surveillance systems have relied on
rapid implementation of electronically transferred data (23).
Manual data entry, which occurred after September 11, 2001,
in 15 New York City emergency departments (EDs), is diffi-
cult to sustain (21). Using pre-existing health data for
syndromic surveillance offers immediate accessibility and poses
limited burden to providers and health-care institutions.
Categorizing symptoms and diagnoses into syndromes is a
fundamental component of syndromic surveillance systems
that use clinical data sets. Although the majority of investiga-
tors have devised broad categories aimed at early detection of
biologic terrorism, validation of syndrome definitions is only
beginning. Respiratory, gastrointestinal, rash, neurologic and
sepsis syndromes have been monitored consistently (19,22).
Because numerous ED and outpatient settings have Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modi-
fication (ICD-9-CM) data available electronically, ICD-9-CM
codes have been used to categorize syndromes. To facilitate
comparability between surveillance systems, a CDC working
group published lists of candidate syndrome groups based on
ICD-9-CM codes (27). The usefulness of ICD-9-CM codes
compared with other data streams, particularly with regard to
the data’s timeliness, requires evaluation by each surveillance
program.
Syndromic surveillance focuses on the early symptom (pro-
drome) period before clinical or laboratory confirmation of a
particular disease and uses both clinical and alternative data
sources (Box). Strictly defined, syndromic surveillance gath-
ers information about patients’ symptoms (e.g., cough, fever,
or shortness of breath) during the early phases of illness. How-
ever, in practice, certain syndromic surveillance systems col-
lect surrogate data indicating early illness (e.g., school or work
FIGURE. Syndromic surveillance — rationale for early detection
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* t = time between detection by syndromic (prediagnostic) surveillance and
detection by traditional (diagnosis-based) surveillance.
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absenteeism data or veterinary data such as unexpected avian
deaths or other potential precursors of human illness). Alter-
native data sources have potential problems, including a pre-
sumed low specificity for syndromes of interest, high
probability of influence by factors unrelated to personal health
(e.g., weather or holidays), and difficulty in retracing data ab-
errations to individual patients. Despite these qualifiers, the
optimal system might be one that integrates data from mul-
tiple sources, potentially increasing investigators’ confidence
in the relevance of an alert from any single data source.
Analytic Methods
for Signal Detection
The analytic challenge in using syndromic surveillance for
outbreak detection is to identify a signal corresponding to an
outbreak or cluster amid substantial “background noise” in the
data. Syndromic surveillance systems use an array of aberration-
detection methods to identify increases in syndromes above
predetermined thresholds. However, signal-detection methods
have not yet been standardized. Temporal and spatio-temporal
methods have been used to assess day-to-day and day and place
variability of data from an expected baseline (27,28).
BOX. Potential data sources for syndromic surveillance
Clinical data sources
Emergency department (ED) or clinic total patient volume
Total hospital or intensive-care–unit admissions from ED
ED triage log of chief complaints
ED visit outcome (diagnosis)
Ambulatory-care clinic/HMO outcome (diagnosis)
Emergency medical system (911) call type
Provider hotline volume, chief complaint
Poison control center calls
Unexplained deaths
Medical examiner case volume, syndromes
Insurance claims or billing data





Health-care provider database searches
Volume of Internet-based health inquiries by the public
Internet-based illness reporting
Animal illnesses or deaths







Novel modes of collection (25)








ED triage staff typically log and tally sheets
Passive
Automated transfer of hospital (usually
ED triage or diagnosis) or outpatient data
Use of data collected for other purposes
Data mining of large collections or from
multiple sources
Passive
Hand-held or touch-screen devices
Active and passive
Medical examiner data
Unexplained death or severe illness data
Advantages
Develop relationships with ED staff
and infection-control professionals
Transportable to various sites





Requires minimal or no provider input
Data available continuously
Data are standardized
Easy to use; rapid provider feedback;
can post alerts and information
Clearly defined syndrome















Not an early warning
Unclear whether it can be
rapidly and broadly
expanded
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Response Protocols
Response protocols for investigating syndromic surveillance
alerts are under development by multiple programs. Obstacles
to effective, efficient follow-up include the difficulty of predict-
ing how well the syndromes themselves correlate with target
diseases under surveillance; the extremely low positive predic-
tive value of any given signal based on the high level of system
sensitivity; and investigators’ relative lack of experience with
syndromic surveillance under real-world conditions (30).
Programmatic requirements for effective signal response
(e.g., documented procedures; staff with appropriate exper-
tise; 24-hour/day, 7-day/week analysis and response; and plans
for information dissemination) are complex. Certain circum-
stances surrounding an alert might prompt rapider investiga-
tion, including clustering of cases by location; severe
symptoms; unexplained deaths; sudden, substantial case num-
bers; simultaneous alerts from multiple data sources; or
restriction of an alert to a particular population (e.g., age group
or sex) (31). Diagnostic confirmation is a paramount step in
investigating alerts, particularly given the nonspecific nature
of certain syndrome categories. Developing protocols to ad-
dress alerts from data sources in which individual cases are
unidentifiable (e.g., over-the-counter medication sales) is par-
ticularly challenging.
 Perspectives and Challenges
Distinguishing those points on which multiple investiga-
tors agree from those that are less well-delineated might be
helpful in defining realistic expectations for syndromic sur-
veillance. Investigators usually agree on the following:
• Syndromic surveillance is being used in numerous states
and localities to detect a potential large-scale biologic
attack.
• Pre-existing electronic health data will likely become
increasingly available, thereby enhancing system devel-
opment.
• Syndromic surveillance does not replace traditional pub-
lic health surveillance.
• Syndromic surveillance is unlikely to detect an individual
case of a particular illness.
• Syndromic surveillance cannot replace the critical contri-
bution of physicians in early detection and reporting of
unusual diseases and events.
Although syndromic surveillance’s ability to detect a
terrorism-related outbreak earlier than traditional surveil-
lance remains unknown, it will likely be useful for defining
the scope of an outbreak, providing reassurance that a large-
scale outbreak has not occurred, and conducting surveillance
of noninfectious health problems (e.g., monitoring nicotine
replacement therapy sales following tobacco-tax increases).
However, integral components of syndromic surveillance
require additional research and evaluation, including the
following:
• defining optimal data sources;
• evaluating appropriate syndromic definitions;
• standardizing signal-detection methods;
• developing minimally acceptable response protocols;
• clarifying the use of simulation data sets to test systems;
and
• advancing the debate regarding resource commitment for
syndromic versus traditional surveillance.
On a broader policy level, defining the role of academic
partners in bridging any potential analytic gaps, defining the
role and scope of a national syndromic data repository, and
developing policy for integrating laboratory testing and labo-
ratory information systems with syndromic surveillance are
on the horizon.
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Abstract
Syndromic surveillance aspires to achieve rapid outbreak detection and response, but stand-alone systems not integrated into
local business processes might fail to offer better health outcomes. To describe how surveillance can most directly serve action, the
author presents a model of local public health work as a series of outcome-driven business processes consisting of information
input, information processing, actions, and outcomes. This report derives lessons for improving each of these elements from public
health emergencies occurring in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Lessons for improving input include 1) creatively mining internal or
readily accessible information; 2) integrating information flow into routine business practices before an emergency; 3) reusing
information in multiple business processes, and ensuring that information-management systems enable such recycling; 4) fostering
relationships with information providers by reducing burdens and meeting their needs; and 5) using agile tools to focus surveil-
lance on pressing problems. Lessons for better processing include 1) combining diverse information in well-organized visual
displays (“surveillance dashboards”); 2) creating alerts that warn of unusual patterns; 3) using Internet tools to view and share
information on demand; 4) using diverse expertise to interpret complex information; 5) assembling surveillance so as to be
scalable (from local to global); and 6) ensuring sufficient environmental, laboratory, and clinical capacity for rapid confirmation
and response. Lessons for linking surveillance to more efficient action include 1) building surveillance directly into response plans;
2) feeding surveillance information directly into response systems; and 3) employing those information and communications
systems used in daily practice to the greatest extent possible. Using surveillance information systematically in outcome-driven
business processes can improve emergency response while building day-to-day organizational effectiveness.
Introduction
Public health surveillance has been defined as “the ongoing
collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data
regarding a health-related event for use in public health
action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve
health” (1). The primary goal of surveillance is to support
action. Because surveillance of established diagnoses might be
too slow or insensitive to initiate timely countermeasures, the
threats of biologic terrorism and emerging infections (e.g.,
severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]) have spurred
interest in syndromic surveillance of near real-time illness
indicators (e.g., chief complaints, laboratory test orders, and
absenteeism). In addition to its new relevance for homeland
security, syndromic surveillance or case management has been
used to track influenza, polio, and sexually transmitted dis-
eases for which laboratory confirmation is impractical (2–4).
Excellent criteria have been proposed for determining
whether syndromic surveillance systems provide reliable, use-
ful information to decision-makers. (5). Different consider-
ations are required to determine whether a system facilitates
rapid, effective action, whether a system can be sustained, and
whether it will be used in an actual emergency. Answers
depend on how well surveillance is integrated into the
day-to-day work of local public health agencies (LPHAs). Local
professionals are best situated to validate a suspected threat
(by rapid assessment of local health-care, environmental, and
laboratory information); define the evolving direction of the
threat and who is at risk (by interpreting local information on
place, time, occupation, and environmental conditions);
notify and mobilize the most immediately affected parties;
and offer timely, locally relevant risk communications. State
and federal resources can help but cannot supplant local knowl-
edge and relationships.
LPHAs are typically small but complex organizations work-
ing simultaneously on multiple desired community outcomes
(e.g., improvements in infant nutrition, food safety, tobacco
use, elder quality-of-life, or communicable disease). Work
toward each outcome can be viewed as a series of business
processes (Figure 1) in which information input (e.g., a refer-
ral, an inspection, a survey, a client assessment, or a disease
report) is processed to reach an action decision. Actions (e.g.,
issuing a WIC coupon, a sanitation order, a citation for
tobacco sales to minors, or an isolation order; conducting a
home visit; or writing a prescription) aim to improve a popu-
lation outcome. A community that tracks outcomes (e.g., teen-
age smoking rates) quantitatively also uses this information as
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* One piece of information can serve as input for multiple business processes
(e.g., a report of a death might prompt a communicable disease
investigation, a death certificate, and collection of a death certificate
processing fee).
†
The business-process model of local public health work was developed
by Stephen Downs, Seth Foldy, Peter Kitch, Patrick O'Carroll, and David
Ross at a meeting on information modeling for public health practice
sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Denver, Colorado,
October 13, 2004.
FIGURE 1. The work of public health represented as a series
of business processes in which information inputs* are















input, creating a feedback loop to adjust the type, quality, or
quantity of actions.
An efficient organization will apply one piece of informa-
tion to multiple business processes. For example, a patient
address received in a disease report can be used to dispatch an
investigator, locate household contacts, issue an isolation order,
and map an outbreak.
This idealized, informatic view of public health emphasizes
the importance of considering how information is most effec-
tively converted into action. Too often, information collection
is emphasized over information use. Poorly processed infor-
mation produces information glut and unread reports. Par-
ticularly when all staff are responding to an emergency,
surveillance information must feed multiple action processes
simultaneously (e.g., case finding, specimen collection, labo-
ratory reporting, outbreak characterization [person-place-time
patterns], isolation and quarantine, environmental surety, and
risk communications).
Various public health emergencies helped the Milwaukee
(Wisconsin) Health Department (MHD) learn to integrate
surveillance into well-organized business processes serving both
emergency and everyday functions. This report describes these
experiences and summarizes lessons that can help improve
syndromic surveillance systems.
Linking Surveillance to Outcomes —
Local Experience
In 1993, approximately 400,000 Milwaukee-area residents
were sickened by a waterborne outbreak of cryptosporidiosis,
a then-emerging disease for which reporting was not man-
dated and testing rarely performed. Although drinking water
turbidity levels increased 10 days before reported onset of
symptoms, the outbreak was recognized only after shortages
of diarrhea medications and enteric culture media were
reported (6). At the time, different agencies held information
(e.g., on water turbidity, customer complaints, and employee
or student absenteeism) that, viewed together, might have
alerted authorities to the outbreak earlier.
After the outbreak, MHD initiated surveillance of water
quality, pharmacy sales, and diarrhea in nursing facilities. Four-
teen LPHAs in Milwaukee County established a single
disease-reporting site (SurvNet) to simplify reporting, improve
outbreak recognition, and increase communication and feed-
back regarding public health trends to clinicians and labora-
tories (data reporters). An interagency task force was formed
to monitor and improve water quality and to compile and
interpret all available information when concerns arose. MHD
upgraded clinical and environmental microbiology capabili-
ties and established fax-broadcast and Internet-based commu-
nication with laboratories, physicians, infection-control
practitioners, and emergency departments (EDs). Debriefings
held after each outbreak identified needed changes in policy
or procedures. MHD adopted a community outcome goal of
20 reportable enteric infections/100,000 residents (adapted
from Healthy People 2010 goal 10-1) (7).
These improvements helped speed effective response in 2000
when a nurse contacted SurvNet about four children from
three health jurisdictions who had suspected but unconfirmed
Escherichia coli O157:H7 infection. Patient interviews identi-
fied a restaurant, which was rapidly inspected and closed.
Broadcasts to clinicians and laboratories provided diagnostic,
treatment, and prevention advice and resulted in rapid identi-
fication of additional cases. Evidence from rapidly performed
epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investigations
demonstrated conclusively that processing of contaminated
whole-beef cuts could cause sustained disease transmission in
restaurants, which helped change national food policy (8). In
this instance, one telephone call arising from clinical suspi-
cion triggered rapid action and comprehensive investigation
and contributed to health-policy change. Each such success
increases interest and confidence in public health surveillance
among clinicians and other reporters of public health
information.
14 MMWR September 24, 2004
The health effects of a 1995 Milwaukee heat wave were rec-
ognized belatedly after the medical examiner was overwhelmed
by investigations of heat-related deaths (9). An extreme-heat
plan was created, under which action is triggered by an envi-
ronmental signal (weather forecast) and further accelerated if
heat illness is observed by emergency medical services (EMS)
or the medical examiner (10). MHD uses communications
tools developed for outbreaks to alert multiple human service
agencies to take planned action to protect those at greatest
risk (9,11). The plan is updated annually and available con-
tinuously online. Heat-adjusted morbidity and mortality were
reduced by 50% during a 1999 heat wave, compared with
1995 (12).
In 1999, local hospitals established EMSystem,® a regional
emergency medicine Internet (REMI) application that enables
EDs to communicate when they must divert ambulances.
When too many EDs simultaneously signal diversion, the
paramedic system overrides diversion, generating an e-mail/
text-page alert. In January 2000, REMI data were used to
track influenza-related ED congestion, and a Health Care
Capacity Alert Committee was formed (including public
health, EMS, medical, and hospital representatives) to issue
recommendations to ease ED crowding (13). In fall 2000, an
unusual volume of diversion-override text pages alerted MHD
to severe ED congestion, months before influenza season.
Review of REMI data indicated that congestion was prima-
rily attributable to inpatient bed shortages. Committee rec-
ommendations to adjust vacation leave, facilitate timely
discharge, and control elective admissions were followed in 2
days by a rapid decline in ED diversions.
REMI data were later used to justify a regulatory waiver
permitting medical/surgical use of rehabilitation and psychi-
atric beds during the 2000–01 influenza season. REMI pro-
vided unexpected but useful surveillance information on
health-care utilization and capacity that, linked to action,
helped build stronger relationships between public health pro-
fessionals and health-care providers.
MHD adapted REMI in 2000 for heat-illness surveillance
during heat waves and in 2002 for short-term surveillance of
biologic terrorism syndromes during international-profile
sporting events (14). This helped MHD establish multi-ED
surveillance for SARS 3 days after CDC urgently requested
surveillance in 2003. After successful deployment in Milwau-
kee, the SARS screening form was downloaded for use by
hundreds of clinicians. Because the REMI application was
then used in >25 cities, SARS surveillance was offered to other
jurisdictions; 27 EDs reported surveillance of >146,500 visits
to LPHAs in four states, and CDC staff were able to down-
load these data for aberration analysis. REMI permitted agile
deployment of a new syndromic surveillance system across
widely distributed jurisdictions (15).
In summer 2003, SurvNet received a report of a febrile blis-
ter illness in an animal dealer associated with sick prairie dogs.
Wisconsin authorities linked this report to a similar case else-
where in the state, triggering immediate trace-forward and
trace-back investigation of animal sales. The illness was sub-
sequently diagnosed as the hemisphere’s first outbreak of
monkeypox. Action to protect the public began before
diagnosis. However, lack of interoperable data systems
impeded information-sharing among the many health and
veterinary agencies involved across multiple states.
Lessons Learned — Linking Better
Surveillance to Better Action
and Outcomes
 These experiences indicated that 1) more syndromic infor-
mation (input) is available than typically used, 2) informa-
tion processing can improve the timeliness and quality of
decision-making, and 3) action can be accelerated by good
information-management practices. Recommendations follow
for better integrating surveillance information into each of
these business process steps (input, processing, and action).
Improving the Input
LPHAs can easily increase the type, quality, and sustainability
of surveillance by 1) mining information from daily business
processes found within or near the organization; 2) integrat-
ing information flow into routine business practices before an
emergency; 3) reusing information in multiple business pro-
cesses, and ensuring that information-management systems
enable such recycling; 4) fostering relationships with infor-
mation providers by reducing burdens and meeting their needs;
and 5) using agile tools to focus surveillance on pressing prob-
lems.
Within local agencies, diverse information streams on symp-
toms, environmental conditions (e.g., heat, water quality, and
animal illness), health-care utilization (e.g., prescriptions, labo-
ratory orders, ambulance diversion, and 911 dispatch calls),
and behaviors (e.g., absenteeism or travel) are often readily
available. Internal information sources might be as useful as
more elaborate data gathering (e.g., MHD uses routine food-
safety inspections to track the number of restaurants permit-
ting smoking). Other local entities (e.g., the water utility or
fire/EMS) also possess important, readily available informa-
tion. Finally, the Milwaukee examples illustrate how environ-
mental, health-care utilization, and other types of data can
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provide earlier warning or more robust validation of prob-
lems than clinical signs and symptoms alone. For surveillance
of waterborne Cryptosporidium, heat-related illness, and
monkeypox, environmental information provided longer alert
lead-times than clinical findings.
Although syndromic surveillance is often inspired by emer-
gencies, an emergency is not the best time to begin work with
unfamiliar information. Without daily practice, systems can
fall into disuse and might complicate emergency response as
much as facilitate it. Ideally, surveillance systems are both
derived from and support daily local public health operations,
thereby strengthening relationships and communications,
which become even more critical during emergencies.
The health agency that uses every datum for multiple pur-
poses can improve alertness and effectiveness at minimal cost.
Ideally, information is “entered once, used often,” instead of
being locked inside applications and unavailable for reuse. Vari-
ous Internet applications collect information but do not per-
mit local analysis of entered data. Internet-served applications
also often fail to permit uploading of information from a lo-
cal agency’s own information-management system. This re-
sults in duplicate entry, poorer data quality, and difficulty using
or reusing information efficiently or creatively. These consid-
erations support the argument for full and rapid implementa-
tion of CDC’s Public Health Information Network (PHIN)
(16) vision of interoperable applications that truly exchange
rather than hoard health information.
The quality and quantity of surveillance information relies
on the willingness of busy people to provide it. One way to
improve surveillance is to make it less burdensome. Combin-
ing disease reporting for 14 jurisdictions in SurvNet made
reporting easier, while also increasing the surveillance catch-
ment area and exploiting economies of scale for more sophis-
ticated data management. Calling one reporting site often
instead of 14 infrequently helped infection-control profession-
als build relationships with SurvNet staff; such relationships
can increase willingness to share observations of uncertain sig-
nificance that enhance recognition of unusual outbreaks (e.g.,
monkeypox). However, such relationships are less likely within
an office covering 300 jurisdictions; therefore, appropriate
local scale remains important. Another way to minimize re-
porting burden is to use those communications tools already
used by health professionals in their own day-to-day work
(e.g., REMI) rather than expect busy professionals to log onto
stand-alone public health utilities (e.g., certain health alert
networks).
Eliminating altogether the need for conscious effort in
reporting is the goal of such surveillance initiatives as elec-
tronic laboratory reporting and secondary mining of health-
information-management systems. However, engaging health
providers in well-designed surveillance activities has other ben-
efits. The SARS screening form was designed to trigger infec-
tion-control protection as well as to alert public health. Its use
was also reported by ED managers to improve clinicians’
index of suspicion.
Providers are most likely to comply with surveillance when
it aids them in activities on which they place high value, such
as improving diagnosis. MHD attempts to issue timely situ-
ational alerts to cue clinicians to problems they might see in
their practices (e.g., heat-related illness during a heat wave,
biologic agents such as anthrax after September 11, 2001, or
E. coli infection during an outbreak). Such alerts help focus
surveillance while also helping clinicians appreciate that sur-
veillance provides, as well as demands, useful information.
Providing timely information that helps providers defend
themselves from infection (e.g., SARS), send the right test, or
offer special resources for affected patients also helps improve
awareness of the benefits of surveillance. Finally, providers
enjoy learning how surveillance contributes to healthy public
policies, not just to tables and graphs.
In a rapidly changing world, surveillance should be flexible
enough to focus on the most immediate threat, based on warn-
ings as diverse as weather forecasts, law-enforcement or inter-
national intelligence, global disease trends, or nearby outbreaks.
This flexibility requires agile tools for surveillance. Agility is
especially important for unexpected emerging diseases (e.g.,
SARS or monkeypox). Milwaukee EDs have become accus-
tomed to implementing temporary surveillance by using
REMI; the threat of the day might change, but the system
used remains familiar. Networks of providers or laboratories
already engaged in one surveillance system (e.g., for influenza-
like illness) might also be amenable to participating in emer-
gency surveillance for other agents, providing another source
of agile surveillance.
Improving Processing
Surveillance information must be processed in a timely,
meaningful way for providers to be guided by knowledge
instead of overwhelmed with data. Effective processing is aided
by 1) combining diverse information in well-organized visual
displays (“surveillance dashboards”); 2) creating alerts that warn
of unusual patterns; 3) using secure Internet sites to view and
share information on demand; 4) using diverse expertise to
interpret complex information; 5) assembling surveillance so
as to be scalable (from local to global); and 6) ensuring suffi-
cient environmental, laboratory, and clinical capacity for con-
firmation and response.
Each different surveillance information stream provides only
a fragmentary view of a complex world. The cryptosporidiosis
16 MMWR September 24, 2004
FIGURE 2. Example of a surveillance “dashboard” that combines different types of























MHD lab-confirmed Influenza A cases
MHD lab-confirmed Influenza B cases
City of Milwaukee percentage of pneumonia and influenza (P&I) deaths
Southeast Wisconsin percentage of influenza-like illness cases
Previous 5-year average percentage of City of Milwaukee P&I deaths
*
50 18
* No Influenza B cases were reported for this period.
outbreak illustrated how assembling and comparing different
types of existing information might be more important than
collecting new information. Fragmented views occur not only
between organizations but just as often within a single agency.
Until recently, different MHD units produced or received sta-
tistics on pneumonia and influenza deaths, influenza-like ill-
ness, and influenza laboratory cultures, but the agency had
no single coherent view of respiratory illness. Creating a single
visual display of all three types of data on a common time axis
and mounting it on the Internet enabled MHD to transform
little-used data into rich knowledge for multiple users, acces-
sible on demand, day or night (Figure 2).
Sharing different expertise might be as important as shar-
ing different information. Milwaukee’s Health Care Capacity
Alert Committee and Water-Health Taskforce are multi-
disciplinary, multiagency groups that interpret and act on
complex information. The Taskforce meets monthly for other
tasks, which keeps it functioning smoothly, and convenes in
response to unusual information or situations.
Scale is important, but optimum scale varies from one situ-
ation to another. Milwaukee’s SurvNet one-stop reporting sys-
tem speeds detection of and response to outbreaks that cross
local jurisdictional boundaries, but the system might not rec-
ognize rare events if implemented statewide. The capacity to
build scalable surveillance across regions and states is enhanced
by the growth of managed care networks, multiregional REMI
systems, multistate surveillance systems (e.g., FoodNet), and
the interoperable information environment promised by
PHIN. Combined with automated tools (e.g., SaTScan™ (17)
analysis) to test the significance of events over variable geo-
graphic and temporal scales, potential flexibility in the scale
of surveillance might approach infinity. However, more often
than not, local insight is needed to interpret local surveillance
information intelligently, which is why national and interna-
tional surveillance systems will only be as strong as their local
building blocks. Confirmation (and control) of suspected
events relies heavily on well-prepared clinical, laboratory, and
environmental expertise. Unless these local capabilities are in
place and integrated for rapid response, even the best and ear-
liest surveillance alert will fail to generate timely effective
action.
Faster, Surer Action
Better information inputs and processing matter only when
they lead to effective action. Effectiveness can be improved by
1) building surveillance directly into response plans; 2) feeding
surveillance information directly into emergency response sys-
tems; and 3) employing information and communication sys-
tems used for everyday practice to the
greatest extent possible.
Considerable time and effort can be
saved when enhanced surveillance sys-
tems are specifically referenced in emer-
gency plans. For example, certain types
of health, environmental, or intelligence
data automatically trigger higher stages
of readiness in Milwaukee emergency
response plans. Ideally, information
from surveillance systems can directly
feed information systems used for emer-
gency response. For example, if a clus-
ter of persons with febrile vesicular rash
is detected, the next steps (investigation,
laboratory diagnosis, isolation, and con-
tact tracing) each require similar infor-
mation, including names, addresses,
clinical information, employers, travel,
and contacts. Downloading such data
from surveillance systems directly
into the line lists used for outbreak
investigation would reduce work and
improve data quality in a rapidly
evolving emergency.
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Emergencies are not optimal times to learn how to use un-
familiar information systems. To the extent possible, surveil-
lance and communications with community partners should
employ the same systems they use everyday, as close to the
point-of-service as possible. This again emphasizes the need
for information exchange between the systems used routinely
in clinical and public health settings, rather than forcing users
to switch to new systems.
Conclusion
 Public health’s primary role goes beyond preparing for
intermittent emergencies to reducing the leading causes of
death, illness, and injury. If increased public health funding
for homeland security is short-lived, resulting surveillance sys-
tems will be most sustainable if they also address long-term,
common problems as well as extraordinary ones. Health
departments that set quantifiable community outcome goals
(e.g., to reduce enteric disease or smoking rates) place surveil-
lance at the core of all work, not just communicable disease
control. Syndromic and other surveillance systems that
become an integral part of day-to-day business processes
become indispensable. They don’t just detect problems but
also measure successes and identify what works. This doubles
the value and sustainability of any surveillance system.
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Abstract
Syndromic surveillance is a rapidly evolving field within public health practice. Substantial experience has been gained in
learning how to conduct syndromic surveillance, informed by a growing body of research and practice, including refinement of
surveillance methods, development of new tools for analysis and evaluation, findings from statistical models and applied evalua-
tions, and expansion of syndromic surveillance to uses beyond preparedness for biologic terrorism. Despite these advances, addi-
tional evaluation is needed to help health departments determine whether to conduct syndromic surveillance. This paper summarizes
the lessons learned from the 2003 National Conference on Syndromic Surveillance, which provided a foundation for defining a
research and evaluation agenda and for developing preliminary guidance for public health agencies planning to implement
syndromic surveillance.
Introduction
Participants in the 2003 National Syndromic Surveillance
Conference were junior- and senior-level professionals from
multiple disciplines, including epidemiology, statistics,
informatics, health care, and public health practice. Confer-
ence presentations outlined the substantial progress that has
been made in understanding how to conduct syndromic sur-
veillance. Methods are being refined, and additional health
departments are gaining experience with syndromic surveil-
lance. However, additional evaluation is needed before guide-
lines can be developed to help other health departments decide
whether to conduct syndromic surveillance. This paper fol-
lows the outline used by the summary of the 2002 conference
(1) to summarize the lessons learned at the 2003 conference
and make recommendations for the future.
What Is Syndromic Surveillance?
The term syndromic surveillance describes the growing array
of surveillance methods aimed at early detection of epidemics
related to biologic terrorism. Although syndromic surveillance
originated before 2001, the field grew substantially after the
terrorist attacks of 2001 generated fears of future attacks. The
word syndromic has been applied because the majority of such
systems monitor different syndromes that might herald the early
stages of epidemics (2). Other syndromic surveillance systems
monitor health indicators of different actions persons might
take or consequences they might suffer (e.g., miss work, use
outpatient services, purchase medications, or require ambu-
lance transport for emergency care) from the early stages of
illness until death. Although certain syndromic surveillance
systems depend on manual data collection, the 2003 confer-
ence emphasized systems that use automated methods to har-
vest data stored electronically and then transmit and analyze
these data. The majority of presenters described ongoing sur-
veillance, not systems designed to operate only during
specific high-profile events.
The 2003 conference focused on describing the utility of
syndromic surveillance, which remains, primarily, the early
detection of an epidemic caused by deliberate release of a bio-
logic agent. Syndromic surveillance also enables public health
officials to provide reassurance that terrorism-related or other
epidemics are not occurring, to detect the onset of expected
seasonal upswings in viral respiratory and gastrointestinal
infections, to detect common epidemics, and to conduct
surveillance for a growing spectrum of health-related events.
Data Sources
Multiple data sources are being used for syndromic surveil-
lance, limited only by the imagination of investigators. These
sources can be classified into two broad categories: 1) clinical
data arising from the use of health-care services (e.g., emer-
gency department visits, clinic visits, or ambulance trip logs),
and 2) all other indicators (e.g., pharmacy sales, calls to emer-
gency numbers or information hotlines, and work or school
absentee rates). Multiple health departments use a combina-
tion of data sources that complement one another.
The benefits of clinical data are twofold. First, productive
relationships can arise between public health staff and clini-
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cians as they establish and conduct syndromic surveillance.
Second, the majority of clinical data sources enable investiga-
tors to follow up with individual patients when surveillance
detects an unusual trend. Nonclinical data can complement
clinical information by providing indicators of events (e.g.,
purchase of over-the-counter medications) that might occur
before persons seek health care, by describing groups not rep-
resented at selected clinical facilities, or by validating trends
observed in clinical data. One disadvantage of nonclinical data
sources is that they typically do not readily allow for follow-
up with affected persons.
Analytic Methods
Although various analytic methods are being used, two utili-
ties are emerging as the statistical workhorses of syndromic sur-
veillance: CDC’s Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS),
which detects unusual trends by time (3), and SaTScan™ (4), a
program originally developed for detection of cancer clusters
that identifies clustering by time and geographic location. As
described elsewhere in these proceedings, substantial work is
under way to develop new statistical methods for aberration
detection and to refine syndrome categories.
Evaluation of Syndromic
Surveillance Systems
After the 2002 conference, at which draft guidelines for evalu-
ating syndromic surveillance systems were introduced, CDC
engaged a panel to assist in revising these guidelines. A revised
draft was distributed to participants at the 2003 conference,
and the final version was published in Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (5). The guidelines rely on established CDC rec-
ommendations for evaluating surveillance systems but
emphasize detection of epidemics rather than cases of illness.
Presenters at the conference used the guidelines to describe sur-
veillance systems and assess the balance between predictive value
(i.e., the likelihood that a statistical alert represents a problem
of public health importance) and sensitivity and timeliness
(i.e., the likelihood that all epidemics are detected at the ear-
liest possible stages).
Investigation of Signals
After being established, a syndromic surveillance system will
inevitably generate alerts, indicating that a monitored indica-
tor has surpassed a statistical threshold. When this happens,
someone (typically an epidemiologist working in a local pub-
lic health department) must decide whether, or to what extent,
an investigation is warranted. Multiple conference presenters
described their experiences with responding to signals, illus-
trating both the science and art of syndromic surveillance.
Practitioners are developing graduated approaches to follow-
up, ranging from closer examination of surveillance data to
aggressive field investigation. They also report developing a
sense of when signals merit more or less aggressive reactions.
Certain practitioners wait to see whether aberrant trends per-
sist for >1 day; others wait until more than one data source
yields a signal before responding more aggressively. These vary-
ing approaches highlight the hard-to-quantify local rules that
are evolving to maximize predictive value while minimizing
losses in timeliness or sensitivity. What is known is that statis-
tical alerts are common, certain alerts represent true public
health emergencies, and substantial work is needed to charac-
terize and quantify the relation between the presence or
absence of an alert and the presence or absence of an outbreak.
Protecting Confidentiality
Protecting confidentiality while maximizing the usefulness
of surveillance raises concerns regarding public health law,
surveillance procedures, and relationships with the public. In
the arena of public health law, one of the most important
events of 2003 was the implementation of the Privacy Rule of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA). HIPAA governs the ways that health-care pro-
viders can share patient information but provides specific
exemptions that allow for reporting of confidential health
information to public health agencies for surveillance and other
authorized disease prevention and control purposes (6). Cli-
nicians, health-care managers, public health officials, and their
attorneys are struggling to achieve an understanding of HIPAA,
including how the provisions for reporting to public health
agencies apply to syndromic surveillance. The distinction
between syndromic surveillance, which is a public health prac-
tice and thus exempt from certain HIPAA privacy provisions,
and research, which is governed differently under HIPAA, has
emerged as a key concern. Presenters at the 2003 conference
described certain successes in conducting surveillance in the
HIPAA era but also reported difficulties.
Virtually all syndromic surveillance systems shun the col-
lection of names or other identifiable information to ensure
that privacy and confidentiality are not violated in the event
of a security lapse. Systems also use multiple methods to
encrypt data and ensure secure transmission and storage. Cer-
tain clinical systems assign numbers to patient-level surveil-
lance records and provide only those numbers in reports to
health departments so that identifying information is retained
by the individual health-care facility. For those systems, any
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follow-up investigation is conducted through and with the
assent of reporting site staff, who control access to identifying
information. Other systems limit the detail reported to
decrease the likelihood that patients will be identified inap-
propriately. Together, such measures reflect adherence to two
principles in public health surveillance: collect information
judiciously, and collect and retain identifying information as
locally as possible. When describing syndromic surveillance
systems based on automatic medical record systems, confer-
ence presenters referred to this practice as “the distributive
data model” (7) because access to data is distributed in a man-
ner commensurate with the respective roles of care providers
and public health staff. The result is that epidemiologists have
information needed to monitor community-level trends in
selected syndromes. If surveillance indicates that further
investigation is warranted, including review of individual
patient records, then access can be requested from the health-
care providers.
Long-term public support for syndromic surveillance will
depend on both the public’s perception that public health
agencies are responsible stewards of any information with
which they are entrusted, and on the perception that syndromic
surveillance serves a useful public good. Thus, public health
agencies must be diligent in communicating with the public
about the utility of syndromic surveillance and about their
strategies for protecting health information.
National and Local Data
Health departments seeking to establish syndromic surveil-
lance can either develop data sources locally or tap national
systems that provide local information. The question is no
longer one of selecting one source versus another but of deter-
mining the right mix of local and national sources (e.g., the
systems offered by the Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveil-
lance System group at the University of Pittsburgh [8] or the
resources being developed by CDC under its BioSense pro-
gram [9]). A critical question concerning these national sources
is whether they will allow for rapid local follow-up with facili-
ties or patients when they yield an aberrant signal that merits
investigation.
Who Owns Syndromic Surveillance?
The question of who “owns” syndromic surveillance was
raised at the 2002 conference because the leadership roles of
different governmental, academic, and private participants
were unclear (1). As demonstrated by presenters at the 2003
conference, innovative projects are being conducted or sup-
ported by multiple entities, including local, state, and national
agencies; the U.S. Department of Defense; the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security; and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. National coordination is increas-
ingly being provided by CDC, as evident from its role in
coordinating the development of evaluation guidelines and
syndrome definitions, implementing BioSense, supporting
national pilot projects, and providing state funding for
surveillance under its terrorism-preparedness program.
Multiple Uses
for Syndromic Surveillance
Compared with the 2002 conference, the 2003 meeting
included considerably less discussion of whether syndromic
surveillance, traditional surveillance, or astute clinicians would
most likely be the first to detect an epidemic. Instead, the
emphasis was on interactions among different epidemic-
detection strategies, including how syndromic surveillance can
alert clinicians to community trends and improve their diag-
nostic assessments (10). Syndromic surveillance and the use-
fulness of the resulting information can foster better relations
among health departments, clinicians, and laboratorians,
thereby enhancing the reporting of notifiable diseases or
suspected clusters.
Another difference during the 2003 conference was that
greater attention was given to nonterrorism-related applica-
tions of syndromic surveillance, for multiple reasons. In 2002,
the events of 2001 were much fresher in our minds. Since
2001, the United States has not suffered another domestic
terrorist attack, and the public’s fears about domestic terror-
ism as the nation prepared for war in Iraq have not been real-
ized. When the Federal government directed resources toward
terrorism preparedness, public health officials recognized
immediately that, to justify their expense, these efforts must
extend beyond surveillance of terrorism-related syndromes.
Furthermore, every naturally occurring outbreak is a limited
rehearsal for responding to a terrorist attack. The emergence
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 demon-
strated the nation’s vulnerability to new infectious diseases and
their potential for epidemic spread. Presenters at the 2003
conference discussed the feasibility of adapting syndromic
surveillance for SARS detection, particularly emergency-
department–based systems (11).
Finally, those who conduct syndromic surveillance are
exploring other innovative uses of this new tool. For example,
New York City used its pharmacy system to assess the impact
of smoking cessation interventions by tracking sales of nico-
tine patches (12), and the U.S. Department of Defense exam-
ined the mental health effects of the terrorist attack on the
Pentagon (13).
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Importance of Partnerships
Those in the vanguard of this field represent successful part-
nerships between public health practitioners and academics.
Syndromic surveillance is more complex than traditional sur-
veillance and benefits from expertise in informatics, statistics,
and advanced epidemiologic methods — skills that health
departments might not be able to maintain as a result of bud-
get and mission constraints but that are readily available in
universities. In turn, public health departments bring a famil-
iarity with community resources, their relations with health-
care providers, and their expertise in conducting surveillance
and applying it to meet public health objectives.
Relation Between Surveillance
and Disease Epidemiology
One theme that was less prominent at the 2003 conference
was the epidemiology of potential agents of biologic terror-
ism. Usually, the conduct of surveillance is shaped by the epi-
demiology of the condition under surveillance, including how
it is diagnosed, treated, or prevented. Relevant questions
regarding the detection of terrorist-related epidemics include
the following:
• What is the likely shape of an epidemic curve?
• How rapidly will different stages of illness occur?
• How will the spectrum of illness become manifest with
respect to different surveillance indicators?
• How will these patterns vary among the potential agents
of biologic terrorism?
In the absence of terrorist attacks, the answers will likely come
from epidemiologic models that simulate a range of hypotheti-
cal scenarios and that test the usefulness of data sources and
aberration-detection methods. Critical groundwork for conduct-
ing such investigations was described at this meeting (14).
Next Steps
Evaluation
The syndromic surveillance evaluation criteria developed
by CDC (5) should be used in multiple ways. First, the crite-
ria should be used to describe the field’s rapidly growing expe-
rience in conducting syndromic surveillance. For example, how
frequently do different syndromic surveillance methods gen-
erate statistical alerts, and what is learned when alerts are
investigated? Conversely, how frequently are epidemics
detected through other means also identified by syndromic
surveillance? How does timeliness of detection compare with
timeliness of other detection methods? CDC might request
grantees conducting syndromic surveillance to add this infor-
mation to required periodic reports. Aggregating, summariz-
ing, and disseminating such reports will allow for a more
comprehensive assessment of the usefulness of syndromic sur-
veillance. Second, more in-depth evaluations of syndromic
surveillance should be conducted in partnership with those
states or localities that have the capacity to conduct such evalu-
ations. Third, historic data should be used to test the utility of
different detection algorithms; the work presented by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and its collabo-
rators illustrates the benefits of this approach (15). Fourth,
epidemiologic models should be constructed to test the time-
liness, sensitivity, and predictive value of detection strategies
under different hypothetical scenarios; progress is being made
in model development (14).
Research and Evaluation Funding
During the 2003 conference, representatives from three fed-
eral agencies — CDC, the Agency for Healthcare Quality and
Research, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
— described the research and evaluation activities they have
funded or plan to fund. These funding agencies should take
guidance from this conference to define a research and evalu-
ation agenda for syndromic surveillance and, if necessary,
update their funding priorities and clarify their roles accord-
ingly. This would help applicants by clarifying practice and
evaluation objectives and increase the likelihood that investi-
gations funded by different agencies complement one another.
Federal agencies should promote government and academic
partnerships by making evidence of such collaboration part
of funding criteria. One strategy might be to create centers of
excellence in syndromic surveillance that would focus on meth-
ods development and evaluation and provide technical assis-
tance to health departments.
Guidelines
Despite the advances highlighted during this conference, con-
siderable questions remain to be answered, particularly for those
agencies that have not yet initiated syndromic surveillance:
• Where should syndromic surveillance be conducted?
Should all states conduct a form of syndromic surveil-
lance?
• Within a state, should syndromic surveillance be con-
ducted in only the largest cities or in medium-sized cities
and rural areas as well?
• If syndromic surveillance is conducted, what are the mini-
mum standards for the selection or number of data
sources?
• What are the recommended methods for data analysis?
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These questions are difficult to answer because experience and
evaluation thus far are insufficient and because quantifying
the risk of a terrorist attack for a given locality is impossible.
As the field gains experience with syndromic surveillance, such
decisions might ultimately be based on the usefulness of
syndromic surveillance in detecting outbreaks not related to
terrorism, with potential detection of terrorist-related events
becoming a secondary use.
In the meantime, health department officials should feel
assured that a decision not to conduct syndromic surveillance
is justifiable. For those who have decided to implement
syndromic surveillance, expecting definitive answers to the
preceding questions is premature, but preliminary guidance
can be developed. Because of its increasing role in coordinat-
ing syndromic surveillance and its history of leadership in
public health surveillance, CDC is the logical agency to take
the lead in developing such guidance, which should include
articulation of the following:
• planning steps, including whom to involve;
• advantages and disadvantages of different data sources and
commonly used or readily available statistical tools;
• strategies for responding to alerts;
• what utility to expect, and what is unknown; and
• a plan to document experience and evaluate performance.
Partnerships with Community
Representatives
The 2003 conference revealed a mix of partnerships involv-
ing public health professionals, clinicians, health-care admin-
istrators, emergency responders, legal experts, law enforcement,
and companies that provide data and other surveillance
resources. Thus far, however, the perspective of community
representatives has not been prominent in deliberations about
syndromic surveillance. For the majority of health problems,
risk is not distributed proportionately among diverse popula-
tions. Biologic terrorism might not be an equal opportunity
threat; the consequences of a terrorist attack are likely to
affect most severely those populations that have long suffered
the adverse consequences of health disparities. Involving com-
munity advocates is not always easy for public health profes-
sionals because advocates sometimes ask questions that are
difficult to answer. However, they often have good questions,
and their perspectives help ensure that surveillance meets com-
munity needs.
Conclusion
The field of syndromic surveillance has advanced consider-
ably. An urgent need remains for continued evaluation of
syndromic surveillance to define its utility and develop rec-
ommendations for its practice. Evaluation criteria developed
by CDC should be used to the extent possible to guide assess-
ments of syndromic surveillance based on both experience and
hypothetical scenarios. The 2003 conference provided a basis
for defining a comprehensive research and evaluation agenda.
Although developing definitive guidelines on syndromic sur-
veillance is premature, experience to date should enable the
development of preliminary guidance to help those interested
in stepping into this arena.
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Abstract
 New York City’s first syndromic surveillance systems were established in 1995 to detect outbreaks of waterborne illness. In 1998,
daily monitoring of ambulance dispatch calls for influenza-like illness began. After the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, concern
about biologic terrorism led to the development of surveillance systems to track chief complaints of patients reporting to emergency
departments, over-the-counter and prescription pharmacy sales, and worker absenteeism. These systems have proved useful for
detecting substantial citywide increases in common viral illnesses (e.g., influenza, norovirus, and rotavirus). However, the systems
have not detected more contained outbreaks earlier than traditional surveillance. Future plans include monitoring school health
and outpatient clinic visits, augmenting laboratory testing to confirm syndromic signals, and conducting evaluation studies to
identify which of these systems will be continued for the long term.
Introduction
The New York City (NYC) Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has conducted prospective sur-
veillance of nonspecific health indicators (syndromes) since




NYC’s first syndromic surveillance systems were
implemented in 1995 to detect substantial outbreaks of
diarrheal illness, particularly those caused by waterborne
Cryptosporidium and Giardia. The program included three
components: 1) surveillance for diarrheal illness at nursing
homes, 2) surveillance of stool submissions at clinical labora-
tories, and 3) over-the-counter (OTC) pharmacy sales. An
evaluation of these systems conducted in 2001 recommended
transition to electronic reporting and use of standardized ana-
lytic methodology to detect aberrations in the data (1). Les-
sons learned from this evaluation were incorporated into the
design of subsequent systems.
Emergency Medical Services
Ambulance Dispatch Calls
Monitoring of ambulance dispatch calls for indicators of
biologic terrorism began in 1998. Approximately 1 million
calls received annually by the NYC emergency medical
services (EMS) system are categorized into 52 call types and
entered into a centralized database. The main outcome of
interest is the percentage of calls categorized as influenza-like
illness (ILI), which includes four call types: respiratory, diffi-
culty breathing, sick, and sick pediatric. An adaptation of the
excess influenza mortality cyclical (linear) regression model
(2) detects aberrations in this daily percentage citywide. The
model controls for season, day of the week, holidays, positive
influenza tests, and heat waves. Daily regressions with <3 years
of baseline data have been performed since 1999 and have
identified widespread influenza epidemics 2–3 weeks before
traditional influenza surveillance systems (3). A review of 2,294
emergency department (ED) charts determined that patients
brought in by ambulance were more likely to be older, more
seriously ill, and admitted to the hospital than patients
arriving by other means (4).
Emergency Department Visits
Syndromic surveillance of ED visits was established after
the 2001 World Trade Center attacks to track the acute health
effects of the attacks and to detect possible biologic terrorism
(5). The initial labor-intensive system, which relied on manual
data collection, was replaced in November 2001 by an elec-
tronic system that has operated daily since then. DOHMH
receives data from 48 hospitals encompassing approximately
86% of annual ED visits in NYC. Data files contain the fol-
lowing information for all ED visits logged during the previ-
ous day: date and time of visit, age, sex, residential zip code,
and free-text chief complaint. Certain hospitals also provide a
visit number or medical-record number. Other personal
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identifiers are not included. Files arrive via direct file transfer
protocol (FTP) or as e-mail attachments. Data are converted
to a standard format, and chief complaints are coded by
syndrome by using a computer algorithm that searches for
key text strings (available at http://www.syndromic.org/
work.html). Citywide temporal and spatial clustering in
syndrome visits, by hospital location or residential zip code, is
assessed by using adaptations of temporal and spatial scan
statistics (6,7). Results are usually available before noon each
day (including weekends). If an unusual cluster is detected,
follow-up is conducted the same day. Follow-up involves
reviewing the age, sex, and chief complaints of patients in the
cluster and telephoning staff at affected EDs to alert them of
the cluster and ask whether they have noted unusual presen-
tations or higher-than-usual volume. When necessary, field
investigations are conducted. A review of the methods and
first year of operation of the ED surveillance system has been
published previously (8).
Retail Pharmacy Sales
In August 2002, DOHMH established a comprehensive OTC
pharmacy sales tracking system. Data from 248 NYC pharma-
cies (representing approximately 30% of citywide sales) are trans-
mitted to DOHMH daily by FTP from a central pharmacy
database and consist of the number of OTC units sold the pre-
vious day, grouped by drug name and store. The two syndromes
monitored routinely are ILI, which includes cough and influ-
enza medications whose sales correlate most strongly with
annual influenza epidemics, and antidiarrheal medicines,
including generic and brand-name loperamide. Citywide trends
are evaluated by using a linear regression model similar to that
used in the EMS system (3), controlling for season, holidays,
day of the week, promotional sales, positive influenza tests, and
temperature. Analysis is conducted weekdays only, with results
for the preceding day available by mid-afternoon. In May 2003,
DOHMH began receiving OTC pharmacy sales data from the
National Retail Data Monitor (9).
Worker Absenteeism
Since November 2001, DOHMH has monitored worker
absenteeism from a single employer (employee population:
approximately 15,000) with multiple locations throughout
the city for unusual patterns of illness. The workers’ reasons
for absence are categorized by a computer algorithm into three
syndrome categories: fever/influenza, gastrointestinal, and cold
(upper respiratory infection). Agencywide trends are graphed
and temporal aberrations assessed by using the cumulative sum
(CUSUM) method (10) with a 14-day baseline. Analysis is
conducted weekdays only, and results for the previous day are
usually available by mid-afternoon.
Staffing for Syndromic
Surveillance Systems
With exceptions as noted, these systems operate 7 days/week
and are staffed by a rotation of eight analysts and five medical
epidemiologists. Each day an analyst with master’s- or doctoral-
level training in public health and statistical software program-
ming experience dedicates 2–3 hours to collect, process, and
analyze data and disseminate results. A medical epidemiolo-
gist reviews the results daily and, when indicated, directs an
investigation with assistance from a public health nurse or
field epidemiologist. Approximately 30 additional DOHMH
public health epidemiologists and nurses have been trained to
assist in signal investigations but have rarely been used. Hos-
pital staff are occasionally enlisted to provide information on
patients, perform diagnostic testing on subsequent patients,
and assist with other aspects of an investigation. Annual di-
rect costs to DOHMH to maintain the existing systems, in-
cluding routine follow-up of signals, are approximately
$150,000 (not including costs associated with research and
development, surveillance for noninfectious disease, or data-
transmission costs incurred by hospitals).
Usefulness
Syndromic surveillance has been most useful for detecting
citywide increases in illness. Syndromic data have been used to
augment health alerts for communitywide gastrointestinal ill-
ness caused by norovirus (11), annual influenza epidemics, and
diarrheal illness following the August 2003 blackout (12).
Although DOHMH has observed an average of two spatial sig-
nals per month for each syndrome, to date none has led to early
detection of a localized outbreak. The occurrence of simulta-
neous signals for the same syndrome from multiple systems has
been rare. Experience indicates that ED surveillance has the
greatest value because it can track multiple illnesses and
enable follow-up with individual patients at the source of care.
Future Projects
DOHMH is developing data sources and testing new ana-
lytic methods for outbreak detection. Data sources being
explored include school health nurse visits, laboratory-order sub-
missions, and outpatient encounters. Promising methodologic
advances include the space-time–permutation method (13) and
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the use of regression modeling to adjust for known sources of
variation before calculating scan or CUSUM statistics.
DOHMH continues to explore how syndromic data can be
used for general public health surveillance (e.g., detecting car-
bon monoxide poisonings or examining the impact of smoking
legislation on nicotine replacement sales [14]).
Conclusion
Syndromic surveillance is one component of overall disease-
surveillance and terrorism-preparedness efforts. Formal evalu-
ations will help DOHMH determine which of the current
systems will become a permanent public health surveillance
activity in NYC.
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Abstract
This paper summarizes the experience of the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) project in collecting and
analyzing free-text emergency department (ED) chief complaints. The technical approach involves real-time transmission of
chief-complaint data as Health Level 7 messages from hospitals to a regional data center, where a Bayesian text classifier assigns
each chief complaint to one of eight syndrome categories. Time-series algorithms analyze the syndrome data and generate alerts.
Authorized public health users review the syndrome data by using Internet interfaces with timelines and maps. Deployments in
Pennsylvania, Utah, Atlantic City, and Ohio have demonstrated feasibility of real-time collection of chief complaints. Retrospec-
tive experiments that measured case-classification accuracy demonstrated that the Bayesian classifier can discriminate between
different syndrome presentations. Retrospective experiments that measured outbreak-detection accuracy determined that the classifier’s
performance was adequate to support accurate and timely detection of seasonal disease outbreaks. Prospective evaluation revealed
that a cluster of carbon monoxide exposures was detected by RODS within 4 hours of the presentation of the first case to an
emergency department.
Introduction
In 1999, the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance
(RODS) project created a regional test bed in a large metro-
politan area (population: 2.3 million persons) that had the
characteristic of high sampling density (i.e., monitoring of
>50% of the population for at least one type of data). The
project then used this test bed to study detectability of out-
breaks, especially detectability of cohort exposures (e.g., a
citywide aerosolized Bacillus anthracis release) that have a nar-
row window of opportunity for mitigation and thus present a
substantial surveillance challenge (1). After early studies of
laboratory data (2) and International Classification of Diseases,
Ninth Revision (ICD-9) coded chief complaints (3,4), later
research focused on analysis of free-text chief complaints. This
paper describes the experience of the RODS project in
collecting and analyzing patient chief complaints.
Methods
The technical approach to Health Level 7 (HL7)–based data
collection and chief-complaint processing has been described
previously (5–9). Briefly, when a patient registers for care at
an ED, a triage nurse or registration clerk enters the patient’s
reason for visit (known as a chief complaint) into a
registration system. This step is part of the normal workflow
in multiple U.S. hospitals (10). The registration system trans-
mits chief-complaint data in the form of HL7 messages (5) to
an HL7 message router in the hospital, which can de-identify
these messages and transmit them via the Internet to a
health department in real time.
At the health department, a naïve Bayesian classifier (9)
encodes each chief complaint into one of eight mutually
exclusive and exhaustive syndromic categories (respiratory, gas-
trointestinal, botulinic, constitutional, neurologic, rash, hem-
orrhagic, and none of the above). RODS software then
aggregates the data into daily counts by syndrome and resi-
dential zip code for analysis by time-series algorithms and
display on interfaces using timelines and maps.
Validation
A goal of the project has been to test whether early detec-
tion of outbreaks can be achieved through statistical analysis
of chief-complaint data (or other routinely collected data).
Although chief complaints are insufficient for accurate diag-
nosis of an individual patient, the hypothesis is that they con-
tain sufficient information so that, when aggregated into daily
population counts and analyzed by using spatio-temporal
algorithms, early detection of an abnormally high number of
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TABLE. Performance of Bayesian and other classifiers in detecting selected syndromes
Positive
Sensitivity Specificity likelihood ratio (LR+)
Classifier being tested Standard cases for comparison No.  (95% CI*) No. (95% CI) No. (95% CI)
Respiratory syndrome
Chief complaint Bayesian classifier Utah Department of Health (UDOH) 0.52 (0.51–0.54) 0.89 (0.89–0.90) 5.0 (4.74–5.22)
(CoCo) respiratory† respiratory with fever§
CoCo respiratory (11) Human review 0.77 (0.59–0.88) 0.90 (0.88–0.92) 7.9 (5.8–10.8)
CoCo respiratory† Utah ICD-9¶ 0.60 (0.59–0.62) 0.94 (0.94–0.95) 10.5 (9.90–11.05)
CoCo respiratory with fever (11) Human review 0.22 (0.06–0.55) 0.99 (0.98–0.99) 24.5 (5.7–105.3)
ICD-9 respiratory (4) Human review 0.44 (0.29–0.61) 0.97 (0.96–0.98) 15.6 (8.6–28.1)
Gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome
CoCo GI† UDOH gastroenteritis without blood 0.71 (0.69–0.74) 0.90 (0.90–0.90) 7.1 (6.80–7.51)
CoCo acute infectious GI (12) Human review 0.63 (0.35–0.85) 0.94 (0.92–0.96) 12.2 (8.3–18)
             (0.82 (0.75–0.90))
ICD-9 acute infectious GI (12) Human review 0.32 (0.14–0.54) 0.99 (0.98–0.99) 37.1 (16.2–85.3)
CoCo GI† Utah ICD-9 0.74 (0.72–0.76) 0.92 (0.92–0.92) 9.5 (9.04–9.94)
CoCo GI with diarrhea (11) Human review 0.12 (0.06–0.22) 0.99 (0.99–0.99) 81.1 (17.56–374.4)
CoCo GI with vomiting (11) Human review 0.16 (0.11–0.24) 0.99 (0.99–0.99) 105 (24.85–444.33)
Neurologic/encephalitic syndrome
CoCo neurologic† UDOH meningitis/ encephalitis 0.47 (0.32–0.63) 0.93 (0.93–0.94) 7.1 (4.98–9.99)
CoCo neurologic† Utah ICD-9 0.72 (0.69–0.76) 0.95 (0.94–0.95) 13.5 (12.57–14.41)
Rash
CoCo rash† UDOH febrile illness with rash§ 0.50 (0.40–0.59) 0.99 (0.99–0.99) 55.6 (44.25–69.91)
CoCo rash† Utah ICD-9 0.60 (0.52–0.67) 0.99 (0.99–0.99) 80.9 (67.43–97.07)
Botulinic syndrome
CoCo botulinic† UDOH botulism-like syndrome 0.17 (0.05–0.45) 0.998 (0.998–0.999) 104 (28.57–381.86)
CoCo botulinic† Utah ICD-9 0.22 (0.13–0.36) 0.999 (0.998–0.999) 167 (89.07–312.90)
Fever
Keyword fever (13) Human review 0.61 (0.51–0.69) 1.0 (0.96–1.0) ** —
Fever from emergency department Human review 0.98 (0.94–0.99) 0.89 (0.82–0.94) 9.3 (5.3–16.2)
report (13)
* CI = confidence interval.
† Source: Gesteland PH, unpublished results, August 4, 2003.
§ Classifier trained on less-specific training classifications than standard, which required documentation of fever in the patient record.











persons who have contracted a respiratory or other illness is
possible.
Case-Detection Accuracy
The research team conducted numerous experiments to test
this hypothesis. The first type of experiment measured the
information content of chief complaints for syndrome cat-
egorization by measuring the sensitivity and specificity with
which patients with different syndromes can be detected from
their chief complaints alone (Table). Each experiment tested
the ability of a classifier program to accurately assign a syn-
drome to a patient on the basis of the chief complaint alone
(in certain experiments, the patient data were ICD-9-coded
ED diagnoses). For example, one experiment measured the
accuracy of the Bayesian text classifier for respiratory syndrome
in comparison with a manual determination made by the Utah
Department of Health during the 2002 Winter Olympic
Games. In that experiment, the Bayesian respiratory classifier
detected 52% of affected patients, with a specificity of 89%.
The experiments demonstrated that chief-complaint data
contains information about the syndromic presentation and
that a naïve Bayesian classifier can extract that information.
For certain syndromes of interest to terrorism preparedness,
the sensitivity of classification is approximately 0.5 (i.e., in
the event of an outbreak causing respiratory complaints, 50%
of affected patients examined at a monitored facility would be
detected).
Outbreak Detection
As expected, the case-detection experiments demonstrate
that the specificity of case classification from chief complaints
is <100%, meaning that daily counts of patients with respira-
tory syndrome would contain noise attributable to falsely clas-
sified nonrespiratory patients. Therefore, a second type of
30 MMWR September 24, 2004
FIGURE. Daily counts of respiratory cases — Washington County, Pennsylvania,
June–July 2003
Source: Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance project.
* The June 2003 increase corresponds to new hospitals being added to the system.
†
The sudden increase on July 18, 2003, was caused by 60 persons reporting to one emergency
department within 4 hours for carbon monoxide exposure.
experiment was needed to determine whether outbreaks would
produce a sufficiently large spike to stand out from the back-
ground noise in the daily syndrome counts (and to determine
how early any spikes would occur). In these outbreak-
detection experiments, a time-series detection algorithm was
run on 3 years of daily syndrome counts from metropolitan
areas that had experienced annual winter outbreaks. The time
of detection from daily syndrome counts was determined as
the date the algorithm first signaled during the beginning of
the seasonal outbreak and was compared with the time of
detection from ICD-9-coded hospital diagnoses (14). For
detection of three pediatric gastrointestinal outbreaks, detec-
tion occurred 29 days earlier (95% confidence interval
[CI] = 4–53) with no false alarms. For pediatric and adult
respiratory outbreaks, detection occurred 10 days earlier (95%
CI = -15–35) and 11 days earlier (95% CI = -10–33), respec-




Retrospective studies cannot prove
that, in field use, this type of system
will lead to earlier detection than exist-
ing methods. For this reason, the project
initiated a prospective evaluation.
The RODS test bed enables public
health officials to examine timelines and
maps whenever an outbreak occurs or
whenever they receive alerts of anoma-
lous syndrome activity. On Friday, July
18, 2003, an on-call epidemiologist
received an alert regarding a spike in res-
piratory cases in a single county out-
side Pittsburgh (Figure). Normally,
daily counts of respiratory cases num-
bered 10, but on that day they num-
bered 60. The epidemiologist logged
onto the RODS interface, reviewed the
verbatim chief complaints of affected
patients, and discovered that all were
related to carbon monoxide exposure
from a faulty furnace. (Authorized pub-
lic health users can access case studies
of these and other outbreaks through
the RODS interface by sending e-mail
to nrdmaccounts@cbmi.pitt.edu).
Technology Dissemination
After rapid (6-week) deployment in February 2002 during
the Winter Olympics, RODS had a proven model for build-
ing permanent, real-time, HL7-based data feeds of chief com-
plaints from hospitals to public health agencies. Such feeds
would have immediate surveillance use and could later be
expanded to include transmission of data about microbiology
results. However, because adoption of the RODS approach
has been slower than expected, the project began to system-
atically identify and address barriers to dissemination. One
barrier was the perception that such approaches are still
unproven and would absorb public health resources through
technology costs and false alarms (15,16). A second barrier
was limited availability of software and lack of technical
expertise. Accordingly, the University of Pittsburgh agreed to
distribute the RODS system free of charge in 2002. Although
this action resulted in hundreds of downloads of both the
RODS system and the Bayesian parser, certain health depart-
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ments lack expertise in database administration, network
administration, geographic information systems, HL7, and
systems management. The RODS laboratory helped Utah and
Pennsylvania avoid this barrier by hosting their surveillance
operations. A cost model for this service was then developed,
and the service was offered to other states, which led to imple-
mentation in Ohio and New Jersey. In addition, the RODS
Open Source Project (http://openrods.sourceforge.net) was
created in 2003 to catalyze the growth of a community of
consultants to help health departments install and operate
surveillance systems (17). In 2003, the University of Pitts-
burgh placed the RODS source code into the public domain
under the GNU General Public License (18). Open-sourcing
a project can facilitate technology dissemination because it
directly addresses information technology managers’ concerns
about access to source code, code sustainability, customizability,
and availability of expertise.
Status of RODS
RODS has operated continuously since 1999, connecting
with 51 hospitals in Pennsylvania, 10 hospitals and 17 urgent
care facilities in Utah, 12 hospitals in Ohio, and four hospi-
tals in New Jersey. The system is also installed in Taiwan and
Michigan.
Conclusions
Free-text chief-complaint data are useful in public health
surveillance because they are widely available and can be
obtained in real time for modest cost. Moreover, the HL7
technical infrastructure thus created can later be expanded to
transmit other types of data. The technical expertise and cost
to create and operate a real-time facility is substantial; there-
fore, sharing costs by using application service providers leads
to cheaper and faster deployment.
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Abstract
Introduction: Computer-based outbreak and disease surveillance requires high-quality software that is well-supported and
affordable. Developing software in an open-source framework, which entails free distribution and use of software and con-
tinuous, community-based software development, can produce software with such characteristics, and can do so rapidly.
Objectives: The objective of the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) Open Source Project is to accelerate
the deployment of computer-based outbreak and disease surveillance systems by writing software and catalyzing the formation
of a community of users, developers, consultants, and scientists who support its use.
Methods: The University of Pittsburgh seeded the Open Source Project by releasing the RODS software under the GNU
General Public License. An infrastructure was created, consisting of a website, mailing lists for developers and users, desig-
nated software developers, and shared code-development tools. These resources are intended to encourage growth of the Open
Source Project community. Progress is measured by assessing website usage, number of software downloads, number of inquiries,
number of system deployments, and number of new features or modules added to the code base.
Results: During September–November 2003, users generated 5,370 page views of the project website, 59 software downloads,
20 inquiries, one new deployment, and addition of four features.
Conclusions: Thus far, health departments and companies have been more interested in using the software as is than in custom-
izing or developing new features. The RODS laboratory anticipates that after initial installation has been completed, health
departments and companies will begin to customize the software and contribute their enhancements to the public code base.
Introduction
In October 1999, researchers at the University of Pittsburgh
began developing the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Sur-
veillance system (RODS), with the goal of improving public
health agencies’ capability to detect a specific threat: a large-
scale, surreptitious release of Bacillus anthracis. The rate of
this technology’s adoption, although accelerating, is not com-
mensurate with the severity of the health threats posed by
biologic terrorism, emerging infections, and common disease
outbreaks. Such threats warrant rapid deployment; therefore,
barriers to the technology’s adoption need to be identified and
removed.
This paper describes the evolution of the RODS system,
previous efforts to transition the technology, and the
rationale behind the creation of an open-source project. It
also describes how the software is licensed, the infrastructure
created to enable growth of the RODS open-source commu-
nity, efforts to publicize the project, metrics collected to assess
its progress, the software architecture of the latest version of
RODS, and plans for additional software development.
RODS System Description
The first version of RODS collected patient chief-complaint
data from eight hospitals in a single health-care system via
Health Level 7 (HL7) (1) messages in real time, categorized
these data into syndrome categories by using a classifier based
on International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9) codes, aggregated the data into daily syndrome
counts, and analyzed the data for anomalies possibly indica-
tive of disease outbreaks. The system provided an Internet-
based interface enabling users to view the data in graphs and
maps (Figure 1). After demonstrating the feasibility of such a
system within a single health-care system in Pittsburgh and
conducting research to support the hypothesis that such a sys-
tem could detect disease outbreaks (2,3), RODS’ developers
expanded the system to collect additional data types and then
deployed RODS in multiple states. The application service
provider (ASP) version of RODS at the University of Pitts-
burgh collects de-identified chief complaints from 76 hospi-
tals in Pennsylvania, Utah, and Ohio (4,5) and also serves as
the user interface for the National Retail Data Monitor
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FIGURE 1. Sample time-series graphs* of syndromic surveillance data as displayed on the Epiplot user interface of the Real-
Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) system
* In this example, graphs of pediatric gastrointestinal emergency department visits are shown alongside graphs depicting unit sales of antidiarrheals and
electrolytes.
(NRDM), which collects and analyzes daily sales data for over-
the-counter (OTC) medication sales (6,7).
The feasibility of rapid deployment of RODS was demon-
strated during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
Utah (4,8,9). In addition, the capability to integrate other
surveillance data types (e.g., electronic laboratory reports [10],
free-text chief complaints (11,12), laboratory orders, dictated
radiology reports, dictated hospital reports [13–15], and poi-
son control center calls [16]) was added. Much of the code
(originally in Perl and C) was rewritten in Java,™ and basic
research was conducted on data and algorithms relevant to
this emerging science (17).
Technology Transition
The initial effort to make RODS software available involved
licensing it for noncommercial use. In December 2002, the
University of Pittsburgh began offering the RODS system as
compiled byte code, free of charge to public health depart-
ments. To date, >180 downloads of this version of the RODS
system and >200 downloads of the Bayesian parser have been
counted. Despite reports of successful installations in Hong
Kong [David Wong, Hong Kong RODS Team, personal com-
munication, May 15, 2003] and Missouri [Terry Tabor, Mis-
souri Department of Health and Senior Services, personal
communication, January 28, 2003], certain state health
departments expressed interest in accessing the RODS source
code.
Giving the software away without providing technical sup-
port soon proved insufficient. Using the RODS software
requires expertise in database, network, geographic informa-
tion system (GIS), HL7, and system management, capabili-
ties not widely available at that time. Users made multiple
requests for customization, support, and assistance with
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installations, for which resources were not available. There-
fore, in September 2003, the University of Pittsburgh released
the RODS software under an open-source license, thereby
creating the RODS Open Source Project to catalyze the shar-
ing of knowledge and skills related to the software, including
its design, installation, configuration, and customization.
Materials and Methods
This section describes the RODS Open Source Project,
including the particular license under which RODS is dis-
tributed, the infrastructure created to enable growth of the
RODS open-source community, methods for publicizing the
project and recruiting developers, and the metrics collected to
assess its progress.
GNU General Public License
RODS is distributed as open-source software under the
GNU General Public License (GPL) (17), the same open-
source license under which Linux® is distributed (18).
Unlike the license under which RODS was initially released
in December 2002, GPL permits anyone to use, copy, and
modify RODS freely. GPL allows consultants and companies
to use, install, support, and customize RODS and permits
these entities to redistribute their enhanced versions of RODS,
provided they make the source code available. This require-
ment fosters continuous software improvement, benefiting all
users and preventing companies from creating proprietary,
closed-source versions of RODS.
Support for Developers and Users
To coordinate community-based development of the code,
the RODS Laboratory organized the Open Source Project.
The RODS modules were classified into six functional areas:
data collection, syndrome classification, data warehousing,
database encapsulation, outbreak detection, and user interface.
Specialists from the laboratory’s research and development
group named development leaders for each functional area.
These development leaders are responsible for recommend-
ing new features based on user requests and evaluating whether
a developer has the qualifications to contribute source code.
Online resources were created to support the Open Source
Project, including the RODS Laboratory website (http://www.
health.pitt.edu/rods) and a project website hosted on
Sourceforge™ (http://openrods.sourceforge.net). The latter
site provides standard software project management tools
(a concurrent versions system server and patch submission
area enabling developers to contribute code), e-mail lists
enabling developers and users to communicate, a software-
bug reporting system, contact information for the develop-
ment leaders, and source code for stable versions of the system.
Recruitment of Developers and Users
E-mail announcements were sent to 181 persons who had
previously downloaded the byte-compiled releases and to all
226 users in the United States who held passwords to the
RODS ASP system. Users were given an opportunity for a
face-to-face meeting with the core developers at two national
conferences, the 2003 National Syndromic Surveillance Con-
ference in New York City and the 2003 American Medical
Informatics Fall Symposium in Washington, D.C. Project lead-
ers of other computer-based surveillance projects were also
invited.
Metrics
The following metrics are collected monthly to manage the
project and assess its progress:
• cumulative number of installations;
• cumulative number of developers who have contributed
code;
• number of new features;
• funding sources;
• cumulative number of mailing list subscribers (one gen-
eral mailing list, one for announcements, and one for
development questions);
• total website page views;
• total downloads of source code;
• number of e-mail announcements sent;
• cumulative number of inquiries from consultants and
companies;
• cumulative number of inquiries from health departments;
• cumulative number of inquiries from academics; and
• cumulative number of inquiries from other groups.
The number of installations and the number of contributing
developers are considered the two most important metrics.
Results
Current Software Architecture
of RODS Version 2.0 and Features
in Development
A complete technical description of RODS has been pub-
lished (8). This section describes the system’s software archi-
tecture and how the modules that comprise that architecture
can be used to accomplish different surveillance tasks.
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RODS 2.0 consists of >42,000 lines of Java code contrib-
uted by a team of eight programmers. RODS is a modular
system that adheres to CDC’s National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System (NEDSS) (19) and Public Health Infor-
mation Network (PHIN) (20) standards so that any of the
components can be incorporated into a foreign surveillance
system or used to create a native end-to-end RODS system.
The RODS software architecture consists of six functional
areas: data collection, syndrome classification, data warehous-
ing, database encapsulation, outbreak detection, and user
interface (Figure 2). Within the following categories, addi-
tional modules are being developed under the Open Source
Project (Table 1):
• Data collection. The data-collection modules consist of
1) an HL7 listener that accepts and maintains connec-
tions from a hospital’s HL7-integration engine; 2) an HL7
parser that extracts patient-visit data from HL7 messages;
and 3) a text-file parser that extracts patient-visit data from
text files uploaded in batches by non-HL7–capable hos-
pitals. In addition to modules to parse patient data from
HL7 messages, modules are being developed to parse
microbiology culture results from HL7 messages and to
import poison center call data to RODS.
Another module is proposed that will fully integrate
detailed OTC medication sales data from the NRDM.
Also planned is an extensible markup language (XML)
module that works with proposed or currently used XML-
document–type definitions for public health surveillance
data (21,22).
• Syndrome classification. RODS Version 2.0 consists of
a single module for syndrome classification, Complaint
Classifier (CoCo) (12). CoCo uses a naïve Bayesian clas-
sifier to assign a free-text chief complaint to a syndrome
category. These syndrome categories are user-specifiable,
and the mappings are created automatically through
machine learning from a user-provided training set.
The RODS Laboratory has rewritten (in Java) and
intends to release a module for ICD-9–based classifica-
tion (8). Additional classification modules, including
keyword-based methods and additional natural language
processing modules to identify radiology reports indica-
tive of inhalational anthrax (15), are in development.
• Data warehousing. These modules function to store and
provide efficient access to surveillance data. RODS effi-
ciently stores and retrieves time-series data from the data-
base through a data warehouse. The data-warehousing
module consists of a cache table updater that keeps run-
ning counts of the number of visits for each syndrome,
stratified by age and sex.
RODS 2.0 assumes the existence of an Oracle™ data-
base. However, RODS does not use Oracle-specific struc-
tured query language (SQL) functions (e.g., database
triggers), and a port to an alternative relational database
system (e.g., PostgreSQL or Microsoft SQL Server™)
should be straightforward.
• Database encapsulation. The database-encapsulation
modules, written as Enterprise Java Beans™ (EJBs), func-
tion to retrieve preprocessed time-series data and case
details (e.g., the patient’s free-text chief complaint) from
the database. In Java, EJBs provide a framework for creat-
ing readily accessed software objects that incorporate stan-
dard methods for security, database access, transactions,
scalability, and communication. The EJBs shield devel-
opers from the database schema and standardize how the
surrounding modules (e.g., the user interface modules)
access the database.
• Detection algorithm. The detection-algorithm modules
provided in the current open-source release include an
implementation of the recursive least-squared (RLS)
algorithm (23) and an initial implementation of a
wavelet-detection algorithm. The RLS algorithm can
detect sudden increases in daily surveillance data counts
(e.g., an increase in the number of respiratory-type visits
that would accompany a large-scale, covert release of
Bacillus anthracis). The wavelet algorithm can automati-
cally model weekly, monthly, and seasonal data fluctua-
tions. NRDM uses wavelet modeling to indicate zip-code
areas in which OTC medication sales are substantially
increased; this algorithm will be applied to the analysis of
health-care registration data.
Another set of modules are planned that will enable
any outbreak-detection algorithm to analyze data from
the system. Currently, the architecture allows algorithms
written or wrapped in Java to retrieve data directly from
the database-encapsulation modules. A module will be
released that outputs data as common text files so that
stand-alone algorithms and statistical software packages
can be used to analyze the data. This method was used by
the What’s Strange About Recent Events algorithm
(WSARE) to analyze data from RODS during the Salt
Lake 2002 Olympic Winter Games (24).
• User interfaces. These modules 1) authenticate users, 2)
display surveillance data as time-series graphs, and 3) work
with a GIS to depict data spatially. The graphing and GIS
modules consist of Java server pages and servlets that use
JFreeChart, an open-source graphing package, and the
GIS functions of Environmental Systems Research
Institute’s ArcIMS™ software.
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FIGURE 2. Software architecture of the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) system
* LDAP = Lightweight directory access protocol.
† XML = extensible markup language.
§ Has General Public License-compatible open-source components.
¶ ICD-9 = International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision.
** RLS = Recursive least-squared.
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TABLE 1. Existing features of the Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveillance (RODS) system, version 2.0, and features awaiting
development
Exists in Exists as GPL*- Needs to be
RODS feature RODS 2.0 compatible source code developed or tested
Data-collection modules
Health Level 7 (HL7) listener X
HL7 parser for microbiology reports X
HL7 parser for admissions, discharge, and transfer (ADT) messages X
Text file parser X
XML parser X
Syndrome-classification modules
Simple Bayesian syndrome classifier X
Syntactic/semantic natural language processing (NLP) classifier X
Keyword classifier X
ICD-9† classifier X
Multiple data-type classifier X
Data-warehousing modules
Diverse database options X
Integrated data-warehouse engine
Aggregation by sex and age X
Outbreak-detection modules
Integrates with external statistical analysis tools X X X
Recursive least-squared (RLS) detection algorithm X
User-interface modules
Manual data-entry interface X
Diverse geographic information system software options X
Lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) interface X
Time-series graphing X X





* GNU General Public License.
†
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision.
Certain state health departments have requested Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) support to enable the cre-
ation of seamless links between existing state surveillance sys-
tems and the surveillance functions provided by RODS;
outside development of such a module is encouraged.
State, local, or national health departments can use RODS
modules to collect, analyze, and view hospital surveillance data
and to view OTC medication sales data from NRDM. A health
department can use a subset of these modules to accomplish a
specific surveillance task (e.g., receiving and processing free-
text chief complaints from hospitals), or it can use all of them
(with the RODS database, analytic modules, and user inter-
face) to create an end-to-end surveillance solution. (Examples
of how health departments can mix and match RODS mod-
ules for different surveillance tasks are available at http://
openrods.sourceforge.net.)
Project Metrics
A total of 480 e-mail announcements about the RODS
Open Source Project were sent during the first 3 months of
the project. This publicity generated 5,370 page views of the
project website, 59 downloads of the source code, and 14
new members to the project mailing lists. One additional
installation is using the open-source version of RODS.
To date, users are more interested in using the software “as
is” and less interested in collaborative feature development.
For example, users have asked when the ICD-9 classifier mod-
ule will be released or whether the system yet works with
Microsoft SQL Server.™  Developers at the RODS Labora-
tory contributed four new features (drilldown of age and sex,
customized jurisdictions, a simplified GIS interface, and user
preferences) (Table 2).  However, at least one health depart-
ment and one consulting company have expressed interest in
collaborating to develop a module that will import XML data
into RODS.
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TABLE 2. Monthly metrics for the Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveillance
(RODS) Open Source Project — September–November 2003
Metric September October November
Number of e-mail announcements sent out 406 0 74
Total page views on website 1,968 1,764 1,638
Total downloads of source code 18 19 22
Cumulative number of members on site
mailing lists 7 8 14
Cumulative number of installations 3 4 4
Cumulative number of inquiries from
consultants and companies 7 8 9
Cumulative number of inquiries from
health departments 5 6 7
Cumulative number of inquiries from
academics 1 1 1
Cumulative number of inquiries from
other groups 2 3 3
Cumulative number of developers 8 8 8
Number of new features 0 0 4
Funding sources 1 1 1
Discussion
The goal of the RODS Open Source Project is to accelerate
the deployment of computer-based outbreak and disease sur-
veillance systems by writing high-quality surveillance software
and catalyzing the formation of a community of users, devel-
opers, consultants, and scientists. In the initial years of com-
puter-based outbreak and disease surveillance system
development, the main barriers to deployment appeared to be
doubts about its efficacy, cost of the technology, concerns about
the cost and effect of false alerts on the practice of public health,
and legal and administrative issues (25,26). Basic research about
data and detectability has been conducted to address concerns
about efficacy (2,3,27–29). To address concerns about the
effects of false alerts, the RODS laboratory has deployed sys-
tems and discovered that persons working in health depart-
ments could incorporate the output of these systems into their
workflows (4,7). The deployments also established that the
cost and effort of deployment is much lower than expected.
Finally, the deployments demonstrated that certain concerns
about privacy could be addressed. The Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which
had not yet become law, nevertheless had a substantial inhibi-
tory effect on hospitals and other covered entities that had
data needed by the project. The enactment of the final pri-
vacy rule, precedents set by system deployments (4,30–32),
and new state laws have helped address certain concerns of
data providers (33).
Open-source projects can create a community of like-
minded persons — scientists, programmers, consultants, and
users — who have the vision of creating innovative, well-
supported software. The importance of catalyzing
such a community cannot be overstated. It can
strengthen the position of information technol-
ogy (IT) managers and public health officials who
wish to deploy computer-based surveillance sys-
tems during planning deliberations. They will be
able to assure their supervisors that source code
is available, that a pool of developers and con-
sultants exists who can be hired to support the
health department if needed, and that ongoing
projects in other health departments can help
them predict project costs and set appropriate
timelines.
The RODS Open Source Project enables pub-
lic health professionals to have a greater role in
developing IT solutions to the problem of early
detection. Just as public health researchers pub-
lish their results in scientific journals, so can they
contribute publicly available IT solutions to the
RODS Open Source Project. This role might become more
apparent as public health personnel become increasingly
knowledgeable about public health informatics and work more
closely with IT subcontractors and consultants.
Continued goals for the RODS Open Source Project are to
increase the number of deployments, developers, and support-
ers of the software. The proposed path for RODS software
development is to increase the number of data types the sys-
tem can accept and implement a range of high-performance
outbreak-detection algorithms. One consulting company and
one health department have separately expressed interest in
collaboratively developing an XML module that can parse non-
RODS data sources. The RODS Laboratory and its collabo-
rators at the Auton Laboratory will continue to develop
outbreak-detection algorithms (e.g., the wavelet-detection
module and WSARE, respectively).
Conclusion
The RODS Open Source Project is making software mod-
ules available that span the spectrum of processing tasks
involved in public health surveillance. Through open source,
the project hopes to accelerate the deployment of real-time
public health surveillance by lowering costs, increasing reli-
ability, preventing vendor lock-in, and ensuring software
customizability. By catalyzing the formation of a community
of open-source public health surveillance software advocates,
this approach will result in a high-quality software product
that achieves mainstream acceptance.
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Abstract
The National Retail Data Monitor (NRDM) is a public health surveillance tool that collects and analyzes daily sales data for
over-the-counter (OTC) health-care products. NRDM collects sales data for selected OTC health-care products in near real time
from >15,000 retail stores and makes them available to public health officials. NRDM is one of the first examples of a national
data utility for public health surveillance that collects, redistributes, and analyzes daily sales-volume data of selected health-care
products, thereby reducing the effort for both data providers and health departments.
Introduction
The National Retail Data Monitor (NRDM) is a public health
surveillance tool that collects and analyzes daily sales data for
over-the-counter (OTC) health-care products from >15,000
retail stores nationwide. NRDM makes aggregated and ana-
lyzed data available to public health officials free of charge (1).
A key rationale for building NRDM is that persons with
infectious diseases often purchase OTC health-care products
early in the course of their illnesses (2,3). Furthermore, retro-
spective studies of certain outbreaks have indicated that moni-
toring OTC sales might have led to earlier detection (4–6).
After decades of investment into developing Universal Prod-
uct Codes (UPCs), optical check-out scanners, and analytic
data warehouses, the retail industry has in effect constructed
95% of a surveillance-system pyramid onto which a capstone
of data integration and analytic capability can be added to
produce NRDM.
NRDM’s objectives are to 1) enlist participation of retailers
to achieve 70% coverage of OTC sales nationally; 2) influ-
ence the industry toward real-time data collection; 3) obtain
supplemental information needed for spatial analysis, adjust-
ment for promotional effects, and maintenance of UPC ana-
lytic categories (e.g., liquid cough medications); 4) promote
and develop this type of surveillance practice; 5) achieve fault
and load tolerance; and 6) develop detection algorithms for
the data.
Methods
The methods used to acquire and analyze retail data have
been described in detail elsewhere (1). This paper summarizes
and updates that information.
Data Acquisition
Data-sharing agreements between retailers and the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh enable the university to collect daily sales
counts by store and by UPC. Retailers transmit data to NRDM
by secure file transfer protocol daily by 3:00 pm Eastern Time
for the previous day’s sales. NRDM aggregates the data by zip
code and product category.
Data Analysis
Health departments receive either aggregated data or access
to data-analysis tools via a secure Internet interface. The tools
allow users to view sales of OTC health-care products on maps
(Figure 1) and timelines.
Various NRDM algorithms are under development, includ-
ing 1) temporal and 2) spatio-temporal. The temporal algo-
rithm involves univariate time-series analyses, one for each
combination of category and zip code. Where uzct represents
the unit sales of category c in zip code z on day t, the univariate
detector learns a model from the set of sales before today {uzc1
uzc2 … uzc,t-2 uzc,t-1}. NRDM uses a specially tailored wavelet
model (7) to predict units sold today. The advantages of wave-
lets are their ability to account for long-term trends (e.g., sea-
sonal effects) and short-term properties (e.g., day-of-week
effects). In its simplest form, the model predicts a Gaussian
distribution for today’s sales, with mean and variance learned
from sales before today. The actual sales for today can be com-
pared with this Gaussian distribution to produce a z-score
(i.e., the number of standard deviations by which today’s sales
lie above the mean). The z-score can be converted to a p-value
to signal alerts.
The spatio-temporal algorithm runs a specially tailored spa-
tial scan statistic (8) over all regions. Each region is evaluated
according to the likelihood ratio of the data under the assump-
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tion of an increased product demand in the region versus no
such increase. Because the data are on a national level, compu-
tational tractability is a major concern for such a use of the scan
statistic. A fast multiresolution method is used (9).
Fault and Load Tolerance
A key requirement for NRDM is fault and load tolerance.
NRDM is fault-tolerant, with the exception of the server site
and Internet connection, which are single and therefore subject
to loss of connection. These vulnerabilities will be addressed by
creation of a second site and second Internet connection. Load
tolerance refers to NRDM’s ability to handle simultaneous
access by a substantial number of users. Preliminary load-
tolerance tests using Apache JMeter (10) have identified certain
bottlenecks, which have since been rectified. Complete load
testing is planned to determine the maximum number of
simultaneous users NRDM can accommodate.
Project Administration
NRDM requires substantial administrative work, including
managing contacts with retailers, executing data-sharing agreements,
coordinating meetings, handling press inquiries, developing fact
sheets, and raising and dispensing funds. This work is handled
jointly by volunteers from state and local health departments, staff
of the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance Laboratory,
and a University of Pittsburgh associate general counsel.
Initially NRDM was organized as a
university-based, grant-funded project.
In May 2003, representatives from four
state health departments (Pennsylvania,
New York, Ohio, and Georgia) founded
an informal association to provide lead-
ership and guidance that holds monthly
conference calls; the association is open
to any health department.
Results
NRDM has operated continuously
since December 2002. The project uses
explicit measures of progress and reports
them monthly to the working group,
including
• number of retail stores participating;
• time latency;
• number of states with accounts for the
NRDM user interface;
• proportion of weekdays and weekends that NRDM user
interfaces are accessed; and
• number of states receiving raw data from NRDM.
As of March 2004, progress towards the goal of 70% data
coverage (a level achievable using data from national chains)
has reached approximately 40% of total national sales. The
time latency is 1 day for all retailers (with one exception that
provides a feed every 2 hours). The project has created >400
user accounts for health department employees in 44 states
and Puerto Rico. Ten entities receive aggregate data feeds from
the system. Progress towards integration of NRDM into pub-
lic health practice is measured by the number of system logins.
Analyses are conducted to track daily and monthly usage and
to compare weekday and weekend logins (Figure 2). A level of
100% usage means that at least one user in the state logged in
each day. Weekend checking remains low but might increase
as public health departments recognize the need to evaluate
surveillance data as it becomes available, 7 days/week.
Prospective evaluation of NRDM as a public health surveil-
lance tool is underway. For example, NRDM has demonstrated
the marked effect of influenza on sales of pediatric cough and
cold remedies and pediatric antipyretics, or the effect of fires
in southern California on sales of bronchial remedies.
(Authorized public health users can access case studies of these
and other outbreaks by using the NRDM Internet interface.
To obtain access, please send e-mail to nrdmaccounts@
cbmi.pitt.edu).
FIGURE 1. Sample map accessible to users of the National Retail Data Monitoring System*
* This map depicts over-the-counter (OTC) sales of cough and cold products in the continental United
States on March 24, 2004, by county.  Different colors are used to indicate the standard deviations
between actual and expected sales.
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Future Plans
From an early warning perspective, the single most impor-
tant improvement to NRDM will be a reduction in reporting
latency after the time of purchase. Better detection perfor-
mance might also be achieved through improved algorithms,
which are under development.
Because they share geographic borders, the United States
and neighboring countries need interoperable public health
surveillance capability. Retail data monitoring is feasible in
Canada, Mexico, and other countries where retailers use the
UPC system or the European Article Numbering system, with
which it is interconvertible. A permanent organizational home
for NRDM is also being explored, with an estimated annual
operating cost of approximately $1 million.
Conclusions
NRDM is a data utility that collects, redistributes, and ana-
lyzes daily sales-volume data of selected health-care products.
A national-level, data-utility approach reduces the effort
required for health departments to monitor sales of OTC
health-care products. Health departments can instead con-
centrate on analysis of data and investigation of anomalies.
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Abstract
The National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Demonstration Program identifies new cases of illness from electronic
ambulatory patient records. Its goals are to use data from health plans and practice groups to detect localized outbreaks and to
facilitate rapid public health follow-up. Data are extracted nightly on patient encounters occurring during the previous 24 hours.
Visits or calls with diagnostic codes corresponding to syndromes of interest are counted; repeat encounters are excluded. Daily
counts of syndromes by zip code are sent to a central data repository, where they are statistically analyzed for unusual clustering by
using a model-adjusted SaTScan™ approach. The results and raw data are displayed on a restricted website. Patient-level
information stays at the originating health-care organization unless required by public health authorities. If a cluster surpasses a
threshold of statistical aberration chosen by the corresponding public health department, an electronic alert can be sent to that
department. The health department might then call a clinical responder, who has electronic access to records of cases contributing
to clusters.
The system is flexible, allowing for changes in participating organizations, syndrome definitions, and alert thresholds. It is
transparent to clinicians and has been accepted by the health-care organizations that provide the data. The system’s data are
usable by local and national health agencies. Its software is compatible with commonly used systems and software and is mostly
open-source. Ongoing activities include evaluating the system’s ability to detect naturally occurring outbreaks and simulated
terrorism events, automating and testing alerts and response capability, and evaluating alternative data sources.
Introduction
The National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Dem-
onstration Program covers a population of >20 million per-
sons, monitoring and analyzing numbers of new cases of illness
derived from electronic patient-encounter records from par-
ticipating health-care organizations. It was created on the
premise that early detection of acute illness in populations
would be useful to public health and that primary care sites
and nurse call centers might register the first evidence of such
conditions.
This CDC-funded program grew out of collaborative
projects between multiple health plans and their respective
state health departments (1–3). It currently includes eight
health-care organizations (Table). The coordinating center,
referred to as the data center, is run by Harvard Medical School
and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care. Elements of the program
have been described elsewhere (4,5).
Objectives
The program’s primary goal is to create a flexible, open-
source surveillance system that uses ambulatory care data to
identify unusual clusters of illness and support rapid public
health follow-up. Secondary goals are to 1) reduce barriers to
private health-care organizations’ voluntary participation,
2) develop and test optimal signal-detection methods, and
3) develop communication and response methods that enable
local public health agencies to obtain detailed clinical infor-
mation about cases that are part of clusters.
System Operation
Data Sources and Processing
at Data-Providing Sites
Data on patient encounters (visits or calls), including
demographic information and diagnostic codes, are recorded
electronically at each health-care organization as part of rou-
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Patient encounter   Metropolitan Population area’s population
Health-care organization Type of organization types captured  area covered served included
Optum Nurse telephone triage and Calls to nurse call Multiple 22,000,000 7% of U.S.
health information services centers population,
unevenly
distributed
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Health plan Ambulatory visits Boston, 140,000 6%
Harvard Vanguard Medical and telephone Massachusetts
Associates calls
Health Partners Research Health plan Ambulatory visits Minneapolis–
Foundation St. Paul, 240,000 8%
Minnesota
Kaiser Permanente Colorado Health plan Ambulatory visits Denver, Colorado 380,000 15%
Scott and White Healthcare System, Physician organizations Ambulatory visits Austin, Texas 384,000 26%–30%
Austin Regional Clinic, and Austin
Diagnostic Clinic
America’s Health Insurance Plans National trade association Not applicable (N/A) N/A N/A N/A
of companies providing
health insurance to >200
million persons
FIGURE. Information flow for the National Bioterrorism
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tine patient care, usually on the same day as the visit or call
(Figure). Each night, patient encounters with codes of inter-
est are extracted automatically from clinical data systems. The
extracted encounter files are created to uniform specifications
and are kept on a directory accessible to software (the con-
sole) provided by the data center.
The console maps patient encounters to syndromes (e.g.,
respiratory) defined by a CDC-led working group (6) and
then identifies illness episodes by omitting patient encounters
in any syndrome that occurred within 42 days of an earlier
visit in the same syndrome. Episodes are mapped to patients’
residential zip codes, and a single file is created containing
counts of new episodes in each syndrome and zip code for
each day. In addition, historic episode files are created and
provide a basis for modeling. Transmission of count data to
the data center in extensible markup language (XML) format
is safeguarded by means of electronic security certificates and
encryption. During the processing of encounter files into epi-
sode files, the console produces encounter lists containing
demographic and clinical information that remain at the origi-
nating site, where they are available in the event of a query
from public health authorities.
Statistical Analysis
For each syndrome and clinical site, daily counts are mod-
eled over a multiyear period, and clusters are evaluated by
using a model-adjusted SaTScan™ approach, which scans
multiple contiguous zip codes over a specified number of con-
secutive days of surveillance (7,8). SaTScan is adjusted by
using generalized linear mixed models that take into account
day of the week, holidays, seasons, secular trends, and the
unique characteristics of each zip code area, based upon his-
toric data (9).
The recurrence interval (i.e., the number of days between
predicted occurrences by chance alone within each
organization’s catchment area) is used to characterize the
degree of statistical aberration of any cluster in the contempo-
rary daily episode data. It is the inverse of the cluster’s p-value.
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Thus, the larger the value of the measure, the rarer (and pos-
sibly more worthy of investigation) the cluster is.
Data Display, Alerts, and Response
Almost immediately upon receipt, raw data and modeled
results are displayed in table, graph, and map form on a
restricted website designed and administered by the data cen-
ter. If a signal exceeds the threshold of statistical aberration
specified by the public health department in whose jurisdic-
tion it occurs, the data center will automatically send an elec-
tronic alert to designated persons at the health department.
This system is being implemented first in Massachusetts, us-
ing the state’s electronic health alert network. If contacted by
the health department, the clinical organization’s responder
can provide detailed clinical information about persons in the
cluster.
System Experience
Validity for Detection of Naturally
Occurring Outbreaks
In November 2003, the system detected unusual respira-
tory illness clusters in Colorado, Texas, and Massachusetts
heralding early severe influenza outbreaks, at least in Colo-
rado. An evaluation is being conducted of the system’s ability
to detect naturally occurring outbreaks of gastrointestinal ill-




The proportion of the population covered by the surveil-
lance system for different metropolitan areas is provided
(Table). Persons without health insurance are not represented.
Historic comparisons and simulations are being conducted to
assess the minimum proportion of an area’s population needed
by the surveillance system to detect outbreaks of different types
and sizes.
Usefulness
The system’s performance in apprehending the 2003 influ-
enza outbreak in Colorado and clusters of gastrointestinal ill-
ness in Minnesota is being evaluated. Extensive simulation is
also being conducted to describe sensitivity to potential acts
of biologic terrorism. Usefulness in practice will be assessed
systematically in collaboration with health departments after
the alerting system has operated for 1 year in at least one state.
Flexibility
The system is highly adaptable. Alert thresholds can be set
at any degree of statistical aberration, can be different for dif-
ferent syndromes and in different locales, and can be changed.
Different statistical methods can be applied to the counts by
date, syndrome, and zip code. With the consent of the orga-
nizations that hold the data, new syndromes categories can
easily be created, and customized queries of the originally
extracted encounters (encompassing approximately 700
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision [ICD-9]
codes) are feasible.
Acceptability and Cost
The system entails no extra work for clinicians. Because pa-
tient-level data stay with the organization and are shared only
when a public health need exists, the system’s distributed-data
model has been accepted by participating health-care organi-
zations. Health plans consider the aggregate data to be either
de-identified or limited data sets as defined by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule. Additionally, they consider this aggregated-data
model to allow them greater control over their proprietary
information.
Resources needed by clinical organizations include a net-
worked Microsoft Windows® personal computer (or compa-
rable) with Internet access, system administrator effort to create
the routine data extract from host systems and to maintain
connectivity, project programmer effort to install and run pro-
grams, administrative effort to review and approve new soft-
ware updates before they are installed on local computers and
to develop communication and response protocols with health
agencies, and clinical responder training and availability.
Because organizations’ cost structures vary widely, predicting
actual costs is difficult.
Openness, Compatibility,
and Portability
The program is designed to be open, maximally compatible
with elements of commonly used surveillance systems, and
easy for additional health-care organizations to join. Syndrome
definitions of the CDC-led working group (6) and open-source
software and development are used wherever possible, and all
protocols and computer code are available to other investiga-
tors and public health agencies.
Health-care organizations use software provided by the
project (written in Python [http://www.python.org]) that can
run on the majority of common operating systems, including
Windows,® Macintosh,® and Linux,® to process their own
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data for transmission to the data center. Uniform file specifi-
cations and console-based uploading allow the system to work
at virtually any site where diagnostic codes are available elec-
tronically on the day of encounter.
Data files created by this system are also directly usable by
health departments and are compatible with the emerging stan-
dards of CDC’s BioSense initiative (10). This allows health-
care organizations to make their data directly available to local
and national health agencies if they so choose.
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Abstract
The purpose of the Daily Emergency Department Surveillance System (DEDSS) is to provide consistent, timely, and robust
data that can be used to guide public health activities in Bergen County, New Jersey. DEDSS collects data on all emergency
department visits in four hospitals in Bergen County and analyzes them for aberrant patterns of disease or single instances of
certain diseases or syndromes. The system monitors for clusters of patients with syndromes consistent with the prodrome of a
terrorism-related illness (e.g., anthrax or smallpox) or naturally occurring disease (e.g., pandemic influenza or food and water-
borne outbreaks). The health department can use these data to track and characterize the temporal and geographic spread of a
known outbreak or demonstrate the absence of cases during the same period (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS] or
anthrax). DEDSS was designed to be flexible and readily adaptable as local, state, or federal surveillance needs evolve.
Introduction
In 2001, the Bergen County Department of Health Services
instituted a countywide syndromic surveillance system that uses
hospital emergency department (ED) data. Located in north-
east New Jersey across the Hudson River from New York City,
Bergen County has a population of approximately 884,000
persons (U.S. Census 2000) living within 234 square miles.
The first step in creating the Daily Emergency Department
Surveillance System (DEDSS) was to identify the appropriate
stakeholders. Within the health department, the creative team
consisted of an epidemiologist, an information technology (IT)
professional, and the director of planning. Next, immediate
external stakeholders, including the infection-control practi-
tioner (ICP), the ED director, the hospital IT professional,
and the hospital director of security, were brought into the
discussion. After the system was developed, local health offic-
ers, health department nurses, and state and regional health
department epidemiologists were updated on its progress.
System Operation
Four of six Bergen County hospitals provide daily data to
DEDSS, representing 85% of all daily ED visits. Early each
morning, the hospital’s computer system generates a text file
containing the following fields for each person who visited
the ED the previous day: date of visit, residential zip code,
age, chief complaint, and admission status. The file, abstracted
from the hospital’s database, uses data produced during nor-
mal, clinical ED workflow. The text file is then automatically
sent to a password-protected file transfer protocol (FTP) server,
where it is stored. The size of each file differs, ranging from a
four-hospital total of 400 to 600 visits/day. At 8:00 a.m. each
morning, the epidemiologist’s computer automatically starts
DEDSS. The program connects to the FTP site and down-
loads, formats, integrates, and analyzes the data. DEDSS then
creates standardized reports and e-mails them to the epidemi-
ologist along with an alert to his cellular telephone indicating
the system ran successfully. The epidemiologist can then
access the reports remotely and determine any needed
follow-up.
Data are analyzed daily by using a modified version of the
cumulative sum statistic (1) programmed in SAS® (2). For
each syndrome in each hospital, a ratio is calculated by divid-
ing the number of visits caused by the syndrome by the total
number of ED visits. This ratio is then compared with the
mean of an 11-day moving baseline that precedes the day of
interest. The first 3 days before the current observation are
ignored to act as a buffer for an outbreak that might grow
slowly over 1–2 days, and the mean is tabulated for days 4–14
before the day of interest. Because the data are not transformed
and any signals that might arise remain in the data set, the
health department uses both a buffer and an 11-day moving
average to offset the effects that days of increased activity would
have on the analysis.
If an observation is higher than expected, on the basis of
the moving average plus 3 standard deviations, a signal is cre-
ated and two reports are generated. The first report includes
the syndrome signaled, hospital (if the signal has occurred at
a single hospital) or county (if the signal has occurred at >2
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hospitals), date, total number of visits, total number in the
syndrome, ratio for that day, and baseline ratio with which it
was compared. For each signal, a corresponding report is gen-
erated that features a line listing of all persons who were part
of the signal.
The first step, as in any outbreak investigation, is to verify
the diagnosis. Because using text strings to identify affected
patients can result in inclusion of patients who do not have
the chief complaints of interest (e.g., no fever instead of fever),
the chief-complaint field for each member of the line listing is
examined. This field contains a mixture of triage information,
clinical diagnoses, and patient statements. For example, a case
of viral respiratory disease (e.g., influenza) might be coded as
fever and cough, viral syndrome, or I don’t feel well, depending
on the hospital. After an investigation determines the system
properly identified appropriate chief complaints and all of the
observations appear to be valid, a level of concern is assigned.
Three levels of concern can be assigned to signals, low, mod-
erate, or elevated, each with corresponding steps. The epide-
miologist assigns the level after reviewing each day’s report,
which usually takes <10 minutes. If a signal is attributable to
low numbers (<10), is just above the baseline, is attributable
to seasonality (e.g., pneumonia in winter), and exhibits no
obvious epidemiologic links (e.g., age or zip code), then the
signal level assigned is low, and no action is taken.
A level of moderate is assigned if multiple signals occur on
the same day in different hospitals; if two, consecutive, low-
level signals occur in the same hospital; if a low-level signal
arises with possible epidemiologic links (e.g., geographic clus-
tering); or if the signal is substantially but not exceptionally
higher than the baseline (on the basis of experience rather
than statistics, until an algorithm is developed to quantify this).
Response to a moderate signal includes e-mail notification of
possible activity to hospital ICPs and epidemiologists in sur-
rounding counties. Those epidemiologists and ICPs then
decide whether to investigate their jurisdiction’s conditions.
If a signal is exceptionally higher than the baseline (on the
basis of experience rather than statistics) or if moderate sig-
nals occur at more than one hospital on a given day, a signal
level of elevated is assigned. An elevated signal entails immedi-
ate notification of hospital ICPs, internal chain of command,
regional epidemiologists, and state health department officials
that further investigation is warranted. Status of hospitals
involved in an elevated-level signal is determined through
phone consultation, and if disease activity remains high, an
epidemiologic investigation is initiated. Depending on the
number of persons and hospitals involved, either the epide-
miologist or the epidemiologic response team are sent to the
hospital to review charts, interview patients, and confer with
hospital personnel regarding next steps.
System Experience
Although the burden to Bergen County has been minimal,
the system’s cost and maintenance requirements need to be
better quantified, both in terms of resources spent and per-
son-hours used to respond to system alerts. Furthermore, the
better the system operators (e.g., epidemiologists and IT per-
sonnel) understand hospitals’ coding and triage practices, the
better they will understand the system’s output and be able to
alter it as needed. To date, no elevated signals have occurred.
Moderate signals have occurred but none that required more
than a telephone consultation with hospital ICPs. In all cases,
the numbers decreased substantially after 1 day, and no speci-
mens were collected by hospital physicians.
DEDSS monitors two primary syndromes: influenza-like
illness (ILI) and gastrointestinal illness (GI). Each syndrome
has a corresponding case definition, complaint group (i.e., a
list of chief complaints being monitored), and diagnostic group
(i.e., a list of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision [ICD-9] codes for validation studies). Preliminary
comparisons of chief complaint to ICD-9-coded diagnoses
indicate sensitivity of 76%, specificity of 96%, and positive
predictive value of 53% for ILI and sensitivity of 61%, speci-
ficity of 97%, and positive predictive value of 32% for GI.
Specific results need to be analyzed further to identify and
quantify the source of noise and discrepancies within the syn-
drome definitions, especially when examining positive pre-
dictive value.
As the system is fine-tuned and case definitions and com-
plaint groups revised, the epidemiologist can easily change
the coding as needed. The system’s malleability enables the
health department to monitor seasonal or short-term disease-
activity trends. During a crisis, the epidemiologist can request
that hospitals place a keyword in the complaint field for all
visits relating to a certain event (e.g., alleged anthrax expo-
sures) to monitor visits more precisely.
DEDSS is designed to accommodate inclusion of new fields
when necessary. If the system were also able to link the clinical
aspects of a patient’s visit (e.g., X-ray results, medications pre-
scribed, laboratory results, or blood work) to each observation,
the epidemiologist reviewing the day’s data would have more
information to examine when assigning the level of concern.
Because the infrastructure is already in place, establishing fu-
ture projects that capture different data will be even easier.
Obstacles and Benefits
The primary obstacles encountered during development and
maintenance of DEDSS involve IT and resources. The ability
to troubleshoot technical and programmatic computer prob-
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lems has been limited by departmental resources. Although
the system is intended to be automated and electronic, cer-
tain hospitals had difficulty scheduling tasks and transferring
the files. Fortunately, the fundamental act of creating the daily
data file was not a problem for any hospitals. However, be-
cause hospital IT personnel are instrumental to the mechan-
ics of file creation, automation, and transfer, including them
in early planning is essential.
After establishing standard analytic methods and reporting
protocols within a jurisdiction, the next step is to coordinate
surveillance systems within the region; as multiple systems
come online, maintaining communication and methodologic
developments in real time is crucial. Conducting surveillance
and validation regionally would enable joining of resources to
accomplish similar goals.
Beyond DEDSS’ stated goals, the system has had additional
benefits. The process of meeting with the hospital personnel
and setting up the data transfer generated excellent working
relations between the health department and the hospitals. It
increased the timeliness of reporting routine incidents and
fostered communication around unusual occurrences. Fur-
thermore, an infrastructure supporting the electronic transfer
of data between hospitals and the health department is now
in place. Unfortunately, redundant capabilities are not yet built
into the system; currently, when one aspect of the system fails,
the entire system goes offline. The system also lacks a single,
dedicated manager. These limitations can result in periods of
system inactivity.
The health department hopes the system will be useful for
more than terrorism-preparedness purposes. Its goal is to have
a multifaceted system that uses multiple analytic processes and
creates reports for multiple users on different aspects of pub-
lic health and health-care delivery.
References
1. Hutwagner, LC, Maloney EK, Bean NH et al. Using laboratory-based
surveillance data for prevention: an algorithm for detecting Salmonella
outbreaks. Emerg Infect Dis 1997;3:395–400.
2. SAS Institute. SAS,® Version 8.2 [Software]. Cary, NC: SAS Institute.
50 MMWR September 24, 2004
 Hospital Admissions Syndromic Surveillance — Connecticut,
September 2001–November 2003
Zygmunt F. Dembek, K. Carley, A. Siniscalchi, J. Hadler
Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, Connecticut
Corresponding author: Zygmunt F. Dembek, Epidemiology Program, Connecticut Department of Public Health, 410 Capitol Ave., MS # 11EPI,
P.O. Box 340308, Hartford, CT 06134-0308. Telephone: 860-509-7994; Fax: 860-509-7910; E-mail: zygmunt.dembek@po.state.ct.us.
Abstract
On September 11, 2001, the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CDPH) initiated daily, statewide syndromic surveil-
lance based on unscheduled hospital admissions (HASS). The system’s objectives were to monitor for outbreaks caused by Category
A biologic agents and evaluate limits in space and time of identified outbreaks. Thirty-two acute-care hospitals were required to
report their previous day’s unscheduled admissions for 11 syndromes (pneumonia, hemoptysis, respiratory distress, acute neurologic
illness, nontraumatic paralysis, sepsis and nontraumatic shock, fever with rash, fever of unknown cause, acute gastrointestinal
illness, and possible cutaneous anthrax, and suspected illness clusters). Admissions for pneumonia, gastrointestinal illness, and
sepsis were reported most frequently; admissions for fever with rash, possible cutaneous anthrax, and hemoptysis were rare. A
method for determining the difference between random and systemic variation was used to identify differences of >3 standard
deviations for each syndrome from a 6-month moving average. HASS was adapted to meet changing surveillance needs (e.g.,
surveillance for anthrax, smallpox, and severe acute respiratory syndrome). HASS was sensitive enough to reflect annual increases
in hospital-admission rates for pneumonia during the influenza season and to confirm an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness.
Follow-up of HASS neurologic-admissions reports has led to diagnosis of West Nile virus encephalitis cases. Report validation,
syndrome-criteria standardization among hospitals, and expanded use of outbreak-detection algorithms will enhance the system’s
usefulness.
Introduction
On September 11, 2001, the Connecticut Department of
Public Health (CDPH) developed and initiated a syndromic
surveillance system based on unscheduled hospital admis-
sions called HASS. The system’s initial objective was to moni-
tor for a concurrent terrorist event caused by Category A
biologic agents (1,2). All hospitals were required to submit
standardized reports to CDPH regarding the number of pa-
tients admitted the previous day with acute respiratory or
neurologic problems and perceived illness clusters among
newly admitted patients. Another objective was to evaluate




All 32 acute-care hospitals within Connecticut are required
to report to CDPH on a standardized form the number of
unscheduled admissions from the previous day. Reporting is
required for 11 syndromic categories, including pneumonia,
with a subcategory for health-care workers with clinical
responsibilities; hemoptysis; respiratory distress syndrome,
with a subcategory for health-care workers with clinical
responsibilities; acute neurologic illness, including meningi-
tis, encephalitis, or unexplained acute encephalopathy;
nontraumatic paralysis; nontraumatic shock, including sep-
sis; fever with rash; fever of unknown cause; acute gastrointes-
tinal illness, including vomiting, diarrhea, or dehydration; skin
infection indicating possible anthrax; and apparent illness
clusters.
HASS has been modified to meet changing disease surveil-
lance needs as follows:
• On the basis of feedback from hospitals in October 2001,
better-differentiated syndrome categories were created
(e.g., pneumonia, hemoptysis, and respiratory-distress
categories replaced a total-respiratory category).
• Reporting categories for gram-positive rod isolates and
radiographic findings consistent with inhalational anthrax
were added for 1 month in late November 2001 after a
case of inhalational anthrax was identified.
• Case follow-up was instituted for all reports of fever with
rash illness beginning November 2002 to enhance small-
pox surveillance.
• Subcategories for health-care workers with clinical
responsibilities were added in May 2003 in response to
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
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FIGURE. Information flow for Connecticut’s hospital admissions
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TABLE. Average number and range of unscheduled hospital admissions per week, by syndrome — Connecticut acute-care
hospitals, August 2002–July 2003
Average no. Range of
Syndrome of admissions* admissions*
Pneumonia 82.7 24–122
Hemoptysis 1.2 0–5
Acute respiratory distress syndrome or respiratory failure of unknown origin 11.3 4–19
Meningitis, encephalitis, or unexplained acute encephalopathy 1.9 0.3–5
Nontraumatic paralysis, Guillian-Barré syndrome, or descending paralysis 2.0 1–4
Sepsis and nontraumatic shock 16.8 6–24
Fever and rash illness 0.4 0–2
Fever of unknown origin 13.1 8–18
Gastrointestinal illness, vomiting, diarrhea, dehydration 26.0 7–39
Skin infection; possible cutaneous anthrax 0.1 0–1
Clusters of illness 0.006 0–1
* In millions.
Initially, hospitals reported to CDPH by fax or e-mail. In
May 2003, a secure website with the report form was inaugu-
rated. Since October 2003, all 32 acute-care hospitals have
reported their data by using the secure website. Each hospital
has access to its data on the website.
CDPH investigates all detected or reported disease clusters
and all cases of selected syndromes. Case follow-up is routine
for the following syndromic categories:
• pneumonia in clinical health-care workers (potential SARS
cases);
• acute respiratory distress or respiratory failure in clinical
health-care workers (potential SARS cases); and
• fever and rash illness (potential smallpox cases).
Analysis
The HASS data set is transformed into an Excel™ spread-
sheet and analyzed with SAS® for Windows™ Version 8e (3)
by using the Shewhart method (4) of analysis to determine
the difference between random and systemic variation. A
3-standard–deviation difference (i.e., statistically significant)
is calculated by using a 6-month moving average of all data
collected. This analysis is performed for each syndrome for all
hospitals combined and for hospitals in each of the three larg-
est of Connecticut’s eight counties (Figure).
A CDPH epidemiologist inspects data daily. Analysis is con-
ducted weekly, whenever a peak in rates is noted, whenever
disease-surveillance questions occur (e.g., when an outbreak
is detected through routine reporting mechanisms), after
unusual events (e.g., the August 2003 electrical blackout), or
when determining whether influenza activity has increased.
System Experience
During August 2002–July 2003, unscheduled admissions
were reported most frequently for pneumonia (an average of
82.7 admissions/million population/week), followed by acute
gastrointestinal illness (26.0), sepsis and nontraumatic shock
(16.8), fever of unknown origin (13.1), and respiratory dis-
tress (11.3) (Table). Syndromes reported least commonly were
disease clusters (0.006), possible cutaneous anthrax (0.1),
fever and rash illness (0.4), and hemoptysis (1.2). No signifi-
cant difference was found by day of the week for admission
rates for the most frequent syndromic categories.
During August 2002–July 2003, a total of 59 spikes in ac-
tivity >3σ were noted. All spikes were detected from county-
specific (not statewide) analysis. By syndrome category, all were
either gastrointestinal (35) or pneumonia (24). All gastrointes-
tinal spikes were limited, single-day events. With one excep-
tion (a January 2002 1-day spike correlated with a norovirus
outbreak affecting 116 persons), no spikes were associated with
known gastrointestinal outbreaks. Spikes in pneumonia clus-
tered during the winter months and were likely caused by sea-
sonal influenza.
During November 2002–November 2003, a total of 58 cases
of fever and rash illness were reported and subsequently
investigated to rule out smallpox. These cases had other diag-
noses, including viral syndrome, serum sickness, meningo-
coccemia, pustular psoriasis, uticaria, toxic shock syndrome,
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scarlet fever, tickborne disease, staphylococcal infection,
parvovirus, human immunodeficiency virus infection, and
chickenpox.
During May–November 2003, two cases of acute respira-
tory distress and nine cases of pneumonia among health-care
workers with clinical responsibilities were reported to HASS
and investigated. None met then-current CDC or World
Health Organization criteria for suspected SARS (5).
Individual hospitals have reported four illness clusters since
HASS’s inception, all gastrointestinal illness of unknown eti-
ology. Laboratory-based surveillance detected 15 different
gastrointestinal illness clusters. No increase in gastrointestinal
illness was observed in Connecticut hospitals serving those
areas affected by the Northeast power blackout during or
after August 14–15, 2003.
A health director who regularly monitored HASS data in
his municipality discovered the first two of Connecticut’s 17
confirmed human West Nile virus cases during 2002. He
requested investigation of two late-summer neurologic syn-
drome reports. Both patients had encephalitis and subsequently
tested positive for West Nile virus infection.
Discussion
CDPH chose to design and implement a system based on
hospital admissions for multiple reasons. Hospital admissions
measure severe illness; the biologic agents of greatest concern
(Category A) all cause illness severe enough to require hospi-
talization. Obtaining additional clinical, follow-up, and labo-
ratory information on these patients is possible because they
are hospitalized in a known place and are monitored. HASS is
easy and inexpensive to implement and modify, requiring no
special computer equipment or programming and 10–15
minutes/day for most hospitals to review the previous day’s
admissions and prepare and submit data. It can be readily
implemented statewide, a desirable feature in a state with dis-
crete population centers (compared with a densely populated
area such as New York City). HASS requires someone at each
hospital to be aware of admission patterns, increasing the
potential to recognize and report unusual events. Finally,
unlike systems based on outpatient visits, HASS enables
detection and investigation of outbreaks as limited as a single
case (e.g., smallpox or SARS).
Baseline information is now available on the frequency of
admissions for a range of syndromes. The system is sensitive
enough to reflect important community events (e.g., concur-
rent increases in a monitored syndrome in city or county hos-
pitals). A sizable laboratory-reported gastrointestinal outbreak
was also evident with HASS. Admission rates for pneumonia
have been observed to vary by season and increase markedly
during an active influenza season. CDPH has increased con-
fidence that HASS can be used for statewide surveillance and
to monitor an outbreak that results in hospitalizations.
HASS has been used successfully to identify and rapidly
investigate individual cases of relatively unusual syndromes
(e.g., the detection of two cases of West Nile virus encephali-
tis by following up on reports of encephalitis in one hospital).
Investigation of cases of fever with rash has identified
chickenpox. Continued investigation of admissions for fever
and rash illness is a reasonable way to conduct enhanced small-
pox surveillance.
HASS has important limitations. First, it is insensitive to
slight changes in the syndromes most frequently reported (i.e.,
pneumonia, gastrointestinal illness, and sepsis). Second, HASS
has yet to detect an outbreak not also detected by other means.
Third, it is insensitive to outbreaks that primarily produce
outpatient illness. Fourth, because it depends on patient
admissions, identifying an outbreak with a time lag between
symptom onset and admission (e.g., anthrax) can be delayed
by 1–2 days when compared with an outpatient syndromic
surveillance system. Finally, because HASS obtains only case
counts rather than individual demographic data, increases in
illness among a demographic subset of the population (e.g.,
children or women) cannot be detected without obtaining
additional information.
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Abstract
BioSense is a national initiative to enhance the nation’s capability to rapidly detect, quantify, and localize public health
emergencies, particularly biologic terrorism, by accessing and analyzing diagnostic and prediagnostic health data. BioSense will
establish near real-time electronic transmission of data to local, state, and federal public health agencies from national, regional,
and local health data sources (e.g., clinical laboratories, hospital systems, ambulatory care sites, health plans, U.S. Department of
Defense and Veterans Administration medical treatment facilities, and pharmacy chains).
Introduction
BioSense is a national initiative to support the advancement
of early detection capabilities by promoting greater and time-
lier acquisition of relevant data and by advancing technolo-
gies associated with near real-time reporting, automated
outbreak identification, and analytics. It is one of three initia-
tives recently advanced by the President of the United States
to improve national preparedness; others include BioShield,
which focuses on rapid development of vaccines and thera-
peutics, and BioWatch, which places environmental air sam-
plers in key locations.
To enhance consistency of public health surveillance
nationally, BioSense will facilitate the sharing of automated
detection and visualization algorithms and approaches by pro-
moting national standards and specifications developed by such
initiatives as the Public Health Information Network (PHIN)
(1) and the eGov activities of Consolidated Health Informatics
(2). Finally, the initiative will encourage integration of early
detection systems with outbreak management and response
systems. Because the benefits of early detection emanate from
early response, standards for early detection systems will help
them share data and integrate with information systems that
support the management of possible and confirmed cases, labo-
ratory results, isolation, prophylaxis, and vaccination.
BioSense is a component of PHIN, which seeks to use
industry data and technical standards to develop specifica-
tions and software elements, allowing for a national electronic
network to support public health needs. In addition to inclu-
sion of functional and technical specifications for early event
detection, PHIN also provides routine public health surveil-
lance (e.g., the National Electronic Disease Surveillance Sys-
tem [NEDSS]), secure communications, analysis and
visualization, information dissemination and knowledge man-
agement, health alerting, outbreak management, laboratory
information systems, and vaccine and prophylaxis adminis-
tration (Figure 1).
BioSense will include an Internet-based software-system
implementation to enable public health officials in major cit-
ies to view data for their communities (Figure 2). The soft-
ware system will implement identified industry standards and
provide a platform for integrating and evaluating different
outbreak-detection approaches. The BioSense software sys-
tem includes both spatio-temporal and temporal analysis
algorithms and approaches to visualizing unusual events in
data (Figure 2). Phase I of the BioSense system is operating in
>20 cities nationally.
Supporting Early Event Detection
Discussion around early event detection over recent years
has focused on the relative value of data sources that are
prediagnostic or syndromic in nature. BioSense seeks to
advance public health capabilities for both prediagnostic and
diagnostic data sources in near real time. Given the ongoing
controversy about prediagnostic surveillance, BioSense will
support rigorous evaluation of these data sources. Where avail-
able, BioSense will prioritize early detection data on the basis
of diagnostic skills of clinical personnel. Frequently, tension
exists between getting data early and having them be inclusive
of clinical judgment, but progress can be made in advancing
real-time reporting of diagnostic and prediagnostic data that
emanate from settings in which an experienced medical pro-
fessional originates the data.
At the same time, BioSense will seek to minimize reporting
burden by extracting early detection information from data
sources that exist for purposes other than public health
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reporting. For example, it will use clini-
cal-care information-system data rather
than asking medical personnel to enter
data manually for the sole purpose of
detecting an outbreak.
BioSense will support early event-
detection capabilities at the local, state,
and national levels. Because routine pub-
lic health reporting systems are incon-
sistent across the United States, early
detection is usually implemented, if at
all, at only one of these levels for any
given area. To maximize national ability
to detect and manage events early, to
leverage expertise at local, state, and
national levels, and to take advantage of
data sources that are aggregated locally,
regionally, and nationally, capabilities
need to be advanced at all three levels




Consequence management is a key
concern for public health, and although
electronic detection systems might be use-
ful in assisting public health profession-
als, they can also create a tremendous
burden. BioSense seeks to address these
concerns in the short term by avoiding
the forced consequence management of
predetermined alerts. Instead of necessi-
tating a series of responses to an alert that
is identifying only a possible occurrence,
BioSense seeks to capitalize on the ana-
lytic capabilities of public health profes-
sionals, including their abilities to
compare and interpret multiple data
sources and determine the likelihood of
an event. It should also enable them to
create and manage thresholds and circum-
stances for alerting to avoid forced conse-
quence management. To support these
capabilities of public health profession-
als, BioSense should coordinate viewing
of multiple data sources and leverage these
sources into greater sensitivity and greater
specificity.

























CDC Internet health alerting
Countermeasure administration
(lab tests, vaccines, prophylaxis)
FIGURE 1. Public Health Information Network (PHIN) component functions and initiatives
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Addressing Privacy Concerns
Although prediagnostic data sources remain to be rigorously
evaluated, researchers using such data sources should antici-
pate concerns about privacy from the public. To address such
concerns, BioSense promotes the use of data that do not con-
tain direct patient identifiers, even though public health
authorities are eligible under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to receive identi-
fied data under certain circumstances. All BioSense data will
be securely managed for access by authorized public health
professionals with appropriate jurisdictional access controls,
and data providers will retain any directly identifiable infor-
mation. An anonymous data linker will enable an authorized
public health investigation in the event of a potential outbreak.
Supporting Public Health Needs
Finally, BioSense seeks to pursue early detection in the con-
text of the multiple needs of public health. Initial detection of
an event by identifying patterns of health-seeking behavior
should be followed by case identification and quantification
of the number, locations, and density of cases. Identifying a
possible outbreak requires investigating symptoms across
multiple cases, travel history, and possible environmental
exposures, and then tracing contacts relative to people and
disease vectors. These capabilities should be integrated with
early detection systems and with systems for isolation, pro-
phylaxis, accelerated vaccination, and adverse-event follow-
up and management.
Conclusion
The initial focus of BioSense has been to advance early
detection and management technologies and capabilities in a
way that considers public health needs and ongoing efforts to
use and evaluate early detection technology and data sources.
It intends to support this work at national, regional, and local
levels and provide a test bed for further evaluation and imple-
mentation.
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Abstract
Hospital emergency department (ED) syndromic surveillance has been proposed for early detection of a large-scale biologic
terrorist attack. However, questions remain regarding its usefulness. The authors examined the use of active syndromic surveil-
lance at hospital EDs in Virginia for early detection of disease events and analyzed the effectiveness of the cumulative sum
(CUSUM) algorithm in identifying disease events from syndromic data. Daily chief-complaint data were collected for 10 months
at seven hospital EDs in southeastern Virginia. Data were categorized into seven syndromes (fever, respiratory distress, vomiting,
diarrhea, rash, disorientation, and sepsis), and the CUSUM algorithm was used to detect anomalies in each of the seven syn-
dromes at each hospital. Fever and respiratory distress syndromes exhibited monthly and ambient-temperature–specific trends
consistent with southeastern Virginia’s influenza season. Furthermore, preliminary frequencies of hospital ED patient chief com-
plaints in southeastern Virginia during a 10-month period were produced by using syndromic data. This system represents an
example of a local syndromic surveillance program serving multiple cities in a limited geographic region.
Introduction
Syndromic surveillance in hospital emergency departments
(EDs) involves monitoring incoming patients with nonspe-
cific syndromes to determine whether an unusual excess of
any group of symptoms exists. Although syndromic surveil-
lance might prove useful for detecting a deliberate release of a
biologic agent, baseline ED chief-complaint data first need to
be better characterized to create a surveillance instrument that
can detect unusual disease incidence of any cause (1,2). Lives
might be lost if an untested surveillance system misses a dis-
ease event (3). Therefore, syndromic surveillance systems
should be investigated critically to determine whether ED data
can serve these purposes. Accordingly, syndromic surveillance
was performed at seven hospital EDs in southeastern Virginia,
and the value of ED-based syndromic surveillance was
explored by analyzing the effectiveness of the cumulative sum
(CUSUM) algorithm for detecting unusual disease events.
Syndromic Surveillance System
Population
The Tidewater or Hampton Roads region of southeastern
Virginia has a substantial military presence, consisting of a
major U.S. Air Force base and a naval amphibious base.
Approximately 13% of the population of the four Virginia
cities from which data were collected (Norfolk, Chesapeake,
Newport News, and Virginia Beach) were either in reserve or
on active military duty in the year 2000 (4). In addition, the
military is responsible for approximately 25% of the region’s
economy (5). The syndromic surveillance system established
in this region involved seven civilian hospitals serving approxi-
mately 1 million residents (6).
Data Collection and Aberration
Detection
ED data were collected from seven hospitals during Sep-
tember 2001–June 2002. Chief-complaint data (i.e., the
patient’s stated reason for visiting the ED) were faxed daily
from hospitals to the health department. These data were then
categorized manually into one of seven syndromes (fever, res-
piratory distress, vomiting, diarrhea, rash, disorientation, and
sepsis). A CUSUM algorithm (7) was used to analyze unusual
increases in each of the seven syndromes at each hospital. The
CUSUM algorithm used three different moving average cal-
culations (mild, medium, and ultra) to identify unusually high
occurrences of each syndrome. The mild calculation used a
moving average of syndrome counts for the 7 days preceding
the ED visit. The moving average for the medium calculation
was for 3–9 days previous, and the moving average for the
ultra calculation was for 3 preceding days. Upper limits for all
three calculations were set to the moving average plus 3 stan-
dard deviations, and observed daily syndrome counts were
compared with each upper limit.
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A working database was created for the Tidewater region
that combined daily entry of syndrome counts with the
CUSUM anomaly-detection algorithm. Daily syndrome
counts were dichotomized as high occurrence or low occurrence
on the basis of daily CUSUM calculations. On high occur-
rence days, the health department performed patient chart
reviews and reported information on patient ED visits (e.g,
discharge diagnosis, laboratory testing, and patient disposi-
tion) to the regional epidemiologist. Monthly reports were also
generated on syndrome counts and distributed
to participating hospitals’ infection-control prac-
titioners, personnel involved in emergency
response to biologic terrorism, and ED personnel.
Detection of Influenza
The CUSUM algorithm detected trends in
fever and respiratory distress occurrences indica-
tive of influenza at hospital C (Figure 1) and by
month and temperature (Figure 2). According
to the sentinel influenza surveillance system,
which consists of a designated group of report-
ing physicians in the region, influenza occurrence
in eastern Virginia increased during the week of
January 23, 2002. However, syndromic data on
fever and respiratory distress revealed an increase
in these two syndromes during the week of Janu-




Syndromic surveillance presented certain chal-
lenges. The collected data spanned only a
10-month period that included both a biologic
terrorist event involving anthrax in a nearby
region as well as an influenza season. Thus,
syndromic data might have reflected both sea-
sonally expected trends and unexpected syn-
drome occurrences. Moreover, the lack of an
electronic method for rapid and accurate data
transfer often delayed the collection process.
Syndromic surveillance retrospectively detected
disease occurrences (e.g., the influenza season);
however, without timely data reporting, acute
disease events might not be detected quickly
enough to permit rapid response.
Extrinsic Value
Despite certain difficulties, a preliminary characterization
of hospital ED populations and syndrome occurrences in the
Tidewater region was produced, the first such effort in south-
eastern Virginia. Because syndromic surveillance has only
recently been introduced into public health, patterns from
different surveillance systems have rarely been compared. This
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FIGURE 1. Detection of seasonal influenza by syndromic surveillance at
one hospital in southeastern Virginia, September 2001–June 2002
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syndromes and identified substantial pattern differences in two
syndromes at only one hospital. This indicates that recogniz-
ing anomalies in any one place and for any one syndrome
might require analysis of local circumstances (e.g., the popu-
lations served by particular hospitals) to enhance syndromic
surveillance and improve detection of the unusual. The
CUSUM algorithm identified increased influenza activity (i.e.,
respiratory distress and fever). With refinement and longer
time series, CUSUM should become more sensitive and even-
tually be able to provide earlier recognition of natural out-
breaks or terrorist events.
Intrinsic Value
Syndromic surveillance can increase communication among
professionals in public health and clinical medicine. Through
greater interaction between the public health and
medical fields, ED physicians and other health-
care personnel realize the value of a public health
specialist (8). Furthermore, partnering of public
health professionals with physicians, law enforce-
ment and other disaster-management workers
can improve a jurisdiction’s preparedness for any
disease event (9). The effectiveness of a surveil-
lance system requires the cooperation and col-
laboration of multiple persons. As part of
syndromic surveillance, EDs might capture sud-
den, subtle changes in the magnitude and distri-
bution of diseases in a population (8).
Meanwhile, public heath departments are
responsible for continuously monitoring surveil-
lance reports and findings (1). For syndromic
surveillance to enhance rapid detection of
anomalous events, clear communication among
hospitals and public health agencies, as well as
preparedness and response capacities, must be
in place.
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FIGURE 2. Average daily occurrence* of seven syndromes, by month and
by temperature — Virginia, September 2001–June 2002
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Abstract
Introduction: Statistical analysis of syndromic data has typically focused on univariate test statistics for spatial, temporal, or
spatio-temporal surveillance. However, this approach does not take full advantage of the information available in the data.
Objectives: A bivariate method is proposed that uses both temporal and spatial data information.
Methods: Using upper respiratory syndromic data from an eastern Massachusetts health-care provider, this paper illustrates a
bivariate method and examines the power of this method to detect simulated clusters.
Results: Use of the bivariate method increases detection power.
Conclusions: Syndromic surveillance systems should use all available information, including both spatial and temporal
information.
Introduction
In 2002, CDC advised health departments to seek routinely
collected electronic data as part of early warning systems for
biologic terrorism (1). The potential cost-effectiveness of such
systems might explain why certain major metropolitan areas
(e.g., Boston and New York) are beginning to implement
CDC’s recommendation (2,3). The primary concern of a
biosurveillance system is to analyze and interpret data as they
are collected and then decide whether further investigation is
required. This report proposes a statistical methodology needed
to make such a system efficient and effective and focuses on
how to use information about the number of patients affected
and where they live to detect outbreaks or other deviations
from the normal pattern of disease.
Two statistical concerns are fundamental to surveillance:
1) determining a reasonable definition of “normal” behavior,
and 2) being vigilant for deviations from this normalcy. CDC’s
weekly surveillance for pneumonia and influenza mortality in
122 U.S. cities is one example of an attempt to put this into
practice (see MMWR Weekly at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr). In
that model, historic data allow for time-series modeling of sea-
sonal fluctuations in deaths; the model represents an attempt to
define normalcy. Building on a sinusoidal model for the sea-
sonal baseline, standard statistical methods (4) provide a confi-
dence band outside of which mortality can be considered a
deviation from the norm. Such a definition of normalcy is too
stringent because deviations from normalcy occur almost every
year; therefore, its usefulness for a surveillance system might be
questionable. However, a too-lenient definition of normalcy
might then never detect a deviation from normal.
Combining Univariate Statistics
Combining more than one test statistic from a single data
source poses problems. In certain situations, multiple testing
without an appropriate statistical adjustment leads to an
inflation of the false-positive rate. However, such adjustments
can be conservative and adversely affect the power of the tests.
One approach that avoids the multiple-testing problem
involves investigating the joint distribution of the test statis-
tics. As a result, the information encoded in each statistic is
used, but the false-positive rate can still be carefully controlled.
The bivariate methodology described in this paper is one
example of combining univariate statistics. Although the con-
cept generalizes easily to other settings, implementation of
this methodology will necessarily differ, depending on the situ-
ation. The requirements and assumptions (as well as the
strengths and weaknesses) of the particular univariate models
and statistics used will affect the power and robustness of any
implementation of this bivariate approach.
Data
Data for this study were obtained from a major health-care
provider in eastern Massachusetts. As patients arrive for emer-
gency care, their cases are geocoded (typically by using the
patient’s residential or billing address); this information is cen-
tralized electronically on a daily basis. For this study, a subset
of the data was selected, consisting of upper respiratory infec-
tions (URIs) during January 1, 1996–October 30, 2000, for
a period of 1,399 days. (For protection of confidentiality, the
spatial data provided in this report were aggregated by census
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FIGURE 1. Sample box plots of daily case volume of upper
respiratory infections, by day
Note: Caseload on weekends is lower, when certain clinics are closed.
Monday counts are, on average, slightly higher but are also more variable
because Mondays are often holidays (which, in turn, results in an elevated
average Tuesday caseload).
tract and white noise was added to the centroids of the tracts.)
Thus, the data stream provides the temporal patterns of dis-
ease (i.e., the number of cases arriving each day), as well as the
spatial patterns of disease (i.e., the locations of patients over
time).
Using all available information should provide better detec-
tion power than using just the number of patients or only
their locations. Thus, the proposal is to analyze the temporal
series first, then the spatial series, and, finally, to conduct a
joint analysis of the two.
Methods
Time-Series Modeling
Time-series modeling is one approach for analyzing tempo-
ral data. Certain trends in the number of patients reporting
daily with URIs make modeling challenging. One such trend
is a seasonal effect, which can be modeled efficiently. Super-
imposed on the seasonal effect is a substantial daily effect,
including a slight downward trend in the number of URIs
from Monday through Friday, as well as a substantially higher
variance from the start of the week to the end (Figure 1). Week-
ends and holidays must be analyzed separately because cer-
tain clinics and other locations are closed on those days,
resulting in lower case volume and a different spatial distribu-
tion of patients. Health-care demand for weekends and holi-
days is often satisfied on Mondays or weekdays immediately
after holidays, resulting in a higher case volume on those days.
For the time series N(t) of number of URIs to be accurately
modeled, a sinusoidal baseline curve must first be fitted to
account for seasonal variations. Each data point can then be
considered as a residual departure from the baseline predic-
tion. The residuals are then modeled to find a best predicted
value of N(t). Because patient behavior varies by day of week,
days are categorized as follows: 1) weekend days or holidays;
2) Mondays or days after holidays; and 3) all other weekdays.
Seasonal and daily effects are incorporated into a linear model.
The residuals from this mean function are autocorrelated;
therefore, a third-order autoregressive component and a first-
order moving average component (Autoregressive Moving
Average [ARMA] [3,1] are used to model this autocorrelation.
Thus, the final model is formulated as
log[N (t )] = (seasonal sinusoid + daily indicators +
interactions) + e (t) + β1e (t – 1) + β2e (t – 2) +
β3e (t – 3) + γ log [N (t –1)]
where e(t) is the residual (observed or predicted value) at time
t, and the β, γ are ARMA coefficients estimated from a stan-
dard statistical package. The standard deviation of the residu-
als is used as a measure of the model’s goodness-of-fit. After
inclusion of the ARMA terms, the standard deviation of the
residuals was reduced from 0.732 to 0.321 (on the log scale),
indicating that the ARMA series has a better fit than the simple
sinusoid. Standard deviations for holidays and weekends,
Mondays and days after holidays, and other weekdays are all
comparable; however, these are measured on the log scale, and
thus, the higher case volume on Mondays and days after holi-
days, together with greater variation on those days (Figure 1),
reduces the model’s predictive power for those days as com-
pared with weekends and holidays, which have lower mean
case counts.
The time series N(t) is an attempt to describe normal
behavior. The residuals are distributed approximately normally
with mean 0, and a nominal alpha level can be chosen on the
basis of historic data, and any observation falling outside
of a particular critical region can be considered worthy of
investigation.
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FIGURE 2. Frequency polygons of distances for five
nonoverlapping periods, illustrating seasonal stability of the
empirical cumulative distribution function of interpoint
distances
Note: Although equiprobable bins are used when calculating the M statistic,




Temporal analysis provides only one perspective, albeit a classic
one, of the information in the surveillance data (i.e., the num-
ber of patients) The geocoded portion of the data set (i.e., the
location of the patients) provides a second perspective. Other
researchers have used spatial analytic approaches (2,3,5) on the
assumption that terrorist attacks might produce a pattern of
disease with a distinctive spatial signature (6).
Multiple spatial statistics have been designed to detect dis-
tinctive spatial patterns (7,8). Because the particular disease
pattern that a terrorist attack might produce remains unknown,
a statistic should be sufficiently flexible to detect multiple dis-
tortions from normalcy without requiring a priori knowledge
of how such a distortion might appear. For this analysis, simple
application of the M-statistic (9), which is based on the distri-
bution of distances between patients, was chosen. To com-
pute the M statistic for detection of outbreaks, all pairwise
distances between locations of patients arriving for care each
day are calculated. An empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion (ECDF) of these distances can then be compared with
the historically determined distribution of distances to yield a
test statistic, M. Asymptotic properties of the M statistic (9)
or empirical simulation allow for a nominal alpha level to
determine substantial deviations from the norm.
Fundamental to use of the M statistic is the remarkable
stationarity of the distribution of distances over time. The
frequency polygon of distances, derived from the ECDF, for
five randomly chosen, nonoverlapping 30-day periods distrib-
uted across seasons and throughout the approximate 4-year
study period, is illustrated (Figure 2). The ECDF is sufficiently
stable from season to season and year to year to establish a
definition of normalcy.
Daily geocoded data enables 1) calculation of the ECDF
         (where F(D) denotes the cumulative distribution func-
tion of interpoint distances determined from historic data)
for each day’s disease cases, and 2) calculation of a test statistic
measuring the departure from F(D). To avoid complexities,
the daily case load is used to calculate distances between
patients; typically, memory can be incorporated into the sys-
tem by extending a temporal window within which to calcu-
late distances. This extension would be especially important
when dealing with a contagious ailment that has an incuba-
tion distribution. To facilitate calculation of the statistic, all
of the interpoint distances are placed into 10 bins that are
equiprobable under the distribution F(D), and a Mahalanobis-
like distance is calculated as
M = (o – e)t S
–
 (o – e)
where o is the 10-dimensional vector of observed proportions
of distances in each bin; e is the vector of expected propor-
tions (equal to [0.1, … , 0.1]) under the null distribution;
and S is an estimator of the variance-covariance matrix ∑ of
the bin proportions calculated under the null. S is calculated
from the historic data and a generalized inverse S
–
 is used
because S is not of full rank.
Because the distribution of distances between patients is sta-
tionary, an alert based on M can be instituted so that large
values of M generate the alert; exactly how large these values
must be is determined by the desired false-positive rate. The
null distribution of M is determined by the null distribution
of the distances; however, asymptotically, NM has a χ2 distri-
bution with degrees of freedom equal to the rank of the cova-
riance matrix ∑ – ∑ (where NM refers to the product of the
test statistic M(t) and number of cases N at a time t). Thus,
the distribution of NM is asymptotically independent of the
number of cases used to calculate the statistic. As the degrees
of freedom increase, the log of a χ2 random variable approxi-
mates a normal distribution, and experience has confirmed
that the values log(NM) give a close normal approximation.
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FIGURE 3. Subset of the null (N) and alternative (A) populations
used to train the quadratic discriminator for using the bivariate
test statistic to perform power calculations for spatio-temporal
disease surveillance
Note: The horizontal axis measures the spatial component of the data, the
vertical axis measures the temporal component, and the solid black line (a
portion of the classification boundary) is used to decide whether a particular
day’s observation falls into the null (normal) or alternative (unusual/outbreak)
population.
More importantly, this demonstrates that the random vari-
ables NM and N are approximately independent for large N
(i.e., N >40). Thus, the temporal information and spatial
information are orthogonal (for large N).This substantiates
combining the two to produce an even more powerful statis-
tic, as discussed in the following section.
Bivariate Test Statistic
Use of a bivariate test statistic, composed of the two statis-
tics described previously, is proposed to increase the power of
outbreak detection. N(t) permits calculation of a residual value
for the number of cases arriving, on the basis of the time-
series prediction for that day, with residuals that are approxi-
mately normal. Log(NM) expresses the deviation of the spatial
distribution of cases from normalcy, and this statistic is
approximately normal as well. Standard techniques from mul-
tivariate analysis can be used to construct an elliptical rejec-
tion region for a bivariate normal population at prespecified
alpha level (false-positive rate) that can be used to detect
deviations from normalcy. However, this might not offer par-
ticular protection against the alternative of interest (i.e., an
outbreak resulting from release of a biologic agent).
As another approach, potential biologic attacks can be mod-
eled to simulate bivariate values in the event of an attack; in
this case, an optimal discriminator (the quadratic classifica-
tion rule) exists between two bivariate normal populations: 1)
the bivariate distribution under the null, and 2) the modeled
bivariate distribution under the alternative of a biologic at-
tack (10). The classification rule is a quadratic form that, given
log(NM) and the one-step-ahead time-series residuals, assigns
one day’s observations to either the null or alternative popula-
tion. This rule minimizes the expected error of misclas-
sification. The false-positive rate can be controlled by shifting
the quadratic boundary appropriately, as determined through
simulation or resampling of the historic record. A typical case
of the null and alternative populations, together with the
boundary of the discriminator, is illustrated (Figure 3).
Results
Because no biologic terrorism events occurred in eastern
Massachusetts during the period of study, an outbreak simu-
lation was necessary. To this end, for each of four locations,
either six, nine, or 12 additional URIs were added to the
existing data set. The range of 6–12 cases represents approxi-
mately 0.25–1.25 standard deviations of the original caseload,
depending on the day of the week (mean daily case count is
approximately 15 cases/day on weekends, 55 cases/day on
Mondays, and 40 cases/day on other weekdays). The signal
was dispersed across adjacent census tracts (i.e., adding six
cases at a particular location amounted to choosing six nearby
tracts and adding one case to each tract). (For brevity, such a
simulated signal is called a cluster.) By using the statistics dis-
cussed previously, power was calculated on the basis of this
simulated disease signal. Although other methods might have
higher power to detect a concentrated cluster (e.g., six addi-
tional cases in one tract), they are less likely to perform as well
when the signal is dispersed.
A simulated cluster was added to each of the 1,399 days of
data, 1 day at a time, to assess how frequently different statis-
tics might detect such a signal. Power calculations were per-
formed separately for each of the three daily categories
(weekend days or holidays, Mondays or days after holidays,
and all other weekdays) because prediction and behavior dif-
fer within each of these categories. A detection threshold was
set for each statistic on the basis of an alpha level of 0.05. For
daily observations (as are illustrated here), this is equivalent
to one false alert every 20 days. Power equals the ratio of
detections to the total number of observations.
The four locations chosen for the simulation are in differ-
ent geographic areas covered by the data. Previous simula-
tions have demonstrated that power to detect a cluster might
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FIGURE 4. Simulated clusters for use in outbreak-detection
power calculations involving spatial and bivariate test statistics
Note: Four different sets of simulations were performed, using different
cluster locations; these are indicated by the circles. Within each circle, large
dots indicate census tracts for which cases were added to simulate a disease
cluster. The small dots represent census tract locations across the Greater
Boston area.
TABLE. Powers for three statistical tests in detecting disease
outbreaks when simulated clusters of size six, nine, and 12 are
superimposed on original data from four locations (census
tracts 446, 185, 364, and 212)
Location, cases Holidays/ Days after
and cluster size Overall weekends Weekdays holidays
Temporal test*
N + 6 0.128 0.168 0.112 0.100
N + 9 0.213 0.304 0.187 0.117
N + 12 0.286 0.408 0.234 0.217
Spatial test using the M-statistic
446, N + 6 0.141 0.162 0.138 0.108
185, N + 6 0.141 0.148 0.151 0.090
364, N + 6 0.093 0.103 0.092 0.075
212, N + 6 0.054 0.078 0.044 0.042
446, N + 9 0.258 0.299 0.264 0.156
185, N + 9 0.254 0.256 0.276 0.175
364, N + 9 0.187 0.237 0.171 0.142
212, N + 9 0.064 0.087 0.051 0.061
446, N + 12 0.383 0.422 0.395 0.258
185, N + 12 0.382 0.397 0.410 0.250
364, N + 12 0.292 0.349 0.283 0.203
212, N + 12 0.072 0.075 0.071 0.071
Bivariate statistic
446, N + 6 0.441 0.536 0.453 0.200
185, N + 6 0.456 0.520 0.514 0.117
364, N + 6 0.373 0.424 0.416 0.117
212, N + 6 0.308 0.360 0.327 0.133
446, N + 9 0.659 0.776 0.682 0.333
185, N + 9 0.652 0.776 0.682 0.283
364, N + 9 0.564 0.728 0.575 0.183
212, N + 9 0.391 0.464 0.416 0.150
446, N + 12 0.777 0.904 0.790 0.467
185, N + 12 0.807 0.896 0.850 0.467
364, N + 12 0.747 0.864 0.780 0.383
212, N + 12 0.509 0.608 0.537 0.200
* Results for this test are not stratified by location because the statistic
depends only on the number of cases and not on location.
depend on the local geography and location of the signal source
(11). This effect is confounded by the population distribu-
tion in the data available. Locations on the outskirts of the
region covered tend to be more sparsely populated; hence, the
signal is more widely dispersed. The census-tract locations in
the study area, together with the four locations at which clus-
ters were simulated, are illustrated (Figure 4). The cluster at
location 446 corresponds to an area approximately circular
with radius 0.5 miles; at locations 185 and 364 with radius 1
mile; and at location 212 with radius 1.5 miles. These radii
reflect population densities.
Power calculations for the three test statistics are provided
(Table). Results for the univariate test statistic N based on
time-series modeling are not stratified by location because the
statistic depends only on the number of cases and not on
locations. Power to detect an additional six, nine, or 12 cases
added to the case counts of the final 399 days of data was then
calculated by using the first 1,000 days to train the model
(Table).
Next, a training sample was generated based on a modeled
signal consisting of 12 cases near location 446, superimposed
on each of the first 1,000 days of data. This permitted genera-
tion of two distinct bivariate normal populations of values,
consisting of N(t) residuals together with log(NM) calcula-
tions, as a training sample. Next, for a simulated cluster in the
final 399 days of data, the corresponding bivariate test statis-
tic was calculated, and the quadratic classification rule was
used to place each day’s simulated cluster into the null (no
signal) population or the alternative (signal present) popula-
tion (Table). Power in this case equals the number of clusters
classified in the alternative divided by the total number of
observations.
Conclusions
The power of the univariate statistic N, which detects
deviations from the predicted number of cases daily, illustrates
the difficulties of time-series modeling for public health sur-
veillance. The behavior of the time series N(t) is nonstationary,
with differing variation according to season and day of the
week. Rather than relying on a simple autoregression, detec-
tion results could be improved by considering a multivariate
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periodic autoregression (12). Meanwhile, the spatial statistic
M has exhibited promise in other contexts to detect spatial
deviations from the norm (3,9). Further research into the char-
acteristics of this and other spatial statistics is needed, as dif-
ferent complementary spatial methods exist that can be used
in conjunction with differing detection power.
Development of additional statistical methods and research
into those methods are critical to the terrorism surveillance
effort. Because routinely collected electronic data are often
available to public health departments and researchers, effi-
cient analysis of these data provides a low-cost method for
surveillance. Although one cannot make any claims as to the
robustness or generalizability of the bivariate method to other
data sets or other univariate statistics, the power calculations
provided here demonstrate that information on the number
of cases as well as the spatial distribution of those cases can be
used effectively in combination to improve the efficiency of
surveillance systems.
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Abstract
Introduction: Syndromic surveillance systems are used to monitor daily electronic data streams for anomalous counts of
features of varying specificity. The monitored quantities might be counts of clinical diagnoses, sales of over-the-counter influ-
enza remedies, school absenteeism among a given age group, and so forth. Basic data-aggregation decisions for these systems
include determining which records to count and how to group them in space and time.
Objectives: This paper discusses the application of spatial and temporal data-aggregation strategies for multiple data streams
to alerting algorithms appropriate to the surveillance region and public health threat of interest. Such a strategy was applied
and evaluated for a complex, authentic, multisource, multiregion environment, including >2 years of data records from a
system-evaluation exercise for the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA).
Methods: Multivariate and multiple univariate statistical process control methods were adapted and applied to the DARPA data
collection. Comparative parametric analyses based on temporal aggregation were used to optimize the performance of these
algorithms for timely detection of a set of outbreaks identified in the data by a team of epidemiologists.
Results: The sensitivity and timeliness of the most promising detection methods were tested at empirically calculated thresh-
olds corresponding to multiple practical false-alert rates. Even at the strictest false-alert rate, all but one of the outbreaks were
detected by the best method, and the best methods achieved a 1-day median time before alert over the set of test outbreaks.
Conclusions: These results indicate that a biosurveillance system can provide a substantial alerting-timeliness advantage over
traditional public health monitoring for certain outbreaks. Comparative analyses of individual algorithm results indicate
further achievable improvement in sensitivity and specificity.
Introduction
A working definition of syndromic surveillance is the moni-
toring of available data sources for outbreaks of unspecified
disease or of specified disease before identifying symptoms
are confirmed. Its goal is to complement existing sentinel sur-
veillance by identifying outbreaks with false-alert rates accept-
able to the public health infrastructure. After data sources are
chosen, multiple data-aggregation decisions follow. Foremost
among these decisions are which data records to monitor, how
data will be aggregated in space and time, and how other
covariates (e.g., age and sex) will be managed. In data aggre-
gation, a thematic tradeoff exists between expanding the space
or time window to increase structure for background model-
ing and masking a potential outbreak signal with the addi-
tional counts.
This paper explores data aggregation by space, time, and
data category; discusses the relevance of data aggregation to
the effectiveness of alerting algorithms; describes approaches
selected for use by the Electronic Surveillance System for the
Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics
(ESSENCE) (1); and discusses these approaches’ performance
in a detection evaluation exercise conducted in 2003 by the
Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technol-
ogy (Bio-ALIRT) program of the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA) (2).
Background
Sliding Buffer Concept
A temporal-aggregation concept underlying certain surveil-
lance algorithms (3,4), including those used by ESSENCE, is
the separation of recent data into three segments that slide
forward in time (Figure 1). These segments include 1) a
baseline period to estimate expected data behavior; 2) the
recent test period, typically 1–7 days, of potentially anoma-
lous data; and 3) a guard band between them to avoid con-
tamination of the baseline by an outbreak signal. Whether
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FIGURE 1. Conceptual sliding buffers for temporal data
aggregation





































the quantities of interest are simple means and standard
deviations, regression coefficients, spatial distributions, or dis-
tributions of covariate strata (e.g., age groups), these tempo-
ral subdivisions are used to determine whether the test-period
data violate the null hypothesis of expected behavior inferred
from the baseline.
Data Aggregation and Purely
Temporal Surveillance
Purely temporal surveillance monitors data time series for
outbreak-induced anomalies without using spatial informa-
tion. Categorical- and spatial-aggregation decisions determine
both the time series to be monitored and the regression-based
or process-control–based approaches to be implemented for
monitoring. Historic data analysis is used to choose the baseline
lengths, and the expected data effects of outbreaks are used to
determine the length of the test period and guard band. These
aggregation decisions (e.g., to stratify among neighboring
regions or data subtypes) might result in the monitoring of
multiple time series. Multivariate algorithms using the data-
covariance matrix can exploit the correlation among these time
series but might be sensitive to changes in data relationships
(e.g., changes caused by informatics or organizational changes)
that are irrelevant to monitoring for disease.
Data Aggregation and Scan Statistics
Spatial-aggregation decisions for purely temporal methods
can be driven by jurisdictional or logistical considerations,
but such decisions can decrease the early warning advantage
of syndromic surveillance (e.g., when early cases are scattered
among the chosen regions). Use of scan statistics (5,6), nota-
bly in SaTScan™ software (7), has become popular because it
avoids preselection bias and can choose the most important
among possible outbreak locations and extents without
oversensitivity caused by multiple testing. Use of scan statis-
tics guides spatial aggregation and can direct limited public
health resources to localities of anomalous case distributions.
Temporal aggregation becomes a concern in ESSENCE
adaptations of scan statistics when the underlying assump-
tion of uniform spatial incidence fails. In such cases, historic
data are used to obtain expected spatial distributions; tempo-
ral baseline and test-period decisions are then necessary. For
example, the New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene successfully used a 28-day baseline and 7-day guard
band and test periods in West Nile virus surveillance (3). An
enhanced scan-statistics implementation in ESSENCE enables
treatment of other aggregation problems (e.g., the distance
measure for generating candidate clusters). The distance
matrix is usually formed by using the Euclidean distance
between centroids of component subregions. Although this
distance measure might be appropriate for monitoring threats
caused by atmospheric risk factors (e.g., an aerosolized release
of a biologic agent), driving distance might be a more suitable
measure for monitoring an increase in communicable endemic
disease. Test-bed implementations have demonstrated that
direct, heuristic modifications to the distance matrix can avoid
undesirable clustering. An ESSENCE enhancement also per-
mits use of multiple data sources to search for anomalous clus-
ters (8). The different data sources need not have the same
spatial partitioning, and their baseline and test intervals might
differ. A stratified scan-statistics approach is used to avoid the
signal masking caused by mismatched scales or variances in
the respective data sources. A performance measure, described
and tested with various signal distributions (8), demonstrates
that the stratified approach retains power to detect signals in
both single and multiple data sources.
Objectives
ESSENCE’s biosurveillance systems attempt to fuse infor-
mation from multiple data sources that vary in their medical
specificity, spatial organization, scale, and time-series behav-
ior. True denominator data specifying the number of persons
at risk are rarely available. These systems are increasingly used
at multiple jurisdictional levels; therefore, the system alerts
should be appropriate to the purview of the user. Specific
objectives are to 1) present aggregation and detection strate-
gies that were applied to the city-level DARPA evaluation
exercise (see Methods), 2) present the ESSENCE results from
this exercise, and 3) draw conclusions about potential system
capability and identify areas for enhancement.
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Methods
For temporal-detection algorithms, statistical process con-
trol (SPC) and multiple statistical process control (MPSC)
algorithms are applied to raw or normalized time-series data.
Data Normalization Strategies
Normalization is required if the raw time-series data exhibit
systematic features (e.g., day-of-week effects). These features
are most often seen in counts of large syndrome-group diag-
noses collected from well-represented regions; an approximate
quantitative rule for these features is a median of >5 counts
per day. When such data features occur, SPC algorithms are
applied to the residuals of linear or Poisson regression. Cur-
rent ESSENCE systems apply goodness-of-fit statistics to
automate the choice of whether to use regression residuals;
regression-predictor variables include time, day-of-week
indicators, and other data-dependent quantities.
Aggregation and Fusion Concerns
Monitoring multiple series might be necessary for three rea-
sons: 1) multiple, disparate data sources might be available;
2) time series for a data source might be divided among
political regions or treatment facilities; 3) the need to moni-
tor for multiple outbreak types might require stratification of
available data by syndrome or product group. These circum-
stances are increasingly intertwined in ESSENCE systems as
the surveillance areas and number of available data sources
increase. Two combined monitoring approaches are taken. In
the multiple univariate approach, detection algorithms are
applied separately to each time series, and alerting depends
on how the separate results are combined. The combination
method must retain sensitivity while avoiding excessive alerts
caused by multiple testing. In the multivariate approach,
MSPC algorithms are applied to the set of time series to pro-
duce a single statistic. These algorithms usually depend on a
recent estimate of the covariance matrix of the input streams,
and the challenge is to avoid alerts caused by changes to data
interrelationships that are irrelevant to potential outbreaks.
Multiple Univariate Strategies
Univariate SPC methods used by recent ESSENCE systems
include 1) an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA)
algorithm (9), with baseline and guard band optimized for
timely alerting of an epicurve-like signal, and 2) the nonhistoric
cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithms from the Early Aber-
ration Reporting System (EARS) (10) used by many local
health departments. Alerting based on the maximum value of
the chosen univariate method over input data streams leads to
excessive alerting as the number of these streams increases.
Using Edgington’s consensus method (11) for multiple
experiments reduces this problem. Bayes Belief Networks
(BBNs) (12), a more versatile means for combining algorithm
outputs, were used in the DARPA evaluation exercise to cal-
culate a composite p-value for alerting. BBNs provide a com-
pact encoding of the joint probability distribution of algorithm
outputs along with other synoptic evidence. This approach
uses a directed graphical structure to represent knowledge of
conditional independences among variables to simplify the
representation of the overall joint probability distribution.
Because variables (nodes in the graph) usually depend on a
limited number of other variables, estimates of probabilities
are needed only for the local (connected) relationships. The
overall probability distribution is then determined from all
local distributions. Thus, the BBN approach permits
environmental evidence and heuristic rules to be included in
alerting decisions.
Multivariate Methods
The use of MSPC methods for surveillance against cyber
attacks by adopting Hotelling’s T2 is described elsewhere (13).
Certain published discussions (14,15) state that multivariate
EWMA (16) and CUSUM (17) methods are preferable to
Hotelling’s T2 for detecting changes in the multivariate mean
because they have shorter average run lengths before the pro-
cess is declared out of control. For the application of finding
outbreak signals in outpatient-visit data, all of these methods
were determined to be oversensitive because they generated
alerts from irrelevant changes in the covariance matrix esti-
mate. To illustrate, the T2 statistic can be written
(X – µ)T S-1 (X – µ)
where X = multivariate data from the test interval; µ = vector
mean estimated from the baseline interval; and S = estimate
of covariance matrix calculated from the baseline interval.
Certain nuisance alerts caused by relative data dropoffs were
eliminated by implementation of a one-sided test in which
the test statistic was replaced with 0 whenever the sum of cur-
rent z-scores over the data streams was negative. These z-scores
were calculated by using the current baseline mean and stan-
dard deviation in each stream. This procedure naturally
reduced the number of alerts in all MSPC methods, and the
resulting T2 statistic performed well in the Bio-ALIRT evalu-
ation. Additional work is needed to improve the specificity of
certain methods (16,17) for biosurveillance applications.
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FIGURE 2. Training data sample from the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency detection evaluation exercise
Note: The circles in the figure indicate a faint outbreak in the training set,
not completely synchronized among the data streams, which could be found






















































The DARPA evaluation exercise was a comprehensive com-
parison of the effectiveness of detection methodologies used
by participating contractor teams in a large, complex, authentic
data environment. The exercise is discussed elsewhere in
detail (2), and its main features are summarized here. The
task for the contractor teams was to find authentic outbreaks
when given daily records from three data sources: military
clinic visits, physician office visits by civilians, and military
prescriptions. Only records of visits or prescriptions that could
be classified with a respiratory or gastrointestinal (GI) diag-
nosis were included in the sample; for simplicity, respiratory
and GI data were analyzed separately for outbreaks. The prin-
cipal covariates included in the records were patient age, sex,
residential zip code, and specific International Classification of
Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes (or, for prescriptions,
Specific Therapeutic Class [GC3] codes and National Drug
Codes [NDC]), along with the respiratory/GI classification.
Data sets from five cities were processed separately. The out-
break detection group (ODG), a committee of epidemiolo-
gists and physicians, chose these data sets and identified sample
outbreaks for training purposes.
Fourteen months of training data from all five cities were
supplied to Bio-ALIRT detection teams for learning the data
features and for choosing and calibrating optimal detection
methods. The resulting methods were to be applied without
further modification to the next 9 months of data. ODG then
examined the 9-month test period of these data sets indepen-
dently and, for each outbreak identified, specified a start date,
nominal date when traditional public health monitoring would
have recognized the outbreak, peak date, and end date. The
ODG findings of eight respiratory outbreaks and seven GI
outbreaks in the test period were treated as the standard for
the exercise, against which the algorithm outputs of each
detection team were scored. The positive and negative aspects
of applying human medical professional judgment to authen-
tic, noisy data for performance-evaluation purposes have been
discussed elsewhere (2).
Sample plots of the training data for each data source are
presented (Figure 2). These time series of patient encounters
indicated substantial respiratory syndrome data counts, dis-
tinct day-of-week effects, and seasonal trends. ODG directed
the detection teams to look for city-scale outbreaks of any
duration. Faint outbreaks in the training set were detected,
not completely synchronized among the data streams, which
could be found only with multivariate methods.
Performance Assessment Tools
The methodology used to measure the performance of the
detection algorithms in this exercise is described elsewhere in
computational detail (2). The two measures used were algo-
rithm sensitivity (i.e., the number of outbreaks detected) and
timeliness (i.e., the number of days between the outbreak start
and subsequent alert). However, instead of being assessed at
fixed algorithm thresholds at uncontrolled specificity, both
measures were calculated for fixed false-alert rates seen as prac-
tical for public health surveillance. False-alert rates of 1 per 2
weeks, 1 per 4 weeks, and 1 per 6 weeks were chosen for this
purpose. Series of trials were conducted on the training data
sets to choose algorithms that were effective at these false-
alert rates with parameters that were approximately optimal
for the surveillance context of this exercise.
Data Conditioning Using
Provider-Count Regression
In terms of the performance measures adopted, a particu-
larly effective data-conditioning procedure was a linear regres-
sion of the daily syndrome counts in which the count of
providers reporting each day was used as a predictor. The daily
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FIGURE 3. Daily counts of total patient encounters and number
of military clinics reporting
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FIGURE 4.  Day-of-week-effect attenuation in provider-count
regression residuals
Rise caused by outbreak





























reporting provider counts were calculated according to the
data type (i.e., the count of clinics for the military outpatient
data, of pharmacies for the military prescription data, and of
individual physicians for the civilian office-visit data). Residuals
from this regression were used as input to the alerting algo-
rithms. Substitution of the count data with these residuals
probably improved algorithm performance because the daily
provider counts can reflect both known data features (e.g.,
holiday and weekend dropoffs) and unknown ones (e.g., spe-
cial military events and severe weather effects). Thus, the
regression can remove such features, which are irrelevant for
public health purposes, from the algorithm inputs (Figure 3).
In effect, the algorithms operate on the difference of the
observed counts from the expected counts given the number
of reporting providers. In comparison plots of actual count
data and regression residuals, the day-of-week effect is strongly
attenuated in the residual plot (Figure 4). Baseline lengths of
1–10 weeks were tested on the training data, and a 5-week
baseline gave the best detection performance on a chosen set
of outbreak signals.
Results
Two algorithmic methods gave robust performance in
detection testing on the evaluation training data sets, using a
candidate set of outbreak events and the false-alert criteria
described previously. The first method was to precondition
all three data streams by using provider count regression and
then to apply Hotelling’s T2 algorithm. The second method
was a multiple univariate EWMA algorithm similar to the
EARS C2 method (10), with the baseline length chosen by
empirical testing (Figure 3). Because these methods differed
in the limited number of outbreaks not detected at the chosen
false-alert rates, their outputs were combined by applying a
BBN based on the joint probability distribution of the
outputs calculated from the training period data.
These two methods and the BBN composite were applied
to the exercise-test data sets for comparison with ODG out-
break findings. Performance results are summarized separately
for the respiratory and GI outbreaks (Table). For GI outbreaks
at the specificity level of one false alert per 4 weeks, the
median detection time was 1 day after the start date chosen
by ODG epidemiologists, whereas their median unaided rec-
ognition date was 2 weeks after the start date. For the two
individual algorithms, the median detection time increased
to 5 days for the most constrained false-alert rate, whereas the
BBN improved timeliness by 2 days. The BBN also detected
an additional outbreak at the lowest specificity. Correspond-
ing results for the respiratory outbreaks indicated that the mul-
tiple univariate method was superior in both sensitivity and
timeliness at the higher specificity levels.
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TABLE. Performance of three methods for detecting two outbreak types — Defense Advanced Research Project Agency detection
evaluation exercise
Sensitivity Median timeliness
Gastrointestinal outbreaks Alerts/7 events Days before alert
False-alert rate (expected days between alerts) 14 28 42 14 28 42
Methods Provider-count–adjusted MSPC* 6 6 6 1 1 5
Multiple univariate SPC† 6 6 6 1 1 5
Bayes Belief Network combination 7 6 6 1 1 3
Sensitivity Median timeliness
Respiratory outbreaks Alerts/8 events Days before alert
False-alert rate (expected days between alerts) 14 28 42 14 28 42
Methods Provider-count–adjusted MSPC 8 7 6 1 4.5 4.5
Multiple univariate SPC 8 8 8 1 1 1
Bayes Belief Network combination 8 7 7 1 1 4.5




Judicious data-aggregation strategies have important func-
tions in improving detection performance of biosurveillance
systems. Choosing the appropriate scope for monitored time
series, stratifying and filtering patient-encounter data, and
tuning algorithms effectively can improve these systems’ sen-
sitivity for early outbreak detection. The DARPA evaluation
exercise provided a useful test bed for quantifying these
improvements by using authentic data streams from five
geographic regions.
The focus on city-level outbreaks in this exercise led to an
emphasis on temporal alerting methods. Both multiple
univariate and multivariate approaches yielded good detec-
tion sensitivity and timeliness, and both presented challenges
that indicate a need for further improvement. As ESSENCE
surveillance systems become more complex, enhancement of
these approaches will be important for managing the mul-
tiple-testing problem while preserving sensitivity. For the
multiple univariate problem, the BBN approach appears ver-
satile for combining separate algorithm-output streams. BBNs
are also robust in that they can handle missing data in a math-
ematically consistent way, an important feature in syndromic
surveillance, where data dropouts are common. Another
advantage of BBNs is the capability to combine other evi-
dence (e.g., sensor or environmental data) with the algorithm
outputs for a fused assessment of the probability of an out-
break. Multivariate methods might have the best potential for
finding faint signals distributed over multiple data sources,
but adaptations are needed for specificity in the biosurveillance
context.
The DARPA exercise results should be understood in per-
spective. Using authentic clinical data from five cities, the
epidemiologist team specified start dates and unaided public
health recognition dates for 15 disease outbreaks. The best
algorithms generated alerts within days of the start date,
whereas the median gap between the start dates and recogni-
tion dates was 2 weeks. The focus on city-level outbreaks and
the restriction of outbreaks to respiratory or gastrointestinal
symptoms probably boosted the algorithm performance. For
the more difficult challenge of a multisource, multilevel sys-
tem to detect outbreaks of unconstrained symptomatology, a
comprehensive evaluation with authentic data would be
extremely complex. Finally, if detection algorithms can truly
give advance warning of >1 week for certain outbreaks, the
matter of how to respond to these early warnings is critical for
public health decision-makers.
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Abstract
Introduction: Intentional releases of biologic agents are often designed to maximize casualties before diagnostic detection. To
provide earlier warning, syndromic surveillance requires statistical methods that are sensitive to an abrupt increase in syn-
dromes or symptoms associated with such an attack.
Objectives: This study compared two different statistical methods for detecting a relatively abrupt increase in incidence. The
methods were based on the number of observations in a moving time window.
Methods: One class of surveillance techniques generates a signal based on values of the generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT). This surveillance method is relatively well-known and requires simulation, but it is flexible and, by construction,
has the appropriate type I error. An alternative surveillance method generates a signal based on the p-values for the conven-
tional scan statistic. This test does not require simulation, complicated formulas, or use of specialized software, but it is based
on approximations and thus can overstate or understate the probability of interest.
Results: This study compared statistical methods by using brucellosis data collected by CDC. The methods provided qualita-
tively similar results.
Conclusions: Relatively simple modification of existing software should be considered so that when GLRTs are performed, the
appropriate function will be maximized. When a health department has data that indicate an unexpected increase in rates
but its staff lack experience with existing software for surveillance based on GLRTs, alternative methods that only require
computing Poisson probabilities can be used.
Introduction
Traditional surveillance systems tend to focus on compul-
sory reporting of specific diseases. However, in recent years,
syndromic surveillance based on emergency department
admissions, hospital bed occupancy, pharmaceutical sales, and
other correlates of disease has increased to detect possible bio-
logic terrorism attacks (1). This study analyzed methods use-
ful in detecting surges in illness (1), particularly when these
increases are abrupt, as might occur during a biologic attack.
This study was based on the assumption that, according to
historic data, events occur on the basis of a known pattern of
events (e.g., seasonal, specific day of the week, or weather).
Methods used to estimate this pattern based on historic data
have been addressed by others (1–3) and are not the focus of
this paper, although one simple fitting method is illustrated.
Although multiple statistical approaches to surveillance have
been proposed and compared before 2001 (4,5), interest in
these methods has recently increased (6–8).
This study’s overall approach scans time, seeking unusual
incidence within a short period. The symbol t represents cur-
rent time, and w represents a window of time used for surveil-
lance, usually a limited number of days. Yt(w) is the number
of events in the last w days before and including t, and Et(w)
is the expected number of such events, usually based on his-
toric data. The proposed methods result in an alert being gen-
erated at time t, if Yt(w) is substantially greater then Et(w).
The procedures are designed so that, if the event rates are the
same as the historic rates, the probability of generating one or
more false signals in a period T is α. The total time frame T is
under the investigator’s control.
The procedures described in this paper can be contrasted
with what are termed quadrat-based tests (9) or cell proce-
dures. In such procedures, time is subdivided into non-
overlapping periods of days, weeks, or months, and the data
analyst searches for substantial increases in these periods. The
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) in Lon-
don uses such a system (10) to automatically scan weekly
reports to provide early warning of disease outbreaks. CDSC
staff compare observed counts of a disease in a given week
with historically fitted expected counts. However, equally con-
cerning is a cluster of cases that occurs during a 7-day period
that overlaps 2 calendar weeks. In a monitoring system that
continuously updates reports, advantages exist, both with
power and speed of detection, in using scan-like statistics and
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examining the number of cases in a moving time interval in-
stead of just looking at nonoverlapping intervals. This is par-
ticularly true for monitoring disease organisms that can be
used for a biologic terrorism event, during which an early
warning might be critical. If the reported effect of a release of
a biologic agent is expected to spread over a 7-day period,
then health department staff use a 7-day scanning window
rather than a calendar week for monitoring.
This study focused on how staff decide that an observed
count in a limited window of width w (measured in days or
weeks) is more substantial than expected, taking into account
multiple testing during a longer surveillance period T. Two
functions of the observed and expected values were used to
judge what constitutes more substantial counts. One func-
tion was based on generalized likelihood ratio tests (GLRTs),
and the other was based on p-values calculated from the clas-
sical, constant-risk scan statistics.
Both of these approaches can be viewed as extensions of the
classical scan statistic, the maximum number of observations
in an interval of width w. One of the defects of the classical
scan statistic is that it assumes a constant baseline rate (4).
This difficulty can be overcome by scanning on the basis of
GLRT (11–14). The first procedure discussed in this paper
shares a common theoretical background with this surveil-
lance method but differs in that the type I error refers to a
period of time (e.g., the time of a limited objective surveil-
lance, or a month, or a year) rather than the instant at which
an alert might be generated. The second procedure, based on
p-values, does not require simulation and thus can be more
easily applied.
For this study, both of these procedures were applied to bru-
cellosis data collected by CDC during 1997–2002. The point
of using these example data is not to evaluate brucellosis but
to illustrate how such an analysis can be performed.
Methods
For this study, the authors assumed that the incidence of
events follows a Poisson process. In this description of the
methods, the notation concerning the process was suppressed,
and focus was placed on Et(w), the expected number of events
in a window of w days ending at time t. The first test requires
that the window width w be fixed before the surveillance; this
condition is then removed.
In a biologic terrorism event, the difference between an early
signal and an obvious outbreak might be days. A critical period
exists, d days, within which the data analyst should detect the
increase. Multiple authors (7,8) have reported that special tech-
niques are needed when only a limited time delay can be toler-
ated. Therefore, the signal decision should be based on
observations within the past d days. In this context, the win-
dow size is in the range w < d. Alternatively, for increased power,
a fixed window of w = d, or w = d – 1, can be used.
G-Surveillance Methods
If the window width, w, is fixed in advance, G-surveillance
used to detect an abrupt increase, on the basis of a fixed type
I error for a given period, generates an alert for substantial
values of the statistic Gt(w),
Gt(w) =  Yt(w) ln [Yt(w)/Et(w)] – [Yt(w) – Et(w)]
where ln is the natural logarithm. (Details of the proof are
available from the corresponding author upon request.) An
alert will be sounded at time t, if Gt(w) is larger than a thresh-
old (i.e., the critical value) obtained through simulation.
The extension to the case where w is not fixed but is within
a certain range (e.g., 1–3 days) follows the same pattern as
previously described (9,15,16). G-surveillance with variable
window widths will signal an alert at time t if
Gt(u to v) = maxu<w<v Gt(w)
is larger than a new critical value.
When data are recorded daily, u in the previous equation cor-
responds to the smallest number of days of interest (presum-
ably, u = 1), and v to the largest number of days. When
surveillance is continuous, u should not be set so small that it
picks up artifacts of data collection and, in certain contexts,
might be >24 hours. If the expected values depend only on past
history, the threshold can be obtained before surveillance
begins by generating realizations of the complete process. For
numerous local health departments to avoid having to develop
expertise in simulating the process, this critical value can be
computed once a year at a central location and then transmit-
ted to local health departments. In other cases, the expected
values depend on current data (e.g., weather conditions), and
the user might have to re-do simulations at each time point t.
P-Surveillance Methods
An alternative method is a fixed-window scan surveillance
method, P surveillance, that does not require simulation but
instead is based on p-values from the classical scan statistic
(17). The traditional fixed window scan statistic, Sw, is the
largest number of cases to be found in any subinterval of length
w (for w, a known constant) of the surveillance interval (0,T).
Two recent books (18,19) summarize results on finding the
exact probability (20), finding bounds (21), and finding
approximations (21,22) for the distribution of Sw. For the
atypical surveillance application, in which the expected
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number of events in any interval of width w is a constant, λ,
the approximation (22) is given by
Pr(Sw>k) =  (T/w) (k–λ) p(k,λ) + s(k,λ)
where p(k,λ) is the Poisson probability of observing exactly k
events, p(k,λ) = exp(–λ) λk / k!, and s(k,λ) the probability of
observing k + 1 or more events.
The limited usefulness of the classic scan statistic in surveil-
lance, because of its assumption of constant baseline risk, has
been noted (4). One early method to overcome this limita-
tion involved stretching or contracting time (23), which has
the disadvantage that it would not allow surveillance in
24-hour units. G-surveillance is another way to overcome the
limitation.
P-surveillance is based on computing a p-value at time t,
focusing on what is happening at that time and ignoring all
other information. The same p-value should be used if the
baseline risk over the whole period is constant at the local rate
at time t.
Under continuous surveillance, an alert is signaled at time t, if
(T/w) [Yt(w) – Et(w)] p[Yt(w), Et(w)] + s[Yt(w), Et(w)] < α
Under this procedure, α is the probability of generating a
false alert in time frame T ( e.g., T = 1 year) and will usually
be set to 0.05 or 0.10. In surveillance applications, loss of
precision will be limited if the second term in the last equa-
tion is ignored so that an alert will be signaled if
(T/w) [Yt(w) – Et(w)] [exp[–Et(w)] Et(w)
Y(w) / Yt(w)!] < α
Thus, P-surveillance in continuous time requires calculating
the left side of the previous equation each time an event
occurs and deciding if it is less than a prespecified α.
Conceptually, a different test based on the ratchet scan sta-
tistic (24) should be performed when the data are collected
daily or weekly instead of continuously. The principle under-
lying the test would be the same.
Justification for the use of P-surveillance requires 1) dem-
onstrating formally that theoretical (mathematical) reasons
exist to assume that P-surveillance has the claimed false-alert
rate, and then substantiating it by simulation, and 2) using
theory or simulations to demonstrate that P-surveillance had
power somewhat comparable to G-surveillance. Work on the
first assertion has already been performed (18), and limited
numerical work by the authors supports the second assertion.
Results (Example)
A study of disease characteristics of microbiologic agents
with particular potential for biologic terrorism lists brucello-
sis among critical biologic agents reported to the National
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (25). For this paper,
weekly national reports of brucellosis are used (for illustration
purposes only) as a proxy for the type of daily totals that might
arise for certain more common conditions in limited geo-
graphic areas.
Provisional (and for years 2001 and 2002, revised) cumula-
tive data can be obtained from Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report (available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr). The data are
revised to adjust for delayed reporting because certain states
submit reports in batches and include suspected cases in addi-
tion to confirmed ones. In using the provisional cumulative
data, distinguishing between negative adjustments caused by
removing previous suspected cases and new suspected or con-
firmed cases is impossible. This study used revised data for
1997–2001 provided by CDC (Table) as a proxy for the analy-
sis possible if the provisional data provided the number of
new cases/week.
Of these 260 weekly baseline counts, all but three are in the
range of 0–7. These three cases are all in different years and
occur at the end of the year. Careful scrutiny of the counts
reveals certain yearly and seasonal patterns; however, to
obtain an overall impression of the magnitude, the mean (1.60;
standard deviation: 1.45) of the remaining 257 counts was
computed (Table).
The following procedure was used to calculate the estimated
value per week (Table). The average (or for weeks 49 and 52,
the median) number of cases of brucellosis per week during
1997–2001 was calculated. The averages were then smoothed
by fitting a spline to the means (or for weeks 49 and 52, the
medians) for the first 51 weeks of data. No adjustment was
made for a possible secular trend.
G-surveillance (i.e., GLRT-based, scan-type methods) was
based on 1) a fixed 3-week window size and 2) on a window
that can be either 1, 2, or 3 weeks. Because the model postu-
lated does not involve any factors unknown at the start of the
year, percentiles of interest can be computed once before the
surveillance period begins. To obtain the percentiles for both
statistics, 100,000 realizations of the process were simulated
for the period of T = 52 weeks, in which weekly counts were
generated on the basis of a Poisson distribution with the
expected value (see last column of Table).
Percentiles of statistics
0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.99
G(3 weeks) 1.98 2.82 3.77 4.36 5.94
G(1–3 weeks) 2.67 3.49 4.48 5.19 6.77
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TABLE. Revised brucellosis counts per week and predicted values
   Average
Week 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1997–2001 Spline
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.81
2 0 0 1 3 0 1 0.8 0.81
3 2 0 1 0 2 2 1.0 0.8
4 0 1 0 0 2 2 0.6 0.8
5 0 1 1 0 2 1 0.8 0.81
6 1 0 2 2 1 1 1.2 0.83
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.4 0.88
8 0 0 2 0 1 4 0.6 0.96
9 0 0 0 2 4 3 1.2 1.08
10 3 0 0 1 3 1 1.4 1.18
11 3 0 1 0 5 1 1.8 1.23
12 0 0 1 2 2 1 1.0 1.23
13 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.2 1.2
14 1 1 2 1 2 1 1.4 1.17
15 1 1 0 0 2 2 0.8 1.16
16 1 1 0 3 1 5 1.2 1.2
17 0 1 0 2 0 0 0.6 1.3
18 3 0 0 3 2 0 1.6 1.46
19 0 3 1 3 4 5 2.2 1.62
20 0 1 3 3 1 5 1.6 1.74
21 4 2 0 3 5 9 2.8 1.82
22 1 1 1 1 3 2 1.4 1.87
23 0 0 1 3 2 0 1.2 1.96
24 0 2 1 2 2 — 1.4 2.13
25 5 3 1 0 6 — 3.0 2.34
26 3 0 1 3 6 — 2.6 2.51
27 4 4 5 5 2 — 4.0 2.6
28 1 2 2 3 0 — 1.6 2.59
29 2 2 1 1 4 — 2.0 2.56
30 5 3 1 3 1 — 2.6 2.53
31 4 1 1 4 5 — 3.0 2.46
32 1 2 2 2 6 — 2.6 2.32
33 1 2 3 2 5 — 2.6 2.13
34 2 0 0 1 1 — 0.8 1.93
35 1 1 1 3 3 — 1.8 1.79
36 0 1 1 2 4 — 1.6 1.71
37 3 2 0 1 3 — 1.8 1.65
38 4 2 2 1 1 — 2.0 1.59
39 2 0 2 2 3 — 1.8 1.52
40 1 1 0 1 2 — 1.0 1.47
41 0 0 0 2 2 — 0.8 1.46
42 0 1 0 1 4 — 1.2 1.5
43 4 5 2 2 3 — 3.2 1.54
44 2 0 2 0 2 — 1.2 1.52
45 0 1 2 3 1 — 1.4 1.48
46 3 0 1 0 3 — 1.4 1.46
47 0 1 0 0 1 — 0.4 1.5
48 2 3 2 1 3 — 2.2 1.62
49 2 1 (14) 1 2 — 2.0* 1.74
50 2 1 2 2 3 — 2.0 1.86
51 2 0 0 2 5 — 1.8 1.96
52 (24) (12) 0 2 7 — 7.0*  7†
Mean 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.6 — 1.6 1.6
Standard 1.5 1.2 1 1.2 1.7 — 0.8 0.5
deviation
Note: The three values in parentheses are presumptive outliers and were not
included directly in descriptive statistics for the year or in the average.
* The median was used instead of the mean because of presumptive outliers.
†
The value was used in generating counts but was not used to fit the spline.
G-surveillance was applied to the 2002 data. The most
noteworthy feature (up to week 23) is the observed
counts of 5, 5, and 9 for weeks 19, 20, and 21, respec-
tively, contrasted with expected counts of 1.62, 1.74,
and 1.82, respectively. For weeks 19–21, the observed
3-week count is 19, and the expected is 5.18. Assuming
use of surveillance with a fixed 3-week window,
G-surveillance at week 21 is based on the value 19 ln
(19/5.18) – (19 – 5.18) = 10.88, where ln is the natural
logarithm. Because this statistic exceeds 5.94, the prob-
ability of observing such a substantial 3-week excess
during a period of 52 weeks was <0.01.
P-surveillance (i.e., corresponding to the p-value) for
a 3-week window starting at an arbitrary day cannot be
determined exactly from this data. Using the weekly
tabulations, the p-value is less than or equal to that
associated with the 19 events in weeks 19–21. The
p-value associated with the 19 cases in weeks 19–21 is
[(52/3) (19 – 5.18)] [exp(–5.18) (5.18)19/19!] =
239.2 (0.00001182) = 0.0004
Thus, if surveillance were performed for a year, the
chance of finding such a substantial excess, relative to
the assumed expected values, is approximately 0.0004.
This example is extreme, and no formal analysis might
be required. Statistical significance at p<0.05 would be
noted if 14 or 15 cases existed in the 3-week period.
Discussion and Conclusion
Two surveillance procedures associated with a set
error rate over a period T are described. G-surveillance
as described is a modification of a statistic used by oth-
ers and implemented in SaTScan™ software (11,26).
The procedure in this report differs from that previ-
ously implemented in terms of the function maximized,
the events to which type I errors refer, and the logistics
of implementation. G-surveillance, as described here,
can have different properties by setting T to values of
21– 30 days somewhat akin to average run lengths pro-
posed for implementation of CUSUM (7) or setting it
to 1 year, which would result in substantially fewer false
alarms but decreased sensitivity. A comparison with a
statistic (e.g., CUSUM) using both data from real out-
breaks and simulated data would identify the properties
of the proposed statistics under both abrupt increases
and gradual increases. For the latter scenario, CUSUM-
like statistics might have superior properties over the
methods proposed here.
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Apparently, the P-surveillance method is new, but it poten-
tially frees the investigator from performing any simulation.
However, three caveats exist, as follows:
1. No reason exists to assume that P-surveillance is better than
G-surveillance, although reasons might exist to prefer the
reverse on the basis of presumed optimal properties of
GLRT.
2. The p-values for P-surveillance are approximate, whereas
those for the G-surveillance are exact. (The exactness to a
given number of decimal places is attributable to perform-
ing enough simulations.)
3. G-surveillance is more flexible, its variants have been
described extensively, and it has withstood multiple tests
over time.
Nevertheless, the p-value computed by P-surveillance, using
either the method described here for continuous surveillance
or the ratchet scan for daily or weekly surveillance, should
give an overall indication of the likelihood of observing a given
excess over expected values in a certain time window, taking
into account that the surveillance is performed for a specified
period.
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Abstract
Introduction: Statistical systems designed for syndromic surveillance often must be able to monitor data received simulta-
neously from multiple regions. Such data might be of limited size, which would eliminate the possibility of using more
common surveillance methods that assume data from a normal distribution.
Objectives: The objectives of this study were to design and illustrate a multiregional surveillance system based on data inputs
consisting of small regional counts, where frequencies are typically on the order of <5.
Methods: Cumulative sum (CUSUM) methods designed for cumulating the sum of the deviations between observed and
expected Poisson-distributed data were modified to account for changing expectations over time, including weekly and monthly
effects. Data on lower respiratory tract infections during 1996–1999 at multiple Boston clinics among residents from 287
census tracts were used to illustrate the approach.
Results: When each region was monitored, 19% of the census tracts signaled a departure during 1999 from the base period
(1996–1998) rates. When local statistics were used to monitor tracts and neighborhoods consisting of surrounding tracts,
60% of tracts experienced departures during 1999 from the base period. These results imply that the increases in lower
respiratory tract infection that occurred during 1999 were geographically pervasive.
Conclusions: Poisson CUSUM methods are useful for monitoring small regional counts over time. The methods can be
generalized to account for time-varying expectations in the counts.
Introduction
Detecting the locations of statistically significant increases
in the rates of health syndromes among multiple geographic
areas as rapidly as possible is a critical public health need (1).
Multiple systems are being designed to achieve this goal; com-
prehensive discussion of the desirable features of a statistical
health surveillance system has been published previously (2).
This paper focuses on two characteristics of such systems: 1)
systems should be capable of detecting increases in regional
rates quickly while keeping the number of false alerts at an
acceptable level, and 2) observations might consist of limited
frequencies that would necessitate the use of binomial or Pois-
son variables instead of normally distributed variables.
Multiple approaches to spatial surveillance in a public health
context have been taken previously. One approach is to use
cumulative sum (CUSUM) methods to monitor disease counts
in geographic areas of interest (3). Another is to perform sur-
veillance by detecting outliers in a temporal sequence of ob-
served binomial variables for multiple geographic regions (4).
Other investigators take existing spatial statistical methods used
for retrospective detection of geographic clusters of disease
and modify them for use in surveillance, which requires re-
peated tests for emergent clusters (5–7).
This paper uses and develops further a CUSUM approach
for small counts (i.e., where frequencies are typically on the
order of <5) assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. CUSUM
methods cumulate deviations between observed and expected
counts during a given period and generate an alert or signal
when cumulated observed counts exceed expected counts by
a predetermined threshold (8).
This paper reviews CUSUM methods for normal and
Poisson-distributed variables. It then describes how to modify
the Poisson CUSUM approach to allow the expected counts
to vary from one period to the next. It also indicates how the
approach can be used to monitor neighborhoods consisting
of a set of contiguous regional units. These approaches are
applied to data on lower respiratory infection episodes reported
by Boston-area clinicians during January 1996–October 1999.
The paper concludes with a discussion of findings.
CUSUM Methods
CUSUM methods are designed to detect sudden changes
in the mean value of a quantity of interest; they are widely
used in industrial process control to monitor production qual-
ity. The basic methods rely on two assumptions: 1) the quan-
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tity being monitored is distributed normally, and 2) the
variable exhibits no serial autocorrelation.
If the variable of interest is converted to a z-score with mean
0 and variance 1, the CUSUM, following observation t, is
defined as follows:
St = max(0,St–1 + z – k)
where k is a parameter. A change in mean is signaled if St > h,
where h is a threshold parameter.
Values of z in excess of k are cumulated. The parameter k in
this instance, in which a standardized variable is being moni-
tored, is often chosen to be equal to one half; in the more
general case, k is often chosen to be equal to one half the
standard deviation associated with the variable being
monitored.
The parameter h is chosen in conjunction with a predeter-
mined acceptable rate of false alerts; high values of h lead to a
low probability of a false alert but also a lower probability of
detecting a real change. The time between false alerts is the
in-control average run length and is designated by the
notation ARL
0
. When k = ½, an approximation for ARL
0
 is
ARL0 = 2(e 
a – a – 1)
where a = h + 1.166 (9). One can choose the parameter h by
first deciding upon a value of ARL
0
, and then solving the
approximation for the corresponding value of h. This expres-
sion for the average run length can be solved, approximately,
for h (P. Rogerson, University at Buffalo, unpublished data):
The choice of k = ½ minimizes the time required to detect a
1 standard-deviation increase in the mean. More generally, k is
chosen to be equal to one half the size of the change (in units of
standard deviations) sought for rapid detection. For this case
(i.e., when k might take on a value other than one half )
CUSUMs for Poisson Variables
When the assumption of normality is not a good one, trans-
formations to normality are sometimes possible. One such
normalizing transformation for data consisting of small counts
is (10):
where x is the observed count and λ is the expected count.
This transformation can be misleading for small values of λ.
In particular, the actual ARL
0
 values might differ substantially
from the desired nominal values. For example, when desired
values of ARL0 = 500 and ARL1 = 3 (where ARL1 is the average
time taken to detect an increase) are used in situations where λ
< 2, simulations demonstrate that using this transformation will
almost always yield actual values of ARL0 substantially lower
than the desired value of 500. In certain cases (e.g., λ ≈ 0.15),
the actual ARL will be <100, indicating a much higher rate of
false alerts than desired. The performance is better when ARL0
= 500 and ARL
1
 = 7, but use of the transformation will again
lead to substantially more false alerts than desired when λ is less
than approximately 0.25. Also troubling is the instability with
respect to similar values of λ; λ = 0.56 will lead to an ARL
0
 of
approximately 400, whereas λ = 0.62 is associated with an ARL
0
of >700. This is also true when ARL1 = 3; λ = 0.96 has an ARL
of approximately 212, whereas λ = 0.98 has an ARL of 635.
When the variable being monitored has a Poisson distribution,
the CUSUM is
St = max(0, St–1 + Xt – k)
New considerations are necessary to determine the param-
eters k and h (12). If λ0 is the mean value of the in-control
Poisson parameter, the k-value that minimizes the time to
detect a change from λ0 to a prespecified out-of-control
parameter λ1 is
(1)
Then, h can be determined from the values of the parameter k
and the desired ARL
0
 by using either a table (11), Monte Carlo
simulation, or an algorithm that makes use of a Markov chain
approximation (12).
Poisson CUSUM methods have been applied previously in
a public health context, primarily in surveillance of congeni-
tal malformations (13,14); the approach has also been
recommended in surveillance for Salmonella outbreaks (15).














The expected in-control value associated with the Poisson
variable might vary with time (λ0,t ; t = 1, 2, ...) (e.g., as a
result of seasonal effects). Simply implementing a CUSUM
scheme with constant parameters would have misleading
results if the actual values of λ0 fluctuated from period to
period about the constant assumed parameter. Instead, time-
specific values of the parameters k and h were used. The
observed values, Xt , were then used in the CUSUM as follows:
St = max[(0, St–1 + ct (Xt – kt)] (2)
where the parameters ct and kt change from one period to the
next, and their values are now discussed.
First h is chosen on the basis of the mean of the time-
varying Poisson parameter, an associated value of k, and the
desired ARL
0
. Once h is chosen, next choose kt on the basis of
λ0,t and λ1,t ,
 (3)
Then, ct is chosen as the ratio h to ht , where the latter is the
value of the threshold associated with the desired ARL0, kt ,
and constant values of λ0,t and λ1,t . Thus, ct = h/ht . The quan-
tity ct is chosen so that observed counts Xt will make the proper
relative contribution toward the signaling parameter h that is
used in the actual CUSUM. If, for example, h > ht , then the
contribution Xt – kt is scaled up by the factor h/ht . An alter-
native approach is to apply a multiplicative factor to the
baseline, or average value of λ (16).
Poisson CUSUM Methods
for Neighborhoods Consisting
of Contiguous Regional Units
An extension is to construct local statistics in association
with each geographic unit. These are defined as a weighted
sum of the region’s observation and surrounding observations,
where the weights could decline with increasing distance from
the region. CUSUMs associated with these local statistics
would be monitored. Local statistics are spatially auto-
correlated, and Monte Carlo simulation of the null hypoth-
esis can be performed to determine appropriate thresholds for
the CUSUMs if no deviation from expected values of the
Poisson parameters exists.
Application to Boston Data
on Lower Respiratory Infection
Data
Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates (Boston, Massachu-
setts) uses an automated record system for its 14 clinics. After
each patient office visit, the clinician records diagnoses and
International Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision (ICD-9)
codes. Patient addresses are recorded; these have been geocoded
and assigned to census tracts.
Data on lower respiratory infection episodes were available
for January 1996–October 1999. During this period, 47,731
episodes occurred that could be assigned to one of the 287
census tracts in the study region.
Model for Expected Counts
The first 3 years of data (January 1996–December 1998)
were used to calibrate logistic regression models for each cen-
sus tract. The logistic transform of the probability of a visit is
taken to be a linear function of the explanatory variables:
where pi is the probability of a visit in region i; xli is the value
of explanatory variable l in region i; and the βs are the
regression coefficients; m explanatory variables and m + 1
coefficients are estimated in each tract.
Compared with the random-effects model described previ-
ously (4), this modeling approach has coefficients that are
specific to individual regions. However, constructing a model
for each region might result in region-specific coefficients that
might not be reliable over time, especially when they are esti-
mated from a limited number of observations. An alternative
might be to have region-specific dummy variables in a single
equation, but this could use a substantial number of degrees
of freedom relative to the number of observations.
In each census tract, the unit of observation was the day. Dur-
ing the 3-year base period (i.e., 1,096 days), expected counts on
each day were modeled as a function of time trend (i.e., the logis-
tic transform of the probability of a visit was taken to be a linear
function of the day number). Eleven dummy variables were cre-
ated for the months of the year; December was taken as the arbi-
trary, omitted category. Finally, a dummy variable was also
included for visits that occurred on weekends, with weekday
observations as the reference category. Another potential variable
capturing temporal autocorrelation in the counts was also con-
sidered, but in the majority of cases it was not significant. Inclu-
sion of such a variable would be a way to address violations of the
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TABLE 1. Average coefficients
in logistic regression model,
















* December is the omitted reference
month.
†
Refers to the time trend; the coefficient
indicates the daily increase in the log-
odds of a visit.
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The average coefficient
for each of the explanatory
variables (in which the
average is taken over the
287 census tracts) is pro-
vided (Table 1). Visits are
most likely in December;
the probability of visits
declines steadily thereafter
until July. In August, the
probability of a visit begins
to increase, until reaching
its maximum in December.
The likelihood of weekend
visits is substantially lower
than weekday visits, as
expected. Finally, the aver-
age time trend is positive.
Poisson CUSUM Method
For an illustration of how the modified CUSUM approach
might be applied, the estimated parameters for each tract were
used, together with the relevant explanatory variables, to derive
the expected probability of a visit for each day, for each census
tract, for the 303-day period beginning January 1, 1999. These
expected probabilities were multiplied by the number of
patients in each tract on each day to derive the expected num-
ber of visits on each day. The latter quantity is the time-varying,
in-control Poisson parameter, λ0,t. To minimize the time to
detect a one half standard-deviation change in this parameter,
the out-of-control Poisson parameter is chosen to be
Although minimizing the time to detecting a one standard-
deviation change is probably more common, one half of a
standard deviation is used here because the standard
deviation is so large relative to the mean. For example, when
 λ0,t = 0.1,            = 0.32
for detecting a 1 standard-deviation change,
λ1,t = 0.1 + 0.32 = 0.42
and for detecting a one half standard-deviation change,
λ1,t = 0.1 + 0.16 = 0.26
An overall probability of 0.05 was desired for an alert, un-
der the null hypothesis of no change in the visit probabilities.
In addition, because 287 CUSUMs are being tested simulta-
neously, adjustment is needed for multiple testing (because
287 × 303 values of the CUSUM are examined). A Bonferroni
adjustment can be made by using 287 × 303 instead of 303 in
the run-length calculations. In particular, because run lengths
have an exponential distribution (17), p(run length < 287 × 303 =
1 – exp(–287 × 303 × µ) = 0.05, which implies an average
run length of 1/µ =1,695,366.
Next, the value of the tract-specific threshold (h) that is
consistent with this average run length and with the tract-
specific values of λ0 and k was determined by using an algo-
rithm described elsewhere (13). Then, time-varying
tract-specific values of ht were determined by either of the
following methods:
1. If λ0,t was close to any of the average values of λ0, the
associated value of h was adopted; if not,
2. A regression equation relating h and λ was estimated by
using the 287 average values of λ0 and the 287 associated
values of h. The regression equation was
h = 8.18 + 32.04λ
The Poisson CUSUM (equation 2) was then started for each
tract on January 1, 1999, by using the observed number of
daily visits, the expected number of daily visits (λ0,t), and
values of h, ht, k, and kt, as described previously.
Results
Of 287 census tracts, 58 (19%) had >1 signal during the
303-day monitoring period. In 19 (37%) tracts, the signals
were short-term and continued no longer than 30 days. Of
the remaining 39 tracts with signals, the majority were either
sustained for approximately the latter half of the monitoring
period (12 tracts) or characterized by a rapid increase in the
CUSUM near the end of the monitoring period (14 tracts).
Tract 26 had an average 0.111 cases/day during the 3-year
base period, which increased to an average of 0.145 cases/day
during the monitoring period (Figure 1). The initial increase
in the CUSUM began in late January. Cases were observed on
January 28, 29, and 31; additional cases were observed on
February 1, 2, and 3. Thirteen cases were observed during a
27-day period that began on January 28, for an average of
0.481 cases/day, substantially higher than the baseline of 0.111
cases/day. The CUSUM continued to increase until June,
indicating a sustained period of higher-than-average
visitation rates, and then declined slightly until September.
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During the base period, tract 83 had an average of 0.120
cases/day; this rose to 0.135 cases/day during 1999 (Figure 2).
Cases leading to the alert occurred on August 4, 6, and 9 (two
cases were observed on August 9). These four cases in 6 days
(0.67 cases/day) were sufficient to generate an alert, particu-
larly because the CUSUM had been increasing slowly during
the preceding months.
During the calibration period (1996–1998), 33.4 cases/day
occurred in the study region; during the first 303 days of 1999,
an average of 36.8 cases/day occurred. The daily increase was
>10%, and this is easily picked up by the CUSUMs in
multiple subregions.
Results for Monitoring Regional
Neighborhoods
 Neighborhoods consisting of each individual region and
its immediately adjacent neighboring regions were monitored
to illustrate the surveillance of local regional statistics. Of 287
census tracts, 173 (60%) had at least one signal during the
monitoring period, and 43 also signaled under the original
Poisson CUSUM. Among the 173 signaling tracts, 90 (52%)
sustained signals for the latter half of the monitoring period,
and 25 (14%) witnessed rapid increases in their CUSUMs
near the end of the monitoring period. The distribution of
regions that had CUSUMs above the threshold on the last
day of the monitoring period (i.e., day 303), under both the
original Poisson CUSUM and the local statistics CUSUM, is
illustrated (Figure 3). More regions signal when the local sta-
tistic is used; here the search for spatial patterns occurs on a
broader geographic scale. The northern, southwestern, and
southeastern portions of the study area emerge as subareas
that deviate substantially from baseline expectations established
during 1996–1998.
The statistical significance of the local statistics was derived
by using a Bonferroni correction for the number of regions.
This is conservative because the local statistics are correlated.
Monte Carlo simulations were conducted by using 30- and
100-region subsets of the original study area to determine more
appropriate thresholds for the local statistics CUSUM. To
achieve a 0.05 probability of a false alert during the 303-day
monitoring period, the target ARL
0
 under the null hypothesis
can be calculated by using
p(run length < 303×n) = 1 – e (–303×s×µ) = 0.05
where n is the number of regions and µ = 1/ARL
0
. For mul-
tiple values of s, the target ARL0 was calculated and the corre-
sponding CUSUM parameters were obtained. The false-alert
rates obtained by the simulations under the null hypothesis
are provided (Table 2). Apparently, the appropriate value of s
is 50%–60% of the number of regions n when the neighbor-
hood is defined by the binary adjacency described previously.
Using different definitions of the neighborhood would change
the appropriate value of s.
On the basis of this result, local statistics CUSUM analysis
was conducted on the Boston data by using s = 160, which is
approximately 55% of the total number of tracts. This time,
183 census tracts, 10 tracts more than before, had at least one
signal during the monitoring period, but no change was noted
in terms of the day and the tract of the first signal.
FIGURE 2. Cumulative sum chart for lower respiratory infection























FIGURE 1. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) chart for lower respiratory
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Poisson CUSUM method is available at http://wings.buffalo.
edu/~rogerson.
An important question raised by the implementation of these
methods in the context of public health surveillance is whether
accurate expectations of disease counts can be formed. To the
extent that expected counts are not well-modeled, the CUSUM
tends to increase, and alerts caused by deviations from expec-
tations will be attributable more to inability to model
expectations and less to any real public health problem.
The methods are ultimately better suited for certain public
health problems than for others. For example, for certain bio-
logic agents, a single case is sufficient to generate an alert, and
a sophisticated statistical system is not needed. In other situa-
tions, monitoring symptoms might reveal patterns that would
otherwise remain hidden in the data. In the 1993 gastroen-
teritis outbreak in Milwaukee, a substantial number of cases
went unnoticed for an extended period (18); quick detection
of spatial patterns in symptoms might have allowed a quicker
public health response.
Discussion
This paper demonstrates how the Poisson CUSUM can be
used in the context of spatial surveillance. In particular, it
focuses on two developments: 1) an extension to allow the use
of Poisson CUSUM methods when expectations vary over
time, and 2) an extension along lines originally discussed pre-
viously (3) that permits monitoring of CUSUMs in subre-
gions and their surrounding neighborhoods. Software for the
TABLE 2. False-alert rates* simulated under the null hypothesis
   30 regions      100 regions
Signaling Signaling
s† ARL0§ probability s ARL0 probability
30 177,216 0.024 100 590,720 0.035
20 118,144 0.038 60 354,432 0.048
15 88,608 0.055 50 295,360 0.056
10 59,072 0.075
* Average: >4,000 trials.
†
s = number of effectively independent regions.
§
ARL0 
= average run length, or time between false-alerts under the null
hypothesis.
FIGURE 3. Distributions of regions that signaled on day 303 of the monitoring period, indicating lower respiratory infection
episodes — Boston, Massachusetts, January 1–October 30, 1999
Poisson cumulative sum (CUSUM) for individual regions Poisson CUSUM for local statistics
Regions signaling
Regions with CUSUM close to the threshold h
Regions signaling
Regions with CUSUM close to the threshold h
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Abstract
Introduction: No generally accepted procedure exists for detecting outbreaks in syndromic time series used in the surveillance
of natural epidemics or biologic attacks.
Objectives: This report evaluates the usefulness for syndromic surveillance of the Pulsar approach, which is based on remov-
ing long-term trends from an observed series and identifying peaks in the residual series of surveillance data with cutoffs
determined by using a combination of peak height and width.
Methods: Simulations were performed to evaluate the Pulsar method and compare it with other approaches. The daily
syndromic counts in emergency departments of four major hospitals in the Athens area during August 2002–August 2003
were analyzed for two common syndromes. A standardized residual series was generated by omitting trends and noise in the
original data series; this series was examined for the presence of peaks (i.e., points having magnitude higher than at least one
of three probabilistically determined cutoffs). The whole process was iterated, and the baseline was recalculated by assigning
reduced weight to the identified peaks.
Results: For the specific simulation schema used, the Pulsar method fared well when compared with other approaches in
meeting the performance criteria of sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness.
Conclusions: Although the suggested algorithm needs further validation regarding the correspondence between detected peaks
and true biologic alerts, the Pulsar technique appears effective for observing peaks in time series of syndromic events. The
simplicity of the algorithm, its ability to detect peaks based not only on height but also on width, and its performance in the
simulated data sets make it a promising candidate for further use in syndromic surveillance.
Introduction
Syndromic time series are used in surveillance of natural
epidemics or biologic attacks. CDC and the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene used syndromic
surveillance systems for detection of biologic terrorism after
the September 2001 terrorist attacks (1–3). Almost simulta-
neously, other systems emerged (4), including those devel-
oped by the Boston Department of Health (5) and the
University of Pittsburgh (4,6), CDC’s drop-in surveillance
systems (7), the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early
Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE)
(8,9), and others (10–12).
The Athens 2004 Olympic Games (August 13–29, 2004)
have made critical the need for a real-time surveillance system
that can alert public health officials to unexpected communi-
cable-disease outbreaks and likely clinical presentations of a
biologic terrorist attack, as has been used for other major ath-
letic events (13–17). Therefore, in July 2002, a drop-in
syndromic surveillance system was established in Greece similar
to that used during the Salt Lake 2002 Olympic Winter Games
(13,18).
Different outbreak-detection algorithms are used in oper-
ating syndromic surveillance systems (2,19–23). Ideally, all
alert mechanisms generate an alert whenever the number of
observed events exceeds the expected number of events while
minimizing the frequency of false alerts. However, no gener-
ally accepted procedure exists for outbreak detection in
syndromic surveillance (24). This paper proposes an algorithm
for statistical detection of peaks. The method is based on
removing long-term trends from the series of observations and
identifying peaks in the residual series of data. This approach
was developed for studying episodic hormonal secretion and
has been used for other applications (25–27). An important
feature of the proposed algorithm is that it generates alerts,
taking into consideration both height and breadth of signals.
The proposed method was applied in the Athens Olympic
syndromic surveillance system database (18) and was com-
pared through simulations with other methods currently
applied in syndromic data series (19–23,28).
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Methods
Data Acquisition
Drop-in syndromic surveillance in emergency departments
(EDs) of major hospitals was first established in Greece by the
Hellenic Center for Infectious Diseases Control in July 2002.
The project’s primary aims were to assess system feasibility
and data-collection timeliness, establish a 2-year background
database, and enhance collaboration with and sensitization of
ED personnel of major hospitals (18). During August 2002–
August 2003, the syndromic surveillance system operated in
eight hospitals and one major health-care center in the greater
Athens area. Surveillance was conducted for the following 10
syndromes: 1) respiratory infection with fever; 2) bloody diar-
rhea; 3) gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood; 4)
febrile illness with rash; 5) meningitis, encephalitis, or unexplained
acute encephalopathy/delirium; 6) suspected acute viral hepati-
tis; 7) botulism-like syndrome; 8) lymphadenitis with fever; 9)
sepsis or unexplained shock; and 10) unexplained death with
history of fever. These syndrome categories were used by the
Salt Lake City Department of Health for syndromic surveil-
lance during the 2002 winter Olympics (13). Trained person-
nel visited EDs and identified syndromic cases from chief
complaints as recorded in ED visit books. All syndromes iden-
tified daily in the ED were recorded, as were the total number
of visits. Data were entered into a database, and data manage-
ment and analysis were performed centrally. In the work pre-
sented here, the time series for the two most commonly
encountered syndromes (respiratory infection with fever and
gastroenteritis [diarrhea, vomit] without blood) are used.
Algorithm Description
The Pulsar method is based on identifying peaks in the
syndromic time series that exceed a specified threshold. Long-
term changes are first screened out, and then peaks are identi-
fied in the screened series. This approach has been previously
suggested for studying episodic hormonal secretion (25).
First, a baseline is defined for the original syndromic series
by using the locally weighted smoothing scatterplots method
(LOWESS) (29), in which a fixed proportion of observations
(the smoothing parameter) is used, and a baseline value is cal-
culated from the observations closest in time to the point.
Weights are assigned to the observations, depending on their
distance from the point. The fraction of observations in the
window is selected so that the window’s average width mini-
mizes the bias-corrected Akaike’s information criterion (AIC),
which incorporates both the tightness of the fit and the model
complexity. This criterion often selects better models than AIC
in small samples (30). Then, a weighted nonparametric
regression of syndromic counts versus time within the win-
dow provides the initial baseline value estimate for that time
point. After the initial estimation of baseline values, new
weights giving less influence to observations far from the cor-
responding baseline values are assigned, and the weighted
regression is repeated. This procedure produces baseline esti-
mates that are not influenced by extreme outlier observations.
A residual series, containing short-term variations but not
trends, is obtained by subtracting the smoothed data from the
original counts and is standardized by dividing the residuals
by an estimate of the noise level, to yield a scaled residual
series, expressed in signal-to-noise units. The peaks in the stan-
dardized residual series are identified on the basis of a combi-
nation of height and width, with no assumption for the shape
of the peak. To be classified as a peak, an elevation should
either be substantially high, even if it is narrow, or span mul-
tiple points in width, even if it is moderately high. For a point
in the signal-to-noise series to be considered part of a peak, it
should exceed a certain cutoff value G(1); or it should exceed
a lower cut-off value G(2) along with one adjacent point; or it
should exceed an even lower cut-off value G(3) along with
two adjacent points; and so forth. The specific choices of n
and G(n)s depend on the time series used for calibration pur-
poses, the relative choice between higher but narrow peaks as
opposed to lower but broad ones, and the desired false-alert
rate. After the initial identification of peaks, the baseline is
recalculated. Reduced weight is assigned to observations pre-
viously identified as part of a peak. Iterations of the whole
process are performed until the same assignment of points to
peaks is achieved.
Algorithm Customization
In the 13-month syndromic series, LOWESS smoothing
was applied with optimal smoothing parameter equal to 15%
for respiratory infection with fever and 52% for gastroenteritis
(diarrhea, vomit) without blood. Alternative estimates were used
for the standardization, including the standard deviation and
the mean absolute deviation in the original series, as well as
the 7-day moving standard deviation and the 7-day mean
absolute deviation in the simulated series. The latter were based
either on the seven most recent observations to the current
time point or on the tenth to fourth most recent observations
(i.e., not taking into account the three most recent ones). The
procedure is performed iteratively to weigh down extreme
values and detect outliers appearing in clusters. In this data
set, extreme clustered observations do not appear to exist, and
two iterations were sufficient to obtain a smoothed series (the
resulting detected peaks of the two iterations differ by <2.5%).
G(1), G(2), and G(3) cutoffs were chosen under the assump-
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tion of normality for the standardized residual series to derive
97% specificity in the whole series and take into account the
effect of multiple testing on the significance level. The thresh-
old is given by G(n) = probit(1-α*[n/6]/d) where d = number
of days that a false alert occurs with probability α = 0.10 and
n = 1 or 2 or 3, whereas the factor n/6 provides the necessary
adjustment for multiple testing (25).
Alternative Methods
The Pulsar approach was evaluated by comparison through
simulations with other commonly used syndromic surveillance
methods (19–23,28). All parameters for each model used in
the comparisons were set so that the specificity (true nonalerts/
nonoutbreaks) in the original time series was fixed at 97%,
assuming no outbreak condition (20,21). For each method,
the day of an outbreak on which an alert was first generated
was recorded. Sensitivity (true alerts/outbreaks) across all simu-
lated series for each syndrome and the timeliness for each
method (i.e., the percentage of the first alert per day of out-
break) were compared among the alternative approaches. The
three performance criteria (sensitivity, specificity, and timeli-
ness) were reported and compared through the Wilcoxon
signed rank or Friedman nonparametric tests. Bonferroni-
adjusted α* are reported. The methods mentioned here have
been used in syndromic surveillance and were evaluated in
this syndromic data series.
The temporal aberration detection (TAD) approach used
by the Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS), a program
provided by CDC to all interested health departments, uses
cumulative sum (CUSUM) methods from the quality-
control literature. CUSUM compares the proportion of syn-
drome counts to total visits on each of the most recent 3 days
to the mean proportion plus 1 standard deviation, during a
7-day moving baseline. CUSUM of positive differences is cal-
culated based on a 3-day interval, and an alert is considered to
occur if it exceeds 2 standard deviations (2,22,23). Time-
series methods (e.g., autoregressive integrated moving aver-
age [ARIMA] time-series models) were proposed for describing
10-year syndromic data from a major Boston-area hospital
(20,21). Different filters were evaluated in data sets with simu-
lated outbreaks, using a fixed specificity rate of 97%. The lin-
ear 7-day filter proved superior in simulations (20). Standard
one-sided CUSUM methods have also been proposed for
detecting outbreaks in surveillance data (19,28).
Simulation Schema
For evaluation of the performance of the proposed meth-
odology, 100 simulated series were created. The original time
series of counts is considered to include no outbreaks. A sce-
nario involving a terrorist attack depends on the biologic agent,
quality, and quantity released; the method of dispersion; and
population characteristics. A 4-day outbreak was chosen to
represent a probable period between symptom presentation
and diagnosis (i.e., the window of opportunity for possible
earlier detection because of syndromic surveillance) (31).
However, different durations of that window are also possible.
Each simulated time series was produced by randomly
injecting 4-day–long outbreaks to the original time series of
daily counts for each syndrome of interest with probability of
15% per day (leading to 18.5 4-day outbreaks on average
among simulated series). An outbreak led to duplication of
the observed counts of the syndrome for that day (respiratory
infection: median size = 27; 5th and 95th percentiles: 24, 29
and gastroenteritis: median size = 15; 5th and 95th percen-
tiles: 14, 16). Two adjacent outbreaks were forced to be >15
days apart to ensure that a previous outbreak did not adversely
affect the alert-detection mechanism of the next (20). The
detection algorithms should detect an outbreak as if it is the
first one that occurs in the original time series.
An outbreak was considered successfully detected if an alert
was generated on >1 day of the outbreak. Alternative patterns
of outbreaks were also examined, including 1) constant
increase for all 4 days, equal to the median counts of the syn-
drome (23.5 for respiratory infection with fever and 15.5 for
gastroenteritis) or 2) constant increase for all 4 days, equal to
the 75th percentile of the counts of the syndrome (35 for res-
piratory infection with fever and 22 for gastroenteritis); 3) lin-
ear increase for the 4 days: (increase of one median/day); 4)
exponential increase for the 4 days: increase of 1, 1.5, 2.5,
and 4 medians for day 1–4, respectively; or 5) exponential
increase for the first 3 days (1, 1.5, 2.5 medians) and subse-
quent decrease on day 4. All statistical computations were
performed by using SAS® software, version 8.2 (32).
Results
The original 13-month time series for four major hospitals
in metropolitan Athens sharing the same catchment area for
the respiratory infection with fever and gastroenteritis (diarrhea,
vomit) without blood syndromes were used to illustrate and
evaluate the proposed method. A total of 305,039 ED visits
(mean: 770/day) were recorded during August 2002–August
2003 in these hospitals. The corresponding mean total syn-
drome counts were 26 and 15 per day for each syndrome,
respectively.
The six different standardization estimates already described
for the Pulsar algorithm, leading to different threshold speci-
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TABLE 1. Sensitivity and specificity of the Pulsar approach for respiratory infection with fever and gastroenteritis (diarrhea,
vomit) without blood syndromes (simulated series)
Syndrome
Respiratory infection with fever Gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood
       Sensitivity       Specificity      Sensitivity            Specificity
Method        Mean  (SE*)  Median (Min–Max†) Mean   (SE)  Median (Min–Max)      Mean   (SE)   Median (Min–Max)     Mean  (SE)  Median (Min–Max)
Pulsar analysis
Model 1§ 0.854 (0.0071) 0.85 (0.667–1) 0.981 (0.0004) 0.981 (0.972–0.991) 0.812 (0.0074) 0.818 (0.625–1) 0.982 (0.0003) 0.981 (0.975–0.991)
Model 2¶ 0.744 (0.0081) 0.737 (0.5–0.9) 0.982 (0.0004) 0.981 (0.972–0.991) 0.768 (0.0088) 0.771 (0.55–1) 0.978 (0.0004) 0.978 (0.972–0.988)
Model 3** 0.656 (0.009) 0.649 (0.45–0.895) 0.985 (0.0004) 0.985 (0.975–0.997) 0.536 (0.0112) 0.538 (0.211–0.789) 0.991 (0.0004) 0.991 (0.981–1)
Model 4†† 0.523 (0.0104) 0.5 (0.263–0.842) 0.987 (0.0004) 0.988 (0.976–0.997) 0.496 (0.0109) 0.5 (0.2–0.789) 0.99 (0.0004) 0.991 (0.981–1)
Model 5§§ 0.718 (0.0089) 0.722 (0.5–0.9) 0.993 (0.0004) 0.994 (0.979–1) 0.701 (0.0101) 0.706 (0.375–0.944) 0.991 (0.0004) 0.991 (0.981–1)
Model 6¶¶ 0.719 (0.0093) 0.737 (0.5–0.9) 0.992 (0.0004) 0.994 (0.982–1) 0.7 (0.0104) 0.706 (0.375–0.944) 0.99 (0.0005) 0.991 (0.978–1)
* Standard error.
† Minimum–Maximum.
§ Standardization by the standard deviation of the original series.
¶ Standardization by the mean absolute deviation of the original series.
** Standardization by the 7-day moving standard deviation of the simulated series.
†† Standardization by the 7-day mean absolute deviation of the simulated series.
§§ Standardization by the 7-day moving standard deviation of the simulated series with a 3-day lag.
¶¶ Standardization by the 7-day mean absolute deviation of the simulated series with a 3-day lag.
fications, were compared. The best approach for both syn-
dromes with respect to the achieved sensitivity was the one
that used the standard deviation in the original series (Table 1;
see Model 1). The corresponding parameter d to the G(1),
G(2), and G(3) thresholds was 0.5 and 1 for respiratory infec-
tion with fever and gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood
syndromic series, respectively, whereas α was set equal to 0.10
for both syndromes. The standardized residuals from the
original time series and from a sample simulated series (num-
ber 10) for each syndrome along with the thresholds are
illustrated (Figure 1).
The TAD approach was used both on the count series and
on the proportion of counts of syndromes to total ED visits
(2,22,23). The results for the count series were superior to
those for the proportion series. The fixed specificity of 97%
in the original time series of counts, for both syndromes, was
reached by using 3 standard deviations for the alert mecha-
nism (Model 1) instead of the 2 used in EARS (Model 2)
(2,22,23) (Table 2).
ARIMA models were used for describing the 13-month
original series of syndromic data (20,21). For respiratory infec-
tion with fever, the autoregressive (AR) order, the moving
average (MA) order, and the integration (I) order were all equal
to 4 days. Weekend was also statistically significant and used
as an explanatory variable in the model. For gastroenteritis
(diarrhea, vomit) without blood, AR = 4 days, MA = 2 days,
and I = 4 days. The filters evaluated were seventh-order MA
(Model 1), seventh-order linear average (Model 2), and sev-
enth-order exponential average (Model 3). The threshold was
again set so that specificity of 97% was achieved in the origi-
nal time series, and the best filter regarding sensitivity was the
seventh-order MA filter (Model 1). The corresponding thresh-
olds are equal to probit(1-α/7) and probit(1-α/8) for each
syndrome, respectively, with α equal to 0.10.
For the one-sided CUSUM method used here, a 7-day
moving average and standard deviation used for standardiza-
tion proved superior to the standard approach (19,28). The
cumulative sum was calculated by St = max{0,(S(t-1)+zt-k)},
where k = 0.5. The specified threshold h was set so that speci-
ficity 97% was achieved in the original time series, and the
corresponding values for the two syndromes were set to 3.5
and 2.75, respectively (Model 1). A second approach employ-
ing values from the literature that actually minimize the aver-
age run length (ARL) of the process was also used (k = 0.5 and
h = 2.5) (19) (Table 2).
The sensitivity and specificity of the alternative methods
(TAD, the time-series approach, and CUSUM) were com-
pared (Table 2). Performance criteria for the best models with
respect to sensitivity for each approach, among the ones using
a set specificity of 97% in the original time series, are directly
compared (Figures 2 and 3). Box-plots of the model’s sensi-
tivity and specificity (Figure 2) and timeliness (Figure 3) are
presented.
The Pulsar approach fared well in comparison with the other
methods for each evaluation criterion. In particular, mean sen-
sitivity was statistically significantly higher (Bonferroni α* =
0.0056) for the Pulsar approach when compared with the other
approaches for both syndromes (Wilcoxon signed rank,
p<0.001 for all comparisons). Furthermore, mean specificity
for the Pulsar method was significantly higher (Bonferroni α*
= 0.0056) than the specificity of the one-sided CUSUM
method (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<0.001). This finding holds
for both syndromes examined. In addition, in the case of res-
piratory infection with fever, the specificity of Pulsar was sig-
nificantly higher than the specificity of TAD (Wilcoxon signed
rank, p<0.001), whereas in the case of gastroenteritis, the speci-
ficity of Pulsar was higher than the specificity of the ARIMA
approach (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<0.001). No other signifi-
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cant differences regarding specificity between the Pulsar
method and the others were identified for either syndrome.
Timeliness for the first day (proportion of alerts at the first
day of an outbreak) differed significantly among the four
approaches (Friedman test, p<0.001) for both syndromes.
Timeliness of the Pulsar method was lower than the timeli-
ness of the ARIMA model (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<0.001;
Bonferroni α* = 0.0056). However, for respiratory infection
with fever, Pulsar’s timeliness was higher than TAD and
CUSUM (p<0.001), and for gastroenteritis, Pulsar’s timeliness
was higher than TAD’s (p<0.001). Results were similar when
the mentioned alternative patterns of outbreaks were used.
Discussion
This paper proposes an algorithm for outbreak detection in
the context of syndromic surveillance time-series data, based
on alert criteria for both height and breadth of signals (25).
The performance of the Pulsar approach and other suggested
methods for outbreak detection (19–23,28) were assessed
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TABLE 2. Sensitivity and specificity for alternative outbreak-detection approaches for respiratory infection with fever and
gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood syndromes (simulated series)
Syndrome
Respiratory infection with fever Gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood
       Sensitivity       Specificity      Sensitivity            Specificity
Method        Mean  (SE*)  Median (Min–Max†) Mean  (SE)   Median (Min–Max)      Mean   (SE)    Median (Min–Max)   Mean   (SE)  Median (Min–Max)
Temporal aberration detection
Model 1§ 0.774 (0.0098) 0.778 (0.526–0.947) 0.977 (0.0008) 0.978 (0.956–0.99) 0.701 (0.0088) 0.696 (0.471–0.889) 0.981 (0.0007) 0.981 (0.956–0.997)
Model 2¶** 0.912 (0.0067) 0.914 (0.737–1) 0.955 (0.001) 0.955 (0.931–0.975) 0.831 (0.0082) 0.833 (0.611–1) 0.957 (0.001) 0.956 (0.924–0.978)
Auto-regressive integrated moving average
Model 1†† 0.738 (0.0083) 0.737 (0.5–0.9) 0.981 (0.0005) 0.981 (0.969–0.997) 0.679 (0.01) 0.684 (0.35–0.867) 0.979 (0.0005) 0.979 (0.966–0.991)
Model 2§§ 0.667 (0.0088) 0.667 (0.5–0.895) 0.978 (0.0005) 0.978 (0.969–0.994) 0.629 (0.0105) 0.637 (0.35–0.833) 0.976 (0.0005) 0.975 (0.963–0.988)
Model 3¶¶ 0.55 (0.0096) 0.55 (0.3–0.737) 0.979 (0.0005) 0.979 (0.969–0.997) 0.57 (0.0106) 0.579 (0.294–0.8) 0.975 (0.0003) 0.975 (0.966–0.985)
Cumulative sum
Model 1*** 0.711 (0.011) 0.706 (0.444–0.895) 0.926 (0.0023) 0.923 (0.877–0.978) 0.728 (0.0095) 0.737 (0.474–0.941) 0.94 (0.0015) 0.941 (0.906–0.975)
Model 2**††† 0.84 (0.0088) 0.842 (0.6–1) 0.87 (0.0029) 0.869 (0.803–0.946) 0.781 (0.0091) 0.789 (0.556–0.947) 0.927 (0.0016) 0.927 (0.887–0.96)
* Standard error.
† Minimum–Maximum.
§ Specificity set at 97%.
¶ Threshold of 2 standard deviations.
** Models presented only for purposes of illustration.
†† 7-day moving average filter.
§§ 7-day linear filter.
¶¶ 7-day exponential filter.
*** Specificity set at 97%.
††† Threshold set so that k = 0.5 and h = 2.5.
through simulations on the basis of direct comparison of sen-
sitivity, specificity, and timeliness. For these performance cri-
teria, Pulsar appears to be at least as effective as the other
methods.
The Pulsar approach, first suggested for studying of epi-
sodic hormonal secretion, was successfully used in the con-
text of syndromic surveillance data. Syndromic data are
expressed initially in signal-to-noise units; then, through an
iterative process, peaks are identified. Point elevations that are
substantially high or elevations only moderately high but span-
ning multiple points in width are identified as peaks. The
thresholds for peak detection are determined probabilistically
on the assumption of normally distributed residuals. The idea
of stochastically determining the thresholds is extended to the
other methods under comparison. The thresholds are chosen
so that a specificity of 97% is achieved in the original
syndromic time series (20,21).
In the simulated data sets, the 97% specificity was most
closely reproduced when using the Pulsar method as com-
pared with the other methods (Tables 1 and 2). Sensitivity for
the chosen Pulsar model (Model 1) for respiratory infection
with fever ranged from 67% to 100%, with a mean of 85%,
whereas sensitivity for gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without
blood ranged from 62.5% to 100%, with a mean of 81%. The
mean sensitivity for the Pulsar approach was higher than the
sensitivity for the other methods. This method compared well
with the others as far as specificity. All methods held specific-
ity close to the 97% benchmark, with the exception of the
one-sided CUSUM. In all methods evaluated, the higher per-
centage of alerts was generated on the first day of the out-
break with the exception of the TAD model, for which alerts
occurred with similar frequency on the first 3 days of the out-
break. The ARIMA model exhibited the best timeliness results,
followed by the Pulsar approach.
Of note, the performance evaluation criteria led to uniformly
worse results for all methods when applied to the daily pro-
portion of syndrome counts to total visits as opposed to syn-
drome counts. Methods adapted to proportion are under
investigation and could be evaluated simultaneously. In addi-
tion, a specific simulation schema was used to compare meth-
ods, with varying outbreak sizes of fixed duration affecting
the generalization of the comparison under other simulation
settings. However, the critical comparison is always the one
based on the detection performance of real outbreaks (33).
Finally, this analysis did not consider other methods that have
been proposed for analysis of syndromic data (34,35), includ-
ing spatial statistical methods (e.g., spatial scan statistic,
Bayesian approaches, and multivariate methods) (36–40).
Conclusion
The performance results of the Pulsar method are overall
comparable with the other methods examined for the specific
simulation schema used. The simplicity of the algorithm, its
ability to be modified regarding choice of standardization and
distributional assumptions for the signal-to-noise ratio, and
its ability to detect peaks based not only on height but also on
width (which more closely addresses the epidemic shapes that
one would expect to last for >1 day) make it a promising can-
didate for further use in syndromic surveillance. The abrupt
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FIGURE 2. Box plots of sensitivity and specificity of 100 simulated series for respiratory infection with fever and gastroenteritis
(diarrhea, vomit) without blood syndrome counts
























Respiratory infection with fever — sensitivity















Respiratory infection with fever — specificity
++ +
+


































Gastroenteritis (diarrhea, vomit) without blood — specificity
++ +
+
increase in population anticipated for the Athens 2004 Olym-
pic Games will provide an ideal prospective surveillance set-
ting for comparing the behavior of all proposed methods
regarding alert mechanisms.
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Abstract
Introduction: Use of free text in syndromic surveillance requires managing the substantial word variation that results from
use of synonyms, abbreviations, acronyms, truncations, concatenations, misspellings, and typographic errors. Failure to detect
these variations results in missed cases, and traditional methods for capturing these variations require ongoing, labor-intensive
maintenance.
Objectives: This paper examines the problem of word variation in chief-complaint data and explores three semi-automated
approaches for addressing it.
Methods: Approximately 6 million chief complaints from patients reporting to emergency departments at 54 hospitals were
analyzed. A method of text normalization that models the similarities between words was developed to manage the linguistic
variability in chief complaints. Three approaches based on this method were investigated: 1) automated correction of spelling
and typographical errors; 2) use of  International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM)
codes to select chief complaints to mine for overlooked vocabulary; and 3) identification of overlooked vocabulary by matching
words that appeared in similar contexts.
Results: The prevalence of word errors was high. For example, such words as diarrhea, nausea, and vomiting were misspelled
11.0%–18.8% of the time. Approximately 20% of all words were abbreviations or acronyms whose use varied substantially
by site. Two methods, use of ICD-9-CM codes to focus searches and the automated pairing of words by context, both retrieved
relevant but previously unexpected words. Text normalization simultaneously reduced the number of false positives and false
negatives in syndrome classification, compared with commonly used methods based on word stems. In approximately 25% of
instances, using text normalization to detect lower respiratory syndrome would have improved the sensitivity of current word-
stem approaches by approximately 10%–20%.
Conclusions: Incomplete vocabulary and word errors can have a substantial impact on the retrieval performance of free-text
syndromic surveillance systems. The text normalization methods described in this paper can reduce the effects of these problems.
Introduction
Syndromic surveillance using existing free-text sources (e.g.,
electronic medical records or emergency department [ED]
chief complaints) offers potential advantages in the timeliness
and richness of the information that can be provided (1). In
particular, capturing surveillance information as free text does
not incur the human effort, delay, or drastic reduction in
information incurred by coding. However, using free text to
track symptom occurrence incurs four particular challenges
caused by linguistic variation: 1) a single symptom can be
described in multiple ways by using synonyms and paraphrases;
2) medical concepts are often recorded using abbreviations
and acronyms that are idiosyncratic to individual hospitals;
3) the same concept can be indicated with different parts of
speech; and 4) words are frequently misspelled or mistyped in
busy medical settings, causing the continual appearance of
new, previously unseen errors. This paper discusses new
approaches to address these four challenges.
Failure to detect linguistic variations results in missed cases.
This problem is potentially severe enough to motivate efforts
to develop surveillance systems based on apparently unam-
biguous numerical codes or standardized vocabularies. One
goal of the current study is to analyze ED chief complaints
empirically to explore the extent of variation present.
Certain efforts to manage linguistic variations and to
increase system sensitivity can produce their own false posi-
tives, thereby lowering specificity, increasing false alarms, and
ultimately wasting limited public health resources. Most
importantly, monitoring symptoms adequately in the pres-
ence of such variability requires ongoing, costly, labor-
intensive maintenance.
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TABLE 1. Variability in strings used to denote selected words
in free-text emergency department chief-complaint data —
New York City, November 2001–November 2002
Word No. of variations No. of instances Incorrect (%)
Abscess 92 3,419 45.4
Diarrhea 349 4,006 11.1
Vomiting 379 16,288 16.7
Nausea 137 4,143 18.8
Headache 196 1,771 3.4
Source: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene chief-
complaint database.
TABLE 2. Examples of different strings* used to denote
vomiting in free-text emergency department chief-complaint
data
1. Andvomiting 100. Vomitedx5today 300. Vommioting
2. Bomiting 101. Vomiteing 301. Vommited
3. Cvomiting 102. Vomites 302. Vommitiing
— 103. Vomiteted 303. Vommiting
15. V0mitting 104. Vomitfever 304. Vommitintig
16. Vamiting 105. Vomitg 305. Vommitit
17. Vbomiting — —
18. Vfomiting 200. Vomitint 325. Vomti
19. Vimit 201. Vomitintg 326. Vomtied
20. Vimited 202. Vomitiny 327. Vomtig
— — —
50. Vomiging 250. Vomitting3xdays 377. Vvomitting
51. Vomihing 251. Vomittinga 378. Womiting
52. Vomiig 252. Vomittingab 379. Womitting
Source: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene chief-
complaint database.
* N = 379
The problem of linguistic variation in surveillance systems
designed for early detection of covert attacks deserves atten-
tion. Increasingly sensitive statistical methods are available with
the potential to detect an outbreak affecting a local geographic
area (e.g., a single hospital). These methods are most effective
when clean data are provided. In addition, syndromic surveil-
lance systems have been used not only for outbreak detection
but for case finding and outbreak monitoring; these functions
can also be compromised when substantial numbers of cases
are missed. Even if a surveillance system contains minimal
errors when used in the site where it was developed, word
usage can vary substantially among sites, making algorithms
developed for one site inadequate for others. Efforts to com-
bine systems for extensive regional surveillance need to be able
to detect and address performance differences caused by word
variation from one site to another.
This paper examines the extent of word variation in the text
of ED chief complaints. It then reviews different approaches
for managing word variation, discusses their limitations, and
outlines a new approach to text normalization on which three
approaches to handling linguistic variation are based. The
performance of these approaches when combined is then com-
pared to a common approach in free-text surveillance systems
based on word-stem matching.
Extent of Word Variation
in Chief-Complaint Databases
Chief-complaint databases from the New York City (NYC)
Department of Mental Health and Hygiene (DOHMH),
Emergency Medical Associates of New Jersey (EMA), and
Boston Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (AEGIS) were
used in these studies. Collectively, the data consist of the chief
complaints from approximately 6 million patient encounters
at 54 hospitals over a period of 1–7 years, depending on the
hospital.
Types of Word Variation
The word variation in these approximately 6 million chief
complaints can be grouped into two types. The first, ortho-
graphic variation, includes variations in spelling attributable
either to different grammatical forms of the same word (e.g.,
coughs, coughed, or coughing) or to spelling errors, transcrip-
tion errors, or typographic errors. In principle, orthographic
variation might be addressed, at least in part, through the use of
string-matching algorithms that group similarly spelled words.
The second type of word variation, nonorthographic (or
semantic) variation, unfortunately cannot be managed merely
by looking at the arrangement of letters in a word. The same
chief complaint can usually be described in multiple ways by
using acronyms, word truncations, idiosyncratic abbreviations,
or legitimate synonyms, all of which can differ from one hos-
pital to another. For example, spelling-correction or string-
matching algorithms cannot be expected to discover that the
869 chief complaints of N V in the DOHMH database should
be regarded as instances of nausea and vomiting. Such cases in
which only a limited number of letters are retained from the
original word are better treated as synonyms rather than
orthographic variations and are referred to here as examples
of nonorthographic or semantic variation.
Orthographic Variation
Substantial orthographic variation was found among words
commonly included in chief complaints (e.g., diarrhea, nau-
sea, or abscess) (Table 1). These numbers were derived from
the DOHMH database, but results for the EMA and AEGIS
databases were similar. A word as simple as vomiting was
misspelled at least 379 ways (Table 2).
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Spelling-correction programs are often based on the obser-
vation that 80% of spelling errors are usually caused by a single
insertion, substitution, or deletion of a letter in the word (2).
That study, based on the performance of computer transcrip-
tionists in 1964, did not reflect the conditions of the typical
modern-day ED. By contrast, in the present study, the modal
number of errors per misspelled word was two, and in 31% of
instances the misspelled words contained >3 errors.
Nonorthographic Variation
Nonorthographic variation in the study data was common.
In each of the three databases, >20% of all nonstop words
(i.e., words other than common articles, conjunctions, and
prepositions [e.g., the, and, a, or or]) in the chief complaints
were nonstandard acronyms, abbreviations, or truncations.
This number was obtained after first excluding such standard
medical abbreviations as CHF, ECG, HCT, HBV, HIV, SOB,
WBC, and 43 others. This observation necessitated this study’s
efforts to address the nonorthographic or semantic variation
found in medical free text.
Substantial differences in usage among sites were present.
Approximately 55% of the word strings in the EMA database
were not contained in the DOHMH data, and 35% of the
strings in the AEGIS database were not present in the
DOHMH data even though the AEGIS database is only 8%
the size of the DOHMH database. The words rigors and
myalgias were used in the AEGIS database 211 and 76 times
more frequently than in the DOHMH and EMA databases,
respectively. Those words occurred so rarely in the NYC chief
complaints that they were not included in, and would not
have been detected by, the DOHMH algorithms. Similarly,
3,392 instances of skin rashes described in the EMA hospitals
using the string erupt would not have been retrieved because
the truncation erupt was used only rarely in NYC and there-
fore not included in their algorithms. The acronym DIB for
difficulty in breathing appeared in 2,679 chief complaints from
New York City but only twice in the >3.5 million chief com-
plaints recorded elsewhere. Such differences highlight the need




The need to clean textual data has been recognized in every
discipline in which textual data is processed, and correspond-
ing methods to deal with the problem have been developed (3).
The majority of these methods have addressed only
orthographic word variation. This paper describes the limita-
tions of the three most commonly used methods (phonetic
spelling correction, word-stem algorithms, and edit distances)
and proposes the need for a fourth, more powerful approach
for managing medical text.
Phonetic Spelling Correction Methods
Phonetic spelling-correction methods include algorithms
such as Soundex, Editex, or Phonix (4). Soundex has been
used for more than a century and is often used in medical
applications. These methods recognize that words can be mis-
spelled when certain letters that sound alike, such as d and t
(as in jauntice or pregnand) or g and j (as in conjested) are
substituted for one another.
Unfortunately, multiple exceptions to these pairings exist
(e.g., g does not sound like j in cough and thus misspellings of
cough would not be detected). More importantly, among the
chief complaints examined in this study, typing and transcrip-
tion errors were more common than phonetic errors. The let-
ters r and y were substituted for t 5 times more frequently
than the letter d because they are located on either side of t on
the keyboard.
Keyword or Word-Stem Methods
The idea behind this current method in free-text syndromic
surveillance is that most words contain a unique string, usu-
ally the first few letters, that is specific enough to identify the
word and that is unlikely to be misspelled. For example, this
method assumes that although breathing might be spelled 147
ways in chief-complaint data, searching for all words begin-
ning with breat would capture the majority of them. Unfor-
tunately, this strategy did not find the 56 (38%) spellings of
breathing in the DOHMH database that did not begin with
breat.
Relying on a word-stem approach not only misses cases but
also requires an untenable level of labor-intensive maintenance.
For example, for a system to recognize cases not beginning
with breat, other word stems (e.g., brath, bereath, and DIB)
need to be added. However, this strategy results in multiple
false positives (e.g., mandibular fractures, dibetes, or the use of
a dibfulator). Further logic is required to avoid retrieving men-
tions of any therapeutic breathrough. Eliminating such new
false positives requires making further ad-hoc modifications
and a continuing spiral of time-consuming maintenance and
increasingly unreadable, error-prone code.
Even if a temporary state is reached in which false positives
and negatives are minimal, new strings will keep arriving,
making the previous logic inadequate. In the present study,
even after 2 million chief complaints had been processed in
the DOHMH system, approximately 750 new strings
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appeared each week. Furthermore, when separate systems are
joined, the complexity of the algorithmic logic must be
increased again (e.g., although diarrhea was spelled 349 dif-
ferent ways in the DOHMH database, the EMA database con-
tained an additional 154 spellings).
A system is far more maintainable if the medical logic
regarding which concepts best represent a syndrome can be
kept at a conceptual level, separate from the underlying
technical intricacies of text processing.
Edit-Distance Methods
A third common method for matching strings is the edit-
distance approach, which measures similarity as the minimum
number of operations (e.g., insertions, deletions, substitutions,
or transpositions) required to transform one string into
another. Multiple modifications of this approach have focused
primarily on computational efficiency in matching long strings
(5).  Edit distances, however, often give results inconsistent
with human intuition. For example, the method would score
both azma and stomac as equally close to asthma. Health pro-
fessionals would not find this useful.
Generalized Edit-Distance Method
The text-normalization method developed for and used in
this project is a generalization of the edit-distance approach
— it models the similarity between two words as the mini-
mum number of typographic errors, phonetic spelling errors,
transcription errors, medical affixes (suffixes and prefixes), and
concatenations that could transform one word into another.
Because the method attempts to create the most plausible
model of how a misspelled string could be generated, it is
designed to represent the psychological distance between two
strings rather than the computational distance.
As an example of the capabilities of this approach, the string
coughvomintingdiarre, which actually appeared in a chief com-
plaint, would be recognized by the text normalization soft-
ware as an instance of the string vomiting (as well as of cough
and diarrhea). Programs based on phonetic matching, edit
distance, keywords, or the majority of other algorithms would
not recognize the first string as a plausible instance of the sec-
ond string.
Because the distances between words produced by the algo-
rithm make intuitive sense (i.e., they correspond closely to
the judgments about word similarity that would be made by
humans), users can more easily work interactively with the
computer or rely on the algorithm to make good decisions
when run fully automatically. In one configuration, text-
normalization software can be used as a pre-processor that
passes normalized chief complaints or medical records as
input into a separate program dedicated to the higher-level
task of recognizing syndromes and analyzing their frequency.
Applications of Text Normalization
To improve system performance, the text-normalization
method was applied to the chief-complaint databases in three
ways. The first use was a straightforward application of text
normalization to automatically remove typographical errors,
misspellings, word concatenations, and other forms of ortho-
graphic variation in chief complaints. The other two methods
used text normalization as an essential tool for vocabulary
expansion, in particular to search for overlooked abbrevia-
tions, acronyms, and other relevant vocabulary. Each applica-
tion is described briefly.
 Normalization of Chief Complaints
Chief complaints were presented to a text-normalization
program, which compared each word in each chief complaint
to a list of 68 key concepts that had been identified as useful
for syndrome identification in the DOHMH syndromic sur-
veillance algorithms. For example, the list included the words
pulmonary, pleuritic, cough, gasping, and dyspnea for respira-
tory syndrome identification. Words sufficiently close to a key
concept were matched with that concept.
To compare the performance of the text-normalization
approach to orthographic variation with the often-used word-
stem approach, the DOHMH word-stem algorithm for diar-
rheal syndrome was applied to the EMA chief-complaint data,
both with and without prior text normalization. Each instance
retrieved by one algorithm but not by the other was reviewed
to determine which approach was correct. Of the 38,956 cases
of diarrhea in the EMA database identified by either approach,
5,217 (13%) were recorded in a nonstandard way. When pre-
viously trained on the DOHMH chief complaints, the text-
normalization program was able to identify all but five of these
cases, an improvement of 896 when compared with cases
recognized without normalization, while incurring only 17
false positives. Orthographic normalization alone improved
performance by 2.3% when compared with the word-stem
approach.
Using ICD-9-CM Codes To Uncover
Overlooked Vocabulary
Although orthographic normalization generated substan-
tial improvement, the possibility remained that additional
words were being used to indicate symptoms and were being
missed. Two additional approaches based on text normaliza-
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TABLE 3. Expanding keyword vocabulary by locating words
that appear in similar contexts in free-text chief-complaint
data
       Word strings of <5 letters
Key concept* with similar contexts†
Black Dark,§ brown, drk,§
Cough Plegm,§ cgh,§
Enteritis Age§
Fever Fevr, feve, fev, cough
Nausea N,§ NVD,§ NV§
Pneumonia RLL, pneu,§ exac§
Rash Rashes, hives§
SOB DIB
Stool Urine, dark,§ brown, black, drk,§ tarry,§ BRBPR§
Source: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene chief-
complaint database.
* Key concepts used in free-text syndromic surveillance.
†Word strings with similar contexts, shown in order of computed similarity.
§Word strings that would have been overlooked when using current word-
stem algorithms.
tion were used to uncover overlooked vocabulary (e.g., unan-
ticipated abbreviations, acronyms, and truncations).
The first approach was to use International Classification of
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM)
codes to select chief complaints most likely to contain
vocabulary relevant to a particular syndrome. For example,
the chief complaints of patient encounters assigned one of the
ICD-9-CM codes in CDC’s ESSENCE grouping for gas-
trointestinal (GI) syndrome (6) could be examined as a likely
source for overlooked words that indicate GI syndrome. Spe-
cifically, these chief complaints were analyzed to see which
words occurred more frequently in this ICD-9-CM GI syn-
drome group than in the cases not in that group. The proce-
dure, in effect, searched for words with the highest relative
risk of occurrence in the selected group as a means to detect
words useful for designating GI syndrome.
In practice, this strategy is compromised because the seem-
ingly innumerable misspellings and corruptions of words in
the chief complaints result in an unmanageable list of word
strings (e.g., 349 variations of diarrhea) whose relevance can-
not be distinguished from the numerous irrelevant words that
also occur with low frequency in the group. Used in this case,
text normalization removes much of the noise and allows the
relevant concepts to emerge.
The EMA database was used for this experiment because it
contained both ED chief complaints and discharge ICD-9-CM
codes for each case. Using the ICD-9-CM codes for GI syn-
drome with text normalization uncovered a number of rel-
evant words not previously included in the DOHMH
word-stem algorithms, including cramps (4,415 instances),
runs, NVD, LBM, Shigella, noninf (1,689 instances, as in noninf
gastroenteritis) and others.
Choosing a different subset of ICD-9-CM codes (e.g., only
those codes that reflect intestinal rather than upper GI dis-
ease) might have uncovered yet additional words. The best
strategies and criteria for choosing productive codes for syn-
onym generation remain to be investigated. The potential
benefits of using more precise and comprehensive coding
schemes (e.g., SNOMED CT®) might also be explored (7).
Using Context To Uncover Overlooked
Vocabulary
A second approach to retrieving overlooked vocabulary, as
well as site-specific idiosyncratic vocabulary requiring
customization, is adapted from the dictum in computational
linguistics that “a word is known by the company it keeps”
(8). This approach seeks to retrieve words with similar mean-
ings by finding words that occur in similar contexts. Words
that co-occur with the same other words tend either to have
similar meanings or at least to be closely related.
In this approach, for each word in the chief-complaint data-
base, the words that most specifically occurred with that word
were tabulated, resulting in a co-occurrence profile of closely
associated words for each word. Each word was then compared
with every other word to identify those with the most similar
co-occurrence profiles. Similarity was assessed by using rank-
order correlation between profiles. Examples of word strings
of <5 letters uncovered by this method that would have been
overlooked when using current word-stem algorithms are pro-
vided (e.g., 4,970 hive-like rashes would have been overlooked
because hives was not previously a search term) (Table 3).
Detection Performance With
and Without Text Normalization
Fortified with normalized text and additional vocabulary, a
syndrome classifier operating on text that has been normal-
ized can demonstrate greater sensitivity and specificity than a
word-stem algorithm operating without normalization. Even
though the two approaches will agree in the majority of cases,
the cases where they differ are revealing.
Word-stem algorithms with and without text normaliza-
tion were applied to detect instances of lower respiratory ill-
ness syndrome. On this particular task, in 3.3 million chief
complaints, 201,327 instances were retrieved, and the sensi-
tivity of the keyword and text-normalization approaches dif-
fered by 5.6% (11,252 instances). When the word-stem
algorithm without normalization indicated presence of a lower
respiratory illness but the algorithm using text normalization
did not, the text-normalization approach was correct in 96.4%
of cases. In the instances in which the text-normalization
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FIGURE. Effect of text normalization on free-text chief-
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approach declared a syndrome to be present and the word-
stem algorithm alone did not, human review of the chief com-
plaints determined that text normalization was correct in
99.8% of cases. Use of text normalization thus substantially
reduced the number of both false positives and false negatives
(Table 4).
If text normalization were applied daily or in hospitals or
surveillance systems with far fewer visits than 3.3 million, the
differences between the two approaches might be greater still.
The two approaches generated substantial differences when
tracking diarrhea or bloody diarrhea syndrome in New York
City hospitals with >100 visits for diarrhea per week (Figure).
In approximately 25% of instances, the sensitivity of the word-
stem approach was improved by 10%–20% when used with
text normalization. In no case was the specificity decreased.
A similar analysis was performed for fever/influenza syn-
drome (excluding upper respiratory illness), which comprises
approximately 16.5% of New York City ED encounters. In
12% of instances, text normalization resulted in a 10%–20%
improvement in sensitivity over the word-stem approach in
tracking the number of fever/influenza chief complaints.
Conclusions
Incomplete vocabulary and word errors can have a substan-
tial impact on the retrieval performance of free-text syndromic
surveillance systems. Certain methods based on text normal-
ization can greatly reduce the impact of these problems. New,
increasingly sensitive methods of analysis will be most effec-
tive with careful attention to the quality of the data on which
they rely.
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Reviewer determination
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Abstract
Introduction: Emergency departments (EDs) using free-text chief-complaint data for syndromic surveillance face a unique
challenge because a complaint might be described and coded in multiple ways.
Objective: Two major ED-based free-text chief-complaint coding systems were compared for agreement between free-text
interpretation and syndrome coding.
Methods: Chief-complaint data from 21,736 patients at an urban ED were processed through both the New York City Depart-
ment of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) syndrome coding system as modified by the Chicago Department of Public
Health and the Real-Time Outbreak Detection System Complaint Coder (CoCo, version 2.1, University of Pittsburgh). To
account for differences in each system’s specified syndromes, relevant syndromes from the DOHMH system were collapsed into the
corresponding CoCo categories so that a descriptive comparison could be made. DOHMH classifications were combined to match
existing CoCo categories as follows: 1) vomit+diarrhea = Gastrointestinal; 2) cold+respiratory+asthma = Respiratory; 3) fevflu
= Constitutional; 4) rash = Rash; 5) sepsis+other = Other, 6) unknown = Unknown.
Results: Overall agreement between DOHMH and CoCo syndrome coding was optimal (0.614 kappa). However, agreement
between individual syndromes varied substantially. Rash and Respiratory had the highest agreement (0.711 and 0.594 kappa,
respectively). Other and Constitutional had an intermediate level of agreement (0.453 and 0.419 kappa, respectively), but less
than optimal agreement was identified for Gastrointestinal and Unknown (0.270 and 0.002 kappa, respectively).
Conclusions: Although this analysis revealed optimal overall agreement between the two systems evaluated, substantial differences in
classification schemes existed, highlighting the need for a consensus regarding chief-complaint classification.
Introduction
Syndromic surveillance has emerged as a novel approach to
early disease detection. Both the public and private health sec-
tors are exploring different approaches to disease-outbreak
detection using real-time, automated syndromic surveillance
systems (1–5). These systems are composed of a series of dis-
tinct steps that work collectively to shorten the time necessary
to detect an aberrant pattern in clinical activity, potentially
indicating a disease outbreak. The flow of information in such
systems begins with the collection of patient chief-complaint
data, often in free-text form, by triage staff in an emergency
department (ED) or outpatient clinic. Then, these complaints
are coded into specific broadly defined syndromes for epide-
miologic surveillance. Next, syndrome counts for a predeter-
mined period are compared with baseline data from a previous
interval. Finally, any suspicious anomalies in syndrome trends
detected during the analytic phase are investigated.
One of the first and most important steps in syndromic
data processing is the classification of free-text chief complaints
into syndromes. In Chicago, Illinois, a major university
teaching hospital and the Chicago Department of Public
Health (CDPH) are working to implement automated, real-
time syndromic surveillance. However, each institution is
using a different free-text chief-complaint coding system. Pro-
cessing of chief-complaint data collected as free text poses a
unique challenge. One solution to the problem is to use soft-
ware specifically designed to evaluate the patient’s chief com-
plaint and then assign it a syndrome category. Different
computerized algorithms, or complaint coders, are trained to
prioritize and code symptoms differently. As a result, depend-
ing on what algorithm is in place in a given clinical setting, a
syndrome profile for a group of patients in a certain span of
time might vary considerably, not only skewing the potential
accuracy of patient data tracking within the hospital but also
affecting public health surveillance efforts on a broader
geographic scale.
Methods
For this study, two major ED-based free-text chief-
complaint coding algorithms were tested. One system was
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version 2.1 of the Complaint Coder (CoCo) developed by
the Real-Time Outbreak Detection System (RODS) labora-
tory at the Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of
Pittsburgh (5). This Bayesian classifier codes symptoms into
syndromes on the basis of probability (i.e., the chances that a
given symptom or group of symptoms will fall into a certain
syndrome grouping), and then the syndrome code with the
highest computed probability is assigned. These probabilities
are determined from a default probability file included as a
part of the CoCo software; this file was derived from 28,990
complaint strings collected from a single ED that were each
manually coded by a physician into a syndrome category.
Although CoCo has the capability to be retrained by using
patient data obtained locally, for this study, the included
default file was used. The second system was the complaint
classifier algorithm developed and implemented by the New
York Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)
after the events of September 11, 2001 (6). This system codes
complaints into syndromes on the basis of keywords, for which
the algorithm searches, to assign a particular syndrome. The
basis for choosing these specific keywords was data previously
collected from New York City area EDs. In Chicago, CDPH
has obtained the DOHMH algorithm and uses certain syn-
drome modules for routine public health surveillance. Both
of these complaint-classifying algorithms require that free-text
chief-complaint data be preprocessed into a preferred format
to be read correctly (i.e., all text must be in lowercase, with all
punctuation removed, for CoCo to process the text); in con-
trast, the DOHMH system requires data to be in uppercase,
but punctuation does not need to be removed or altered.
Data for this study included all chief complaints collected
during January–June 2002 at a Chicago ED where all chief-
complaint data are logged in a free-text manner, for a total of
21,736 free-text complaint strings. All complaints were pre-
processed for each of the two coding algorithms; only case
and punctuation were altered as necessary. Spelling or gram-
matical errors were not corrected and instead left in place.
These complaints were then processed by each coding algo-
rithm separately and compared for agreement, by using the
kappa statistic; all statistical analysis was implemented by
using SPSS 10.0 software (7).
Results
CoCo’s syndromes are more broadly defined and distinct
from one another, whereas the syndromes of the DOHMH
coding algorithm are of a more specific nature with a certain
level of overlap (e.g. not just Gastrointestinal, as in CoCo, but
Vomit and Diarrhea in particular, to specify upper and lower
gastrointestinal symptoms, respectively) (Figure 1). Because
of apparent differences in syndrome specificity between the
two coding algorithms, to make a descriptive comparison
between the two systems, the syndrome categories of the
DOHMH coder were collapsed to more accurately match the
wider scope of the CoCo syndromes. This scheme was based
on the types of chief complaints that were classified into each
syndrome in both systems, as follows:
• Any symptom coded as Vomit or Diarrhea by the
DOHMH algorithm was renamed Gastrointestinal to
match CoCo.
• Any symptom classified as Cold, Respiratory, or Asthma by
the DOHMH coder was renamed Respiratory.
• FevFlu in the DOHMH system was renamed Constitu-
tional.
• Any symptom coded as Sepsis or Other by the DOHMH
algorithm was renamed Other.
• Symptoms coded as Rash were left as is and were not com-
bined with any other syndromes.
Three syndromes existed, Hemorrhagic, Botulinic, and Neuro-
logic, into which CoCo classifies symptoms for which no
exact equivalent exists in the DOHMH algorithm, as used by
CDPH. These are syndromes that, although extremely nar-
row in their scope, have considerable relevance in surveillance
for biologic terrorism agents. However, because no direct com-
parison could be made for the current analysis, any chief com-
plaints coded as Hemorrhagic, Botulinic, or Neurologic were
removed from the study.
FIGURE 1. Scheme used to collapse New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) categories, as modified
by the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH), into the
Real-Time Outbreak Detection System (RODS), Complaint
Coder (CoCo) Version 2.1 (Center for Biomedical Informatics,
University of Pittsburgh)
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FIGURE 2.  Emergency department free-text chief complaint
data as processed by Real-Time Outbreak Detection System
(RODS), Complaint Coder (CoCo) Version 2.1 (Center for
Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh) and the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)































Of the specific syndromes into which CoCo classifies chief
complaints, Respiratory was the most frequently represented,
at 14.0% (Figure 2). Constitutional and Gastrointestinal were
roughly equivalent in their representation, at 8.7% and 10.2%,
respectively. Rash was present at the same frequency as the
Unknown category, at 2.4%. Unknown represents a catch-all
category into which CoCo places symptoms it is not trained
to handle. Symptoms commonly reported in an ED setting,
yet not fitting into any of the four tracked syndromes (Respi-
ratory, Constitutional, Gastrointestinal, and Rash) represented
the largest group of all, the Other category, at 62.3%.
For the DOHMH system, Respiratory was also the most
frequently coded of the tracked syndromes (11.3%), and Con-
stitutional and Gastrointestinal were similar in representation
(5.4% and 3.7%, respectively) (Figure 2). A total of 77.8% of
the chief complaints in the data set were classified not into
any of the tracked syndrome categories but as Other, a larger
proportion than the 62.3% coded as Other by CoCo. The
DOHMH coding algorithm can classify chief-complaint data
into substantially variable syndromes, and the syndromes into
which the study data were categorized were only those syn-
dromes within the DOHMH coder that CDPH uses on a
daily basis for routine public health surveillance. Had CDPH
been actively using every possible syndrome into which the
DOHMH algorithm is trained to code data, possibily all of
the chief complaints coded as Other would instead have been
coded into a distinct syndrome category. The Unknown
category prevalence was approximately 0, indicating that the
DOHMH coder was able to recognize and categorize virtu-
ally all of the chief complaints.
This study used the kappa statistic to assess the agreement
in syndrome classification between both coding algorithms
(i.e., the chances that a given chief complaint was coded as
the same syndrome by both algorithms were analyzed). On a
scale of zero to one, with one representing complete overall
agreement between both algorithms, the kappa statistic was
calculated to be 0.614. This represents a substantial level of
overall agreement between the two coding systems (8). This
value was also statistically significant (standard error = 0.05;
95% confidence interval = 0.604–0.624; total = 145.866
[p<0.0005]). However, when the kappa statistic was calcu-
lated for each syndrome, the results varied substantially. The
Rash syndrome had the highest level of agreement, with a kappa
of 0.711. Examination of the data confirms this level of opti-
mal agreement, because the majority of free-text chief com-
plaints coded as Rash by both algorithms — representing
66.8% of the complaints coded as Rash by the DOHMH sys-
tem and 55.4% by CoCo — was simply the word rash. Any
coding algorithm trained to classify symptoms into a Rash
category would be capable of correctly classifying a complaint
of rash. The Respiratory syndrome had the next highest level
of agreement, with a kappa of 0.594. A sample of the com-
plaints used to define the respiratory and gastrointestinal cat-
egories of the different coding systems is provided (Table).
The majority of free-text strings coded as Respiratory by both
algorithms were common respiratory complaints (e.g., short-
ness of breath, asthma attack, and difficulty breathing). One
notable difference was that a complaint of dib was recognized
by the DOHMH algorithm as an abbreviation for difficulty
in breathing and subsequently coded as Respiratory. In con-
trast, CoCo coded all 106 complaints of dib as Unknown. In
fact, dib represented the largest proportion of the symptoms
coded as Unknown by CoCo. An even lower level of agree-
ment was identified within the Constitutional syndrome (kappa
statistic = 0.419). A complaint string of fever was the most
common symptom coded as Constitutional by both systems;
however, beyond this single common symptom, distinct dif-
ferences in complaints coded as Constitutional existed between
the two algorithms.
The Gastrointestinal syndrome had the lowest level of agree-
ment of all four tracked syndromes between the two coding
algorithms, with a kappa of only 0.270. A key contributor to
this low agreement is the handling of a free-text complaint of
abdominal pain (and all abbreviations indicative of pain in
the abdomen [e.g., abd pain]). CoCo codes a complaint of
abdominal pain as Gastrointestinal; in fact, abdominal pain (and
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TABLE. Sample comparison of syndrome category definitions between the New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene (DOHMH) algorithm, as modified by the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH), and the Real-Time Outbreak
Detection System (RODS), Complaint Coder (CoCo) Version 2.1 (Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh)
DOHMH/CDPH
Diarrhea: diar, dair, diah, enteri, gastroent, 558; IF stool, bowel,
bm AND loose, watery, or liquid
Vomit: throwing up, threw up, food pois, vom, vmt, n/v, 787
Cold: stuffi, stuffy, sneez, nasal, nasel AND cong, conj, drip,
disch, runn, cong, runn, nose, congested, congestion, cold
Respiratory: pneumon, gasp, SOB, pulmon, monia, infiltr, croup,
bronch, hypox, 786.2, 786.0, 480, 481, 482, 483, 465, 466, 484,
485, 486, pleur, dyspn, coug, couh, breat, beath, dib, d i b, d.i.b.,
brathing, diff dr, uri, uri/, uri; u r i, u.r.i, sob, s o b, s.o.b.
Asthma: asth, asmtha, ashtma, astma, asyhma, whez, azth, az,





pain or cramps anywhere in the abdomen, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea, and abdominal distension or swelling
problems of the nose (coryza) and throat (pharyngitis), as
well as the lungs; examples of Respiratory include congestion,
sore throat, tonsillitis, sinusitis, cold symptoms, bronchitis,
cough, shortness of breath, asthma, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, and pneumonia; the presence of both
cold and flu symptoms is Respiratory and not Constitutional
* For CoCo to process, all text must be in lowercase.
its similar spellings or abbreviations) accounted for 33.7% of
the complaint strings coded by CoCo as Gastrointestinal, con-
siderably more than any other complaint. However, the
DOHMH algorithm is not trained to code a complaint of
abdominal pain as Gastrointestinal and instead codes it as Other.
The symptom that represented the largest proportion of
DOHMH’s Gastrointestinal syndrome (26.7%) was a com-
plaint of vomiting, which was the second-most frequent com-
plaint within CoCo’s Gastrointestinal category (at 10.5%).
Additionally, examination of the data coded as Gastrointesti-
nal by each algorithm provides insight into the hierarchy of
syndromes within each system. When a single complaint string
included multiple symptoms, a decision had to be made by
each algorithm regarding which syndrome is most important
for surveillance purposes, because each algorithm is trained to
settle on a single syndrome and not allow for multiple codings
of a single complaint string. For example, a complaint string
of vomiting blood was coded by CoCo as Hemorrhagic, indi-
cating that CoCo is trained to weigh the presence of blood
within the complaint as more important than vomiting, which
is otherwise coded as Gastrointestinal. In contrast, the
DOHMH algorithm codes a complaint of vomiting blood as
Gastrointestinal. Another example is a complaint string of rash
fever. The DOHMH algorithm codes such a complaint as
Constitutional, meaning that it has been trained to consider
the keyword fever as more important than the keyword rash,
whereas CoCo codes rash fever as Rash, demonstrating that
even in the presence of fever, CoCo considers a rash to be the
more important finding.
Conclusions
This study’s findings demonstrate the substantial variabil-
ity that exists between these two chief-complaint coding
systems. Whereas the overall agreement for coding of the data
set was satisfactory, agreement between individual syndrome
classifications ranged from substantial to unsatisfactory. These
differences are not necessarily a problem of accuracy or per-
formance, but rather a result of the choices made in designing
the coding systems. When relying on automated classifica-
tion of chief-complaint strings, public health officials need to
be aware of the symptom hierarchy within systems because
this prioritization will result in changes in syndrome
classification prevalence.
The programs in this study allow for individual modifica-
tion of the algorithms that classify each complaint, and chang-
ing each program is possible so that the user can obtain
approximately complete concordance for the syndromes of
choice. However, this highlights a more substantial problem:
what are the syndrome categories that surveillance systems
should be monitoring? A recent literature review revealed
multiple syndrome categories under surveillance in different
programs throughout the country (1–5). These categories
ranged from such individual syndrome categories as respira-
tory or gastrointestinal to such groups of syndromes as rash
with fever or upper/lower respiratory infection with fever.
No set standards exist regarding which syndrome classifica-
tions should be regularly monitored. The ultimate goal of sur-
veillance should be early detection of disease outbreaks, either
natural or as a result of biologic terrorism. Although surveil-
lance systems should remain flexible to adapt to local public
health needs, national consensus is required to define which
syndromes should be monitored as well as what chief com-
plaints accurately define these syndrome categories. After agree-
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ment is reached, efforts can focus on refining systems’ ability
to perform automated real-time syndromic surveillance
accurately.
This study had certain limitations. First, the DOHMH sys-
tem already has a newer version available that might change
the outcome of coding complaints. Second, neither system
was designed to be specific to Chicago, where the chief com-
plaints were made; regional differences in demographics, lan-
guage, and culture might affect the coding. Third, this study
did not examine the validity or efficacy of the two surveil-
lance systems. Further studies are needed to evaluate the
diverse approaches available for automated chief-complaint
classification in ED-based syndromic surveillance.
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* Use of flu-like illness in this paper is not synonymous with the CDC case
definition for influenza-like illness, which is defined as fever >100°F and
cough or sore throat (2).
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Abstract
Introduction: Syndromic surveillance monitors trends in nonspecific health indicator data to detect disease outbreaks in a timely
manner; however, only a limited percentage of persons with mild illness might exhibit behaviors that could be detected by
syndromic surveillance.
Objectives: The objectives of this study were to 1) examine the demographic characteristics of New Yorkers with recent flu-like or
diarrheal illness, 2) describe behaviors associated with having flu-like illness, and 3) estimate the citywide burden for selected
illnesses by calculating the syndromic multiplier (i.e., the number of citywide illnesses represented by each visit to an emergency
department [ED]).
Methods: A cross-sectional telephone survey of 2,433 adult residents of New York City (NYC) was conducted during March 19–
March 31, 2003, and October 27–November 23, 2003. Respondents were asked about flu-like illness, behaviors related to flu-like
illness, and diarrheal illness during the 30 days before the interview. Estimated numbers of citywide illnesses were compared with ED
visits for flu-like and diarrheal illnesses that were recorded by the NYC syndromic surveillance system for the same periods.
Results: Every ED visit for flu-like illness represented approximately 60 illnesses among city residents; every visit for diarrheal
illness represented approximately 251 illnesses. Among adults who reported a recent flu-like illness, 53.2% purchased over-the-
counter (OTC) medications; 32.6% reported missing school or work; 29.1% visited a physician; 21.4% called a physician for
advice; 8.8% visited an ED; and 3.8% called a nurse or health hotline for advice. Of those who reported multiple behaviors,
respondents most commonly reported purchasing OTC medications as their first response to a flu-like illness.
Conclusions: Population-based survey data can be used in conjunction with syndromic surveillance data to better understand
the relation between nonspecific health indicators and the burden of certain illnesses in the community, and to assess the represen-
tativeness of different syndromic data sources.
Introduction
Syndromic surveillance systems are typically designed to
detect increases in nonspecific health indicators that poten-
tially signal the beginning of a disease outbreak, including an
outbreak attributable to biologic terrorism. The data used by
syndromic surveillance systems often represent behavioral
indicators of early illness (e.g., pharmaceutical sales or
employee absenteeism) and clinical indicators associated with
more severe illness (e.g., emergency department (ED) visits or
ambulance dispatches). Syndromic surveillance is particularly
notable for its timeliness because it collects and analyzes these
data daily.
Because diseases caused by potentially threatening biologic
agents often have prodromes that include fever, cough, short-
ness of breath, muscle aches, and general malaise (1),
syndromic surveillance systems frequently examine nonspe-
cific respiratory and constitutional symptoms, collectively
referred to here as symptoms for flu-like illness.* However,
only a limited percentage of persons with such symptoms
might exhibit behaviors that syndromic surveillance systems
could detect. For example, ED visits for flu-like illness are
likely to represent a fraction of the total number of flu-like
illnesses in the community because persons with milder forms
of the illness might not seek treatment at an ED.
Unlike in traditional disease surveillance systems, syndromic
surveillance data are highly dependent on health-seeking or
consumer behaviors. Better understanding of the actions
people take when they become ill could highlight potential
gaps in surveillance, identify promising data sources, and
improve quantification of the magnitude of community-
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level illness corresponding to syndromic alerts. Such
information is also crucial to the development of simulated
disease-outbreak models.
To better understand the relation between illness in the com-
munity and syndromic surveillance data regarding nonspe-
cific health indicators, the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) applied informa-
tion from a citywide survey on self-reported illnesses and
behaviors to its syndromic surveillance system. During the
spring and fall of 2003, DOHMH conducted a population-
based survey to estimate citywide prevalence of chronic dis-
eases and behavioral risk factors. The survey asked adult NYC
residents about recent flu-like and diarrheal illnesses as well as
about their health-seeking and consumer behaviors during flu-
like illness. Prevalence estimates of behaviors during flu-like
illness could provide an indication of the most frequent and
timely sources of health-indicator data for use in syndromic
surveillance in NYC. By combining information from the
survey on the prevalence of illness with ED syndromic sur-
veillance data, DOHMH was able estimate the syndromic
multiplier — the number of citywide illnesses represented by
each ED visit.
Objectives
The objectives of this study were to 1) examine the demo-
graphic characteristics of New Yorkers with recent flu-like or
diarrheal illness, 2) describe health-seeking and consumer be-
haviors associated with flu-like illness, and 3) estimate the
citywide burden of illness corresponding to syndromic sur-
veillance ED visits by calculating the syndromic multiplier.
Methods
Community Health Survey
To assess annual trends in the health and health behaviors
of New Yorkers, DOHMH conducts the New York City Com-
munity Health Survey (3), a citywide, cross-sectional telephone
survey of 10,000 persons, modeled after the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) (4). The target popula-
tion for the survey is noninstitutionalized NYC adults aged
>18 years with telephones. A smaller, supplemental citywide
survey, used to ask timely and seasonally related questions and
to pilot test other questions for the larger survey, was admin-
istered twice in 2003, once in the spring and once in the fall.
A total of 1,211 interviews were conducted during March 19–
March 31, 2003, and 1,222 interviews were conducted dur-
ing October 27–November 23, 2003. Interviews were
conducted in English, Spanish, and Chinese. The minimum
cooperation rate, using the definition provided by the Ameri-
can Association of Public Opinion Research (5), was 48% in
the spring survey and 64% in the fall survey. The survey was a
simple random sample; weights were applied to each observa-
tion such that the sum of the weights equaled the total adult
population of NYC (N = 6,068,009, on the basis of the 2000
U.S. Census).
During both the spring and fall surveys, respondents were
asked the following question about recent flu-like illness: “In
the last 30 days, did you have a flu-like illness with high fever,
muscle aches, and cough or sore throat?” If respondents
answered yes, they were then asked about different behaviors:
“During this illness, did you a) purchase an over-the-counter
(OTC) medication; b) miss work or school; c) call a doctor’s
office for advice; d) call a nurse or other health hotline; e) visit
with your regular doctor; f ) visit a hospital emergency room
or urgent care center; g) visit a health-care facility other than
your doctor or an emergency room?” Questions regarding
behavior were asked in random order to minimize bias associ-
ated with respondent fatigue. In the fall survey, respondents
who replied yes to >2 behavior-related questions were asked
to specify which action they took first. In the spring survey,
respondents were also asked whether they experienced recent
diarrheal illness: “In the last 30 days, did you have diarrhea
with at least three loose bowel movements within 24 hours?”
Syndromic Surveillance Data
As part of the NYC syndromic surveillance system, data on
ED visits, which include chief complaints, are transmitted daily
to DOHMH from participating NYC hospitals (6). Each ED
visit is categorized into one of several syndromes (i.e., respira-
tory, fever/influenza, diarrhea, vomiting, and asthma) on the
basis of the free-text information contained within each chief
complaint. Daily counts of ED visits for these syndromes are
analyzed each day to detect citywide temporal increases or
localized spatial clustering that might be indicative of a disease
outbreak.
For this analysis, ED visits by adults (aged >18 years) for the
respiratory or fever/influenza syndromes were considered to be
visits for flu-like illness. Visits included in the diarrhea syndrome
category were considered to be visits for diarrheal illness.
Estimation Methods
Using the survey data, DOHMH estimated the prevalence
of self-reported flu-like illness, behaviors associated with flu-
like illness, and diarrheal illness during the 30 days before the
survey interview. The relative standard error (RSE) was used as
a criterion of precision, calculated by dividing each estimate by
its standard error; estimates with RSE of >30% have low preci-
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TABLE 1. Prevalence of flu-like illness and diarrheal illness,
by age, sex, race/ethnicity, education level, and health-care
access — New York City Community Health Survey, 2003
Flu-like illness Diarrheal illness
in last 30 days in last 30 days
(n = 2,433)* (n = 1,211)†
Characteristic %§ (95% CI¶) % (95% CI)
All respondents 19.6 (17.8–21.6) 8.7 (7.2–10.6)
Age
18–64 years 22.0 (19.9–24.2) 8.9 (7.2–10.9)
>65 years 6.3 (4.1–9.5) 7.9 (4.7–13.0)
Sex
Male 17.6 (15.1–20.4) 7.2 (5.1–10.0)
Female 21.4 (18.8–24.2) 10.1 (7.9–12.7)
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 16.0 (13.6–18.9) 8.9 (6.1–11.6)
Black, non-Hispanic 19.7 (16.2–23.8) 7.9 (5.4–11.5)
Hispanic 25.8 (22.0–30.1) 8.7 (5.7–13.0)
Other 18.6 (13.0–25.7) 9.7** (4.9–18.2)
Education level
<High school 20.7 (16.4–25.7) 12.0 (7.5–18.6)
High school graduate 23.4 (19.4–27.9) 8.1 (5.6–11.6)
>High school 17.5 (15.3–19.9) 7.8 (6.0–10.1)
Health-care access
Insured 18.0 (16.0–20.0) 8.8 (7.1–10.9)
Uninsured 26.7 (21.8–32.2) 7.5 (4.6–11.9)
*Asked during the spring (March 19–March 31, 2003) and fall (October 27–
November 23, 2003) surveys.
† Asked during the spring (March 19–March 31, 2003) survey only.
§ Weighted prevalence estimates.
¶Confidence interval.
**Estimate has a relative standard error of >30%, indicating low precision
and stability.
sion and stability. The estimated numbers of New Yorkers with
flu-like and diarrheal illness were calculated by using the
weighted prevalence estimates from the survey.
Using the syndromic surveillance data, DOHMH summed
the total counts of ED visits for flu-like and diarrheal illness
over 30-day periods. Because the survey was administered over
multiple weeks, 30-day weighted averages of ED visits were
calculated by applying the percentage of respondents on each
interview date to the corresponding count of ED visits for the
previous 30 days.
The approximate number of citywide illnesses represented
by each ED visit in the syndromic surveillance system was
obtained by dividing the estimated number of New Yorkers
with illness during the previous 30 days by the 30-day weighted
average of ED visits. The syndromic multiplier was then cal-
culated by multiplying the above estimate by the citywide
coverage of the syndromic surveillance system (e.g., the per-
centage of ED visits reported out of all ED visits in NYC). By
using the standard errors of the survey prevalence estimates,
DOHMH also calculated 95% confidence limits on the
syndromic multiplier. SAS® version 8.2 (7) and SUDAAN®
version 8 (8) were used to conduct the analyses.
Results
Survey Results
The overall prevalence of adult New Yorkers who reported
a flu-like illness during the previous 30 days was 19.6%
(Table 1), which corresponds to approximately 2.4 flu-like
illnesses/person/year. The prevalence of flu-like illness was
slightly higher during the fall survey (20.8%) than during the
spring survey (18.5%). The prevalence of adult New Yorkers
who reported a diarrheal illness during the previous 30 days
was 8.7%, which corresponds to approximately one diarrheal
illness/person/year.
Of all reported behaviors during a flu-like illness, respon-
dents most frequently reported purchasing OTC medications
(53.2%) (Table 2). Additionally, 32.6% reported missing work
or school, 29.1% reported visiting a physician, and 21.4%
reported calling a physician for advice. Respondents less fre-
quently reported visiting an emergency department (8.8%)
or calling a nurse or health hotline (3.8%). Only 18.5% of
those with flu-like illness exhibited none of the health-
seeking behaviors asked about in the survey.
Adults aged 18–64 years were significantly more likely to
report a recent flu-like illness (22.0%) than adults aged >65
years (6.3%; p<0.001). Older adults reported calling a physi-
cian or visiting an ED during a flu-like illness more often
than did younger adults, although those differences were not
significant. No difference in prevalence of reported diarrheal
illness by age group was observed. Females were slightly more
likely than males to report both recent flu-like illness (21.4%
and 17.6%, respectively; p = 0.05) and diarrheal illness (10.1%
and 7.2%, respectively; p = 0.09). Although Hispanics were
significantly more likely to report flu-like illness (25.8%) than
whites (16.0%; p<0.001), limited differences were observed
among the racial/ethic groups regarding behaviors during a
flu-like illness.
The prevalence of flu-like illness was similar across education
level. However, persons with less than a high school education
were significantly less likely to miss work or school because of
this illness (16.3%) than were those with more than a high
school education (35.2%; p<0.001). A higher prevalence of
respondents without any health insurance reported flu-like
illness (26.7%) than those with health insurance (18.0%;
p = 0.002), but fewer reported calling a physician, visiting a
physician, or visiting an ED because of this illness.
Of those who reported flu-like illness during the previous
30 days, 50.7% reported carrying out >2 of the health-
seeking or consumer behaviors examined by the survey. Of
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TABLE 2.  Prevalence of behaviors during flu-like illness (n = 460), by age, sex, race/ethnicity, education level, and health-care
access — New York City Community Health Survey, 2003*
Purchased Missed Visited Called
 over-the-counter work Visited Called emergency nurse or
medication or school physician physician department health-line
Characteristic %† (95% CI§) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI)
All respondents 53.2 (47.7–58.5) 32.6 (27.8–37.9) 29.1 (24.7–33.9) 21.4 (17.5–25.9) 8.8 (6.5–11.9) 3.8 (2.4–6.1)
Age
18–64 years 54.9 (49.3–60.3) 33.8 (28.7–39.2) 29.0 (24.5–34.0) 20.5 (16.6–25.1) 8.6 (6.2–11.8) 3.9 (2.4–6.3)
>65 years 17.9¶ (8.0–35.2) 8.9¶ (2.2–30.0) 29.7¶ (14.9–50.5) 39.3 (20.7–61.6) 13.0¶ (3.7–36.7) 3.0¶ (0.4–18.6)
Sex
Male 52.2 (43.9–60.4) 36.0 (28.4–44.3) 30.4 (23.5–38.3) 19.1 (13.8–25.9) 6.6 (3.7–11.7) 5.5¶ (2.9–10.3)
Female 53.8 (46.8–60.8) 30.2 (24.1–37.1) 28.1 (22.7–34.3) 23.0 (17.8–29.2) 10.4 (7.2–14.7) 2.6¶ (1.3–5.2)
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 50.2 (41.2–59.2) 37.5 (29.3–46.6) 30.4 (22.8–39.2) 25.7 (18.8–34.0) 6.9¶ (3.7–12.5) 6.6¶ (3.5–12.0)
Black, non-Hispanic 49.5 (38.8–60.3) 26.1 (18.1–36.0) 33.0 (24.1–43.3) 19.5 (12.9–28.3) 12.4 (7.2–20.5) 1.9¶ (0.6–6.3)
Hispanic 56.8 (47.8–65.4) 29.5 (21.8–38.7) 29.9 (22.7–38.2) 21.6 (15.0–30.2) 9.1 (5.2–15.2) 4.0¶ (1.6–9.60
Other 57.7 (39.3–74.2) 40.0 (23.5–59.2) 16.9¶ (7.8–32.9) 14.0¶ (6.0–29.2) 6.4¶ (2.3–17.0) 0¶
Education level
<High school 50.1 (37.9–62.3) 16.3 (9.0–27.8) 37.4 (26.7–49.6) 18.7 (11.0–30.0) 10.6¶ (5.4–19.8) 0.9¶ (0.1–6.0)
High school graduate 58.2 (47.6–68.2) 35.6 (26.1–46.4) 29.7 (21.4–39.5) 16.3 (10.6–24.4) 9.9 (5.9–16.2) 3.8¶ (1.5–9.1)
>High school 52.2 (45.0–59.4) 35.2 (28.8–42.2) 27.0 (21.4–33.4) 25.1 (19.5–31.6) 7.8 (4.8–12.5) 4.9 (2.7–8.6)
Health-care access
Insured 51.1 (45.0–57.2) 32.3 (26.8–38.2) 33.7 (28.4–39.5) 23.5 (19.0–28.7) 9.7 (6.9–13.5) 3.8 (2.2–6.3)
Uninsured 61.7 (49.9–72.3) 34.3 (24.3–46.0) 14.6 (8.8–23.1) 16.0 (9.2–26.3) 6.6¶ (3.2–13.1) 4.2¶ (1.4–11.6)






Estimate has a relative standard error >30%, indicating low precision and stability.
TABLE 3. Frequency of initial behavior during flu-like illness
among persons who took >2 health-seeking actions (n = 108)
— New York City Community Health Survey, 2003*
Behavior %† (95% CI§)
Purchased over-the-counter medication 36.6 (26.6–48.0)
Missed work or school 30.3 (20.6–42.1)
Visited physician 16.2 (10.1–25.1)
Called physician 11.8 (6.7–19.9)
Visited emergency department 3.3¶ (1.1–9.8)
Called nurse or health hotline 0.7¶ (0.2–3.0)
* Asked during the fall (October 27–November 23, 2003) survey only.
†Weighted prevalence estimates.
§Confidence interval.
¶ Estimate has a relative standard error of >30%, indicating low precision
and stability.
these, 36.6% of respondents reported purchasing OTC medi-
cations first, before carrying out any other behavior (Table 3).
An additional 30.3% of respondents reported first missing
work or school. The next most common initial behaviors were
visiting a physician (16.2%) and calling a physician for advice
(11.8%). Only 3.3% of respondents reported first visiting the
ED before any other behavior. The least common first behav-
ior was calling a nurse or other health hotline (0.7%).
Calculating the Syndromic Multiplier
Approximately three-quarters of all ED visits in NYC are cap-
tured by the city’s syndromic surveillance system. In February
and March 2003, a total of 39 hospitals provided daily ED
data to the system, representing 58% of hospitals and 74% of
ED visits in NYC. In October and November 2003, a total of
40 hospitals (60% of hospitals, 76% of visits) provided daily
ED data. The mean (standard deviation) daily counts of adult
visits were 476 (70) for flu-like illness and 46 (12) for diarrheal
illness. Flu-like illness accounted for 9% of all ED visits; diar-
rheal illness accounted for <1% of all visits. The daily counts of
ED visits for flu-like and diarrheal illness during September 1,
2002–November 30, 2003 are provided (Figure).
By calculating the syndromic multiplier, DOHMH esti-
mated that each ED visit represented 60.0 flu-like illnesses
among adult New Yorkers, including 76.5 illnesses among
those aged 18–64 years and 11.1 illnesses among those aged
>65 years (Table 4). For diarrheal illness, each ED visited was
estimated to represent approximately 250.6 illnesses among
adults citywide.
Discussion
 Understanding the frequency and timing of health behav-
iors during illness provides valuable context for syndromic
surveillance and can help guide development of simulated
disease-outbreak models. The prevalence estimates of flu-like
and diarrheal illnesses determined by this population-based
survey of adult NYC residents are similar to those from
other population-based surveys of communitywide flu-like
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TABLE 4. Calculation of the syndromic multiplier by using prevalence estimates of flu-like illness and diarrheal illness from the
New York City Community Health Survey and 30-day counts of emergency department (ED) visits from the New York City Syndromic
Surveillance System, 2003
Community Health Survey Syndromic Surveillance System
Weighted % citywide
population 30-day count coverage of Syndromic
Characteristic %* (95% CI†) estimate§ of ED visits all ED visits multiplier¶ (95% CI)
Flu-like illness during previous 30 days
(n = 2,433)** 19.6 (17.8–21.6) 1,187,956 14,849 75 60.0 (54.4–66.0)
Age
18–64 years 22.0 (19.9–24.2) 1,132,361 11,105 75 76.5 (69.2–84.2)
>65 years 6.3 (4.1–9.5) 55,595 3,743 75 11.1 (7.2–16.9)
Diarrheal illness during previous 30 days
(n = 1,211)†† 8.7 (7.2–10.6) 537,363 1,578 75 250.6 (205.8–304.0)
Age
18–64 years 8.9 (7.2–10.9) 457,360 1,307 75 262.4 (212.0–323.3)
>65 years 7.9 (4.7–13.0) 70,004 271 75 193.6 (114.7–319.6)
* Weighted prevalence estimates.
† Confidence interval.
§ Of adult New York City residents (N = 6,068,009).
¶ Using the following calculation: (weighted population estimate / 30-day count of ED visits × percentage of citywide coverage of all ED visits.
** Asked during the spring (March 19–March 31, 2003) and fall (October 27–November 23, 2003) surveys.
†† Asked during the spring (March 19–March 31, 2003) survey only.
FIGURE. Daily emergency department visits for flu-like and diarrheal illness by
























Source: New York City syndromic surveillance system.
illness (9) and diarrheal illness (10,11). By using these preva-
lence estimates, DOHMH was able to estimate the syndromic
multiplier — the number of citywide illnesses that each ED
visit represents.
Although OTC medication purchases and absenteeism
appear to be two of the more frequent and timely health
behaviors during flu-like illness, the lack of specificity and the
variability caused nonhealth-related events (e.g., promotions
influencing OTC medication pur-
chases, or reasons for absenteeism other
than illness) might reduce the suitabil-
ity of these data sources for timely out-
break detection. The survey results also
indicate that outpatient physician
encounters were considerably more fre-
quent and timely than ED visits. Where
available, data on outpatient physician
encounters might offer a degree of dis-
ease specificity and an ability to inves-
tigate signals equal to or greater than
the more commonly monitored ED
chief-complaint data.
Population-based surveys can help
identify gaps in current syndromic sur-
veillance systems. For example, this sur-
vey determined that persons without
health insurance were more likely to
report recent illness but less likely to
seek care. Including data from outpa-
tient sites that provide health care to
medically indigent and uninsured persons might improve the
representativeness of syndromic surveillance data.
Because the survey relied on self-reports, the data might
suffer from bias caused by inexact recall of the timing of
recent flu-like illnesses and resulting behaviors. Respondents
might have reported illnesses and behaviors that occurred >30
days before the survey; this type of recall bias is often encoun-
tered in surveys eliciting temporal-based information (12).
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As a result, the self-reported 19.6% with a recent flu-like
illness and subsequent 8.8% who visited an ED might repre-
sent overestimates of the illness’ true prevalence.
In addition, the syndromic surveillance case definition for
flu-like illness is unlikely to identify all ED visits for flu-like
illness. Previous studies have determined that the sensitivity
of ED chief-complaint data ranges from 44% when medical
chart review is used as the standard (13) to 81% when dis-
charge diagnosis is used as the standard (14). However, visits
for other reasons are unlikely to be misclassified as visits for
flu-like illness; the specificity of chief-complaint data in the
two studies were 97% and 95%, respectively. Consequently,
this study’s calculation of 60 citywide illnesses/ED visit for
flu-like illness might overestimate the true ratio.
These surveys were conducted during periods without any
known outbreaks of influenza or gastrointestinal illness. A
primary objective of syndromic surveillance is to detect
abnormal increases in behaviors associated with flu-like ill-
ness not necessarily attributable to influenza (e.g., to detect
events of biologic terrorism). However, these estimates of
citywide illness might change during an outbreak if severity
of illness alters the pattern of health-seeking behaviors.
Conclusions
 By combining data from a citywide survey with syndromic
surveillance data, DOHMH was able to use the syndromic
multiplier to estimate the number of illnesses in the commu-
nity represented by each ED visit. Survey responses regarding
the actions persons take during a flu-like illness provided
important information about health-seeking behaviors and
about the representativeness of different data sources used in
syndromic surveillance.
References
1. Rotz LD, Khan AS, Lillibridge SR, Ostroff SM, Hughes JM. Public
health assessment of potential biological terrorism agents. Emerg
Infect Dis 2002;8:225–230.
2. CDC. Flu activity: reports and surveillance methods in the United States.
Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC,
2004. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm.
3. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH).
NYC community health data. New York: DOHMH, 2004. Available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/survey/survey.html.
4. CDC. Behavioral risk factor surveillance system user’s guide. Atlanta:
US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, 1998.
5. American Association of Public Opinion Research. Standard defini-
tions: final disposition of case codes and outcome rates for surveys.
Ann Arbor, Michigan: AAPOR, 2000.
6. Heffernan R, Mostashari F, Das D, Karpati A, Kulldorff M, Weiss D.
Syndromic surveillance in public health practice, New York City. Emerg
Infect Dis 2004;10:858–64.
7. SAS Institute, Inc. SAS,® version 8.2 [Software]. Cary, NC: SAS Institute,
Inc., 1999.
8. RTI International. SUDAAN,® version 8. [Software]. Research Triangle
Park, NC: RTI International.
9. Monto AS, Sullivan KM. Acute respiratory illness in the community.
Frequency of illness and the agents involved. Epidemiol Infect
1993;110:145–60.
10. Kuusi M, Aavitsland P, Gondrosen B, Kapperud G. Incidence of gas-
troenteritis in Norway—a population-based survey. Epidemiol Infect
2003;131:591–7.
11. Herikstad H, Yang S, Van Gilder TJ, et al. A population-based esti-
mate of the burden of diarrhoeal illness in the United States: FoodNet,
1996–7. Epidemiol Infect 2002;129:9–17.
12. Huttenlocher J, Hedges LV, Bradburn NM. Reports of elapsed time:
bounding and rounding processes in estimation. J Exp Psychol Learn
Mem Cogn 1990;16:196–213.
13. Espino JU, Wagner MM. Accuracy of ICD-9-coded chief complaints
and diagnoses for the detection of acute respiratory illness. Proc AMIA
Symp 2001;164–8.
14. Begier E, Sockwell D, Branch LM, et al. The National Capitol Region’s
ED syndromic surveillance system: do chief complaint and discharge
diagnosis yield different results? Emerg Infect Dis 2003;9:393–6.
112 MMWR September 24, 2004
Comparison of Office Visit and Nurse Advice Hotline Data
for Syndromic Surveillance — Baltimore-Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Area, 2002
Jade Vu Henry,1 S. Magruder,2 M. Snyder1
1Kaiser Permanente of the Mid-Atlantic States, Rockville, Maryland; 2Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland
Corresponding author: Jade Vu Henry, 2102 East Jefferson Street, Rockville, MD 20849. Telephone: 301-816-6891; Fax: 301-816-7465; E-mail:
jade.v.henry@kp.org.
Abstract
Introduction: Kaiser Permanente of the Mid-Atlantic States (KPMAS) is collaborating with the Electronic Surveillance
System for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics II (ESSENCE II) program to understand how managed-care
data can be effectively used for syndromic surveillance.
Objectives: This study examined whether KPMAS nurse advice hotline data would be able to predict the syndrome diagnoses
made during subsequent KPMAS office visits.
Methods: All nurse advice hotline calls during 2002 that were linked to an outpatient office visit were identified. By using
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes, outpatient visits were categorized into seven
ESSENCE II syndrome groups (coma, gastrointestinal, respiratory, neurologic, hemorrhagic, infectious dermatologic,
and fever). Nurse advice hotline calls were categorized into ESSENCE II syndrome groups on the basis of the advice guide-
lines assigned. For each syndrome group, the sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive value of hotline calls were calculated
by using office visits as a diagnostic standard. For matching syndrome call-visit pairs, the lag (i.e., the number of hours that
elapsed between the date and time the patient spoke to an advice nurse and the date and time the patient made an office visit)
was calculated.
Results: Of all syndrome groups, the sensitivity of hotline calls for respiratory syndrome was highest (74.7%), followed by
hotline calls for gastrointestinal syndrome (72.0%). The specificity of all nurse advice syndrome groups ranged from
88.9% to 99.9%. The mean lag between hotline calls and office visits ranged from 8.3 to 50 hours, depending on the
syndrome group.
Conclusions: The timeliness of hotline data capture compared with office visit data capture, as well as the sensitivity and
specificity of hotline calls for detecting respiratory and gastrointestinal syndromes, indicate that KPMAS nurse advice hotline
data can be used to predict KPMAS syndromic outpatient office visits.
Introduction
Across the United States, managed care organizations oper-
ate clinical and administrative information systems to sup-
port the routine delivery of health-care services to their
members. Data from these information systems offer promise
for enhancing public health surveillance activities in commu-
nities where managed care organizations operate (1–4). How-
ever, despite the widely recognized potential of using
managed-care data for tracking community health indicators,
managed care organizations and public health departments
have previously had limited incentive to form alliances to
improve public health surveillance (5).
In 2001, when residents of the Baltimore-Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area were diagnosed with inhalational anthrax,
Kaiser Permanente of the Mid-Atlantic States (KPMAS)
experienced a public health emergency requiring daily inter-
action with local health authorities. In the course of deliver-
ing health care to victims of this biologic terrorism, KPMAS
employees became acutely aware of the need for stronger
links with public health agencies at all government levels (6).
While responding to the anthrax crisis, KPMAS was also able
to demonstrate the public health potential of its administra-
tive and clinical information systems, having searched its da-
tabases to identify and contact hundreds of enrollees at-risk
to recommend testing and treatment options (7). Drawing
from the lessons of this front-line experience, KPMAS began
looking for substantive ways to support the local public health
infrastructure.
Since 2002, the KPMAS Research Department has collabo-
rated with the Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notifi-
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cation of Community-Based Epidemics II (ESSENCE II) pro-
gram. KPMAS researchers view ESSENCE II as a community
health partnership — a voluntary collaboration of diverse com-
munity organizations that are pursuing a shared interest in com-
munity health (8). The ESSENCE II program seeks to
strengthen the local public health infrastructure by developing
a regional syndromic surveillance system. To achieve this objec-
tive, ESSENCE II has drawn together a multisector,
multidisciplinary group of researchers, health-care providers,
and public health authorities with expertise in medicine, math-
ematics, and public health, as well as access to health data.
KPMAS operates a secure information system that routinely
captures data from an array of health-care operations, includ-
ing laboratory tests, radiology procedures, pharmacy prescrip-
tions, inpatient and outpatient visits, as well as membership
demographics, appointment history, clinician notes, and nurse
advice hotline calls. All of these data sources have potential
value for syndromic surveillance. However, limited staff and
funding are available to make KPMAS health-care informa-
tion accessible for public health surveillance. Understanding
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each KPMAS data
stream can help prioritize information-technology investments
for syndromic surveillance. To assess the performance of
potential new data streams for the ESSENCE II surveillance
system, this paper compares the epidemiologic properties of
KPMAS nurse advice hotline data with outpatient office visit
data obtained during January 1–December 31, 2002. The goal
of this study was to determine whether nurse advice hotline
data would be able to predict the syndromic diagnoses made
during a subsequent office visit.
Methods
Population and Delivery System
KPMAS contracts with 36 local hospitals and operates 30
outpatient medical centers to deliver health services to a popu-
lation of >500,000 members. To facilitate the continuity of
care, each member is assigned a unique permanent identifica-
tion number that can be used to retrieve and link all adminis-
trative and clinical data. Appointment scheduling and the nurse
advice hotline function together within the KPMAS call cen-
ter, which serves as a major entry point into the delivery sys-
tem. Appointment clerks in the call center schedule routine
appointments, while nurses operate an advice hotline to
administer protocol-driven, medically appropriate advice over
the telephone and to schedule acute-care office visits when
necessary. In 2002, 369,646 members made 1,497,686 calls
to the nurse advice hotline.
Data Link Between Individual
Nurse Advice Hotline Calls
and Outpatient Office Visits
The KPMAS information system captures not only the date
and time a patient is seen for an outpatient office visit
(Encounter_Date), but also the date and time that appoint-
ment is scheduled (Enc_File_Date). A third data field
(Advice_Date) captures the date and time the patient
contacted the nurse advice hotline. For this study, a hotline
call and an office visit were defined as linked if all of the fol-
lowing criteria were met: 1) the patient identification number
assigned to the hotline call matched the patient identification
number assigned to the office visit; 2) the date of the hotline
call matched the date the patient called for the appointment;
and 3) the time of the hotline call either matched or preceded
the time the patient called for an appointment.
Categorizing KPMAS Data
into Syndromic Groups
All outpatient visits are assigned one or more diagnostic
codes from the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision (ICD-9). These diagnostic codes reflect the patients’
presenting conditions, symptoms, presumed diagnoses, and
definitive diagnoses. Before this study, ESSENCE II devel-
oped sets of ICD-9 codes representing clinical manifestations
of potential infectious disease outbreaks (9). Those sets of ICD-
9 codes were used to categorize all KPMAS outpatient visits
during 2002 into seven syndrome groups: coma, gastrointesti-
nal, respiratory, neurologic, hemorrhagic, infectious dermatologic,
and fever.
The information system that supports the KPMAS nurse
advice hotline does not use the ICD-9 coding system. Instead,
as nurses speak with patients, they select one or more KPMAS
advice guidelines from a drop-down menu on the computer
screen. These advice guidelines are based on 586 current
KPMAS nurse advice clinical-practice protocols that corre-
spond to patient-reported symptoms and presumed diagnoses.
The KPMAS advice guidelines were classified into syndrome
groups corresponding to the seven ICD-9–based ESSENCE
syndrome categories (Box). Of the 586 KPMAS advice guide-
lines, 68 were used to define syndrome categories for nurse
advice hotline calls (the remaining 518 were for conditions
not of interest for syndromic surveillance). Because none of
the advice guidelines corresponded to the ESSENCE II coma
syndrome group, this category was dropped from analysis and
only six of the seven categories were used.
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All nurse advice hotline calls received during 2002 were cat-
egorized according to the new syndrome groups. Approxi-
mately 20% of all hotline calls were assigned at least one
syndromic advice guideline. The remaining 80% of hotline
calls were associated with advice guidelines not relevant to
syndromic surveillance and therefore not used in the hotline
syndrome classification scheme.
Because more than one ICD-9 diagnosis can be assigned to
a patient during a given office visit, single office visits can fall
into more than one ESSENCE syndrome group and be
counted multiple times. Similarly, a nurse can use more than
one advice guideline during a given call, in which case the call
would fall into more than one advice syndrome group and be
counted more than once. Multiple calls or multiple visits by a
given patient in a single day for the same syndrome are counted
only once.
Analysis
The total numbers of hotline calls and outpatient visits by
syndrome group received during January 1–December 31,
2002, were determined and compared. All hotline calls linked
to a subsequent outpatient visit were then identified. For each
syndrome group, the sensitivity, specificity, and positive pre-
dictive value of hotline calls was calculated, using office visits
as a diagnostic standard.
All hotline calls whose syndrome assignments matched those
of the linked office visit were identified. For each of these
matching syndrome call-visit pairs, the time lag (i.e., the num-
ber of hours that elapsed between the date and time the pa-
tient spoke to an advice nurse [Advice_Date] and the date
and time the patient was seen for the office visit
[Encounter_Date]) was calculated. Univariate statistics on this
time lag were then generated.
The study was reviewed and approved by the legal depart-
ment of the Kaiser Foundation Research Institute, as well the
KPMAS Institutional Review Board for the protection of hu-
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TABLE 1. Number of nurse advice hotline calls and outpatient
office visits, by syndrome group — Kaiser Permanente of the
Mid-Atlantic States, 2002
No. of No. of outpatient
Syndrome group   hotline calls* office visits*
Gastrointestinal 72,107 26,521
Respiratory infection 242,785 201,402
Neurologic 22,957 144
Dermatologic, infectious 20,117 440
Fever 17,866 5,230
Hemorrhagic manifestation 1,580 456
* Multiple calls or multiple visits by a given patient in a single day for the
same syndrome are counted only once.
TABLE 2. Validity of syndromic nurse advice hotline calls to
detect syndromic outpatient office visits — Kaiser Permanente
of the Mid-Atlantic States, 2002
Office visit in Office visit not in
Syndrome group syndrome group syndrome group
Gastrointestinal
Call in syndrome group 13,178 22,376
Call not in syndrome group 5,124 530,016
Sensitivity = 72.0% Specificity = 95.9% PPV* = 37.1%
Respiratory infection
Call in syndrome group 88,410 50,078
Call not in syndrome group 29,977 402,818
Sensitivity = 74.7% Specificity = 88.9% PPV = 63.8%
Neurologic
Call in syndrome group 10 12,478
Call not in syndrome group 27 557,906
Sensitivity = 27.0% Specificity = 97.8% PPV = 0.1%
Dermatologic, infectious
Call in syndrome group 166 10,491
Call not in syndrome group 118 559,639
Sensitivity = 58.5% Specificity = 98.2% PPV = 1.6%
Fever
Call in syndrome group 1,153 8,600
Call not in syndrome group 2,376 558,414
Sensitivity = 32.7% Specificity = 98.5% PPV = 11.8%
Hemorrhagic manifestation
Call in syndrome group 14 750
Call not in syndrome group 91 569,546
Sensitivity = 13.3% Specificity = 99.9% PPV = 1.8%
* PPV = positive predictive value.
TABLE 3. Syndromic nurse advice hotline calls with matched*




No. of calls with and office visit
Syndrome group matching visit Mean Median Mode
Gastrointestinal 13,178 12.0 4.0 2.0
Respiratory infection 88,410 12.3 5.0 2.0
Neurologic 10 23.6 11.0 3.0
Dermatologic, infectious 166 8.17 4.5 1.0
Fever 1,153 8.3 5.0 2.0
Hemorrhagic manifestation 14 50.0 25.0 —
* A syndromic call that generates an office visit in the same syndrome group
is defined as matched.
man subjects. All analysis of patient-level data was performed
by researchers at KPMAS. No patient-level data were released
from KPMAS for this analysis.
Results
Total nurse advice hotline calls and total outpatient office
visits, by syndrome group, were compared (Table 1). Of all
syndrome groups, respiratory and gastrointestinal syndromes
generated the highest volume of hotline calls and office visits.
Within every syndrome group, patients made at least twice as
many hotline calls as office visits, with the exception of the
respiratory syndrome category, which resulted in 242,785
hotline calls and 201,402 office visits.
Approximately 570,500 hotline calls were linked to an
office visit. The exact count varies slightly among syndrome
groups because multiple calls or multiple visits by a given
patient in a single day for the same syndrome were counted
only once. The sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive
value of hotline calls for detecting syndromes diagnosed dur-
ing office visits were calculated (Table 2). Of all syndrome
groups, the sensitivity of hotline calls for respiratory syndrome
was highest (74.7%), followed by hotline calls for gastrointes-
tinal syndrome (72.0%). Hotline calls for respiratory and gas-
trointestinal syndromes also had the highest positive predictive
value. Sensitivity was lowest for hotline calls in the hemor-
rhagic group. The specificity of all nurse advice syndrome
groups was high, ranging from 88.9% to 99.9%.
Univariate statistics for the lag between syndromic hotline
calls and their matching syndromic office visits were gener-
ated (Table 3). The mean lag between hotline calls and office
visits ranged from 8.3 to 50 hours, depending on the syn-
drome group. Hotline calls in the hemorrhagic syndrome cat-
egory provided the greatest mean lead time (50 hours) over
corresponding office visits; however, hotline calls and office
visits were both categorized as hemorrhagic in only 14 instances.
The median lead time ranged from 4 hours for gastrointestinal
and dermatologic/infectious syndromes to 25 hours for hemor-
rhagic syndrome. The mode for the lag ranged from 1 to 3
hours, depending on the syndrome.
Discussion
 Analysis indicates that nurse advice hotline data is 4–50
hours timelier for syndrome detection than outpatient office
visit data, depending on the syndrome group. This lead time
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might even be substantially greater because ICD-9 codes for
KPMAS office visits are not immediately entered into the
information system; as much as a 1-month lag can exist
between the time a patient is seen and the time information
from that visit is available for data analysis.
Of >1 million hotline calls made during 2002, approxi-
mately 570,500 were linked to an outpatient visit. KPMAS
patients made at least twice as many hotline calls as office
visits within each syndrome category, with the exception of
respiratory syndrome. A critical consideration in assessing the
ability of syndromic advice calls to detect syndromic office
visits is that many advice calls do not generate an office visit.
Although all of the hotline call syndrome groups demon-
strated high specificity relative to office visits, sensitivity and
positive predictive value varied according to syndromic group.
Further research is needed to explain the differences observed
between hotline data and office-visit data. The performance
of hotline data might be compromised by the data stream’s
emphasis on symptoms rather than clinical presentations and
definitive diagnoses. Alternatively, these observed discrepan-
cies might identify opportunities to add or remove advice
guidelines from syndrome classifications of nurse advice hotline
calls. Patient health-seeking behavior might also account for
part of the differences observed between the number of calls
and similarly grouped visits (e.g., work requirements, child-
care needs, or transportation barriers might lead certain
patients to use the advice hotline exclusively in place of a clini-
cal examination). Finally, coding practices and other provider
behaviors, as well as delivery-system factors (e.g., appointment
access), might generate differences between counts of calls and
visits. Health-services research aimed at understanding how
patient, provider, and delivery-system factors relate to syn-
drome classifications might be helpful in establishing the theo-
retical underpinnings for effective outbreak-detection
algorithms.
Conclusions
This study examined the relative value of two alternative
health-care data streams, nurse advice hotline calls and out-
patient office visits, collected from a single, integrated deliv-
ery system. The timeliness of hotline data capture compared
with office visit data capture, as well as the sensitivity and
specificity of hotline calls for detecting respiratory and
gastrointestinal syndromes, indicate that KPMAS nurse
advice hotline data can be used to predict KPMAS syndromic
outpatient office visits.
This analysis did not attempt to address whether KPMAS
data could be used to detect epidemics in the broader Wash-
ington, D.C.-area community. Additional studies assessing the
external generalizability of KPMAS data should be performed
to determine whether KPMAS can serve in a sentinel surveil-
lance capacity.
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Abstract
Introduction: Public health researchers are increasingly interested in the potential use of monitoring data on over-the-
counter (OTC) pharmaceutical sales as a source of timely information about community health. However, fundamental
uncertainties persist, including how timely such information is and how best to aggregate information about hundreds of
products.
Objectives: This analysis provides new information about OTC timeliness and illustrates a method of OTC product aggre-
gation for surveillance purposes.
Methods: Timeliness measurements were made by correlating pharmaceutical sales counts with counts of physician encoun-
ters, after adjustment to remove seasonal effects from both counts. OTC product aggregations were formed by a two-stage
process. In the first stage, individual products were placed into small groups based on qualitative observations. In the second
stage, a clustering algorithm was used to form supergroups (i.e., product group clusters) sharing similar sales histories.
Results: Even after seasonal correction, OTC counts correlated with clinical measures of community illness. However, the lead
time of nonseasonal fluctuations was substantially shorter than that for uncorrected data. The clustering approach produced
16 meaningful supergroups containing products that behaved approximately alike.
Conclusions: Measurements of OTC lead time sensitive to the timing of annual cyclic trends in the behavior of persons
seeking health care do not reliably indicate the lead time observed for short-term (e. g. weekly or monthly) fluctuations in
community health-care utilization.
Introduction
Data on the sale of over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceuti-
cal products might provide a convenient, meaningful, and
timely indicator of public health conditions (1–6). Monitor-
ing sales of OTC products offers at least three advantages as
possible early indicators of public health. First, these products
are widely used. Second, a reliable and detailed electronic
record is made instantly at the time of each sale, and such
records are aggregated regionally for commercial purposes;
these electronic records can be readily transmitted to aid in
health surveillance. Finally, OTC data also capture the loca-
tion of sale and type of product (and, by implication, the
symptom[s] that the product is intended to relieve).
Despite growing interest in OTC data, certain questions
persist, including 1) how to interpret OTC sales data, 2) how
much lead time these data should be expected to provide, 3)
how to aggregate OTC products into informative product
groupings, 4) how to control confounding factors, and 5)
which product sales correlate with which types of illnesses.
This report outlines progress in answering two of those ques-
tions. With respect to OTC lead time in tracking trends in
health-care utilization, the analysis indicates that lead-time
measurements based on the timing of annual cyclic trends
can be longer than those based on short-term fluctuations,
which are more relevant to public health surveillance. With
respect to appropriate aggregations of OTC products, the
report describes a method used by the Electronic Surveillance
System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epi-
demics (ESSENCE II) (7). The actual product aggregations
identified might also provide insights for future study.
OTC Lead Time: Short-Term
and Seasonal Observations
Multiple studies have attempted to quantify the timeliness
of OTC sales compared with other indicators of public health
(1,5,6). A 1964 study based on two outbreaks in a single city
identified a substantial peak in cold remedy sales at the begin-
ning of an increase in encounters with clinical patients known
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to be infected with influenza B virus and 1 week before the
peak in those encounters; an earlier increase in cold remedy
sales was approximately coincident with the early winter in-
crease in noninfluenza respiratory virus activity (1).
A second study compared the time series of hospital-
discharge diagnoses to OTC electrolyte sales for six cities and
over three annual cycles (5). Because these discharge diagnoses
were tagged with the time of hospital admission, they could
be viewed as a proxy for a chief-complaint data source. Lead
times were measured by two methods: cross-correlation of the
raw time series and comparison of the times for the first
detectable increase each year. The two methods produced con-
sistent estimates indicating approximately 2-week lead times
for pediatric electrolyte sales relative to pediatric hospital
admissions for respiratory and diarrheal disease. Lead times
measured by both methods are sensitive to the seasonal varia-
tion of the two data sources; the timing of events that occur
on shorter time scales might be obscured.
A third study compared a time series of outpatient insurance-
claim diagnoses for acute respiratory conditions to OTC sales
of influenza remedies in six different subregions of the Mary-
land–Washington, D.C.–Virginia area (6). Lead times were
estimated by cross-correlation of data that were corrected for
day-of-week effects and for the effect of the late-December
holiday period. Measured peak correlations ranged from 0.86
to 0.93, and the average measured lead time of OTC sales
relative to outpatient physician encounters was 2.8 days (range:
2–7 days). Although these results also were dominated by sea-
sonal trends, this report presents corresponding results with
seasonal effects removed.
Although certain natural and societal processes that occur
annually could influence these results, such processes might
not be important for short-term surveillance time scales, and
the applicability of seasonal results might be questionable. For
public health surveillance applications, the timing of seasonal
trends is not the quantity of primary interest. More often,
disease surveillance seeks timely recognition of short-term (e.g.,
weeks or days) health trends.
OTC Product Aggregations
Because the >1,000 OTC pharmaceutical products that are
of potential interest for public health surveillance compete
for customers with the same ailments, aggregation of related
products is necessary to obtain statistically useful inferences
about the number of people feeling ill. The goal of an aggre-
gation method is to combine products that are used by the
same demographic groups to treat the same illnesses (defined
as a given combination of symptoms and by the relative sever-
ity of those symptoms). Differences in sales between products
in an aggregated product group would then be irrelevant for
public health surveillance. By contrast, when products are used
by different demographic groups or to treat different symp-
toms, then aggregation of these products could compromise
specificity and be less useful.
Data Sources
This analysis relied on two data sources identical to those
used in a previous study (6). The first source was pharmacy-
sales data from approximately 300 drugstores in the Maryland–
Washington, D.C.–Virginia area. The pharmacy data included
store location, product sold, number of units sold, and date
sold; no information was provided that would identify the
purchaser. For the timing study, only remedies for treating
influenza were used. For the OTC aggregation study, a larger
set of product categories was used, including cough, cold, al-
lergy, sore throat, fever, “flu,” antidiarrheal, bronchial, sinus,
and pain remedies. The second data source was insurance-
billing data from approximately 13,000 outpatient clinics and
doctors offices in the Maryland–Washington, D.C.–Virginia
area. These data included the patient’s geographic region, the
date of the patient-physician encounter, and the primary di-
agnostic code used for billing purposes. Not all patients from
these 13,000 clinics were included. A weekly average of ap-
proximately 4,000 encounters was reported for acute respira-
tory conditions in all geographic regions. Only diagnostic codes
of interest for syndromic surveillance were collected, and only
acute respiratory diagnoses were used in the analysis.
Methods
OTC Lead Time
Both the physician acute respiratory encounter data and
the OTC influenza remedy data were modeled by a Poisson
regression. The covariates were a linear time ramp, a sinusoi-
dal annual cycle (8), day-of-week factors, and a day-of-week/
annual cycle interaction term. Holidays and heavy snow days
were ignored when the regression parameters were estimated.
After the data were fitted to a model of seasonality, separate
considerations were made of seasonal and nonseasonal trends
in the data. Weekly cycles were removed from the OTC- and
physician-encounter–model fits by smoothing with a 7-day
moving average window. The resulting smoothed model fits
contained only linear and seasonal variations. The seasonal
contribution to lead time was measured by cross-correlating
the smoothed model fits. Nonseasonal contributions were
measured by correlating the residuals of the model fits
(smoothed actual counts divided by smoothed model fit) for
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FIGURE 1. Comparison between residuals for physician billing
claims for respiratory ailments and over-the-counter  (OTC)
sales of “flu” remedies, after correction for seasonal effects
— urban Baltimore, Maryland–Washington, D.C., region
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each of the subregions in the study. A comparison of these
residuals for the most populous region included in the study,
the Urban National Capital Area (consisting of the urban and
suburban areas near Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Maryland,
and the corridor in between) is provided (Figure 1). A strong
correspondence was observed between fluctuations in OTC
sales and fluctuations in physician encounters, even after a
sinusoidal annual cycle was removed from both. These residuals
exhibited smaller correlations than did the original data, but
because they were not driven by cyclic annual trends, the rel-
evance to time-critical public health surveillance was clearer.
Method To Cluster Similar
Sales Histories
A two-step OTC aggregation method was developed for
preliminary use in the ESSENCE II surveillance system. The
first step was to group individual products qualitatively into
41 adult groups, 16 pediatric groups, and four infant groups,
each of which was formed by combining an indication (e.g.,
allergy, cough, or fever) with a physical type (e.g., chest rub,
inhaler, or lozenge). Indications for the product were judged
first by the product name. If the names alone left the indica-
tions ambiguous, then product descriptions were consulted.
This first step was required to obtain a high enough count
of sales in each group so more quantitative methods could be
applied. Although the first step was essentially qualitative, a
conservative approach was taken by finely dividing the set of
all OTC products into a substantial number of first-level prod-
uct groups. This process was not expected to result in prod-
ucts with distinct uses being placed in the same group.
For the second stage of aggregation, observed sales histories
(i.e., the number sold on each day during a certain period) of
the different first-level groups were compared across a test
period of approximately 17 months. If the ratio of sales of
one product group to another was approximately constant
over time, then the two product groups were assumed to be
used to treat the same illnesses. Therefore, groups with
approximately proportional sales histories were aggregated into
supergroups for use in public health surveillance.
The likelihood of observing the data under two different
models was compared to measure the similarity of different
groups’ sales histories. Under model 1, the aggregated sales of
product group N and M were assumed to be Poisson distrib-
uted with means that could vary from day to day. The natural
log of the ratio of their means was assumed to be normally
distributed with a standard deviation of 0.1. (This standard
deviation was chosen to be small so the ratio between expected
sales of products N and M could vary only slightly in the
model.) The overall average log ratio and the daily (geomet-
ric) average of the means of product groups M and N were
chosen by a maximum likelihood fit to the data. Under model
2, the sales of product groups N and M on each day were
assumed to be independently Poisson-distributed, with means
equal to the observed daily sales counts.
Because it was less constrained, the second model would
always fit better. However, if the product groups were closely
related, and if sales of product group N tended to rise and fall
in proportion to sales of product group M, then model 1 would
fit almost as well. The difference in data likelihood between
the two models indicated the degree to which the two sales
histories are not proportional. Therefore, a distance, D, was
defined between product groups M and N by applying the
following formula:
D = log(probability of observing the data under model 2) –
log(probability of observing the data under model 1)
After this distance measure was obtained, standard hierar-
chical clustering techniques (9) were used to find clusters of
product groups that were close together relative to the other
product groups, as measured by the distance, D.
As this technique was refined, a complication was encoun-
tered that was apparently attributable to the effects of prod-
uct promotions. When daily sales of cold remedies in powder
form were compared with sales of cold/influenza remedies in
pill form, products were found to have closely related sales
histories. However, on three occasions (November 2001, Sep-
tember 2002, and October 2002), sales of cold powders sub-
stantially exceeded their normal level for periods of 6–7 days,
whereas sales of cold/influenza pills did not. These events were
assumed to be attributable to promotions and were excluded
from the analysis.
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FIGURE 2. Results of clustering algorithm for group adult over-the-counter (OTC)
medications for purposes of syndromic surveillance
Note: First-stage OTC product groups are listed along the y-axis. Vertical lines joining each group to a
cluster at the x-axis represent the dissimilarity between that group and the most dissimilar element
already included in the cluster. Clusters that are similarly joined at the x-axis represent the greatest
dissimilarity between members of the two clusters joined. Product groups that are joined by vertical
lines to the left of the clustering threshold are aggregated together for surveillance purposes. The
indicated value of the clustering threshold is merely one option; the optimal setting for the threshold
has not been determined by this analysis.
An automated way to identify these
1-week aberrations was developed.
First, a local background estimate was
subtracted from raw OTC data, aggre-
gated for each first-stage product group
by using a trimmed-mean algorithm
with a 20-day window centered on each
day to create a normalized time series.
Second, the normalized data were com-
pared with a threshold, relative to a lo-
cal estimate of the standard deviation.
Finally, runs of threshold exceedences
lasting 6–8 days were identified and
excluded from the calculation of the
distance, D.
The output of the clustering algo-
rithm for the adult product groups is
summarized in a dendrogram
(Figure 2). By setting a threshold on
this dendrogram at a specific distance
value, distinct clusters of product
groups (supergroups) were formed to
be aggregated for health surveillance
purposes. If the threshold were set too
high, specificity would be lost because
unrelated groups would be aggregated
together. If it were set too low, statisti-
cal power would be lost because the
resulting larger number of aggregated
groups would have lower counts, and
results would also be more susceptible
to product-specific influences (e.g.,
promotions or introductions of new
products). For ESSENCE applications,
the threshold was set initially at a level
to form 16 supergroups, some of which
might not be selected for monitoring.
Results
OTC Lead Time
An analysis of the correlation-based
measurements of OTC lead time iden-
tified high cross-correlations between
the smoothed model fits for physician
visits and OTC sales (Table 1). This
finding reflects the fact that both model
fits were 1-year–period sine waves that
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TABLE 1. Peak correlations* and corresponding lead times of
over-the-counter “flu” medications compared with outpatient
visits for respiratory ailments for six regions in or near the
National Capital Area (NCA)†
Seasonal variation Residuals
Lead time¶ Lead time††
Region Correlation§  (days) Correlation**  (days)
Richmond 0.99 2 0.25 3
Eastern Shore 0.99 8 0.43 0
Western NCA 0.995 21 0.26 –3
Urban NCA 0.98 15 0.75 2
Southern NCA 0.95 12 0.47 –8
Northern NCA 0.97 16 0.66 –3
* Although the correlations provided here were computed from curves
obtained for the period September 6, 2001–April 29, 2003,  this table
only includes correlations for November 2, 2001–July 1, 2002, to enable
full comparison with those published earlier (6).
† Seasonal variations and residual, nonseasonal variations were considered
separately, and snow days and holidays were ignored in both data sets.
§ Maximum cross-correlations of the fitted seasonal trend models.
¶ Time shifts that were observed to maximize the seasonal trend model
correlations.
** Maximum cross-correlations of the residuals (data divided by the fitted
seasonal trend model).
†† Time shifts that were observed to maximize the residual correlations.
TABLE 2. Empirical aggregated supergroupings of over-the-
counter pharmaceutical products
Supergroup Supergroup
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FIGURE 3. Cross-correlation versus time offset between
physician respiratory billing claim residuals and over-the-counter
(OTC) “flu”-remedy sales residuals, after correction for seasonal
and day-of-week effects — urban Baltimore, Maryland–
Washington, D.C., region, November 2, 2001–July 1, 2002
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were shifted in time to maximize cross-correlation. In every
case except Richmond, the sine-wave fit to the OTC data was
shifted approximately 1–3 weeks earlier than the sine wave
that was fit to the physician-encounter data. This indicates a
repeatable 1–3 week lead in the seasonal cycle of OTC pur-
chases, relative to the corresponding cycle in physician en-
counters.
Strong correlations between physician-visit and OTC
residuals were observed, even though the seasonal trends were
removed. The observed time-shifts in these residuals (as
defined by maximum cross-correlation) were much shorter
(in every case except that of Richmond) than those observed
for the seasonal fits. The correlation in the best case (Urban
National Capital Area) was also evident from a plot of the
data (Figure 1), and the lead for this case was measurable, as
indicated by the rapid decrease in correlation at other lags
(Figure 3).
Clustering
A total of 16 supergroups were identified (Table 2). The
sales histories represented by these groups ranged from strong
winter seasonal peaks to approximately constant daily sales
throughout the year to peaks in the spring and fall pollen
seasons. Product groups with similar indications or similar
physical forms tended to be placed in the same supergroups.
This result was not guaranteed by the method but rather
indicates that similar sales histories correlate with similar
product use.
Although this analysis took an empirical approach, certain
supergroups (e.g., cough, allergy, sore throat, and sinus rem-
edies) would have been formed anyway on the basis of intu-
ition. However, the strength of this empirical approach is
evident in the more surprising results. For example, pain pills
were used heavily during the pollen season and therefore are
grouped in the allergy cluster. Also, sales histories of powders
sold to treat various maladies are more similar to each other
than they are to other products advertised for the same mala-
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dies. Monitored allergy syrups do not appear to belong with
other allergy medications because sales peak during the win-
ter cold season rather than during the pollen season. (A prob-
able explanation, obtained after the analysis was completed,
was that most allergy syrups included in the data were tar-
geted for diabetics.) Finally, products advertised to treat chest
congestion had little indication of a seasonal trend and there-




Persistent correlations between OTC influenza remedy sales
and physician acute-respiratory encounters were determined,
even after removal of the annual sinusoidal variation from
both. This makes a more convincing case for the use of OTC
products to monitor sudden changes in public health than
do results strongly influenced by annual variations. However,
these data do not indicate a repeatable positive lead time of
OTC products relative to physician encounters on shorter,
subannual time scales. Earlier results about OTC timeliness
based on annual cycles could be misleading.
The findings outlined in this report are subject to at least
two limitations. First, the lower correlations observed in cer-
tain regions might be biased by inexact spatial correspondence
between physician encounter and OTC data sets; a more com-
prehensive data set might provide a basis for more precise
measurements of correlations and lead times. Second, only
the relation between influenza remedies and acute respiratory
diagnoses was considered, and other OTC–physician connec-
tions might yield different results.
If other researchers are able to verify the result of no signifi-
cant lead time of OTC data relative to physician encounters
at subannual time scales, this would not necessarily imply that
OTC data are not useful for public health surveillance. None
of this analysis includes the lag in reporting the data. OTC
sales data might be electronically available with a shorter
reporting lag after the sales event compared with the lag to
receive physician outpatient data. The number of patients seek-
ing OTC medications early during a given outbreak might
also be larger than the number seeking care from a physician.
All else being equal, OTC sales data are potentially a more
sensitive measure of community illness.
OTC Product Aggregation
A quantitative method was presented that can be used to
enhance and validate a more qualitative approach by
automatically sorting through a heterogeneous set of OTC
product groups to find relatively homogenous supergroups of
products. Both the method and the specific supergroups iden-
tified might be helpful to others attempting to use OTC data
for surveillance of community health. This method demon-
strated its value for the ESSENCE surveillance system by find-
ing certain unexpected relationships between product groups.
Appropriate aggregation of product supergroups might vary
regionally or demographically. The method discussed in this
report might be a good approach for identifying custom OTC
aggregations for specific applications.
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Abstract
Introduction: The 2003 National Syndromic Surveillance Conference provided an opportunity to examine challenges and
progress in evaluating syndromic surveillance systems.
Objectives: Using the conference abstracts as a focus, this paper describes the status of performance measurement of syndromic
surveillance systems and ongoing challenges in system evaluation.
Methods: Ninety-nine original abstracts were reviewed and classified descriptively and according to their presentation of evalu-
ation attributes.
Results: System evaluation was the primary focus of 35% of the abstracts submitted. Of those abstracts, 63% referenced prospec-
tive evaluation methods and 57% reported on outbreak detection. However, no data were provided in 34% of the evaluation
abstracts, and only 37% referred to system signals, 20% to investigation of system signals, and 20% to timeliness.
Conclusions: Although this abstract review is not representative of all current syndromic surveillance efforts, it highlights recent
attention to evaluation and the need for a basic set of system performance measures. It also proposes questions to be answered of all
public health systems used for outbreak detection.
Introduction
Interest in syndromic surveillance remains high in the United
States, with approximately 100 state and local health jurisdic-
tions conducting a form of syndromic surveillance in 2003
(1). However, skepticism about the efficacy of syndromic sur-
veillance for early detection of terrorism-related illness has
increased (1–4).
At the 2002 National Syndromic Surveillance Conference,
an evaluation framework (5) was presented that closely fol-
lowed CDC’s Updated Guidelines for Evaluation of Public
Health Surveillance Systems (6). That evaluation framework
described the system attributes that should be measured but
provided limited guidance on how to measure those attributes
consistently.
In 2003, CDC convened a national working group on
outbreak-detection surveillance.* The working group clarified
terminology and revised earlier frameworks to emphasize early
outbreak detection, putting syndromic surveillance into con-
text as a specialized surveillance tool. The resulting Framework
for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for Early
Detection of Outbreaks (7) provides a structure for evaluating
syndromic surveillance systems and reporting the results. The
revised framework offers a task list for describing a surveillance
system (Box 1) and provides visual aids to improve standard
collection and reporting of evaluation information. The frame-
work also provides a timeline with milestones in outbreak
development and detection, from exposure to a pathogen to
the initiation of a public health intervention. Although this
timeline does not specify a single, reproducible measure to
reflect the timeliness of detection, it does provide more consis-
tent specification of intervals for comparing performance among
different systems and different settings. The framework also
describes two approaches, encompassing sensitivity, predic-
tive value negative, and predictive value positive, to evaluate
system validity for outbreak detection: 1) the systematic
description and accumulation of experiences with outbreak
detection, and 2) simulation-based methods.
The importance of evaluating syndromic surveillance sys-
tems is widely recognized (1,3–5,8–11), but a common set of
measures have not yet been defined that will establish the added
value of syndromic surveillance compared with current sur-
veillance tools. Nonetheless, progress has been made toward
uniform guidance on evaluating syndromic surveillance sys-
tems (7). This paper summarizes progress during 2003 and
describes steps for the future.
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Methods
The authors reviewed the original 99 abstracts submitted to
the 2003 National Syndromic Surveillance Conference and
divided them into two categories: 1) surveillance systems and
2) analytic methods. Abstracts about surveillance systems were
subcategorized into 1) system descriptions, 2) implementa-
tions, and 3) evaluations. Analytic methods abstracts included
those addressing detection algorithms, data modeling, and case
definitions. For each abstract, the reviewers identified the geo-
graphic location of the surveillance system or primary author
and the responsible entity for the system or study being
described (e.g., local health department or university). Infor-
mation was also gathered about the data-collection method
used, the purpose of the system, and the type of data used. An
abstract was classified as pertaining to system evaluation if the
author indicated intent to present a system evaluation or if
the abstract provided results of the system’s experience in
detecting outbreaks. Evaluation variables abstracted were fre-
quency of system signals, investigations, outbreaks detected
and missed, estimation of timeliness, and the effect of early
detection.
Each abstract was reviewed by both authors of this paper
and results were reconciled in a meeting. Abstract forms were
entered into Epi Info 2002 (http://www.cdc.gov/epiinfo/) for
analysis.
Results
The 99 abstracts were submitted by authors from 23 states,
the District of Columbia, and seven countries outside the
United States (Figure). The bulk of the syndromic surveil-
lance work, as reflected in these abstracts, is occurring in state
and local health departments and within U.S. academic insti-
tutions. Abstract authors were based in state and local health
departments (40%), universities (32%), federal government
agencies (13%), health-care organizations (11%), and busi-
nesses (4%). Abstracts focused on system evaluation (35%),
description of systems or their implementation (26%), data
management, modeling, and detection algorithms (28%), and
case definition (11%).
Of the 60 abstracts that described a full syndromic surveil-
lance system, 30% indicated use of manual data collection
BOX 1. Tasks for evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks*
Task A. Describe the system b. Data quality: How does data quality affect validity
of outbreak detection?
i. Representativeness: How well does the system
reflect the population of interest?
ii. Completeness: What percentage of data are present
for each record?
Task C. Describe the system experience
1. System usefulness: In what ways has the system dem-
onstrated value relevant to public health?
2. Flexibility: How adaptable is the system to changing
needs and risk thresholds?
3. System acceptability: Have stakeholders been willing
to contribute to and use the system?
4. Portability: How readily can the system be duplicated
at another location?
5. System stability: How consistent has the system been
in providing access to reproducible results?
6. System costs: What are the resource requirements to
deploy and maintain the system?
Task D. Summarize conclusions and make recommen-
dations for use and improvement of systems for early
outbreak detection
1. Purpose: What is the system designed to accomplish?
2. Stakeholders: Whom does the system serve?





e. Epidemiologic analysis, interpretation, and investi-
gation
Task B. Provide data demonstrating outbreak detection
attributes
1. Timeliness: How early in the outbreak is the event
detected?
2. Validity: How well does the system perform in distin-
guishing outbreak detection of public health significance
from less important events or random variations in dis-
ease trends?
a. Sensitivity and predictive value: What percentage of
true outbreaks are detected by the system? What per-
centage of signals by the system are relevant (true
positives)? What percentage of negative results are
truly negative?
* Source: CDC. Framework for evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of outbreaks: recommendations from the CDC working group.
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FIGURE. Location of U.S.-based syndromic surveillance
systems described in 99 abstracts submitted for the 2003
National Syndromic Surveillance Conference
TABLE. Data sources for 60 abstracts on syndromic
surveillance submitted to the 2003 National Syndromic
Surveillance Conference
Data source No. of abstracts* %*
Emergency departments 29 48
Office or clinic visits 13 22
Hospital diagnoses 7 12
School absences 7 12
911 calls/EMS runs 6 10
Over-the-counter drug purchases 5 8
Poison control centers 5 8
Nurse advice lines 4 7
Veterinary clinics 3 5
Medical examiners 2 3
Pharmacy prescriptions 2 3
Laboratory results 2 3
Laboratory orders 1 2
Medical center parking-lot volume 1 2
Online obituaries 1 2
Subway-worker absences 1 2
School perception of an outbreak 1 2
* Certain systems used multiple data sources.
outside the typical workflow of the data provider. Ninety-five
percent described systems designed to detect outbreak pat-
terns in the data, with only 5% using syndromic surveillance
for individual case detection (e.g., severe acute respiratory syn-
drome or West Nile encephalitis). Of the 35 abstracts that
described system evaluation, 34% provided no data in the
abstract, only describing the intent to present evaluation data.
Nonetheless, 63% addressed the outbreak-detection experi-
ence in a prospective direction. Of the 35 abstracts that
described system evaluation, 37% reported on the signaling
of a system; 20% referred to one or more investigations; 57%
addressed one or more outbreaks detected or missed; and 20%
addressed timeliness in any fashion. None of the abstracts
estimated the public health effect of early detection.
Discussion
The systems described in these conference abstracts are not
a representative sample of jurisdictions conducting syndromic
surveillance; rather, they are a synopsis from those jurisdic-
tions willing to share their experiences at a national confer-
ence. Furthermore, certain presentations were invited talks
for which abstracts were not submitted.
The diversity of data sources being used reflects the early
stage of development of syndromic surveillance and the
exploration of novel data sources (Table). The predominant
focus, consistent with recommendations from the 2002
National Syndromic Surveillance Conference (9), is on data
from emergency departments and other clinical sources. A
substantial number of systems (30%) continue to rely on
manual data collection at the data source. The sustainability
of such a system has been questioned (3,8–10,12). Whether
for routine data collection or for innovative surveillance
systems, automated data captured during the usual course of
care (or business) is preferred to manual data collection when
continuous, complete reporting is the goal. Manual data col-
lection will continue to play a role in actual or threatened
outbreak settings that have special data needs that cannot be
filled by using existing electronic data (3,7,9,10,12).
A substantial number of abstracts (35%) focused on the
evaluation of a system, although the rigor and methods of
evaluation varied considerably. One third of abstracts that
stated intent to present a system evaluation provided no data
at all in the abstract regarding how effectively the system was
working. However, approximately two thirds of the evalua-
tion abstracts referred to tracking performance prospectively
rather than simply analyzing historical data to identify known
events. Not only is prospective identification of an outbreak a
more substantial indicator of success, but it also offers ben-
efits beyond identifying specific events (e.g., stronger relation-
ships between clinicians and public health practitioners and
higher quality surveillance data) (4,13–15).
To better understand the performance of outbreak-
detection systems, basic measures of performance need to be
counted. How often a system signals (i.e., how often it indi-
cates that something worthy of further investigation is occur-
ring) also needs to be reported. This applies to all the ways
that health departments detect outbreaks (e.g., phone calls
from the public), not just to syndromic surveillance. Every
surveillance system should be able to report how many times
in a given period (e.g., 1 month) it has triggered a follow-up
investigation, yet only 37% of the evaluation abstracts gave
any indication of system signals, much less a rate of signaling.
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BOX 2. Priority evaluation questions for early outbreak-
detection systems
1. How often does the system signal an event for further
epidemiologic attention?
a. What was the time period (e.g., 1 month)?
b. What was the statistical threshold (e.g., p-value)?
c. If the threshold has changed, explain why.
2. How were signals responded to?
a. What percentage of signals were investigated
through new data collection?
b. What percentage caused increased reporting fre-
quency from affected sites?
c. What percentage conducted detailed manual analy-
sis of any data available to the jurisdiction?
d. What percentage conducted manual analysis of data
from the system?
e. What percentage were reviewed for data errors?
f. What percentage of signals were ignored?
g. What resources were directed to follow-up?
3. How many outbreaks were detected through the system?
a. How timely was detection relative to other systems?
b. How timely was detection relative to the stage of
the outbreak?
c. What were the agent, host population, and envi-
ronmental conditions of the outbreak?
4. How many outbreaks were missed by the system?
a. What were the agent, host, and environmental con-
ditions?
b. How was the outbreak detected?
5. What was the public health response to detection (e.g.,
no response, urgent communication to clinicians, or
vaccination campaign)?
More information is needed about different responses to
signals and the results of those responses. When a system sig-
nals, multiple responses can be made, from deciding not to
act on the signal to launching a full investigation with staff
participation and new data collection. Intermediate steps might
include reviewing the data for errors, reviewing records manu-
ally within syndrome categories to search for patterns, con-
ducting manual epidemiologic analysis for subgroup
associations with the signal, examining data from other sources,
and ensuring early submission of the next cycle of reports from
affected locations. Although certain systems are potentially
not signaling and therefore not instigating investigations, that
only 20% of the systems presented in the evaluation abstracts
have initiated investigations seems unlikely. Routine report-
ing of how often signals elicit a response and what those
responses entail is essential.
Jurisdictions should report routinely both on outbreaks
detected through syndromic surveillance and outbreaks missed.
Practitioners should also report outbreaks detected through
other methods to understand the relative value of syndromic
surveillance. Of the 2003 evaluation abstracts, >50% addressed
the detection or nondetection of outbreaks, but room for
improvement remains.
Lastly, early detection is essential in syndromic surveillance,
yet only 20% of the evaluation abstracts addressed timeliness.
Measuring timeliness should be a routine part of reporting.
The evaluation timeline in the Framework for Evaluating
Public Health Surveillance Systems for Early Detection of
Outbreaks (7) provides milestones that should aid in the
reporting of timeliness.
Conclusion and Next Steps
Evaluation requirements should be simplified and standard-
ized to allow comparisons across systems and across outbreak-
detection approaches. Simulations offer promise for testing
and improving systems designed to detect rare events. The
abstracts submitted to the 2003 conference reflect initial
efforts to evaluate analytic methods in isolation with simula-
tion exercises. Testing intact systems is needed to verify how
well they might perform in practice at providing early warn-
ing of public health emergencies. Additional research is needed
to validate the assumptions necessary for modeling disease
outbreaks (e.g., the spread of disease in various scenarios, or
the individual and community behavior patterns after onset
of illness that might serve as early outbreak indicators).
Although detailed descriptions of systems would be a help-
ful step forward, the reporting burden could be heavy and
additional experience is needed to determine the required
system attributes and to standardize the descriptions. An
interim approach might be to prioritize a limited number of
measures of likely value now until experience is gained with
other measures. A simplified version of the Framework for
Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for Early
Detection of Outbreaks (7) might focus on questions regard-
ing timeliness, validity, and usefulness of an outbreak-
detection system (Box 2). Such a framework could help
standardize reporting of the different methods used by public
health departments to detect outbreaks. Ultimately, the goal
is to measure the effect of detection methods — how public
health is improved by detection, and at what cost. The pro-
posed framework could move the field forward incrementally
by using readily available information and measures until
additional information on metrics for outcomes and costs
becomes available.
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Abstract
Introduction: The outbreak-detection performance of a syndromic surveillance system can be measured in terms of its ability
to detect signal (i.e., disease outbreak) against background noise (i.e., normally varying baseline disease in the region). Such
benchmarking requires training and the use of validation data sets. Because only a limited number of persons have been
infected with agents of biologic terrorism, data are generally unavailable, and simulation is necessary. An approach for
evaluation of outbreak-detection algorithms was developed that uses semisynthetic data sets to provide real background (which
effectively becomes the noise in the signal-to-noise problem) with artificially injected signal. The injected signal is defined by
a controlled feature set of variable parameters, including size, shape, and duration.
Objectives: This report defines a flexible approach to evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of
outbreaks and provides examples of its use.
Methods: The stages of outbreak detection are described, followed by the procedure for creating data sets for benchmarking
performance. Approaches to setting parameters for simulated outbreaks by using controlled feature sets are detailed, and
metrics for detection performance are proposed. Finally, a series of experiments using semisynthetic data sets with artificially
introduced outbreaks defined with controlled feature sets is reviewed.
Results: These experiments indicate the flexibility of controlled feature set simulation for evaluating outbreak-
detection sensitivity and specificity, optimizing attributes of detection algorithms (e.g., temporal windows), choosing approaches to
syndrome groupings, and determining best strategies for integrating data from multiple sources.
Conclusions: The use of semisynthetic data sets containing authentic baseline and simulated outbreaks defined by a con-
trolled feature set provides a valuable means for benchmarking the detection performance of syndromic surveillance systems.
Introduction
Evaluation of surveillance systems for early detection of
outbreaks is particularly challenging when the systems are
designed to detect events for which minimal or no historic
examples exist (1). Although infection by biologic agents is
rare, exceptions have occurred. For example, in 1979, persons
living in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union were exposed
to Bacillus anthracis during an unintentional release from a
weapons plant (2), and a limited number of persons were
exposed in Florida, New York, and the District of Columbia
during 2001 when B. anthracis spores were released through
the mail (3). However, absent sufficient real outbreak data,
measuring a system’s detection performance requires simula-
tion. Simulated outbreaks must reflect the diversity of threats,
both natural and man-made, that a surveillance system might
reasonably be expected to encounter and detect. This paper
describes a flexible approach to generating standardized simu-
lated data sets for benchmarking surveillance systems and pro-
vides examples of its application. Rather than model all pos-
sible conditions and factors, the approach relies on simulated
outbreaks characterized by a controlled feature set that sys-
tematically defines the magnitude, temporal progression, du-
ration, and spatial characteristics of the simulated outbreaks
on the basis of variable parameters.
Stages of Outbreak Detection
The goal of outbreak detection is to generate an alert when-
ever observed data depart sufficiently from an expected baseline
(4). In other words, the system must be able to detect a signal
(i.e., disease outbreak) against background noise (i.e., nor-
mally varying baseline disease in the region). Four basic
methodologic stages are used to process data for outbreak
detection: 1) the syndrome grouping stage, in which data
acquired from different sources are used to assign each
patient to a particular syndrome group (e.g., respiratory
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and noise from two data sets simulated signal
Noise
Synthetic Signal from a naturally occurring Simulated noise and signal
outbreak superimposed on simulated
noise
infection or gastrointestinal infection); 2) the modeling stage,
in which historic data, including data for patients during the
past year(s), are analyzed to establish a model from observed
temporal and spatial patient distributions; 3) the detection
stage, in which the expected values (i.e., predicted daily fre-
quencies of patients in each syndrome group) are compared
with observed values to determine whether abnormal activity
is occurring; and 4) the alert stage, in which thresholds are set
to evaluate whether an unusual pattern warrants notifying
public health authorities.
The first two stages can be accomplished by using historic
data from a given region. Depending on the data source, dif-
ferent methods can be used to assign a case to syndrome group.
For example, emergency department (ED) data can be cat-
egorized by chief complaint by using a naïve Bayesian classi-
fier (5) or by a standardized grouping of International
Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes (6).
Outbreaks are identified by comparing observations with the
predictions generated by a model describing the expected
baseline temporal or spatial pattern. Examples include time-
series models (7), spatial scan statistics (8,9), and models of
interpoint distance distributions (10).
At the detection stage, observed values must be compared
with expected values; a signal containing outbreaks (hereafter
referred to as an outbreak signal) is required to evaluate a
system’s detection performance. However, limited data are
available concerning terrorism-related events, and none are
available in the format used by existing syndromic surveil-
lance systems.
Data Sets for Benchmarking
Performance
Performance of outbreak-detection models can be measured
by using authentic data, synthetic data, or combinations of
the two (Table). Two kinds of purely authentic data sets are
possible. One is genuine syndromic data contemporaneous
with either a known large-scale local outbreak (e.g., a winter
influenza surge) (11) or a more circumscribed event (e.g., a
diarrheal outbreak) (12). The data set
would contain the background of ordi-
nary disease or symptom occurrence
and the signal of the actual outbreak. A
second type of authentic data set is a
hybrid containing background from a
regional surveillance system spiked with
cases from a known outbreak. This ap-
proach was taken when over-the-
counter medication-sales data were
spiked with an outbreak based on the Sverdlosk incident (13).
Alternatively, a hypothetical baseline can be constructed, and
actual or simulated signals can be imposed and injected. Al-
though this approach is valid, limited need exists to simulate
background activity, given the abundance of readily available
real-signal streams from surveillance systems.
The approach described in this paper superimposes a simu-
lated signal onto an authentic baseline, permitting explora-
tion of the effects of controlled variations of signal
characteristics. Two main approaches can be taken to creating
this simulated signal: 1) using multistage, multivariate math-
ematical models to produce the signal or 2) defining a series
of parameters that enable generation of a controlled feature
set simulated signal. For example, a complex mathematical
model (14) might be based on a scenario in which a particular
form of aerosolized B. anthracis is dispersed under a certain
set of atmospheric conditions over a specific geographic
region with a well-characterized population demographic. The
number of susceptible persons might be estimated and their
subsequent behaviors modeled. The resulting effect on the
syndromic surveillance data set (e.g., retail sales, primary care
visits, or ED visits) could be projected. However, this approach
for evaluating outbreak-detection performance is labor-
intensive, and the models are based on multiple assumptions.
A more flexible approach is to use a set of variable parameters
describing a particular outbreak. Defining feature sets of out-
breaks (e.g., magnitude, shape, and duration) allows rapid
determination of the limits of a system’s ability to detect an
outbreak under varying conditions.
Using Parameters To Specify
Outbreak Characteristics
Background noise can be spiked with additional cases con-
figured as spatial or temporal clusters, describable as a controlled
feature set. Different adjustable parameters enable ready
manipulation of the simulated outbreaks. Optimally, a training
data set should be modeled, and the artificial outbreak signal
should be injected into a validation data set. However, if suffi-
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FIGURE 1. Distorting effect of background noise on simulated
outbreaks
Note: Plot A depicts two simulated outbreaks spaced apart. Plot B depicts
the background noise signal. Plot C illustrates the effect of noise distorting
the outbreaks. Plot D demonstrates how the noise distorts the outbreaks
differently when the outbreaks are shifted to the right by 1 day. Plot E
demonstrates how the noise distorts the outbreaks when the outbreaks
are shifted to the right by 2 days.
cient data are not available to do so, the artificial outbreak
signal can be injected into the same data used for training.
Outbreak Duration
A key parameter is the duration of the added outbreak sig-
nal. Executing simulations over a range of outbreak durations
is useful, and various factors might influence the range cho-
sen. Different agents can cause outbreaks of different lengths;
for example, a surge in influenza activity lasts weeks or months,
whereas a foodborne outbreak might last only 4–5 days. Fur-
thermore, the temporal window used by the detection system
might have a substantial effect on how outbreaks of different
magnitudes are detected. If the detection window were based,
for example, on a sliding moving average of 7 days, 2- or 3-day–
long outbreaks would be smoothed out; under certain condi-
tions, this smoothing might dilute the signal. Conversely,
outbreaks gently trending upward in numbers might not be
detected with a shorter sliding window.
Outbreak Spacing
One efficient way to measure outbreak-detection perfor-
mance and the factors that influence it is to spike a data stream
with a substantial number of individual outbreaks. The more
outbreaks presented to a model-based system, the more accu-
rately the system’s detection performance can be character-
ized. To maximize the number of simulated outbreaks in the
data set, one can introduce multiple nonoverlapping outbreaks
in a single data set (e.g., a 5-day outbreak beginning on day 1,
a second beginning on day 11, and a third on day 21). The
outbreaks are then removed and replaced by a different set of
nonoverlapping outbreaks and again presented to the system
(e.g., days 2, 12, and 22). For measurement purposes, all
individual outbreaks must be isolated temporally to ensure
any response to the previous outbreak has been eliminated
from the system before the next outbreak is encountered. For
systems that analyze data by using a temporal window of >1
day, the spacing between outbreaks must be greater than that
width to ensure independence. Although such temporal iso-
lation is critical for accurate measurement of detection per-
formance, it will not directly address the system’s ability to
detect overlapping outbreaks. Shifting the outbreaks in time
ensures that outbreaks are affected by different regions of noise
(Figure 1). Spacing outbreaks throughout the year also per-
mits measuring the effect of seasonal changes in the back-
ground on outbreak detection. Understanding the effects of
different regions of background noise cannot be accomplished
without simulation.
Outbreak Temporal Progression
The time course of an outbreak spreading through a popu-
lation can follow multiple paths, effectively producing a
signature shape related to the epidemic curve. For example, a
highly infectious disease (e.g., smallpox) could spread expo-
nentially over time, whereas a point-source exposure that is
not contagious from person to person (e.g., a release of
B. anthracis) would be unlikely to grow exponentially. Mul-
tiple canonical shapes of temporal progression (Figure 2) can
be used in simulations to characterize the detection perfor-
mance of surveillance systems. In a system monitoring daily
ED visits, for example, flat outbreaks have a fixed number of
extra visits/day for the duration of the outbreak (e.g., 10, 10,
10, 10, and 10 extra visits for a 5-day outbreak). Linear out-
breaks have a linearly increasing number of extra visits/day
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FIGURE 2. Four canonical shapes of temporal progression
for simulated outbreaks
over the course of the outbreak (e.g., five, 10, 15, 20, and 25
extra visits for a 5-day outbreak). Exponential outbreaks have
an exponentially increasing number of extra visits/day over
the course of the outbreak (e.g., two, four, eight, 16, and 32
extra visits for a 5-day outbreak). Sigmoid-shaped outbreaks
mirror epidemiologic phenomena in which the number of
affected individuals increases exponentially at first, then slows
down until it plateaus at a new fixed level (e.g., two, four,
eight, 12, and 14 extra visits for a 5-day outbreak). Alterna-
tively, a model of more complex shape described by a multi-
nomial (e.g., the Sverdlosk [2] outbreak) might be desirable.
Outbreak Magnitude
Because the minimum detectable size of an outbreak is
often of interest, outbreak-detection performance should be
tested over a range of signal magnitudes; detection perfor-
mance might vary substantially depending on these magni-
tudes. This variability is attributable primarily to the changes
in signal-to-noise ratio that result from different outbreak sizes.
For limited outbreaks that are at or near the “noise floor” of
the model (i.e., the usual level of random variability in the
model’s predictions), the detection performance is typically
poor because distinguishing outbreaks from the random noise
of the model is difficult. As the relative size of an outbreak
increases, identifying an outbreak in the presence of noise
becomes easier. Once the outbreak magnitude is such that the
noise does not effectively mask it, the outbreak-detection per-
formance of the system typically plateaus at perfect or near
perfect detection.
For identification of an appropriate range of outbreak mag-
nitudes for simulations, the error or noise profile of the model
should be characterized. The daily forecast errors of the model,
defined as the forecast value minus the actual value for each
day, must be calculated. The error profile can be visualized by
plotting a histogram of these daily forecast errors and stan-
dard deviation of the error distribution. Outbreak magnitudes
should range from near zero to at least twice the standard
deviation of the forecast error. For example, in the case of a
model of ED visits with mean of 140 visits/day and an error
profile with a standard deviation of 20 visits, simulations of
outbreaks ranging in magnitude from 0 to 40 visits/day should
be run. This range can be sampled in intervals of five, yielding
the following set of outbreak magnitudes: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20,
25, 30, 35, and 40.
The error profile of a model might vary during a year
because of seasonal differences in signal variability. For
example, respiratory-visit rates could vary more unpredict-
ably in winter than in summer. In such cases, constructing
separate error profiles for different seasons might be useful to
tailor the detection test to each season.
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Spatial Features
The outbreak cluster might describe the spatial relationship
among the additional cases, which are represented as geocodes
(i.e., latitude and longitude), possibly augmented by a time
stamp. If so, the cluster can be described in terms of a maxi-
mum cluster radius, the distribution of cases within that radius,
and the angle from a fixed point (e.g., a hospital). Simulating
spatial clusters raises additional challenges, including the iden-
tification of realistic locations for simulated cases, based on
the spatial features of a region (e.g., housing and of bodies of
water).
Metrics for Detection Performance
Sensitivity and Specificity
A tradeoff always exists between sensitivity and specificity,
and the ability to detect outbreaks must be balanced against
the cost of false alerts (1). For evaluation purposes, holding
sensitivity or specificity constant can be useful when plotting
the other against another variable (e.g., outbreak magnitude
or duration). For example, specificity might be held constant
while plotting sensitivity versus outbreak magnitude. For each
outbreak magnitude, the alert threshold should be tuned
until the desired number of false alerts (and thus the desired
specificity) is achieved. At this point, the resulting sensitivity
under these conditions is measured. This process is repeated
for each outbreak magnitude, ultimately yielding a plot of
sensitivity versus outbreak magnitude with specificity fixed.
The likelihood of not having an alert when no signal (speci-
ficity) exists can be measured simply by running the model
on the baseline data without inserting artificial outbreaks.
Overall Outbreak Detection Versus
Outbreak Day Number
Because outbreaks presented to the system typically will last
>1 day, sensitivity and specificity can be measured either in
terms of detection of specific outbreak days or of the overall
outbreak. When the outbreak-day approach is used, each day
is considered a separate, independent case; if a particular 5-day
outbreak is detected on 3 days but missed on 2 days, three
successes (true positives) and two failures (false negatives) are
recorded. Similarly, each of the intervening nonoutbreak days
is considered independently when false-positive and true-
negative rates are calculated.
When the overall outbreak-detection approach is used, each
outbreak is viewed as a single entity; if the outbreak is cor-
rectly detected on an outbreak day, the system has produced a
true positive. An alternative criterion for a true positive is that
the outbreak was correctly detected on a majority of the out-
break days. When the overall outbreak sensitivity is reported
(e.g., “The system detected X% of all outbreaks presented to
it”), full sensitivity and specificity statistics are reported by
using the outbreak-days approach.
Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) Curves
The tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity is well-
portrayed by ROC curves, which plot sensitivity versus one
minus the specificity. For tests that have no diagnostic value,
the ROC curve is a straight line along the diagonal of the
plot. For plots of tests with higher diagnostic value, the line is
curved away from the middle of the plot. The area under the
ROC curve can thus be used as a measure of the diagnostic
value of a test (9). The diagnostic value of two tests can be




A series of experiments was conducted by using semisyn-
thetic data sets containing authentic background noise and
controlled feature set simulated outbreaks. These experiments
illustrate the flexibility of the approach. In all these experi-
ments, the primary sources of data were ED chief complaints
and ICD-9 codes from two urban academic teaching hospi-
tals that share the same catchment area. The first experiments
were performed to test the accuracy of the model used for the
Automated Epidemiologic Geotemporal Integrated Surveil-
lance (AEGIS) system, which was developed at Children’s
Hospital Boston and Harvard Medical School. This
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model was
constructed on the basis of approximately a decade of historic
data from a single ED. The model is run every 10 minutes on
real-time data streams producing forecasts of ED volume over
the next 24 hours. The system was presented with 7-day–long
outbreaks of fixed size, spaced 15 days apart. Specificity was
held constant at 97% to produce approximately one false
alert/month. On average, 137 visits occurred each day. The
results indicated a positive relationship between outbreak
magnitude and system sensitivity at varying outbreak
magnitudes (7).
For performance to be improved, a series of experiments
was conducted in which the temporal detection window was
widened from 1 day to 1 week, and a controlled feature set
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simulation was used to measure the effects of temporal filters,
differentially weighting the importance of each day for 1 week.
The results demonstrated that the wider temporal window
was able to more than double the detection sensitivity while
holding the specificity fixed. The results also indicated that
different temporal filter shapes provided complementary sets
of benefits with regard to timeliness and overall sensitivity of
detection (15).
Syndromic surveillance systems require data that allow the
grouping of patients into syndromes or prodromes. Previous
studies have examined the accuracy of different methods of
syndrome grouping (16–19). This study assessed the effects
of syndrome groupings on model accuracy, which is a key
factor in outbreak-detection performance (20). Daily ED visit
rates were analyzed from two urban academic tertiary-care
hospitals. Three methods were used to group the visits into a
daily respiratory-related syndrome category: chief complaint,
diagnostic codes, and a combination of the two. These group-
ings were used to build historic models that were then tested
for forecasting accuracy and sensitivity for detecting simu-
lated outbreaks. For both hospitals, the data grouped accord-
ing to chief complaint alone yielded the lowest model accuracy
and the lowest detection sensitivity. Using diagnostic codes to
group the data yielded better results. Smoothing of the data
was demonstrated to improve sensitivity in all cases, although
to varying degrees. Combining the two grouping methods
yielded the best accuracy and sensitivity.
In the last set of experiments, the optimal method for inte-
grating data from multiple regional EDs was determined (21).
In one simulation, the synthetic outbreak was introduced
evenly into both hospital data sets (aggregate model). In the
second, the outbreak was introduced into only one or the other
of the hospital data sets (local model). The aggregate model
had a higher sensitivity for detecting outbreaks that were evenly
distributed between the hospitals. However, for outbreaks that
were localized to one facility, maintaining individual models
for each location proved to be better. Given the complemen-
tary benefits offered by both approaches, the results suggested
building a hybrid system that includes both individual mod-
els for each location and an aggregate model that combines all
the data.
Limitations
This study is subject to at least four limitations. First, using
simulated data for benchmarking syndromic surveillance sys-
tems carries the risk of evaluating performance under unreal-
istic conditions. Second, the controlled feature set simulation
approach entails the explicit assumption that the historic data
are pure noise and contain no signal. For terrorism-related
events, this assumption is almost certainly true. However, de-
tectable outbreaks of naturally occurring infection are likely
contained within the historic data. Third, this approach does
not account for processes occurring at the syndrome-
grouping stage because artificial cases are injected directly into
the data stream. A person with a case of true upper respiratory
infection who reports to an ED might not be correctly
assigned to the proper syndrome group on the basis of a chief
complaint or ICD-9 code. However, the approach could be
modified to introduce simulated cases earlier in the process,
hypothetically presenting them to the syndrome classifier,
enabling modeling of the accuracy of the syndrome grouping
process. Finally, in live syndromic surveillance systems, records
representing specific events for a given day might be transmit-
ted from the data sources at different points in time. Such
time delays could be incorporated into the controlled feature
set simulations. In the experiments described, discrete param-
eter values are assigned. Another approach would be to use a
method such as Monte Carlo simulation (22) to redefine the
model parameters over a smoother distribution of values.
Application of controlled feature set simulation to surveillance
by using multivariate data streams requires explicit assump-
tions about the relationships among the signal features across
data sets.
Conclusions
Use of semisynthetic data sets containing authentic back-
ground noise and outbreaks defined by a controlled feature
set provides a valuable means for benchmarking the detection
performance of syndromic surveillance systems.
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Abstract
Introduction: The paucity of outbreak data from biologic terrorism and emerging infectious diseases limits the evaluation of
syndromic surveillance systems. Evaluation using naturally occurring outbreaks of proxy disease (e.g., influenza) is one alter-
native but does not allow for rigorous evaluation. Another approach is to inject simulated outbreaks into real background
data, but existing simulation models generally do not account for such factors as spatial mobility and do not explicitly
incorporate knowledge of the disease agent.
Objective: The objective of this analysis was to design a simulated anthrax epidemic injection model that accounts for the
complexity of the background data and enables sensitivity analyses based on uncertain disease-agent characteristics.
Model Requirements and Assumptions: Model requirements are described and used to limit the scope of model develop-
ment. Major assumptions used to limit model complexity are also described. Available literature on inhalational anthrax is
reviewed to ensure that the level of model detail reflects available disease knowledge.
Model Design: The model is divided into four components: 1) agent dispersion, 2) infection, 3) disease and behavior, and 4)
data source. The agent-dispersion component uses a Gaussian plume model to compute spore counts on a fine grid. The
infection component uses a cohort approach to identify infected persons by residential zip code, accounting for demographic
covariates and spatial mobility. The disease and behavior component uses a discrete-event approach to simulate progression
through disease stages and health-services utilization. The data-source component generates records to insert into background
data sources.
Conclusions: An epidemic simulation model was designed to enable evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems. The model
addresses limitations of existing simulation approaches by accounting for such factors as spatial mobility and by explicitly
modeling disease knowledge. Subsequent work entails software implementation and model validation.
Introduction
Syndromic surveillance systems potentially allow rapid
detection of outbreaks and enable prompt public health
intervention (1). Although considerable effort and funding
have been directed in recent years toward the development of
systems and outbreak-detection algorithms, minimal evalua-
tion of their performance in real surveillance environments
has been conducted (2,3).
The conditions under which a syndromic surveillance sys-
tem is likely to rapidly detect an outbreak need to be better
understood. Public health decision-makers faced with fund-
ing decisions for terrorism preparedness should understand
which types of disease agents and attack scenarios are likely to
be detected by syndromic surveillance and which are not.
Although speculations on this topic have been published (4,5),
limited empirical research has been conducted. From a sys-
tems-development perspective, such evidence is required to
ensure that developers understand which system configura-
tions (especially which detection algorithms) are best suited
to detecting specific attack scenarios and disease agents. The
efficacy of algorithms in tightly controlled settings has been
evaluated to an extent (6,7), but evaluation of outbreak-
detection effectiveness in realistic settings has been minimal.
The ideal evaluation approach would assess system perfor-
mance by using existing outbreaks of the type the system is
intended to detect. However, for the majority of locations
where systems are operating, essentially no previous data exist
on outbreaks from agents of biologic terrorism. An alterna-
tive suggestion is to use data on seasonal outbreaks as a proxy
signal for evaluation (8). This approach is useful but limited.
Seasonal outbreaks are limited in number and might differ in
* The views expressed are those of the author and should not be construed
as representing the position of the U.S. Department of Defense.
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important ways from the type of outbreaks systems are
intended to detect. Moreover, performing sensitivity analyses
using real outbreak data is not usually possible.
Another alternative is to use simulated data for evaluation.
Given the complexities of real data, evaluation should be based
on real data injected with simulated outbreaks as opposed to
relying on fully simulated data (8). To date, simulations have
focused on injecting relatively simple signals with abstract char-
acteristics into univariate time series (6,9) or on creating simple,
abstract spatial signals (7). These simulation efforts are useful
for understanding the general performance characteristics of
detection algorithms, but they do not enable thorough evalua-
tion of surveillance-system and detection-algorithm performance
in realistic settings.
A limitation of existing simulation approaches is that they
create signals with insufficient complexity to evaluate the
effectiveness of certain algorithms in the scenarios and data
environments for which they were designed. For example,
algorithms used by syndromic surveillance systems often rely
on spatial information (10) and on the joint distribution of
multiple attributes (7). To evaluate the performance of a sys-
tem that uses such algorithms, a simulation must be capable
of producing a signal that accounts for such factors as the
spatial mobility of persons among regions and the joint distri-
butions of such variables as age and diagnosis. Another limi-
tation of current simulation approaches (6,7,9) is that the
disease agent responsible for the simulated signal is not
explicitly modeled. Such explicit modeling is necessary to un-
derstand the plausible range of detection-performance results
for a specified outbreak scenario. Different assumptions about
disease-agent parameters (e.g., time spent in the incubation
state) are required for a simulation model developed for sys-
tem evaluation.
This paper describes the design for a simulation model
intended to enable evaluation of the outbreak-detection char-
acteristics of a syndromic surveillance system. The goal is to
develop a model that 1) creates a realistic signal for injection
into background data sources, 2) explicitly incorporates knowl-
edge of disease, and 3) is as simple as possible. The aim is to
design a model that can be generalized to multiple disease
agents, geographic locations, and data sources. However, to
focus model development, developers limited the model
design to simulate exposure to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis
spores in the Norfolk, Virginia, area and the resulting effect




Developing a simulation model requires simplifying reality
in a way that sufficiently decreases complexity but still meets
model requirements (11). The purpose of this model is to
enable evaluation of the outbreak-detection characteristics of
syndromic surveillance systems. Functionally, the model must
simulate the effects of an epidemic in sufficient detail such
that attributable cases can be plausibly injected into the back-
ground of authentic health-utilization records. The simulated
records must account for such factors as the spatial mobility
of the population and joint distributions of multiple attributes
within and across data sources. From a design perspective, the
model must explicitly incorporate knowledge of the disease
agent in a way that enables analyses of the sensitivity of detec-
tion performance to key disease parameters.
Model Scope and Assumptions
Focusing on evaluation of timely outbreak detection pro-
vides a means of limiting the model’s scope. This model
assumes that outbreak detection by a surveillance system is
successful only if it occurs 1) before the outbreak is evident
because a sufficiently large number of persons seek care and
2) before a limited number of persons are diagnosed with a
disease caused by a nonendemic Category A biologic agent
(12). This assumption allows the scope of the model to be
limited to the early stages of disease progression, up to hospi-
tal admission. However, it also requires that the model accu-
rately reflect population and provider behavior before and after
illness onset.
Another assumption is that before an epidemic is recog-
nized, the behaviors of both health-care seekers and providers
are reflected by historic data. This means that persons use
health-care services, and health-care providers assign diagnoses
and prescribe medications, according to historic patterns for
persons with similar demographic characteristics and similar
symptoms. Historic patterns for health-care consumers and
providers can be determined empirically from background
data, and this assumption substantially limits the need for
quantitative data on health-care utilization in the early stages
of an epidemic.
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TABLE 1. Fields in data sources used for simulation
Physician Pharmaceutical
Field visits prescriptions
Scrambled subscriber identification number * *
Family member identification number * *
Facility type *† *†




Facility identification number * *
Facility zip code *† *†
Facility type *†
Code ICD-9†§ GC3†¶
* Field is present.
†
Simulation model outputs field for simulated records.
§





To develop a model for inhalational anthrax, the investiga-
tors reviewed the literature on anthrax to ensure that the dis-
ease was modeled at a resolution appropriate to available
knowledge. A limited number of studies have quantitatively
modeled dispersion of anthrax spores, infection with inhala-
tional anthrax, and disease progression among infected per-
sons. A study of the Sverdlosk anthrax outbreak indicated that
dispersion of an aerosol of B. anthracis is adequately described
by a Gaussian plume model (13). Although it was based on
incomplete data, that validation of the Gaussian plume model
is the most complete analysis described in the literature. The
Gaussian plume model seems to provide a reasonable first
approximation in an urban setting, and others have
used the model in an urban environment with essentially no
modifications (14).
The estimates of an infectious dose of B. anthracis spores
(ID10 = 1,135, ID50 = 8,940) proposed previously (15) are
the geometric means of estimates from subject matter special-
ists, obtained before the U.S. anthrax cases in 2001. The age-
specific estimates proposed (ID10 = 450–4,500, ID50 =
1,500–15,000) (16) were apparently based on the previous
estimate (15) but were modified to account for knowledge
derived from analysis of the 2001 exposures to mailborne
B. anthracis. The revised age-specific values are consistent with
the observation that the infectious doses in the 2001 cases
were lower than previously thought necessary, and with
observation from the Sverdlosk cases that children seem to
require higher infectious doses (13). The probability of infec-
tion can be estimated from the number of spores inhaled (S)
and the age category (n), by using functions described
previously (14,16).
In terms of disease progression, one researcher (14) mod-
eled five disease states for inhalational anthrax: uninfected,
incubating, prodromal, fulminant, and dead. In addition, val-
ues determined from the Sverdlosk outbreak (17) were used
to parameterize the lognormal distribution of duration in the
incubation state (14). Parameters for the lognormal distribu-
tions of time in the prodromal and fulminant states from the
2001 cases in the United States (18,19) and an analysis of the
time from exposure to death (17) were also estimated (14).
These estimates in days are incubation (median = 10.95; dis-
persion = 2.04), prodromal (median = 12.18; dispersion =
1.41), and fulminant (median = 1.5; dispersion = 1.41), where
the log of time in a state is normally distributed with mean µ
and variance σ2: log(t) ~ N(µ, σ2). Following other published
work (20), the dispersion factor d = exp(σ). Approximately
68% of the cases in a state fall in the interval median/d to
median * d, and roughly 95% of the cases fall in the interval
median/d2 to median * d2. Human (21) and animal (22) evi-
dence demonstrates that duration in the incubation state de-
pends on the number of inhaled spores, although research
indicates that the Sverdlosk data do not support this (14). In
addition, animal evidence indicates that time from exposure
to death is dose-dependent (22), although whether this is at-
tributable only to a shortened incubation period and not also
to a shortened duration of subsequent states is not clear.
Background Data and
Simulation Region
Although the model is intended to be generalizable to other
settings, our initial design focuses on two specific data sources
drawn from the Norfolk, Virginia, region: ambulatory physi-
cian visit billing records and pharmaceutical prescription
records for military personnel and their dependents. These
types of data are used routinely by syndromic surveillance sys-
tems (23–26). Persons are uniquely identified with encrypted
personal identifiers in a way that allows anonymous linkage
of records for persons across the two data sources. The simu-
lation region is defined as an area approximately 160 km by
200 km that encompasses 158 zip codes from two states.
During July 2001–May 2003, a total of 115,732 persons from
the simulation region made 231,116 clinical visits and 148,761
pharmacy visits. Within the region, clinical visits were made
to 16 clinical facilities, and prescriptions were filled at 316
pharmacies. The fields in the background data sources are
provided (Table 1).
Model Design
To facilitate overall model development and description, the
model was divided into four components: a dispersion model,
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Note: A model run begins with calculation of spore distribution by the dispersion model (1) for a given
release scenario. The infection model (2) then makes a stochastic calculation of infected persons.
Disease course and health-seeking behaviors of infected persons are then simulated by the disease
and behavior model (3). Finally, the data-source model (4) generates simulated records for insertion
into background data sources.
FIGURE 1. Overview of an epidemic simulation model design illustrating the relation
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an infection model, a disease and behavior model, and a data-
source model (Figure 1). The dispersion model makes a cal-
culation of the distribution of aerosolized spores over the study
area. The infection model then takes the spatial distribution
of spores, along with information on the covered population
and inter-region travel information, to estimate the number
of infected persons by home location. The disease and behav-
ior model then determines progression of infected persons
through disease stages and identifies the health-care–seeking
behaviors of these persons over time. Finally, the data-source
model converts the generic behaviors taken by persons into
specific database records that can be combined with real
background data.
The rest of this section describes each model component,
focusing on the general structure, main assumptions, and
parameters to be varied. Mathematical and technical details
are available from the corresponding author and are not
presented here.
Dispersion Model
The dispersion model calculates the number of spores
inhaled at point locations in the simulation region. A Gaussian
plume model was used to simulate dispersion of spores over
the region. Home locations of covered persons in the back-
ground data are available by zip code. Because considerable
variation exists in the shape and size of zip codes within the
region, the simplest approach of estimating spore exposure at
a single point within each zip code was rejected. Instead, a
regular grid over the simulation region, with at least one grid
cell falling within each zip code, was defined. A cell size of
100 m is sufficient for this purpose in the Norfolk, Virginia,
region. Therefore, each run of the dispersion model will take
as input the release parameters (location, amount, and atmo-
spheric conditions) and the grid description, and produce as
output the number of spores inhaled at the center of each cell
on the grid. The main parameters to vary within this model
component are the amount of release, the location of the
release, and the atmospheric conditions (wind direction and
speed and atmospheric turbulence).
Infection Model
The infection model determines the number of infected
persons from the covered population in each age/residential
zip code/sex/spore-dose stratum. The covered population is
defined as the set of unique persons represented in the back-
ground data sources. The average of the spore counts for the
grid cells that fall within the zip code is used to determine the
spore concentrations within each zip code. Correspondence
of grid cells to zip codes is determined
by overlaying the grid on the zip-code
boundaries by using a geographic
information system (GIS) and then
using spatial topology to assign each
grid cell the zip code that contains the
centroid of the grid cell.
The geographic distribution of the
covered population at the time of
exposure is modeled as the probability
of a person being in a zip code at a cer-
tain time given his or her residential zip
code and age category. Time is divided
into three categories (work/school, rec-
reation, and home) on the basis of time
of day and day of week, and three age
groups are identified (young [0–18
years], middle-aged [19–64 years], and
elderly [>64 years]. For the work time
category and the middle-aged age group,
probabilities are determined from U.S.
Census workflow data (27) (Figure 2).
For all other combinations of time cat-
egories and age groups, probabilities are
determined by using inverse exponen-
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TABLE 2. Base case lognormal distribution parameters for
dose-dependent duration of three inhalational anthrax disease
states, by dose category and number of spores inhaled
Disease Dose Spores Median Dispersion
state category inhaled (µ) (variance)
Incubation High >12,000 4 (1.4) 1.75 (0.31)
Medium 4,000–12,000 10.95 (2.4) 1.75 (0.31)
Low <4,000 15 (2.7) 1.75 (0.31)
Prodromal High >12,000 1.0 (0) 1.25 (0.05)
Medium 4,000–12,000 2.5 (0.9) 1.25 (0.05)
Low <4,000 4.0 (1.4) 1.25 (0.05)
Fulminant High >12,000 1.0 (0) 1.25 (0.05)
Medium 4,000–12,000 1.5 (0.4) 1.25 (0.05)
Low <4,000 2.5 (0.9) 1.25 (0.05)
tial driving distance between zip codes, with a distinct expo-
nential weight for each time category. The weights are to be
varied in sensitivity analyses and are chosen so that persons
tend to be more widely dispersed during recreation times than
during work or school times, and in turn more widely dis-
persed during work or school times than during home times.
The spore-concentration data, the geographic distribution
of the covered population, and the probability of infection
given dose and age (as described in Methods) are used to
determine the probability of infection for each age/residential
zip code/sex/spore dose stratum given the attack time. This
probability is then used along with the number of persons in
the covered population to sample the number infected in each
stratum from a binomial distribution. Each run of the infec-
tion model will therefore take as input the time of the attack,
the number of spores at each location on the grid (from the
dispersion model), the covered population, grid cell-to-zip code
correspondence, workflow mobility, inter-zip code driving
distances, and distance weights. The output of this model will
be the number of persons infected within each age/residential
zip code/sex/spore-dose stratum. The main parameters to vary
are the probability of infection given
spore dose and the distance weights
used to determine the geographic
distribution of nonworking persons.
Disease and Behavior
Model
The disease and behavior model
determines the progression of infected
persons through disease states and the
generic types of health-care–utilization
behaviors of infected persons. Drawing
on previous work in modeling anthrax
(14), progression is modeled through
three disease states: incubation, prodro-
mal, and fulminant. The disease pro-
gression for each person is modeled as
a semi-Markov process (28), with the
transition time between states sampled
from a log-normal distribution param-
eterized by the person’s spore dose. Base
case parameters are adapted from a pre-
vious simulation study (14) (Table 2).
Each infected person begins in the
incubation state and progresses to the
prodromal state. Unless successfully
treated with curative therapy while in
the prodromal state, the illness
progresses to the fulminant state and then exits the model
after the simulated duration of the fulminant state.
For each day a person is in the prodromal or fulminant
disease state, the person’s health-care–utilization behaviors are
simulated. The behaviors of persons are modeled as a Markov
process (28), with the transition probabilities drawn prima-
rily from the background data (Figure 3). The model is run
Source: U.S. Census data, 2000.
Note: The proportion of workers leaving a county (only one origin county is provided here for clarity) to
work in other counties is represented by the thickness of the arc between the origin county and the
destination county.
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FIGURE 3. Disease-behavior model for persons in prodromal
and fulminant disease states
Note: A person’s path through the model is simulated for each day spent in
the prodromal and fulminant state. Simulated behaviors on each day lead
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for each person on each day until the person exits the model.
Each person begins in the initial state (N) from which he or
she can seek care in one of three ways: 1) a physician visit
(MD); 2) an emergency-department visit (ED); or 3) a pre-
scription without a clinical visit (Rx), or not seek care and exit
the behavior model for that day.
The first step in determining whether and how a person
seeks care is to determine the daily background probability
distribution of age/sex/diagnostic set for each care-seeking
behavior. The diagnostic set is the set of International Classifi-
cation of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) diagnoses consis-
tent with a person in the same disease state. Day-of-the-week
variation in visit probability is taken into account when cal-
culating background probabilities during the prodromal stage
but not in the fulminant stage. In the fulminant stage, the
assumption is that the only behavior that can be taken is to
visit the ED, and that, at the first visit, the person is admitted
and therefore leaves the simulation model. In the prodromal
state, multiple visits can occur, and the background distribu-
tion of person-visit frequency is used to scale the probability
of repeat visits. After the background probability of type of
care by covariates has been determined, the next step in deter-
mining whether a person seeks care is to multiply the back-
ground probability by a scale factor unique to each disease
state. These scale factors, to be varied in sensitivity analyses,
account for the probability of not making a health-care visit
for persons having symptoms consistent with the disease state.
This cannot be estimated from the background data. Work is
under way to identify these scale factors for classes of symp-
toms (e.g., lower respiratory, constitutional) through litera-
ture review and health-utilization surveys (29). After an
individual care-seeking behavior is chosen, subsequent transi-
tion probabilities are determined directly from the background
data for persons with the same age/sex/diagnostic set.
The disease component of the model is run once for each
infected person, and the behavior component of the model is
run once for each day an infected person is in the prodromal
state and once for each day in the unhospitalized fulminant
state. Input to the disease-behavior model is the number of
infected persons in each age/sex/spore-dose stratum, the dis-
ease state transition parameters, the diagnostic sets for each
disease state, and the scale factors for seeking care in each
disease state. The output is a set of behavior records for each
infected person with each record defining the date of health-
care utilization, demographic information including residen-
tial zip code, and type of utilization. The main parameters to
vary are the disease state transition parameters, and the diag-
nostics sets and care-seeking scale factors for each disease state.
Data-Source Model
The data-source model uses the behavior records from the
disease and behavior model to generate records for injection
into background data sources. The current model includes
two data sources: clinical visits and pharmaceutical prescrip-
tions. These data sources are described in the Methods sec-
tion; a list of the fields in each data source is provided (Table 1).
Creation of a data source record requires assigning a diagnos-
tic (ICD-9) or pharmaceutical code (GC3) and facility (clinic,
hospital, or pharmacy) to a behavior record and formatting
the resulting information to match the background data struc-
ture. Facility location is chosen by sampling the background
data distribution based on the historic use of facilities by per-
sons from the same residential zip code with the same diag-
nostic set. Diagnostic and pharmaceutical codes are chosen
by sampling historic data distributions for persons with simi-
lar demographic characteristics. The inputs to the data source
model are the behavior records and the diagnostic sets for each
disease state. The output is the records for injection into the
background data sources. The only parameter to vary is the
diagnostic sets.
Conclusions
This paper defines requirements and specifies a design for
an injection simulation model that should enable evaluation
of outbreak detection through syndromic surveillance.
Although it is intended to be generalizable, the model is
described in the form required to simulate an aerosol attack
with B. anthracis spores in the Norfolk, Virginia, area. The
model scope and complexity have been limited by making
plausible assumptions regarding patient and health-care pro-
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vider behavior. The model also demonstrates an approach to
developing a sufficiently complex outbreak signal by incorpo-
rating spatial mobility and by relying on joint variable distri-
butions in background data sources. Finally, a method for
incorporating explicit models of disease and illness behavior
into a simulation model was demonstrated. The degree of detail
in the model should allow for sensitivity analyses based on
uncertain disease and behavior parameters to determine their
influence on detection performance.
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Abstract
Introduction: Early detection of disease outbreaks enables public health officials to implement immediate disease control and
prevention measures. Computer-based syndromic surveillance systems are being implemented to complement reporting by
physicians and other health-care professionals to improve the timeliness of disease-outbreak detection. Space-time disease-
surveillance methods have been proposed as a supplement to purely temporal statistical methods for outbreak detection to
detect localized outbreaks before they spread to larger regions.
Objective: The aims of this study were twofold: 1) to design and make available benchmark data sets for evaluating the
statistical power of space-time early detection methods and 2) to evaluate the power of the prospective purely temporal and
space-time scan statistics by applying them to the benchmark data sets at different parameter settings.
Methods: Simulated data sets based on the geography and population of New York City were created, including effects of
outbreaks of varying size and location. Data sets with no outbreak effects were also created. Scan statistics were then run on
these data sets, and the resulting power performances were analyzed and compared.
Results: The prospective space-time scan statistic performs well for a spectrum of outbreak models. By comparison, the pro-
spective purely temporal scan statistic has higher power for detecting citywide outbreaks but lower power for detecting geo-
graphically localized outbreaks.
Conclusions: The benchmark data sets created for this study can be used successfully for formal statistical power evaluations
and comparisons. If an anomaly caused by an outbreak is local, purely temporal surveillance methods might be unable to
detect it, in which case space-time methods would be necessary for early detection.
Introduction
Early detection of disease outbreaks enables public health
officials to implement disease control and prevention mea-
sures at the earliest possible time (1–3). For an infectious dis-
ease, improvement in detection timeliness by even 1 day might
enable public health officials to control the disease before it
becomes widespread. Real-time, geographic, early outbreak-
detection systems have been used in New York City (NYC)
(4–8), the greater Washington, D.C., area (9), Salt Lake City,
Utah (10), and other locations (11). Because the onset of a
disease outbreak is unpredictable, early detection methods need
to continuously evaluate different incoming data streams (e.g.,
ambulance dispatches, emergency department [ED] visits,
pharmacy sales, or health insurance claims). Furthermore,
because early evidence of an outbreak might be localized, sys-
tems need to monitor multiple locations simultaneously
because neither the extent nor geographic pattern of the out-
break is yet known.
The majority of traditional disease-surveillance methods are
purely temporal in nature in that they seek anomalies in time-
series data without using spatial information (12). Although
temporal methods are important and can be used simulta-
neously for multiple areas, they do not take into account geo-
graphic location and might be unable to quickly detect
localized outbreaks that do not conform to predefined areas.
For this reason, different space-time early detection methods
have been proposed (13–17). Research in this area is ongoing,
and new or refined methods will likely be proposed soon. The
effectiveness of these new methods will then have to be evalu-
ated and compared with current methods.
When evaluating an outbreak-detection method, investiga-
tors should have knowledge of the method’s ability to detect
true outbreaks and the number of false alerts likely to result.
The first aim of this study was to create simulated benchmark
data sets that can be used for rigorous evaluation of the statis-
tical power of early outbreak-detection methods, an
important complement to other evaluations that use real data
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sets with known outbreaks or real data sets with spiked out-
breaks in which additional artificial cases are added to the real
cases. The second aim was to estimate and compare the power
of prospective purely temporal scan statistics with different
versions of the prospective space-time scan statistics (14) that
are used daily by the syndromic surveillance program of the
NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
 Methods
 Benchmark Data
A collection of public benchmark data sets for statistical
power comparisons was established to enable evaluation and
comparison of early detection methods as they are developed.
Geographic coordinates (representing the approximate center
of each zip code) and population numbers for 176 NYC zip
codes were used for these data sets.
A total of 134,977 benchmark data sets with a random num-
ber of cases of a hypothetical disease or syndrome were gener-
ated under either the null model or one of 35 alternative
models, including a citywide outbreak with a relative risk of
1.5 and 34 geographically localized outbreaks in one of 17
different locations with either a high or modest excess risk.
Three different sets of data sets were then generated under the
null model and under each of the 35 alternative models, each
with 31, 32, and 33 days, respectively. For each of the three
null-model scenarios, with 31, 32, and 33 days, respectively,
9,999 random data sets were generated.
For each of the 3 sets of 35 alternative
models, defined by the number of days in
the data and the location and relative risk
of the outbreak, 1,000 random data sets
were generated.
For each data set, the total number of
randomly allocated cases was 100 times the
number of days (i.e., 3,100 cases in the
data sets containing 31 days, 3,200 cases
in the data sets with 32 days, and 3,300
cases in the data sets with 33 days). The
number 100 was chosen to reflect the
occurrence rate of certain syndromes com-
mon to the NYC ED-based syndromic
surveillance system.
Under the null model, each person liv-
ing in NYC is equally likely to contract
the disease, and the time of each case is
assigned with equal probability to any
given day. Thus, each case was randomly
assigned to zip code z and day d with
probability proportional to rzd = popz, where popz is the popu-
lation of zip code z.
For the alternative models, one or more zip codes were
assigned an increased risk on day 31 and, when applicable, on
days 32 and 33 as well. For these zip code and day combina-
tions, rzd was multiplied by an assigned relative risk. For all
other zip code and day combinations, rzd did not change. Each
case was then randomly assigned with probabilities propor-
tional to the new set of rzd to generate data under the alterna-
tive models.
Six alternative models in which the outbreak affected only
one zip code were evaluated. The six zip codes varied in size
and location. Next, six additional alternative models were con-
sidered, with the outbreak centered at the same six zip codes
but also including four to nine neighboring areas. Seven addi-
tional alternative models, with outbreaks in the Rockaways
region, along the Hudson River, and throughout each of the
five NYC boroughs were also examined (Figure 1).
For each of the alternative models, the relative risk of the
outbreak was assigned on the basis of the outbreak area’s total
population, with more populous areas assigned a lower rela-
tive risk. This was done so that the power was 99% to detect
a signal at the α = 0.05 level when a Poisson distribution was
used to compare the observed relative risk within the out-
break area with the remaining zip codes by using only 1 day
of data with a total of 100 cases. This approach permits evalu-
ation of the relative strength of methods for detecting differ-
FIGURE 1. Location and size of simulated disease outbreaks — New York City
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ent cluster types to be evaluated. For example, if a method has
85% power to detect an outbreak in one zip code and 80%
power to detect a borough outbreak, the method is relatively
more efficient at detecting smaller outbreaks. In addition to
the relative risks created by using the 99% rule, a second group
of data sets was created and evaluated by using the same rule
but with 90% power. An alternative model with a citywide
outbreak was also considered, with a relative risk of 1.5 in all
zip codes during days 31, 32, and 33.
By using the same simulated data when comparing methods,
the variance of the power-estimate differences is kept to a mini-
mum (18). Availability of the simulated data sets (http://
www.satscan.org/datasets) will enable new methods to be thor-
oughly evaluated and compared with minimal effort.
For statistical reasons, completely separate data sets with
31, 32, and 33 days, respectively (rather than one data set
from which one could then use the desired number of days)
were created to obtain proper power estimates. The majority
of methods for conducting statistical evaluation of geographic
clusters are based on Monte Carlo hypothesis testing (19),
whereby the test statistic for the real data set is compared with
the value of the test statistic for simulated data sets generated
under the null hypothesis, after conditioning on the total num-
ber of cases observed. That is, the critical values for the likeli-
hood ratio or any other type of test statistic are calculated
conditioned on the total number of cases in the data set, so
that only their geographic and temporal distribution are evalu-
ated but not the total count observed. If only one data set was
used for all three periods, the total number of cases during the
first 31 days must be fixed to condition on the total number
of cases in the 31-day analysis, but the total number of cases
during the first 32 days must also be fixed to condition on the
total number of cases in the 32-day analysis. However, if both
of those are fixed, then the number of cases during day 32 is
also fixed, which cannot be done because one should condi-
tion only on the total number of cases during the whole study
period but not on individual days within that period.
Prospective Space-Time Scan Statistic
The benchmark data sets were used to estimate the power
of the prospective space-time scan statistic (14). In brief, the
prospective space-time scan statistic imposes a cylindrical win-
dow on the map and lets the center of the circular base move
over the region, so that, at different positions, the window
includes different sets of neighboring zip codes. For each circle
center, the circle’s radius is varied continuously from zero up
to a maximum radius so that the window never includes, for
example, >50% of the total population at risk. Thus, the win-
dow remains flexible, both in location and size. In addition,
the height of the cylinder, representing time, is flexible such
that the window might contain one or more days up to an
upper limit. Hence, the window could cover a geographically
small outbreak in a single zip code having lasted multiple days
(a long and narrow cylinder), a geographically large outbreak
affecting the entire city but present only during the last day (a
short and fat cylinder), or any other combination of geographic
size and temporal length. In total, the method creates thou-
sands of distinct windows, each with a different set of neigh-
boring zip codes and days within it, and each a possible
candidate for containing a disease outbreak.
Only those cylinders that reach all the way to the end of the
study period are considered. In mathematical notation, let
[B,E] represent the time interval for which data exist, and let
s and t represent the start and end dates of the cylinder,
respectively. All cylinders for which
B < s < t = E
are then considered. Different parameter options can be cho-
sen in terms of the maximum geographic and temporal cluster
size being considered; this study evaluated five different combi-
nations.
Conditioning on the observed total number of cases, N, the
definition of the space-time scan statistic S is the maximum
likelihood ratio over all possible cylinders Z,
where L(Z) is the maximum likelihood for cylinder Z,
expressing how likely the observed data are when allowing for
different risk inside and outside the cylinder, and where L0 is
the likelihood function under the null model.
Let nZ represent the number of cases in cylinder Z. Using a
Poisson model for the observed number of counts, let µ(Z) be
the expected number under the null model, so that µ(A) = N
for A, the total region under study. Then,
if nz > µ(Z) and L(Z)/L0 = 1. Details about the mathematical
formulas, including derivations as likelihood ratio tests, have
been published elsewhere (20). The cylinder for which this
likelihood ratio is maximized identifies the most likely clus-
ter. Its p-value is obtained through Monte Carlo hypothesis
testing (19).
The prospective space-time scan statistic can be implemented
by using different parameter options. As the standard analytic
option, 50% of the population was used as the upper limit on
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the geographic cluster size, and a period of 3 days was used as
the upper limit on the temporal cluster size. The possibility of
citywide outbreaks was also considered by including purely
temporal clusters containing 100% of the population in ad-
dition to the 50% maximum size. No adjustment was made
for the time-repeated analyses conducted daily. For selected
alternative outbreak models, the power of the prospective
space-time scan statistic was evaluated for the following
changes in parameter options: 1) not including purely tem-
poral clusters; 2) setting the maximum geographic cluster size
at 5% of the population rather than 50%; 3) setting the maxi-
mum temporal cluster size at 1 and 7 days, respectively, rather
than 3 days; and 4) adjusting for the multiple testing stem-
ming from the repeated daily analyses such that only one false
alert would be expected per year (14).
 Purely Temporal Scan Statistic
The purely temporal scan statistic is mathematically a special
case of the space-time scan statistic, in which counts from the
entire surveillance area are aggregated so that no spatial infor-
mation remains. Hence, the window is defined only by its tem-
poral length, which could be one or more days. As with the
prospective space-time scan statistic described previously, only
those windows for which B < s < t = E were considered. A
period of 3 days was used as the maximum temporal length.
 Power Estimations
The power estimations were conducted as follows. First, for
the random data sets generated under the null model, the log
likelihood ratio (LLR) was obtained for all cylindrical win-
dow locations and sizes, and its maximum noted, to obtain
the maximum LLR for each simulated data set. A critical value
corresponding to a 0.05 significance level was computed by
identifying the 500th highest maximum LLR from among the
9,999 random data sets generated under the null model. Then,
the estimated power for a particular alternative model was
calculated as the percentage of the 1,000 random data sets for
which the maximum LLR exceeds the critical value.
Separate critical values were obtained for each number of
days considered (31, 32, and 33) and for each of the different
analytic options used. However, as long as the number of days
and the analytic options are the same, the same critical value
can be used for different alternative outbreak models. All cal-
culations were performed by writing additional routines for
the SaTScan™ software (21).
Results
For the standard parameter options, the estimated powers
for the different alternative models and different relative risks
are provided (Tables 1 and 2). The power was good for both
small and large outbreak areas. As expected, the power was
higher when more days had elapsed since the start of the out-
break. The increase in power was rapid. The power was
approximately the same for outbreaks of different sizes. The
major exception was the Hudson River outbreak, for which
the lower power was caused by using a circular geographic
window to capture a long and narrow outbreak. The same
loss of power was not seen in the similarly shaped Rockaways
region, possibly because that region has fewer zip codes than
the Hudson River outbreak region.
For selected alternative outbreak models, the estimated pow-
ers for each parameter option are provided, as well as for the
purely temporal scan statistic (Table 3). Setting the maximum
temporal cluster size to 1 day increased the power to detect
the outbreak during the first day, at the expense of decreased
power during subsequent days.
Adjusting for previous analyses reduces the power, a conse-
quence of the unavoidable trade-off between power and the
number of false positives. Hence, the choice of whether to
adjust for previous analyses is similar to a choice of whether
to use 0.01 instead of 0.05 as the α level. Both approaches
will reduce the number of false alerts but also reduce the power
to detect true outbreaks. The purely temporal scan statistic
has considerably higher power for citywide outbreaks but does
not perform well for localized outbreaks.
Certain power estimates were unexpected. For example, for
an outbreak in a single zip code, the power would be expected
to be higher with an upper limit of 5% rather than 50% on
the geographic cluster size. However, for outbreak model A,
the power is 0.86 in both cases (Table 3). The power is
depicted as a function of the false-detection rate (α level)
(Figure 2, top). The number of cases in the outbreak is always
an integer, and if the outbreak area is limited, only a limited
number of integer values are possible in the true outbreak
area. Thus, the power function takes discrete jumps at certain
α levels, and the location of the jump varies for different ana-
lytic options. Hence, for certain values of α, one method might
be superior to another even though both methods have
almost the same power at other α levels. The locations of these
jump points are different for different single zip code out-
breaks. As the number of zip codes in an outbreak area
increases, this phenomenon disappears, such that the power
functions are much smoother for model A with four neigh-
bors (Figure 2, middle) and for Manhattan (Figure 2, bottom).
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TABLE 2.  Estimated power of the prospective space-time scan statistic for 19 different outbreak models with medium excess
risk, at different days of the outbreak
No. of Expected/day
§
zip Pop. Null Alternative Power on day
Outbreak area codes %* RR† model model 31 32 33
A. Williamsburg, Brooklyn 1 1.1 5.66 1.1 6.2 0.35 0.74 0.92
B. Roosevelt Island, Manhattan 1 0.1 24.19 0.1 2.4 0.37 0.73 0.93
C. Bulls Head, Staten Island 1 1.1 5.65 1.1 6.2 0.34 0.74 0.93
D. LaGuardia, Queens 1 0.5 9.42 0.5 4.7 0.32 0.67 0.91
E. West Farms, Bronx 1 0.7 7.36 0.7 5.1 0.29 0.72 0.90
A with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 4.0 3.06 4.0 12.2 0.42 0.79 0.94
B with 5 neighboring zip codes 6 3.2 3.33 3.2 10.6 0.40 0.77 0.95
C with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 3.3 3.29 3.3 10.8 0.33 0.77 0.94
D with 9 neighboring zip codes 10 8.2 2.39 8.2 19.5 0.42 0.85 0.97
E with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 3.7 3.13 3.7 11.6 0.43 0.79 0.96
Rockaways 5 1.3 5.01 1.3 6.5 0.34 0.76 0.91
Hudson River 20 10.3 2.24 10.3 23.0 0.33 0.65 0.82
Bronx 25 16.6 2.00 16.6 33.0 0.62 0.94 0.99
Brooklyn 37 30.8 1.82 30.8 55.6 0.79 0.98 0.999
Manhattan 40 19.0 1.95 19.0 36.8 0.57 0.90 0.99
Queens 62 28.0 1.84 28.0 51.1 0.73 0.97 0.998
Staten Island 12 5.5 2.71 5.5 14.9 0.43 0.81 0.97
* Pop. % = percentage of the city population represented by the outbreak area.
†
RR = relative risk.
§
Expected/day = expected number of patients/day in the outbreak area under the null and alternative models, respectively.
TABLE 1. Estimated power of the prospective space-time scan statistic for 17 different outbreak models with high excess risk, at
different days of the outbreak
No. of Expected/day
§
zip Pop. Null Alternative Power on day
Outbreak area codes %* RR† model model 31 32 33
A. Williamsburg, Brooklyn 1 1.1 9.91 1.1 10.9 0.86 0.996 0.999
B. Roosevelt Island, Manhattan 1 0.1 57.08 0.1 5.7 0.92 0.996 1.000
C. Bulls Head, Staten Island 1 1.1 9.89 1.1 10.8 0.83 0.99 1.000
D. LaGuardia, Queens 1 0.5 18.63 0.5 9.3 0.85 0.998 1.000
E. West Farms, Bronx 1 0.7 13.76 0.7 9.6 0.83 0.997 1.000
A with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 4.0 4.47 4.0 17.8 0.85 0.996 1.000
B with 5 neighboring zip codes 6 3.2 5.02 3.2 16.0 0.82 0.996 1.000
C with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 3.3 4.93 3.3 16.2 0.83 0.99 1.000
D with 9 neighboring zip codes 10 8.2 3.24 8.2 26.4 0.88 0.996 1.000
E with 4 neighboring zip codes 5 3.7 4.62 3.7 17.0 0.86 0.99 1.000
Rockaways 5 1.3 8.48 1.3 11.0 0.84 0.997 1.000
Hudson River 20 10.3 2.97 10.3 30.4 0.66 0.96 0.996
Bronx 25 16.6 2.56 16.6 42.1 0.94 1.000 1.000
Brooklyn 37 30.8 2.25 30.8 68.4 0.98 1.000 1.000
Manhattan 40 19.0 2.47 19.0 46.5 0.92 1.000 1.000
Queens 62 28.0 2.28 28.0 63.1 0.98 1.000 1.000
Staten Island 12 5.5 3.82 5.5 20.9 0.87 1.000 1.000
* Pop. % = percentage of the city population represented by the outbreak area.
†
RR = relative risk.
§
Expected/day = expected number of patients/day in the outbreak area under the null and alternative models, respectively.
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Discussion
One goal of developing the benchmark data sets was to
enable quick and simple comparison of new early detection
methods with methods proposed previously. Inventors of new
methods will hopefully make use of this opportunity. Pend-
ing evaluation of emerging methods, different parameter
options of the prospective space-time scan statistic have been
evaluated.
An important consideration when using the prospective
space-time scan statistic is whether to include purely tempo-
ral cluster windows for detection of citywide outbreaks.
Including this option increases the power for a citywide out-
break only marginally while minimally
decreasing the power for the localized
outbreak models (Table 1). In the
majority of situations, purely temporal
clusters should be included as an analy-
sis option. For the same reason, using
50% as the upper limit in cluster size
minimizes assumptions about the geo-
graphic cluster size.
The choice of maximum temporal-
window size is less clear. Making the
temporal window too small can sub-
stantially reduce the power to detect
slowly emerging disease outbreaks. At
the same time, these methods are meant
for the rapid detection of disease out-
breaks, and, depending on the disease,
late detection of an outbreak might not
provide any public health benefit. Com-
promise is needed and should be deter-
mined by the nature of the surveillance
setting.
For the majority of these power evalu-
ations, no adjustment was made for
repeated analyzes performed daily. If
such an adjustment were made, instead
of keeping the false-alert rate at 5% for
any given day (one false alert every 20
days), it could be set so that under the
null model only one false alert/year (or
per any other period) would be
expected. As a result, the power would
automatically decrease (Table 3). This
decrease in power is attributable not to
the method’s strengths or weaknesses
but to the ever-present trade-off
between power and the number of false
alerts. All power comparisons must use identical false-
detection rates to be valid.
This study is subject to at least three limitations. First, the
alternative outbreak models used for the benchmark data sets
represent only a subset of the potential geographic and tem-
poral features of actual disease outbreaks. As such, this study
is a first step in creating different outbreak models for evalu-
ating and comparing the statistical power of different
outbreak-detection methods. For example, rather than a sud-
den increase in relative risk followed by a constant excess risk
level in the outbreak area, one could construct outbreak mod-
els in which the relative risk increased gradually. Moreover,
rather than simulating outbreaks that are geographically static
TABLE 3. Powers of different analytic options for the prospective space-time scan
statistic for selected outbreak models and at different days of the outbreak
Analysis options
Maximum Maximum Include Adjustment
temporal geographic purely for repeated Power on day
Outbreak area size (days) size (days) temporal analyses 31 32 33
A: Williamsburg, 3 50 Yes No 0.86 0.996 0.999
Brooklyn 3 50 No No 0.86 0.996 0.999
1 zip code 3 5 No No 0.86 0.995 0.999
(RR* = 9.91) 1 50 Yes No 0.92 0.91 0.92
7 50 Yes No 0.86 0.996 0.999
3 50 Yes Yes 0.64 0.98 0.999
3 N/A Yes, only No 0.19 0.30 0.42
A: Williamsburg, 3 50 Yes No 0.85 0.996 1.000
Brooklyn 3 50 No No 0.85 0.996 1.000
5 zip codes 3 5 No No 0.86 0.99 1.000
(RR = 4.47) 1 50 Yes No 0.90 0.91 0.89
7 50 Yes No 0.83 0.995 1.000
3 50 Yes Yes 0.64 0.98 0.999
3 N/A Yes, only No 0.29 0.50 0.63
Manhattan 3 50 Yes No 0.92 1.000 1.000
(RR = 2.47) 3 50 No No 0.92 1.000 1.000
3 5 No No 0.77 0.98 1.000
1 50 Yes No 0.96 0.94 0.94
7 50 Yes No 0.90 0.999 1.000
3 50 Yes Yes 0.71 0.99 1.000
3 N/A Yes, only No 0.75 0.96 0.99
Whole city 3 50 Yes No 0.86 0.99 1.000
(RR = 1.5) 3 50 No No 0.84 0.99 1.000
3 5 No No 0.40 0.69 0.81
1 50 Yes No 0.91 0.88 0.86
7 50 Yes No 0.81 0.99 1.000
3 50 Yes Yes 0.56 0.95 0.998
3 N/A Yes, only No 0.996 1.000 1.000
No outbreak 3 50 Yes No 0.05 0.06 0.05
(RR = 1.0) 3 50 No No 0.05 0.06 0.05
3 5 No No 0.05 0.06 0.06
1 50 Yes No 0.05 0.06 0.05
7 50 Yes No 0.05 0.06 0.05
3 50 Yes Yes 0.002 0.0001 0.004
3 N/A Yes, only No 0.05 0.06 0.04
* RR = relative risk.
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in time, an outbreak might first be spa-
tially limited and then expand to neigh-
boring zip codes, or it might start in
one place and then gradually move to
other areas of the city.
Second, this study examined data only
for New York City. Simulated bench-
mark data sets for methods evaluation
should be based on real geographic ar-
eas with realistic numbers for the
underlying population at risk; NYC was
selected for this study because it is where
the investigators conduct outbreak sur-
veillance. However, effective surveillance
methods should work for different
geographic areas and for different
distributions of the population at risk.
Evaluating outbreak-detection methods
for geographic areas other than NYC
would be valuable.
Finally, although these power estimates
do capture the timeliness of a signal, they
do not reflect its spatial accuracy. Only
rarely will detected and true clusters
coincide 100%, but the overlap might be
better or worse for different methods.
Conclusions
The prospective space-time scan statis-
tic performed well for all alternative mod-
els considered. Power was lowest for the
Hudson River outbreak but remained
surprisingly good considering that a cir-
cular window was used to detect a long
and narrow cluster.
The low power of the purely temporal
method to detect localized outbreaks pro-
vides a strong argument for using space-
time surveillance methods for early
outbreak detection, if the outbreak is
expected to be localized. However, the
purely temporal scan statistic performs
substantially better at detecting a citywide outbreak, even when
compared with a space-time method that includes the purely tem-
poral outbreak as one parameter option. This is because less
multiple testing needs adjustment when the multiple circles used
to define localized outbreaks are not used, and an unavoidable
trade-off exists between maximizing the power to detect local-
ized versus citywide outbreaks.
FIGURE 2. Power as a function of the false-detection rate (alpha), at day 31, for
three different disease-outbreak models (A [top], A plus 4 neighbors [middle], and
Manhattan [bottom])
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FIGURE 2. (Continued) Power as a function of the false-detection rate (alpha), at
day 31, for three different disease-outbreak models (A [top], A plus 4 neighbors
[middle], and Manhattan [bottom])
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Abstract
Introduction: Early detection of disease outbreaks by a medical biosurveillance system relies on two major components: 1) the
contribution of early and reliable data sources and 2) the sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness of biosurveillance detection
algorithms. This paper describes an effort to assess leading detection algorithms by arranging a common challenge problem and
providing a common data set.
Objectives: The objectives of this study were to determine whether automated detection algorithms can reliably and quickly
identify the onset of natural disease outbreaks that are surrogates for possible terrorist pathogen releases, and do so at acceptable
false-alert rates (e.g., once every 2–6 weeks).
Methods: Historic de-identified data were obtained from five metropolitan areas over 23 months; these data included Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes related to respiratory and gastrointestinal illness syndromes. An
outbreak detection group identified and labeled two natural disease outbreaks in these data and provided them to analysts for
training of detection algorithms. All outbreaks in the remaining test data were identified but not revealed to the detection groups
until after their analyses. The algorithms established a probability of outbreak for each day’s counts. The probability of outbreak
was assessed as an “actual” alert for different false-alert rates.
Results: The best algorithms were able to detect all of the outbreaks at false-alert rates of one every 2–6 weeks. They were often
able to detect for the same day human investigators had identified as the true start of the outbreak.
Conclusions: Because minimal data exists for an actual biologic attack, determining how quickly an algorithm might detect such
an attack is difficult. However, application of these algorithms in combination with other data-analysis methods to historic
outbreak data indicates that biosurveillance techniques for analyzing syndrome counts can rapidly detect seasonal respiratory and
gastrointestinal illness outbreaks. Further research is needed to assess the value of electronic data sources for predictive detection. In
addition, simulations need to be developed and implemented to better characterize the size and type of biologic attack that can be
detected by current methods by challenging them under different projected operational conditions.
Introduction
The Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition
Technology (Bio-ALIRT) biosurveillance program was imple-
mented during 2001–2004. The program’s objective was to
develop data sources, technologies, and prototypes for moni-
toring nontraditional data sources (e.g., animal sentinels,
human behavioral indicators, and nondiagnostic medical data)
that might enable public health authorities to detect terrorist
release of a pathogen or toxin at the earliest possible moment.
Technical challenges to the development of Bio-ALIRT have
included 1) determining the value of each data source, alone
and in combination with others, for earlier outbreak detec-
tion; 2) correlating and integrating information derived from
heterogeneous data sources; 3) developing autonomous signal-
detection algorithms with high sensitivity and low false alerts;
and 4) maintaining privacy protection while correlating
de-identified data sources.
Early detection of disease can be divided into two compo-
nents: contributions made by the data, and contributions made
by anomaly-detection algorithms. Bio-ALIRT investigators
evaluated multiple data sources in comparison with standard
data that indicated when an outbreak of influenza-like illness
(ILI) or gastrointestinal illness (GI) actually occurred (as docu-
mented by de-identified insurance claims). The lead-time over
those reference data and the confidence interval can then be
calculated. (Additional information about the Bio-ALIRT data
research is available from the corresponding author.)
This paper focuses on the evaluation of the detection algo-
rithms as a component of a biosurveillance system. A com-
mon challenge problem and common data set are required to
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† Approximately 250 International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9) codes are closely associated with ILI and GI illness.
evaluate detection algorithms; for the first Bio-ALIRT algo-
rithm evaluation in August–September 2002, this was accom-
plished by using the BioWar simulation, which uses a software
agent-based approach to simulate both a normal background
and an outbreak signal (1). In 2003, to determine whether
the algorithms could detect real disease outbreaks, the investi-
gators used wholly authentic, de-identified, historic military
and civilian data from five cities. An advantage of the evalua-
tion approach used in 2003 is that it relied exclusively on real
data and not on simulation, which might inadvertently intro-
duce bias into the assessment. Also, by working with real data
from cities of interest, the evaluators were able to hone their
skills in a realistic environment that might also produce
insights to further program goals. Limitations of the historic
outbreak evaluation approach include uncertainty about the
exact start dates and sizes of outbreaks and the inability to
examine algorithm outbreak-detection capabilities under a
substantial number and variety of conditions. Furthermore,
pathogens likely to be used in a terrorist attack are presumed
to have a different epidemiologic curve than an ILI outbreak.
However, detecting slowly increasing seasonal respiratory out-
breaks and more rapidly rising GI outbreaks across a metro-
politan region were considered to be reasonable surrogates
for detecting deliberate pathogen releases.
Bio-ALIRT was sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a central U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) research and development agency,
primarily to protect troops from biologic agents. Contract
investigators included the Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory in cooperation with the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research; the University of Pittsburgh/Carnegie
Mellon University team; the General Dynamics Advanced
Information Systems (formerly Veridian) team with the
Stanford University Medical Informatics group; and IBM Cor-
poration. The Potomac Institute performed an independent
evaluation function. Both CDC and a municipal department
of health also participated in the detection evaluation.
Methods
Data Sources
Authentic military and civilian data from five cities were
analyzed. ILI and GI were used as surrogates for a biologic
attack because these syndromes might mimic early symptoms
of certain Class A pathogens on CDC’s biologic terrorism
threat list.† Naturally occurring historic outbreaks of ILI and
GI were identified by using measurable phenomena (e.g., vis-
its for symptomatic care to a health-care provider) that gener-
ated records (e.g., insurance claims from physicians’ offices or
hospital outpatient care) from which identifying information
was removed.
Three data sources were obtained for the evaluation:
military outpatient-visit records with International
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes, civil-
ian ICD-9-coded outpatient visit records, and military out-
patient prescription records. All data were stripped of
identifying information to protect patient privacy. After geo-
graphic regions with overlap between available military and
civilian populations were determined, five areas were selected
for investigation: Norfolk, Virginia; Pensacola, Florida;
Charleston, South Carolina; Seattle, Washington; and Louis-
ville, Kentucky. DoD military treatment facility (MTF) cov-
erage was approximately 100% for those five areas, whereas
civilian coverage for the regions ranged from 15.9% to 32.7%,
with a mean of 25.1%. All three data streams generated sig-
nals for the same disease outbreaks for approximately the same
dates (Table 1), which increased the investigators’ confidence
in the overall quality of the data set.
The military data included ICD-9 codes from all MTF out-
patient visits by active duty personnel, retirees, and dependent
family members. These data included date of visit, <4 ICD-9
codes per visit, age, residential zip code, and MTF designator.
Military pharmacy data captured all prescriptions paid for by
the military health-care system and filled at either MTFs or
civilian pharmacies. The evaluation data set included the phar-
macy identification (ID) number; the date the prescription was
written and filled; the drug name, generic drug classification,
and therapeutic class identifier; whether the prescription was
new or a refill; the number of refills; and the patient’s age. Sur-
veillance Data, Inc. (SDI) provided de-identified ICD-9 out-
patient data from similar geographic regions, including the date
of visit, <5 of the selected ICD-9 codes, and the patient’s age
and residential zip code.
Military outpatient ICD-9 information was captured elec-
tronically shortly after the outpatient visit. ICD-9 codes are
added to the electronic record either by the provider or by a
professional coder and sent with demographic and clinic
information to a central repository. Pharmacy data were col-
lected electronically at the time the prescription was filled.
Over-the-counter drug prescriptions (e.g., decongestants and
antidiarrheals) at MTFs were also included in the data.
All identifying information was removed from military out-
patient and pharmacy data before their provision to the Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the teams.
SDI data were generated from electronically transmitted
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TABLE 1. Start date, date of estimated public health recognition, peak date, and end date of respiratory and gastrointestinal
illness outbreaks in one metropolitan area, by data provider — Bio-ALIRT Biosurveillance Detection Algorithm Evaluation, 2003
Date of estimated Peak End
Start date public health date of date of
Data provider of outbreak recognition outbreak outbreak
Respiratory illness, February 10, 2003–April 29, 2003
Ambulatory Data System (ADS) Feb. 10 Feb. 24 Mar. 10 Apr. 21
Pharmacy Transaction Data Service (PDTS) Feb. 10 Feb. 24 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
Surveillance Data, Inc. (SDI) Feb. 10 Feb. 24 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
Final Feb. 10 Feb. 24 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
Respiratory illness, September 16, 2002–April 28, 2003
ADS Sept. 16 Sept. 23 Mar. 10 Apr. 21
PDTS Sept. 16 Sept. 18 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
SDI Sept. 23 Sept. 30 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
Final Sept. 16 Sept. 23 Mar. 10 Apr. 28
Gastrointestinal illness, October 21, 2002–February 10, 2003
ADS Oct. 21 Nov. 18 Jan. 6 Jan. 29
PDTS Oct. 22 Nov. 25 Jan. 6 Jan. 29
SDI Nov. 12 Dec. 10 Jan. 29 Feb. 10
Final Oct. 21 Nov. 25 Jan. 29 Feb. 10
Gastrointestinal illness, February 24, 2002–March 13, 2003
ADS Feb. 25 Mar. 10 Mar. 10 Mar. 13
PDTS Feb. 24 Mar. 3 Mar. 3 Mar. 12
SDI N/A N/A N/A N/A
Final Feb. 24 Mar. 10 Mar. 10 Mar. 13
insurance claims for physician office services from a substan-
tial sample of physicians across the United States. As claims
were sent from the physicians to the insurers, identifying
information was removed pursuant to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and data
were transmitted to SDI and loaded into a data warehouse.
WRAIR uses military outpatient ICD-9 codes for an active
disease surveillance system known as the Electronic Surveil-
lance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based
Epidemics (ESSENCE). On the basis of previous experience
and in conjunction with CDC, groups of ICD-9 codes and
medications that best reflect respiratory and gastrointestinal
illness were used for the evaluation. (A list of these ICD-9
codes is available from the corresponding author.) Only these
drug categories and ICD-9 codes were provided to partici-
pants. However, participants were allowed to manipulate the
syndrome categories and to delete or subgroup codes to
improve their analysis. Data for July 2001–August 2002 were
provided for training of the algorithms. The test data stream
ran during September 2002–May 2003.
Outbreak Determination
An outbreak detection group (ODG) was formed to deter-
mine when natural outbreaks of gastrointestinal and respira-
tory illness took place in the selected areas and times. This
group included medical specialists and epidemiologists from
throughout the program; after joining the group, they were
sequestered from participating in the detection portion of the
evaluation. Using visual and statistical techniques, ODG found
evidence of disease outbreaks in the data and also determined
that the three data streams correlated effectively (Table 1).
For convenience, a simple anomaly-detector algorithm was
run over the data to assist in identification of outbreaks. Four
dates were then determined for each of the agreed outbreaks:
1) start date, 2) date ODG expected that public health offi-
cials would declare prospectively that an outbreak was occur-
ring, 3) peak date, and 4) end of outbreak (Figure). ODG
included both broad, seasonal outbreaks and more concise
disease-count elevations that occurred both inside and out-
side of seasonal fluctuations. Because the data were retrospec-
tive, outbreaks could not be confirmed in the majority of cases.
However, because the algorithms being evaluated are intended
to alert public health authorities to the likelihood of an out-
break, the presumptive standard was considered reasonable
for the evaluation of the detection algorithms.
The data were divided into 14 months of training data and
9 months of test data. Two outbreaks were identified in the
training data, and the dates of these outbreaks were provided
to the teams. The dates of all outbreaks identified in the test
data were withheld from the teams until after they submitted
their detection results.
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TABLE 2.  Start date, date of estimated public health recognition, peak date, and end date
of respiratory and gastrointestinal illness (GI) outbreaks in five metropolitan areas —
Bio-ALIRT Biosurveillance Detection Algorithm Evaluation, 2003
Date of estimated Detection
Start date public health Peak date End date difference
Outbreak type of outbreak recognition of outbreak of outbreak (days)
Metropolitan area A
Respiratory Feb. 10, 2003 Feb. 24, 2003 Mar. 10, 2003 Apr. 28, 2003 14
Respiratory Sept. 16, 2002 Sept. 23, 2002 Mar. 10, 2003 Apr. 28, 2003 7
GI Oct. 21, 2002 Nov. 25, 2002 Jan. 29, 2003 Feb. 10, 2003 35
GI Feb. 24, 2003 Mar. 10, 2003 Mar. 10, 2003 Mar. 13, 2003 14
Metropolitan area B
Respiratory Jan. 22, 2003 Feb. 18, 2003 Mar. 4, 2003 Mar. 31, 2003 27
GI Feb. 16, 2003 Feb. 16, 2003 Feb. 17, 2003 Feb. 18, 2003 0
Metropolitan area C
Respiratory Jan. 27, 2003 Feb. 3, 2003 Feb. 10, 2003 Mar. 19, 2003 7
Respiratory Oct. 17, 2002 Nov. 12, 2002 Dec. 9, 2002 Dec. 20, 2002 26
GI Dec. 6, 2002 Dec. 18, 2002 Dec. 17, 2002 Jan. 28, 2003 12
Metropolitan area D
Respiratory Nov. 4, 2002 Dec. 10, 2002 Feb. 3, 2003 Apr. 14, 2003 37
Metropolitan area E
Respiratory Oct. 28, 2002 Nov. 18, 2002 Dec. 9, 2002 Feb. 3, 2003 21
Respiratory Feb. 3, 2003 Feb. 18, 2003 Feb. 24, 2003 Apr. 15, 2003 15
GI Nov. 14, 2002 Dec. 9, 2002 Jan. 29, 2003 Feb. 11, 2003 26
GI Nov. 11, 2002 Dec. 9, 2002 Feb. 24, 2003 Apr. 16, 2003 29
GI Feb. 22, 2003 Feb. 24, 2003 Feb. 24, 2003 Mar. 11, 2003 2
FIGURE. Detection of outbreaks on the epicurve
1. Start of outbreak
2. Public health
recognition
Should have detected by now




A   Optimal time for detection — optimally, closer to the start
B   Not a false alert if detection occurs at point B
C   False alert — outbreak is still occurring, but counts are decreasing
Assessing Algorithm
Performance
The sensitivity and timeliness of each outbreak-detection
algorithm were assessed at false-positive rates of practical rel-
evance for public health surveillance. Teams submitted detec-
tion results for <3 algorithms. The detection results for each
algorithm consisted of two files,
one for respiratory outbreaks and
one for GI outbreaks. Each row
in a file contained a date followed
by five numbers, one for each city.
The numbers were the algorithm
output indicating the likelihood
of an outbreak in a given city on
a given day. For the majority of
algorithms, the numbers were
p-values, but the assessment
method did not require this.
The three false-positive rates
selected were one per 2 weeks, one
per 4 weeks, and one per 6 weeks.
Sensitivity and timeliness for res-
piratory and GI outbreak detec-
tion were calculated separately at
each false-positive rate. This
resulted in six estimates of sensi-
tivity and timeliness for each
algorithm. A false-positive rate for
an algorithm corresponds to a
threshold applied to the algorithm’s numerical output. This
threshold was determined separately for each type of outbreak
(i.e., respiratory and GI) and for each city by examining the
number of false alerts during nonoutbreak periods at each
threshold. The numerator for sensitivity was defined as the
number of outbreaks with >1 algorithm output over the thresh-
old between the start date of the outbreak and the date public
health authorities were expected to recognize the outbreak;
the denominator for sensitivity was the number of outbreaks.
The dates for respiratory and GI outbreaks in the five metro-
politan areas are presented (Table 2).
Timeliness of outbreak detection was measured by using a
variation of the activity monitor operating characteristic
(AMOC) method (2). In practice, this entailed calculating
the median time to outbreak detection for an algorithm at
each false-positive rate. Median time to detection was used
because mean time is problematic; outbreaks have different
lengths, and no obvious way exists to penalize evaluation par-
ticipants for an undetected outbreak. For example, if missed
outbreaks are ignored, then a method that alerts late can have
a larger mean than a method that does not alert at all. For a
single outbreak, time to detection was defined as the number
of days between the outbreak start date and the date the algo-
rithm output first crossed the threshold. If the algorithm did
not identify the outbreak before the date public health
authorities were expected to recognize the outbreak, then an
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infinite time to detection for that outbreak was assigned to
the algorithm. Assignment of an infinite time for a single out-
break does not unduly influence the calculation of the
median the way it would influence calculation of the mean.
Charts for sensitivity and timeliness were calculated for each
algorithm and used to compare performance of the various
alerting algorithms on the 15 outbreaks identified by the
ODG. The limited number of outbreaks precluded testing
for statistically important differences in detection performance
between algorithms.
Conducting the Test
Evaluation data were collected and distributed by WRAIR.
Approximately 14 months of training data with two labeled
outbreaks were released to the teams, including DoD ambu-
latory ICD-9 codes, DoD pharmacy data, and civilian medi-
cal-claims data for five cities. Unlabeled test data were released
6 weeks later. The teams were on the honor code to analyze
the data prospectively (e.g., daily) as they were presented rather
than identify peaks and then trace them back to their origins
to determine the start of the outbreak. The processes used by
the teams were asserted to be repeatable and thus verifiable.
Two weeks after distribution of the test data, the algorithm-
detection output was collected from participating teams, and
software to score detection results was distributed to them.
The software automatically computed sensitivity and timeli-
ness. Desirable characteristics for the evaluation were high
values for sensitivity (i.e., detecting that an outbreak occurred)
and low values for timeliness (i.e., a slight delay in detecting
the outbreak at the different false-alert rates).
Results
The best algorithms were able to detect all of the out-
breaks, often for the same day the ODG had determined ret-
rospectively that the outbreaks had begun, at a false-alert rate
of one every 2 weeks (Tables 3 and 4). This study measured
the number of days after the initial outbreak that the algo-
rithms would detect the outbreak; therefore, detecting on day
1 is optimal. Compared with the human investigators, the
algorithms detected the outbreaks “virtually prospectively.”
That is, the algorithms determined a probability of outbreak
for a particular day as the date they were encountered, instead
of when human investigators were projected to have detected
the outbreak, leading to an average detection advantage of
>18 days (Table 2). The detection advantage was more marked
for seasonal respiratory outbreaks; the GI outbreaks peaked
more rapidly and decisively. The leading detection algorithms
included statistical process control methods applied to regres-
sion residuals, Bayesian change-point techniques, and wave-
let methods. One of the analytic teams, instead of measuring
raw syndrome counts, instead obtained good results by de-
tecting variation in the total number of medical providers re-
porting and measuring the regression by using Hotelling’s T2
(3). A fuller description of the evaluation results and tech-
niques will be forthcoming.
Conclusion
This paper has described a methodology and results for quan-
titatively evaluating the performance of outbreak detection
algorithms used in biosurveillance. This methodology permits
assessment of the performance of algorithms implemented by
different research teams in detecting real outbreaks identified
by expert opinion. Both timeliness and sensitivity were
assessed at false-positive rates of practical relevance for public-
health surveillance.
An advantage of the approach used is that it relied solely on
actual data; no simulation was conducted that might inad-
vertently introduce bias into the assessment. Using real data
from cities of interest enabled teams to hone their skills in a
realistic environment that might also produce important
insights that would further program goals. However, this
approach has certain limitations, including uncertainty about
the exact start date and size of outbreaks and inability to
examine algorithm outbreak-detection capabilities under a sub-
stantial number of diverse conditions. In addition, the num-
bers of real outbreaks in the data set used in this evaluation
were not sufficient to support statistical significance testing,
which limited the precision of the results. Further, pathogens
that would be used in a terrorist attack are presumed to have
a somewhat different epidemiologic curve than a natural ILI
outbreak, for instance. However, detecting slowly rising sea-
sonal respiratory outbreaks, as well as more rapidly rising GI
outbreaks, over a metropolitan region were considered to be
reasonable surrogates for detecting deliberate pathogen releases.
The results of this analysis indicate that authentic historic
data with real outbreaks can support evaluation across research
teams by providing a common challenge problem and com-
mon data set. ODG members agreed on the number and dates
of the outbreaks in all three parallel data streams for each of
the five cities. The reliability of this agreement was not as-
sessed quantitatively, but the general agreement indicates that
the data were adequate to support the comparison. Epide-
miologic investigators determined the dates of outbreaks on
the basis of professional judgment. However, no further
investigation was conducted to determine whether local pub-
lic health authorities in these five metropolitan areas believed
Vol. 53 / Supplement MMWR 157
TABLE 4. Performance of outbreak detection algorithms at detecting gastrointestinal illness
— Bio-ALIRT Biosurveillance Detection Algorithm Evaluation, 2003
Sensitivity
Median No. of
timeliness outbreaks Total no. of
Team False-alert rate Best algorithm (day) detected outbreaks
RODS* 1 per 2 weeks wav8ssm_max† 1 7 7
1 per 4 weeks BCD§ 1 6 7
1 per 6 weeks BCD 1 6 7
ESSENCE¶ 1 per 2 weeks provReg/Hotel** 1 6 7
1 per 4 weeks EWMA†† C2 1 6 7
1 per 6 weeks EWMA C2 1 6 7
CDC 1 per 2 weeks Wavelet transform 1 6 7
1 per 4 weeks moving average 4 5 7
1 per 6 weeks 9 5 7
General Dynamics 1 per 2 weeks B, C 3 6 7
1 per 4 weeks B, C 3 6 7
1 per 6 weeks C 26 5 7
IBM 1 per 2 weeks A 2 6 7
1 per 4 weeks A 3 6 7
1 per 6 weeks A 5 6 7
* Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveillance.
† Wavelet algorithm to 8th level (2^8 days = 256 days); ssm refers to days of week modeled as their own time
series (Saturday, Sunday, Monday); and max refers to reporting out the maximum standard deviation among
the three individual data streams processed.
§ Biosurveillance using change-point detection.
¶ Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics.
** Provider count regression residuals, which are inputs to a multivariate Hotelling’s T2 algorithm.
†† Exponentially weighted moving average.
TABLE 3. Performance of outbreak-detection algorithms at detecting respiratory illness
— Bio-ALIRT Biosurveillance Detection Algorithm Evaluation, 2003
Sensitivity
Median No. of
timeliness outbreaks Total no. of
Team False-alert rate Best algorithm (day) detected outbreaks
RODS* 1 per 2 weeks wav8ssmtwrf_sum† 1 8 8
1 per 4 weeks wav8ssmtwrf_sum 1 8 8
1 per 6 weeks wav8ssm_max§ 1 7 8
ESSENCE¶ 1 per 2 weeks provReg/Hotel** 1 8 8
1 per 4 weeks EWMA†† C2 1 8 8
1 per 6 weeks EWMA C2 1 8 8
CDC 1 per 2 weeks EARS§§ C3 3 7 8
1 per 4 weeks 5.5 6 8
1 per 6 weeks 18.5 5 8
General Dynamics 1 per 2 weeks A 1.5 8 8
1 per 4 weeks A 2.5 8 8
1 per 6 weeks A 3.5 8 8
IBM 1 per 2 weeks C 2.5 8 8
1 per 4 weeks C 2.5 8 8
1 per 6 weeks C 2.5 8 8
* Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveillance.
† Wavelet algorithm to 8th power using all days of the week and summing results from all three data streams.
§ Wavelet algorithm to 8th level (2^8 days = 256 days); ssm refers to days of week modeled as their own time
series (Saturday, Sunday, Monday); and max refers to reporting out the maximum standard deviation among
the three individual data streams processed.
¶ Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics.
** Provider count regression residuals, which are inputs to a multivariate Hotelling’s T2 algorithm.
†† Exponentially weighted moving average.
§§ Early Aberration Reporting System.
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that actual outbreaks took place at those times. Rather, the
outbreak was determined on the basis of the fact that an un-
usual number of case counts were reported.
This evaluation provides a “snapshot” of the performance
of certain algorithms and data-processing methods, in the
hands of five teams, at detection of outbreaks identified by a
panel of experts. Whether certain algorithms were better overall
than others was not determined. The evaluation indicates
that objective ways exist to compare critical aspects of bio-
surveillance systems by using authentic data from real
outbreaks.
Acknowledgments
The following persons provided exceptional help in the conduct
of the evaluations: Virginia Foster, WRAIR; David Buckeridge,
Stanford University; Andrew Kress, Surveillance Data, Incorporated;
Ted Senator, DARPA; Judith Brillman, University of New Mexico;
Howard Burkom, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory; Murray Campbell, IBM; Karen Cheng, General
Dynamics; Kathleen Carley, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU);
Yevgeniy Elbert, WRAIR; Jay Mansfield, WRAIR; Andrew Moore,
CMU; Doug Stetson, General Dynamics; Michael Wagner,
University of Pittsburgh. The following persons provided helpful
comments regarding earlier drafts: Howard Burkom; David
Buckeridge; Virginia Foster; Bill Hogan, University of Pittsburgh;
Henry Rolka, CDC.
References
1. Carley K, Fridsma D, Casman E, et al. BioWar: scalable multi-agent
social and epidemiological simulation of bioterrorism events. Pittsburgh,
PA: Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational
Systems, 2003. Available at http://www.casos.ece.cmu.edu/casos_work
ing_paper/carley_2003_biowar.pdf.
2. Fawcett T, Provost F. Activity monitoring: noticing interesting changes
in behavior. In: Proceedings of the Fifth ACM SIGKDD international
conference on knowledge discovery and data mining. New York, NY:
ACM Press, 1999;53–62.
3. Buckeridge DL, Burkom H, Campbell M, Hogan WR, Moore AW.
Algorithms for rapid outbreak detection: a research synthesis. J Biomed
Inform (in press).
Vol. 53 / Supplement MMWR 159
ESSENCE II and the Framework for Evaluating
Syndromic Surveillance Systems*
Joseph S. Lombardo,1 H. Burkom,1 J. Pavlin2
1Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland; 2Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Silver Spring, Maryland
Corresponding author: Joseph S. Lombardo, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 11100 Johns Hopkins Rd, Laurel, MD 20723.
Telephone: 443-778-6287; Fax: 443-778-5026; E-mail: Joe.Lombardo@jhuapl.edu.
Abstract
Introduction: The Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE
II) is a prototype syndromic surveillance system for capturing and analyzing public health indicators for early detection of
disease outbreaks.
Objectives: This paper presents a preliminary evaluation of ESSENCE II according to a CDC framework for evaluating
syndromic surveillance systems.
Methods: Each major topic of the framework is addressed in this assessment of ESSENCE II performance.
Results: ESSENCE captures data in multiple formats, parses text strings into syndrome groupings, and applies multiple
temporal and spatio-temporal outbreak-detection algorithms. During a recent DARPA evaluation exercise, ESSENCE
algorithms detected a set of health events with a median delay of 1 day after the earliest possible detection opportunity.
Conclusions: ESSENCE II has provided excellent performance with respect to the framework and has proven to be a useful
and cost-effective approach for providing early detection of health events.
Introduction
In response to the threat of biologic terrorism and the
resurgence of virulent forms of infectious diseases, techno-
logic advances are being applied to disease surveillance.
Syndromic surveillance systems have emerged to capture and
analyze health-indicator data to identify abnormal health con-
ditions and enable early detection of outbreaks. Given the
limited public health experience with biologic terrorism and
the variety of possible terrorism scenarios, the research com-
munity is exploring the application of advanced detection tech-
nology to prediagnostic syndromic data. In 2003, CDC issued
a draft framework for evaluating syndromic surveillance sys-
tems (1), which was later revised and published in MMWR
(2). The CDC framework is designed for evaluation of rela-
tively mature, fully operational syndromic surveillance sys-
tems. The technology to support syndromic surveillance is
just maturing, with current operational experience gained from
test-bed use. This paper applies the framework to the Elec-
tronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of
Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE), a series of proto-
type systems developed by Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) and the Division of Preven-
tive Medicine at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.
System Description
Purpose
Multiple versions of ESSENCE have been developed, each
for different purposes. ESSENCE I provides worldwide sur-
veillance for military personnel and their dependents at all
military treatment facilities by using ambulatory records gen-
erated for TriCare, the military’s health-care system. ESSENCE
II is a regional system that supports advanced surveillance
within the National Capital Region (NCR) test bed. The sys-
tem is being developed by JHU/APL in collaboration with
the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
the District of Columbia Department of Health, and the Vir-
ginia Department of Health. Other versions of ESSENCE
have been developed for military facilities and deployed forces.
This description focuses on ESSENCE II only.
ESSENCE II is a test-bed system for 1) evaluating nontra-
ditional health-care indicators, 2) developing and evaluating
analytic techniques for early identification of abnormal dis-
ease patterns, and 3) providing an integrated view of NCR
* This research is sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and managed under Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) contract N00024-98-D-8124. The views and conclusions
contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed
or implied, of DARPA, NAVSEA, or the U.S. Government.












































ESSENCE II: National Capital Region (NCR) sources
FIGURE 1. Data sources for the Electronic Surveillance System for the
Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE)
military and civilian health department data (3) (Figure 1).
The system captures data on military ambulatory visits and
prescription medications and merges them with civilian emer-
gency department (ED) chief-complaint records, school-
absenteeism data, over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription
medication sales, civilian ambulatory visits, veterinary health
records, and health department requests for influenza testing.
All data are de-identified by their providers before being trans-
ferred to ESSENCE II, where they are archived, analyzed, and
provided through secure Internet sites to local health depart-
ments and to hospitals that have data-sharing agreements with
their health departments.
Stakeholders
NCR health departments conduct surveillance by using ED
chief-complaint data from hospitals within and around the
District of Columbia metropolitan area. ESSENCE II helps
automate the processes of capturing hospital data, parsing
chief-complaint text strings, and analyzing data for
abnormalities.
ESSENCE technology is being used to form a regional col-
laborative disease-surveillance network. The network consists
of four major nodes, one at each state and District of Colum-
bia health department and a regional node for performing
analysis across jurisdictional boundaries. The architecture
permits fully identifiable information to be captured and
archived at health departments for patients within their juris-
diction. The regional node negotiates the acquisition and dis-
tribution of data (e.g., military health-care data and OTC
medication sales) across the region. The architecture also per-
mits de-identification, aggregation, and sharing of informa-
tion among the region’s health departments while increasing
the sensitivity for detection of abnormal health events
occurring across jurisdictional boundaries.
Operation
The data flow through an ESSENCE II node is illustrated
(Figures 2 and 3). First, to expedite data collection and main-
tain confidentiality, the data providers create automated query
software to extract recent data elements from their archives.
These extractions are assembled into a de-identified update
record, encrypted, and posted to a secure file transfer proto-
col (FTP) site. The query software automatically executes at a
regular interval (e.g., daily at midnight or once every 8 hours)
that can be changed easily. Although ESSENCE II can accept
Health Level 7 (HL7) (4) data streams, the majority of data
providers prefer the automated query approach. ESSENCE
II polls the FTP sites to look for new entries, which are then
ingested, cleaned, formatted, and archived in the primary
system archive.
Data-sharing policies across the region have not been
approved by all NCR health departments. After these policies
are approved, selected data fields or aggregates of counts will
be transmitted to other nodes in the network.
Chief-complaint data from hospital EDs 1) are received as
text strings, which are of variable length; 2) include punctua-
tion, misspellings, or abbreviations; and 3) can use varying
syntax and vocabularies. A chief-complaint parsing algorithm
developed for ESSENCE II converts text strings
into syndrome groupings (5). The syndrome
groupings agreed to by the NCR health depart-
ments are death, gastrointestinal, neurologic, rash,
respiratory, sepsis, unspecified, and other, but the
chief-complaint parsing algorithm can easily
accommodate modifications. After ED data are
entered into the primary archive, the parsing
algorithm automatically converts the text strings
into syndrome groupings. When the parser’s per-
formance is compared with that of human cod-
ers, the parser provides, on average, 97%
sensitivity and 99% specificity. Whenever new
hospital EDs are added to the system, the parser’s
performance is assessed to adjust for unfamiliar
textual information. The algorithm provides
approximately perfect conversion into syndrome
groupings for the most prevalent syndromes
(respiratory and gastrointestinal) and degraded
performance for those less frequent (neurologic).
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FIGURE 3. Processing and display flow for the Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification























































* Early Aberration Reporting System.
†
Exponentially weighted moving average.
§
Geographic information system.
FIGURE 2. Data-acquisition flow for the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of
Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE)
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In addition to ED chief-complaint information, ESSENCE
II also receives data from physician-encounter claims in the
form of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision
(ICD-9) codes and from retail merchants in the form of Uni-
versal Product Codes (UPCs) for OTC medications. These
data are grouped into the same syndrome categories as the
chief-complaint data to enable outbreak detection by
syndrome.
Next, ESSENCE II applies outbreak-detection algorithms.
These algorithms use a working archive known as the detection
archive. New records are moved into the detection archive at
the launching of the detection process. The detection algorithms
are run every 4 hours, although this interval is adjustable.
ESSENCE II can accommodate HL7 data streams if they are
available from the hospital. Temporal and spatio-temporal
algorithms are implemented in ESSENCE II to determine
abnormalities. Also included are reference algorithms for
assessing the performance enhancement provided by the
ESSENCE II algorithms. CDC’s Early Aberration Reporting
System (6) algorithms were chosen as reference algorithms
because they were already in use by regional health departments.
ESSENCE II uses two temporal algorithms: 1) an auto-
regressive modeling algorithm that predicts syndrome counts
and looks for differences between actual counts and estimates
and 2) the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA),
a statistical process control method. Details on these algo-
rithms are published elsewhere (7). The autoregressive
algorithm is based on a linear regression model that predicts a
continually fluctuating daily expected count and threshold.
The model bases its daily predictions on the previous 4 weeks
of ESSENCE data, accounting for the day of the week and
whether the day is a holiday or the day after a holiday. (The
holiday function serves to explain artificial peaks in the data
attributable to surges in patient visits after days when clinics
are closed.) EWMA compares each observation to an average
of past data that weights observations exponentially by time
so that the most recent observations are most influential. There-
fore, EWMA can be used when daily visit counts do not have
the temporal structure required by a regression model.
ESSENCE II uses a built-in goodness-of-fit statistic to deter-
mine whether the regression is useful in explaining the data;
when this test fails, the automated checking process switches
to EWMA.
A variant of the spatial scan statistic (8) is used to form
clusters in time and space across the region by using zip codes
as the smallest spatial resolution. The scan statistic has been
modified to include multiple sources (9), which increases the
sensitivity while controlling the false-alert rate.
ESSENCE II uses a secure website to transfer information
to its users. Users must use individual passwords to access the
website and can only access information for their respective
jurisdictions. Four ESSENCE II portals enable users to view
raw data and results from processed data:
• A map portal displays geographic distribution of raw data
and clusters formed by scan statistics. The user can select
data elements for geographic display and access details by
clicking on the location of the data provider or the zip
code(s) of interest. The details can be presented as tables
or time graphs.
• The second portal provides alert lists for the output of
the detection processes. These lists consist of color-coded
flags to indicate algorithm outputs that are higher than
expected. Upper confidence limits (UCLs) for the daily
predictions are computed and used as alerting thresholds.
If an observed count exceeds the 95% UCL but not the
99% UCL, a low-level (yellow) alert is generated; if it
exceeds the 99% UCL, a high-level (red) flag results. The
user can organize the lists to provide flags on data of
interest, sort lists by elements of interest, and access data
or link to the map portal to view the spatial distribution
that resulted in the flag.
• The query portal enables a user interested in specific data
to select from drop-down menus and view selected data
elements over a selected timeframe as graphs or tables. All
tabular information can be cut and pasted into a
spreadsheet program for analysis offline.
• The fourth portal enables users to generate summary
reports for export outside ESSENCE II. The user can
select any data elements in the archive and view historic
counts as well as upward or downward trends. This portal
also contains tutorial material on operating ESSENCE II
and a message board for making suggestions to developers
or sharing thoughts with other users.
Outbreak Detection
Timeliness
The purpose of syndromic surveillance is to detect as early
as possible abnormal disease patterns that could result in high
mortality. This new technology should be evaluated and com-
pared with traditional techniques to determine whether it
improves upon detection timeliness. At least five layers
of possible improvement exist (Figure 4). At each layer, the
improvement is compared with a standard method to
determine whether timelier notification is possible.
1. The first layer is the acquisition of a data source that
contains an early indicator. For example, one promising
data source is the nurse hotline service provided by certain
health-care organizations.
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FIGURE 4. Layers of possible improvement to outbreak-detection timeliness — Electronic Surveillance











































2. The second layer involves filtering of the data stream to
more closely match the population that exhibits early
symptoms of disease. For example, because symptoms
consistent with the release of a biologic agent at a facility
(e.g., the Pentagon) would probably be observed among
active-duty personnel at that facility, military data could
be filtered by age to separate active-duty, retired, and
dependent populations.
3. The third layer removes confounders from nontraditional
data sources. For example, OTC medication sales are
strongly influenced by sales promotions, seasonal effects,
and day-of-week activity, as well as by the socioeconomic
status of the community in which the sale occurred.
ESSENCE II uses algorithms to model these confounders
and remove their influence, thus allowing identification
of the underlying pattern attributable solely to increases
in disease.
4. The fourth layer addresses improvements to outbreak-
detection algorithms that use a single data stream. Signal
processing, regression modeling, and process control
methods have been used to monitor single data streams.
5. The fifth layer addresses multivariate methods for gaining
sensitivity needed for early recognition of an abnormality.
Improvements at any of the five layers or combination of lay-
ers can improve notification timeliness.
CDC’s framework (1,2) provides a timeline, consisting of
nine “anchor points,” for measuring timeliness and performance
of syndromic surveillance. The first three anchor points, point-
source exposure, symptom onset, and health-seeking behavior, are
independent of system performance; symptom onset is a func-
tion of the incubation period of the disease, and health-seeking
behaviors depend on socioeconomic factors. The fourth anchor,
capture of the behavior in the record, varies by data source, taking
only seconds for scanning in OTC medications or hours to
days for electronic claims. The fifth anchor point, data source
ready to share, depends on the data provider and on system
requirements for data updates. Data can be sent in real time
(e.g., an HL7 feed from a hospital), hourly, daily, or at other
predetermined intervals (e.g., ED chief-complaint data could
be accumulated over 1 day and sent at midnight). ESSENCE
II accepts both HL7 and ED chief-complaint data feeds. The
data-ingestion module within ESSENCE II automates the
capture data into the system process (anchor point six) within
seconds. The seventh anchor point, apply pattern-recognition
tools/algorithms, is also a function of the data-capture rate. If
data are captured in real time, the detection algorithms must
also operate in near real time. If data are captured daily, then
the algorithms must be applied daily. ESSENCE II captures
data throughout the day and applies the detection process every 4
hours but can alter the processing period when real-time data
are received. After the detection process is complete, the auto-
mated alert generation process (anchor point eight) takes only
seconds to minutes. The ninth anchor point, initiate public health
response, depends upon policies and personnel at individual
health departments and is independent of the syndromic
surveillance system.
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FIGURE 5. Outbreak-detection performance of three algorithms in the
Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification of Community-Based
Epidemics (ESSENCE)
1 per 2 weeks 1 per 4 weeks
False-alert rate
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Algorithm performance can also be evaluated by detection
of actual disease events within the community. In summer
2003, the ESSENCE II project participated in a blind evalu-
ation conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) Bio-ALIRT Program (11). This evaluation
provided the opportunity for independent validation of
results from the ESSENCE II outbreak-detection process and
independent evaluation of participating syndromic surveil-
lance systems. To conduct the evaluation, DARPA assembled
an independent team of epidemiologists and physicians to
identify respiratory and gastrointestinal events in data streams
from five cities. The data included military and civilian
ambulatory records and military prescription records. Team
members identified eight respiratory and seven gastrointesti-
nal events and, given only the raw data streams, were asked to
estimate 1) start dates for the event, 2) date when a health
department might recognize the event, 3) the peak of the event,
and 4) the end of the event. Participants whose algorithms
were being evaluated were provided only the raw data streams
and asked to identify events.
Three ESSENCE II detection methods were
selected for this evaluation (10): 1) a multivari-
ate statistical process control algorithm applied
to the residuals of a regression technique used to
control for unexplained data dropouts, 2) a
multiple univariate method based on the EWMA
control chart, and 3) a Bayesian Belief Network
applied to the outputs of the first two algorithms
to optimize the decision for the two detectors.
The results of these algorithms’ detection per-
formance and timeliness are provided as a func-
tion of false-alert rate, for rates of one false alert
every 2 weeks, 4 weeks, or 6 weeks (Figure 5). In
this context, a false alert does not imply the need
for a laborious outbreak investigation but rather
a more detailed review of the data and use of
human judgment to dismiss alerting flags. For
the highest false-alert rate, all three algorithms
detected the eight respiratory events with a
median detection time of 1 day after the start of
the event (as determined by the epidemiology
team). If the false-alert rate was constrained to
once every 6 weeks, only the multiple univariate
SPC method maintained its level of performance.
For gastrointestinal events, only the Bayesian
Belief Network successfully detected all seven
events with a median delay of 1 day. Results
might vary when the same algorithms are
applied to other data streams and other seasons.
The majority of events used in the evaluation were seasonal
epidemics attributable to colder weather, limited outdoor
activity, and increased communicability during holiday gath-
erings; few, if any, of the cases comprising these events would
result in death or were reportable diseases.
Experience
System Usefulness
ESSENCE II is used routinely by the Montgomery County
(Maryland) Department of Health and Human Services for
different purposes, including to accredit county hospitals for
the capability to respond to mass casualties resulting from ter-
rorism, to identify foodborne outbreaks, and to provide gen-
eral knowledge of the county’s health status. The department
also requests changes to detection thresholds during high-
profile events in the region that might affect public health in
the county. The county health department continues to find
new uses for ESSENCE II outputs; in 2004, it used the
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system to determine when to initiate and cancel an influenza-
vaccination program.
Flexibility and Portability
ESSENCE II acquires data feeds with minimal burden to
data providers. The system accepts different data standards for
acquisition and data sharing. Adding a new data source is more
of a legal chore than a technical one because sources can be
added with minimal hours of coordination or software devel-
opment. ESSENCE is designed to enable persons with mini-
mal programming skill to create new syndrome categories or
change syndrome groupings in minutes. The system also allows
users to access historic data to perform retrospective studies.
Multiple versions of ESSENCE II exist to accommodate
different jurisdictions, data volumes, and data providers for
both military preventive medicine and civilian health depart-
ments. ESSENCE II is also being provided to state and local
health departments. Modifications are needed for local geo-
graphic shape files, zip codes, and data providers; these modi-
fications can be performed by state health department IT staff.
 System Acceptability
Acceptance by the majority of data providers has been
exceptional. Currently, the test-bed version of ESSENCE II is
used primarily when the level of risk increases. After the NCR
network is fully implemented, usage levels are expected to
increase. Full implementation is expected in 2004.
System Stability
 Versions of ESSENCE II have been acquiring data since
1999 and have operated since then with minimal interrup-
tion. The system’s size and complexity have expanded from
the NCR military population and certain Maryland counties
to include all of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.
System Costs
System size and cost are a function of the jurisdiction’s size,
the number of data providers, and the size of the epidemiol-
ogy department assigned to surveillance and follow-up.
A minimum county-level configuration requires one or two
computers, $15,000 for off-the-shelf software, one part-time
epidemiologist, and one part-time IT professional. Cost-
effectiveness depends upon the resources of the health
department and the vulnerability of its population.
Conclusions
ESSENCE II is the first disease-surveillance system to
incorporate both military and civilian data to improve the
sensitivity and specificity of detecting abnormal disease
occurrence. The design requires minimal resources from data
providers, thus encouraging their participation. Research into
algorithm improvements has been enhanced by operation of
a test bed and by rapid upgrades to test improvements in an
operational environment. Implementation of the NCR disease-
surveillance network should provide operational insights for
other jurisdictions considering collaborative surveillance
systems.
CDC’s framework for evaluating syndromic surveillance
systems provides a needed reference for developers and health
departments wishing to develop and implement new systems.
Evaluation would be enhanced if CDC provided standard data
sets to test the processes embedded within the systems and
provide a benchmark for comparing system performance.
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Abstract
Introduction: The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research used the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification
of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) to conduct population-based behavioral health surveillance among military-
health–system beneficiaries. The study analyzed the effectiveness of using prescribing patterns of psychotropic medications to
monitor changes in a community’s behavioral health status.
Objectives: The objectives of this study were to 1) determine the feasibility of tracking psychiatric illnesses by monitoring
prescriptions for psychiatric medications; 2) assess how often psychiatric medications are prescribed for patients with no record
of psychiatric illness; 3) determine at what types of clinics these medications are prescribed most often and what other diag-
noses are attributed to these patients; and 4) analyze data for potential changes in the population’s mental health after high-
stress events.
Methods: Correlation analysis and calculations of sensitivity and specificity were used to determine how well prescription
medications correlate with outpatient diagnoses and how well they serve as proxies for outpatient diagnoses. A descriptive
analysis was conducted of the types of clinics (e.g., primary care, behavioral health, or other specialty clinics) treating patients
and the associated percentage of concurrence between prescriptions and diagnostic codes.
Results: In military treatment facilities, a diagnosis of depression or anxiety correlated significantly (r = 0.82) with antide-
pressant or anxiolytic prescriptions. Sensitivity of prescriptions when compared with outpatient visits was 0.76, and specificity
was 0.94. Among those patients who visited a primary care clinic either the day before or the same day as an antidepressant
or anxiolytic prescription was filled, 60.1% did not receive a diagnosis of any mental health disorder. Behavioral health
clinics had the highest correlation between diagnoses and prescriptions; specialty clinics had the lowest.
Conclusions: Behavioral health trends in a population can be monitored by automated analysis of prescribing patterns alone.
This method might be a rapid indicator of needed mental health interventions after acute stress-inducing events and be more
sensitive than tracking diagnoses alone.
Introduction
New approaches to public health surveillance that use auto-
mated, and often unconventional, data sources have focused
on the threat of emerging infections and biologic terrorism.
However, other uses for these technologies exist beyond tradi-
tional surveillance of infectious disease. Mental health sur-
veillance using de-identified data has the potential to estimate
the prevalence of certain mental illnesses, especially among
persons who are sensitive to events that cause stress in their
communities (e.g., natural or man-made disasters, regional
unemployment, or deployments at military bases). These sys-
tems can support planning for more resource-intensive tradi-
tional mental health surveillance activities (1) and signal a
need for community-based mental health interventions that
emphasize normalization of responses to stress.
Automated public health surveillance systems are an inex-
pensive and timely augmentation to traditional health sur-
veillance methodologies and can enhance provider alertness
to public health threats (2,3). By using routinely collected
electronic data (4–6) from different traditional and nontradi-
tional sources (e.g., administrative, clinical, pharmacy, and
retail databases, and school and work absenteeism data)
(4,7–11), such systems can detect increases in the number of
cases above that normally expected, with varying degrees of
specificity.
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Certain mental illnesses might not require as urgent a
response as infectious-disease outbreaks and therefore might
not seem to justify use of automated data sources in surveil-
lance. However, few, if any, active mental health surveillance
tools exist, primarily because finding measures of mental health
changes in a community is difficult. Thus, data on routine
outpatient visits or pharmacy prescriptions might prove use-
ful for determining a community’s mental health status and
assessing the effectiveness of interventions. Furthermore,
communitywide increases in mental illness might require
rapider intervention when illness could result in suicidal or
homicidal behavior.
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) instituted
the Standard Ambulatory Data Record (SADR) to record
demographic and diagnostic data on all military outpatient
visits, including International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision (ICD-9) codes for each visit. In 1999, the Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) created the Elec-
tronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of
Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) to detect and track
infectious-disease outbreaks among military-health–system
beneficiaries (12,13). Using the SADR database, ESSENCE
automatically collects ICD-9 codes that potentially indicate
infectious diseases and groups them into clinical diagnostic
categories based on clusters of similar ICD-9 codes. Codes
are grouped to reduce the variability and increase the sensitiv-
ity of administrative diagnostic data (14) and to improve
baseline data-monitoring capability.
To study utilization of mental health services among mili-
tary beneficiaries in the Washington, D.C., area after the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon, WRAIR adapted
the ESSENCE model to include psychiatric ICD-9 codes.
Although no overall increase in utilization of mental health
care was identified, the study did detect a significant change
in the distribution of diagnoses, including relative increases
in the median number of visits for adjustment reactions, anxi-
ety, and acute-stress reactions during the first 5 months after
the attack (15).
For the current study, groupings of mental health outpa-
tient diagnostic data were correlated with pharmacy data and
used to monitor changes in the mental health status of mili-
tary communities. Diagnostic data based on ICD-9 codes
might not be the best indicator of mental illness in a com-
munity, for multiple reasons. Anecdotal evidence published
previously indicated that physicians might code only one
diagnosis even when patients are seen for multiple condi-
tions or make coding decisions based on codes most avail-
able or frequently used (10). In addition, diagnostic coding
for mental health can be affected by stigma and employ-
ment culture. Stigma associated with a mental illness diag-
nosis is well-documented in the literature (1,16–20). In the
military, a mental illness diagnosis can affect a service
member’s security clearance, flight status, and authorization
to carry a weapon (17,19). A patient whose recorded diag-
nosis does not indicate a mental disorder might still receive
a prescription for a psychiatric condition; therefore, prescrip-
tions might be a better reflection of true mental health than
the recorded diagnosis.
Pharmacy data provide insight into a clinician’s treatment
focus and might more accurately represent a patient’s true
condition. In addition, prescriptions are often renewed or
refilled for chronic conditions regardless of the patient’s pri-
mary complaint at the time of the visit (10,21). However,
these data can be complicated by multiple indications for the
same medication and are also sensitive to treatment setting
(6). Because military patients, like other populations that have
been studied systematically, receive a substantial percentage
of their psychiatric care from primary care providers rather
than mental health providers, measures of mental health treat-
ment in primary care settings are needed.
This study’s objectives were to 1) determine the feasibility
of tracking psychiatric illnesses through the monitoring of
psychiatric medication prescriptions by correlating diagnoses
and the drugs prescribed; 2) assess how often psychiatric medi-
cations are prescribed to patients with no diagnostic record of
psychiatric illness, particularly to estimate underreporting of
psychiatric illnesses and determine whether pharmacy data
might be a better indicator of mental health treatment;
3) determine at what types of clinics (i.e., primary care, spe-
cialty care, or behavioral health) psychiatric drugs are most
often prescribed without corresponding mental health diag-
noses, and identify what other diagnoses are attributed to these
patients; and 4) evaluate whether any increases in anxiety or
depression among family members of deployed military
personnel could be detected.
Methods
Data were obtained for all outpatient visits at fixed military-
treatment facilities (MTFs) and for prescriptions for all mili-
tary beneficiaries during July 2001–August 2002.
Approximately 8.8 million active-duty personnel, family
members, and retirees are eligible for care of MTFs. Of this
population, approximately 4.5 million are enrolled in the
military’s health-care system, Tricare Prime, which usually
indicates they intend to receive care at MTFs (although some
do access care outside of military hospitals and clinics). Those
not enrolled in Tricare Prime can also receive treatment at
MTFs on a different payment schedule.
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TABLE 1. International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision (ICD-9) codes used to categorize depression or
anxiety
ICD-9 code Description
296.20 Major depressive disorder, single episode, unspecified
296.21 Major depressive disorder, single episode, mild
296.22 Major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate
296.23 Major depressive disorder, single episode, severe
296.24 Major depressive disorder, single episode, severe with
psychotic behavior
296.25 Major depressive disorder, single episode, in partial or
unspecified remission
296.26 Major depressive disorder, single episode, in full
remission
296.30 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, unspecified
296.31 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, mild
296.32 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, moderate
296.33 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, severe
296.34 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, severe with
psychotic behavior
296.35 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, in partial or
unspecified remission
296.36 Major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, in full
remission
300.00 Anxiety state, unspecified
300.01 Panic disorder
300.02 Generalized anxiety disorder
300.09 Other anxiety state
300.21 Agoraphobia with panic attacks
300.22 Agoraphobia without panic attacks
300.23 Social phobia
300.29 Other isolated or simple phobia
300.3 Obsessive-compulsive disorder
300.4 Neurotic depression
308.0 Acute reaction to stress, predominant emotional
disturbance
308.3 Acute reaction to stress, other
308.4 Acute reaction to stress, mixed disorders
308.9 Acute reaction to stress, unspecified
309.0 Brief depressive reaction
309.1 Prolonged depressive reaction
309.81 Prolonged posttraumatic stress disorder
311 Depressive disorder, not elsewhere classified
The outpatient SADR database consists of <4 ICD-9 codes
for every MTF visit. These codes are entered approximately at
the time of the patient encounter, usually by the provider but
also by professional coders at certain locations. The data
include visits to all fixed MTFs worldwide but do not include
deployed forces involved in military operations. All mental
disorder ICD-9 codes in the 291–318 range, as well as related
ICD-9 codes used by behavioral health clinics (e.g., mental health
or substance abuse counseling; problems related to partner rela-
tionships, family circumstances, life circumstances, maltreatment,
or abuse) were grouped according to established methods (22,23).
In addition, a subset was created of all ICD-9 codes related to
depression and anxiety, as those conditions would be more likely
to increase during times of stress (Table 1).
The code for tension headache (307.81) was excluded from
the analysis because this diagnosis is commonly used for head-
ache unrelated to a mental disorder. The code for tobacco use
disorder (305.1), which is included in the ICD-9 mental dis-
order category but not typically treated as a mental disorder,
was also excluded. Deleting 305.1 also excluded use of certain
antidepressants (e.g., bupropion) used as smoking cessation
aids that could confound the analysis.
Outpatient pharmacy prescriptions at all MTFs and Tricare
network pharmacies are collected in the Pharmacy Data Trans-
action Service database at the time they are filled (24). Pre-
scriptions of medications used primarily to treat depression
and anxiety (Table 2) were correlated with outpatient diag-
noses. Certain medications were excluded to limit potential
confounding factors. For example, trazodone, a potential
antidepressant, is highly sedating and almost always used as a
sleep aid. Hydroxizine has an anxiolytic indication but is
almost always used for its antihistamine properties as an
allergy medication. Amitriptyline is sedating and has cardio-
vascular side effects and is therefore rarely used as an antide-
pressant, although it is often used at low doses for pain
conditions (e.g., headaches).
The strengths of correlations between antianxiety and anti-
depressant prescription medications and outpatient visits for
mental health, anxiety, and depression were measured by
using Pearson’s correlation coefficient (25). Data were grouped
by week to decrease the effect on the correlation of the usual
weekly pattern of visits and prescriptions.
The two databases were then matched by using a code pro-
vided by Tricare that is uniquely assigned to each patient but
does not allow patient identification. A match was determined
for those patients who 1) had a new prescription written for
one of the medications listed (Table 2) and 2) also had a
recorded outpatient visit the day (or the day before) the
prescription was written.
Prescriptions and outpatient visits were expected to have a
correlation based on holiday and seasonal effects (e.g., fewer
persons saw a health-care provider or were prescribed medica-
tions on holidays, compared with more persons during the
winter influenza and seasonal affective disorder seasons); for
this reason, the sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive
value of the prescription data were calculated by using outpa-
tient visits both for depression and anxiety only and for all
mental health concerns as the standard.
For those patients who were prescribed antidepressants or
anxiolytics and who also had an outpatient diagnostic code
from the same visit, the numbers of patients receiving depres-
sion or anxiety diagnoses, any mental health diagnoses, and
all other diagnoses were calculated. The clinical setting was
taken into account by grouping clinics into three categories:
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1) mental health, 2) primary care (i.e., family practice, urgent-
care clinics, emergency departments, internal medicine, and
pediatrics), and 3) all other clinics (e.g., orthopedic, cardiol-
ogy, or physical therapy). Prescription refills were not used in
this analysis because the purpose of this surveillance was to
detect acute psychiatric illness. However, certain prescriptions
that appeared to be new and that were included might have
represented dosage changes, brand changes, or renewals after
all refills had been used (i.e., were not first-time prescriptions
for the drug category).
Finally, outpatient visits and drug prescriptions among
military beneficiaries were monitored to determine whether
any increases in depression or anxiety had occurred; this was
particularly relevant during 2003, when U.S. military
deployments likely increased stresses on active-duty military
and their families.
Although data for deployed forces were not available, data
were examined from three installations from which substan-
tial numbers of troops had been deployed to Iraq for Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Trends in outpatient visits for anxi-
ety and depression and filled prescriptions for antianxiety and
antidepressant medications during July 2001–September 2003
were analyzed, by military beneficiary category, at all MTFs
at the three installations. On any given day during surveil-
lance, only the initial visit for anxiety and depression or the
first prescription filled at the installation was included. To
best reflect those who live at or near the installations, the analy-
sis included only anxiolytics and antidepressants filled at phar-
macies within a 50-mile radius of any of the three installations.
The percentages of mental health visits and prescriptions for
spouses (out of total outpatient visits or prescriptions) at that
MTF were determined to decrease the effect of a changing
population size. The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test (25) was used
to test the alternative hypothesis that anxiety and depression
visits and prescriptions differed significantly after January 9,
2003 (i.e., the date of deployment for OIF).
Results
 During July 2001–August 2002, a total of 2,343,684
anxiolytic and antidepressant prescriptions were written for
894,922 unique patients. A total of 1,588,081 outpatient vis-
its for 408,083 unique patients were given an ICD-9 code for
any mental health disorder, and 675,564 (42.5%) of these
visits, representing 224,459 unique patients, were for depres-
sion or anxiety, as defined previously (Table 1). Records con-
taining the code for tension headache (2,712) or tobacco use
disorder (44,828) were excluded.
The correlation coefficient was 0.82 when only new pre-
scriptions for anxiolytics and antidepressants were compared
with diagnoses of depression or anxiety. The coefficient was
0.85 when prescriptions were compared with all mental health
diagnoses. Including prescription refills in the analysis increased
the correlation coefficient to 0.85 for diagnoses of depression
or anxiety and to 0.88 for all mental health diagnoses.
Of all antidepressant or anxiolytic prescriptions, 934,220
(40.0%) matched with a recorded outpatient visit. This num-
ber includes 650,100 patients who received one or more pre-
scriptions and had a matching outpatient visit, with 87% of
visits occurring the same day as and 13% the day before the
prescription was written. Of those prescriptions that matched
an outpatient visit, 37.4% were for refills and the remainder
for new prescriptions. For prescriptions that did not match
an outpatient visit, the percentage attributable to refills
increased to 54%.
In the sensitivity and specificity analysis, prescription data
were relatively sensitive (0.76) and highly specific (0.94)
(Table 3). However, the positive predictive value was low
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TABLE 4. Recorded diagnoses of military-health–system patients prescribed anxiolytics or antidepressants, by clinic type —
July 2001–August 2002
No. of Patients (%) with depression Patients (%) with other Patients (%) with
Clinic type patients or anxiety diagnosis mental health diagnosis other diagnosis
Behavioral health 129,454 89,878 (69.4) 46,351 (35.8) 14,942 (11.5)
Primary care 423,957 147,011 (34.7) 40,651 (9.6) 254,894 (60.1)
Specialty clinic 96,689 3,789 (3.9) 5,049 (5.2) 88,143 (91.2)
Total 650,100 240,678 (37.0) 92,051 (14.2) 357,979 (55.1)
(0.26). This result was expected because visits for anxiety or
depression are relatively rare (8.0%) compared with all out-
patient visits. The result also reflects the substantial number
of prescriptions given without a corresponding diagnosis of
depression or anxiety. If prescriptions without a correspond-
ing diagnosis truly represent a mental illness, then prescrip-
tions might be a better indicator of mental illness than the
gold standard of outpatient visits. Because the outpatient codes
chosen are broad and medications are more specific, these find-
ings probably are conservative, and the correlation between
prescriptions and mental health diagnoses might be stronger.
When the gold standard is expanded to include all mental
health visits, the sensitivity decreases (0.52) and the positive
predictive value increases (0.31), indicating that antidepres-
sants and anxiolytics are not as sensitive an indicator of any
mental health condition.
Among patients with a matched prescription and visit, 62.4%
who were prescribed anxiolytics or antidepressants in primary
care clinics did not receive a diagnosis of any mental health
disorder (Table 4). Behavioral health clinics had the highest
correlation between prescription and diagnosis, and other spe-
cialty clinics had the lowest, with 11.5% and 91.2%, respec-
tively, having no mental health diagnosis. This discrepancy might
differ in civilian health-care settings that link diagnostic codes
more closely to reimbursement and prescription justification.
The majority of the diagnostic codes for patients receiving
medications were codes for common medical illnesses (e.g.,
hypertension and diabetes) or generic codes for counseling.
In addition, certain diagnoses (e.g., insomnia, myalgia, and
myositis) were not psychiatric but could justify the prescrip-
tions given. Nonpsychiatric diagnoses for which an antide-
pressant or antianxiety drug could appropriately be used (e.g.,
back and joint pain and strains, urticaria and rash, headache
and migraines, counseling, or insomnia) constituted approxi-
mately 19% of the codes.
ICD-9-code and prescription data were then used retrospec-
tively for surveillance of military-health–system beneficiaries.
Although use of psychotropic medications increased gradually
during July 2001–September 2003, since the start of OIF
deployments on January 9, 2003, or the start of OIF hostilities
on March 19, 2003, no acute increases in outpatient visits for
anxiety or depression or for prescriptions across the total mili-
tary beneficiary population were determined. However, if the
data are grouped by beneficiary category and if military instal-
lations with higher rates of deployment are isolated, certain
trends become apparent. The percentage of total outpatient visits
attributed to depression or anxiety and the percentage of total
prescriptions for antidepressants or anxiolytics for spouses at
the three installations that had high rates of OIF deployment
were calculated (Figure). The rates of both outpatient visits and
prescriptions during January 9, 2003–September 25, 2003, dif-
fered significantly (p <0.0001 for both visits and prescriptions;
Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test) compared with the previous period
of July 7, 2001–January 8, 2003.
Discussion
The analysis demonstrated a strong correlation between
mental health outpatient diagnoses and prescription of anti-
depressants and anxiolytics. It also indicated that additional
patients are prescribed these medications without a correspond-
ing diagnosis for depression, anxiety, or any mental disorder.
This result is similar to findings published previously that 55%
of Medicaid beneficiaries who received psychotropic medica-
tion did not receive a mental health diagnosis (21). These
results indicate that tracking outpatient medications might
be a more sensitive means for detecting changes in the mental
health of a population.
However, multiple potential confounders exist. First, 24% of
patients who had an ICD-9 diagnosis for anxiety or depression
were not prescribed psychotropic medications; therefore, if only
prescriptions are surveyed, those patients will be overlooked.
Second, in certain instances, the matching of outpatient visits
TABLE 3. Sensitivity and specificity analysis of antidepressants
and anxiolytics when using matched outpatient visits for anxiety
and depression as standard*
Anxiolytic or Outpatient visit for
antidepressant anxiety or depression
prescribed Yes No Total
Yes 243,476 690,744 934,220
No 75,575 10,542,493 10,618,068
Total 319,051 11,233,237 11,552,288
* Sensitivity = 0.76; specificity = 0.94; positive predictive value = 0.26.
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FIGURE. Outpatient visits for anxiety or depression out of total visits and prescriptions for antidepressants or anxiolytics out
of total prescriptions for spouses at three military installations with high rates of deployment
and prescriptions might not have been for the same encounter.
For example, a patient could have had a telephone consultation
or other provider interaction that resulted in a prescription;
meanwhile, on the same day or the previous day, the same
patient could have made an office visit for an entirely unrelated
medical complaint. In such a case, the matching process would
have linked the records and made the prescribed medication
appear linked to an unrelated diagnosis. Such an error can make
discrepancies between diagnosis and prescribing behavior
appear greater than they are. However, such a situation also
indicates that prescriptions might be a more sensitive surveil-
lance tool, given that a prescription record exists despite no
corresponding mental health diagnosis.
A third potentially confounding situation involves prescrip-
tion of medications for disorders other than mental illness.
Certain medical conditions (e.g., insomnia, pain conditions,
urticaria, or migraine) can merit the prescription of antide-
pressants or anxiolytics. To adjust for this confounder, certain
medications used more commonly for such conditions were
removed and the analysis rerun. In that analysis, the percent-
age of patients receiving antidepressants or anxiolytics who
had not been given a mental health-related diagnosis decreased
by <1% in primary care clinics.
A fourth potentially confounding situation involves patients
who take psychotropic medications for chronic conditions but
who are treated for a different chief complaint during an
office visit. A provider might code the visit accurately for the
presenting complaint while also renewing the prescription for
the chronic condition, which would make the number of cod-
ing errors appear greater and would decrease the specificity of
using prescriptions for surveillance of acute events. Now that
a longer historical record of patient visits and prescriptions is
available, future studies will attempt to exclude from the analy-
sis anyone who has ever received a medication in the anxiety
or depression category.
Surveillance among military beneficiaries at three Army posts
indicates that distress levels related to deployments might have
increased in the population. Increases in mental health visits
by military spouses were apparent. The increase in the rate of
visits for anxiety or depression was greater than the increase in
rate of psychotropic drug prescriptions. This finding high-
lights a potential limitation of relying on pharmacy data for
mental health surveillance in a population. Deployment-re-
lated stress is common, and various counseling services that
do not involve pharmacologic intervention are available to
service members and families. Prescription-based indicators
of distress might be less helpful in this context than they would
be if a traumatic or terrorist event occurred in a population.
Conclusion
Automated analysis of prescribing patterns of psychotropic
medications can be used to monitor behavioral health trends
in a population. This surveillance method has potential to be
a rapid and sensitive indicator of needed mental health inter-
ventions after acute stress-inducing events, especially in com-
bination with surveillance of outpatient diagnoses. The
importance of this surveillance is in its ability to react quickly
to an increased need for mental health services. As with any
other surveillance system that relies on data not originally gath-
ered for surveillance purposes, any apparent increases in
either prescribing behavior or outpatient visits should be veri-
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fied by discussions with the provider or a review of records. If
an increase in mental health needs is confirmed, early inter-
ventions can include community outreach and increased
advertisement of available resources.
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Abstract
Introduction: During 2000 and 2001, Auckland Regional Public Health Service piloted a general-practitioner–based
syndromic surveillance system (GPSURV).
Objectives: The pilot evaluated data capture, the method used to distinguish initial from follow-up visits, the definition of
denominators, and the external validity of measured influenza-like illness trends.
Methods: GPSURV monitored three acute infectious-disease syndromes: gastroenteritis, influenza-like illness, and skin and
subcutaneous tissue infection. Standardized terms were used to describe the syndromes. Data were uploaded daily from clinics
and transferred to a database via a secure network after one-way encryption of patient identifiers. Records were matched to
allow the distinction of follow-ups from first visits, based on between-visit intervals of <8 weeks. Denominator populations
were based on counts of unique patients treated at participating clinics during the previous 2 years. Record completion was
examined by using before-and-after surveys of self-assessed standardized-term recording. Between-visit intervals were counted
for matching records and alternative denominators were calculated on the basis of different observation periods. Weekly
influenza-like illness rates were compared with rates generated by an alternative system.
Results: Physicians’ self-reported recording compliance was highest for skin and subcutaneous tissue infection (71%) and lowest for
influenza-like illness (48%). Initial visits had 18%–19% greater compliance than follow-up visits. The number of physicians
reporting increasing compliance during the pilot was greater than the number reporting decreases for all conditions. Comparison of
data with an independent influenza-like illness surveillance system indicated a close agreement between the two data series.
Conclusions: These results indicate that incidence of acute syndromes can be monitored, at least as successfully as a manual
system, by using standardized clinical-term data from selected general-practice clinics. The provision of feedback reports
appears to have a limited but positive effect on data quality.
Introduction
The potential to enhance public health surveillance by
using general-practice data has been discussed by public health
practitioners (1,2). Computerization of general practice records
and increased emphasis on population health within primary
care (3) have brought this potential closer to realization.
In New Zealand (NZ), electronic systems for physician
reimbursement have contributed to widespread adoption of
computerized family practice information systems. In 1995,
an estimated 84% of NZ family physicians or general practi-
tioners (GPs) used a computer for, at minimum, office man-
agement (4). A recent survey determined that 57% of NZ
GPs use an electronic system to record and store clinical data;
this figure was predicted to reach 89% by early 2004 (5). The
potential for GP-based sentinel surveillance in NZ is also
enhanced by virtually every GP clinic having, at minimum,
dial-up connectivity to a secure wide area network.
These trends of increased information-system use among
GPs created an opportunity for Auckland Regional Public
Health Service (ARPHS) to develop a general-practitioner–
based sentinel surveillance system (GPSURV). ARPHS pro-
vides public health surveillance for NZ’s greater-Auckland
region, which consists of seven districts or cities with a com-
bined population of 1.29 million persons (6). GPSURV was
designed to monitor community incidence of specified acute
syndromes and rates of physician visits for common chronic
conditions.
During 2000 and 2001, to test the feasibility of GPSURV,
ARPHS undertook a pilot study with 27 volunteer GPs from
nine clinics. After 3 months of system implementation,
ARPHS evaluated the data collected to assess different aspects
of internal validity, including data quality. External validity,
or the degree to which observed trends were likely to repre-
sent communitywide trends, was examined after 12 months
of data had been collected.
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TABLE 1. Acute syndromes and codes tracked during pilot implementation of a general-practitioner–based syndromic surveillance
system (GPSURV) — Auckland, New Zealand, 2000–2001
Syndrome Read Code* Definition
Gastroenteritis A0.00 >3 loose stools/day or vomiting starting within last 5 days and not attributable to any
noninfectious cause
Influenza-like illness H27.00 Acute upper respiratory infection with abrupt onset and two or more of the following:
fever, chills, headache, or myalgia
Skin and subcutaneous tissue infection M0.00 Any presumptive bacterial skin infection, including superficial involvement (e.g.,
folliculitis) or deep involvement (e.g., cellulitis)
* Source: National Health Service Information Authority. The clinical terms version 3 (the Read Codes): incorporation of earlier versions of the Read Codes
(the Superset). Birmingham, England: NHS Information Authority, 2000.
Objectives
This paper summarizes the evaluation of the GPSURV
pilot with respect to acute syndrome surveillance. The evalu-
ation assessed data capture, the validity of methods used to
define illness episodes and denominator populations, the
effect of physician participation on self-reported data-quality
assessments, and the external validity of influenza-like–illness
reporting.
Methods
CDC (7) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (8)
have produced frameworks for evaluating established surveil-
lance systems. The WHO protocol focuses on reviews of paper-
based systems and therefore was not applicable to this study.
The CDC framework accounts for the interchange of elec-
tronic data but is not intended to guide pilot studies, nor does
it focus on the outbreak-detection capability of real-time sur-
veillance systems. However, a recently published evaluation
framework for evaluating syndromic surveillance systems (9)
explicitly addresses evaluation of the outbreak-detection func-
tion of syndromic surveillance and guided the writing of this
paper.
GPSURV Implementation
GPs were recruited from nine clinics whose physicians rou-
tinely used standardized terms to record patient assessments.
Clinics were distributed across four cities, but locations were
not random, and only one clinic was located in central
Auckland. The combined population represented by the
recruited clinics was 52,960 persons, or approximately 4.1%
of the Auckland region’s population.
GPSURV was designed to use standardized terms rather than
free-text searches to identify patients with target conditions
for three reasons. First, clinics were using different informa-
tion systems, thereby necessitating use of a standard data-
extract specification. Second, the project aimed to collect mini-
mal data from clinic information systems with minimal dis-
ruption. Third, using standardized terms would likely enhance
specificity and simplify analyses.
The standardized terminology used by participating physi-
cians was the Read Codes, Version 2 (10). This terminology
was widespread in NZ at the time of the pilot because the NZ
Ministry of Health had promoted it as the national standard
for electronic primary care records. The Read terminology
incorporates a conceptual hierarchy within its coding system
(11). Codes are used as shorthand for clinical terms, and varia-
tions of general terms use codes that incorporate the parent
term code (e.g., the code for viral gastroenteritis, A07y0.00,
includes the first two characters of the code for the parent
term intestinal infectious diseases, A0.00).
Although not ideal for epidemiologic purposes, the Read
hierarchy can be used to specify syndromes for surveillance.
Three acute infectious clinical syndromes were chosen for the
pilot: gastroenteritis, influenza-like illness, and skin infection.
Physicians were provided case definitions and corresponding
codes (Table 1).
Physicians were advised to record either the specified par-
ent code or a more specific instance of the parent term or
corresponding code, as clinically indicated. Data were uploaded
daily from clinics via a secure network (Figure 1). A utility
within each system enabled the physician or researchers to
specify search terms or codes, thus ensuring the system had
the flexibility to change conditions under surveillance. A
unique patient identifier, the New Zealand National Health
Index (NHI) was encrypted by an independent third party
before data were transferred to the GPSURV database.
Encryption enabled data for matching patients to be linked
while maintaining patient privacy.
The electronic record system used by a majority of physi-
cians did not allow physicians to distinguish an initial visit
from follow-up visits for the same illness episode. Record link-
age for this pilot allowed this distinction to be made by using
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FIGURE 1. Information flow within a general-practitioner–
based syndromic surveillance system (GPSURV) — Auckland,
New Zealand








































an algorithm based on between-visit intervals. Visit records
for the same patient and syndrome were categorized as follow-
ups if the visit occurred within 8 weeks of a previous visit.
Because GPSURV aimed to compare disease occurrence
among clinics and districts, denominators were required to
calculate incidence rates. Unlike in the United Kingdom or
the Netherlands where patients register with only one physi-
cian or clinic, NZ patients can visit as many GP clinics as
they wish. This factor increased the difficulty of defining a
denominator population. Alternative denominators have been
recommended for countries in this situation (12). GPSURV
defined denominators as active patients (13) and used counts
of unique patients treated once or more by a participating
physician during the previous 2 years. These counts were
performed automatically by the clinic information system.
Physician-specific reports providing feedback on recorded
illnesses and comparisons with regionwide trends were pro-
duced on a weekly and quarterly basis. Reports aggregating
data to district and region levels were produced at the same
time intervals. No statistical aberration-detection methods were
used during the pilot because the focus was on assessing
feasibility, data quality, and internal validity.
Data Quality
The sensitivity of GP-based surveillance systems is a func-
tion of diagnostic reliability and record completion or data
capture. By defining the events under surveillance as condi-
tions or problems identified by participating physicians,
GP-based syndromic surveillance (e.g., GPSURV) is less
concerned with diagnostic reliability than with record
completion and data capture. Given the primary function of
outbreak detection through detection of aberrations in time-
series data, even incomplete data capture does not necessarily
prevent such a system from fulfilling this function, provided
data completion does not fluctuate over time. Nevertheless,
the completion of recording and event data collection does
affect system sensitivity.
Multiple approaches have been taken to assess the comple-
tion of term or code recording within electronic GP records.
In the UK, where GPs have been required to retain both
paper and electronic records, studies have measured comple-
tion by comparing those records (14–16). When clinics do
not retain paper records, this approach is not possible. Direct
inspection of electronic records would be possible but expen-
sive and disruptive. Other approaches have included classify-
ing physicians into adequate or inadequate recorders by
comparing their incidence and prevalence rates with average
values (17,18), and by using other data (e.g., diagnoses men-
tioned in hospital letters) as a proxy for prevalence (18). The
proxy most commonly used has been data on prescribed medi-
cines, obtained either directly from the clinic (19) or from
centralized data collections (20,21). This method is useful only
when medicines are prescribed exclusively for specified
conditions.
Survey methods have demonstrated that GPs reliably self-
report certain activities (e.g., asking patients about tobacco
use [22]), and one study used a survey to examine electronic
record-keeping within GP clinics in a UK network (23). No
known studies have been published on the effect of individu-
alized feedback on data quality in GP-based surveillance sys-
tems, although certain authors have reported that feedback is
likely to have a positive effect (21,24).
For this study, a survey method was used to measure the
completion of data recording for acute syndromes in the evalu-
ation. Surveys of participating physicians were conducted
before and after the first 3-month period of the pilot. For
each surveillance condition and consultation type (i.e., initial
and follow-up), respondents were asked to estimate the per-
centage of patient visits for which they recorded a standard-
ized term or code (as opposed to free text).
To assess the effect on the denominator of changing the
observation period, counts of active patients seen within pre-
vious 6-, 12-, and 18-month periods were compared with the
denominator obtained by counting the number of patients
attending during the previous 24 months. For evaluating the
appropriateness of using an 8-week interval between
consecutive visits to identify new illness episodes for the same
health problem, distributions of between-visit intervals for
matching patient records were examined.
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TABLE 3. Changes of >10% from baseline survey to 3-month
follow-up survey in physicians’ (n = 17) self-assessed
compliance in using standardized terms to record patient
diagnoses, by syndrome and visit status — Auckland, New
Zealand
First visits Follow-up visits
Syndrome Increases Decreases Increases Decreases
Skin infection 6 2 7 0
Gastroenteritis 6 2 6 1
Influenza-like illness 7 3 6 2
External Validation
Generalizability of measured trends to the region’s popula-
tion would have depended on the geographic distribution of
conditions under surveillance and the representativeness of dis-
ease events detected at the sentinel sites. A full evaluation of
these concerns was beyond the scope of the pilot study. How-
ever, an attempt was made to examine external validity of
observed trends by comparing data for one syndrome with data
from an independent source. The age-sex structure of the study




A total of 21 physicians completed a baseline survey, and
22 of 27 participating physicians completed a follow-up sur-
vey administered 3 months after the pilot began. Not all 22
of those completing the follow-up survey answered each
question; nonrespondents for particular questions were
removed from analysis. Compliance was defined as recording
standardized terms for >90% of patient visits.
Of the acute syndromes studied, recording for skin and sub-
cutaneous tissue infection had the greatest compliance (71%
of physicians), and influenza-like illness had the least (48% of
participants) (Table 2). For all conditions, physicians reported
recording standardized terms for follow-up visits less frequently
than for first visits.
Of the 21 physicians who had previously returned a baseline
survey, 17 completed the follow-up survey. Before-and-after
responses from these physicians were compared (Table 3). The
number of physicians reporting a between-survey change for each
diagnosis and visit type, based on a change of >10% in percent-
age of terms recorded, was determined. Although the number of
participants was too limited to test any trends statistically, for all
acute syndromes, more increases than decreases occurred.
Categorization of Follow-Up Visits
The percentage of visits for acute syndromes that were cat-
egorized as follow-ups (i.e., by using the 8-week between-visit
interval) were as follows: 5% for influenza-like illness, 9% for
gastroenteritis, and 25% for skin infections. Analysis of pairs
of consecutive encounters for skin infections determined that
82% of follow-up visits occurred within 14 days of the previ-
ous matching encounter. Only three matching visits for any
acute condition were recorded >8 weeks after the previous
encounter; however, only 3 months of data were analyzed for
matching pairs.
Denominator Populations
The size of the active-patient population increased with the
period of observation, as would be expected. The number of
active patients counted during a 6-month period was 60% of
the 24-month count and 78% and 92% of the 24-month count
for 12- and 18-month periods, respectively.
External Validation
Weekly ILI rates were compared with ILI rates as measured
by a separate surveillance system. FLUSURV, a surveillance
system for influenza and ILI, collects manually recorded data
from approximately 40 volunteer GPs in the Auckland region.
Participating FLUSURV clinics keep a written tally of patients
meeting the WHO case criteria for ILI. Each week, a public
health clerical staff member calls clinics to obtain data on the
number of new cases. Denominator data for participating
physicians are based on physician estimates of total patient
population numbers. Only one clinic participated in both
GPSURV and FLUSURV. The result of this comparison is
illustrated (Figure 2). Although data are collected from a dif-
ferent network of clinics, incidence trends indicate statistical
agreement (t = 1.81; p = 0.085 not significant, 20 degrees of
freedom). The first peak of the season appears to be higher in
the FLUSURV data, but incidence rates from GPSURV were
age-standardized, which is likely to have reduced measured
TABLE 2. Number and percentage of doctors reporting >90%
compliance in using standardized terms to record patient
diagnoses, by syndrome and visit status — Auckland, New
Zealand
First visits Follow-up visits
Syndrome No. (%) No. (%)
Skin infection 15/21 (71) 11/21 (52)
Gastroenteritis 13/22 (59) 9/22 (41)
Influenza-like illness 10/21 (48) 6/20 (30)
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FIGURE 2. Influenza-like illness incidence as measured by
two surveillance systems — Auckland, New Zealand
* GPSURV data age-standardized to Auckland’s population.
†
General-practitioner–based syndromic surveillance system.
§

































rates slightly. GPSURV appears to have detected the second
substantial peak of the season earlier than FLUSURV.
Given the low self-reported compliance for recording of
influenza-like illness, this result appears surprising. One pos-
sible explanation is that the initial 3-month pilot period was
during late spring and early summer when ILI incidence was
likely to be minimal. Thus, GPs might have been more likely
to use alternative terms (e.g., hay fever) to record syndromes
with upper respiratory symptoms.
Comparison of age-sex structures demonstrated that
approximately all age-sex bands of the study population were
within 2% of comparable percentages for the regional popu-
lation. An exception was the <10 years age group; when com-
pared with the regional age-sex distribution, this age group
comprised 6% more of the study population for males and
5% more for females.
Discussion
This study examined the validity of disease-incidence mea-
sures based on the collection and analysis of clinical data rou-
tinely recorded by a network of volunteer family physicians.
The study’s findings indicate that, despite participant vari-
ability in data recording and problems with defining denomi-
nator populations, the incidence of common acute syndromes
can be monitored at least as successfully by using standard-
ized clinical-term data from selected GP clinics as by using
manual methods. However, the sensitivity of this method will
depend on the frequency of the syndrome under surveillance.
For less common conditions, a larger sample of GPs would be
required. Similarly, geographic variations in disease incidence
probably would not be detected without increasing the geo-
graphic spread of participating clinics.
The study’s findings indicate that the algorithm used to clas-
sify follow-up visits is probably working effectively. In the case
of influenza-like illness, however, only 5% of visits were actu-
ally follow-ups. Thus, misclassification of these as first visits
would have had minimal impact on measured rates. The evalu-
ation indicated that approximately 80% of patients treated
over a 2-year period would be counted over 12 months. The
effect of changing observation period for defining the denomi-
nator would be more complicated given possible changes in
age structure at different time periods. Nevertheless, if such a
denominator were to be used for further surveillance, a
12-month observation period would probably suffice.
Clinic participation in the pilot appeared to have a limited
but positive impact on data quality. This might have resulted
from regular feedback provided to physicians in weekly and
quarterly reports. Other aspects of participating in the project
might also have contributed to improvements in data quality;
for example; physicians might have gained an increased aware-
ness of the public health benefits of providing valid data.
However, observed fluctuations in the recording of standard-
ized terms raise the possibility that this approach might be
prone to artefactual aberrations in time-series data, and par-
ticipating GPs would need to maintain consistency in their
recording behavior for ongoing surveillance.
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Abstract
Introduction: Recent terrorist activity has highlighted the need to improve surveillance systems for the early detection of chemical
or biologic attacks. A new national surveillance system in the United Kingdom (UK) examines symptoms reported to NHS
Direct, a telephone health advice service.
Objectives: The aim of the surveillance system is to identify an increase in symptoms indicative of early stages of illness caused
either by a deliberate release of a biologic or chemical agent or by common infections.
Methods: Data relating to 10 key syndromes (primarily respiratory and gastrointestinal) are received electronically from 23 call
centers covering England and Wales. Data are analyzed daily and statistically significant excesses, termed exceedances, in calls
are automatically highlighted and assessed by a multidisciplinary team.
Results: During December 2001–February 2003, a total of 1,811 exceedances occurred, of which 126 required further investi-
gation and 16 resulted in alerts to local or national health-protection teams. Examples of these investigations are described.
Conclusion: Surveillance of call-center data has detected substantial levels of specific syndromes at both national and regional
levels. Although no deliberate release of a biologic or chemical agent has been detected thus far by this or any other surveillance
system in the UK, the NHS Direct surveillance system continues to be refined.
Introduction
Recent terrorist activity has highlighted the need to improve
surveillance systems for early detection of chemical or bio-
logic attacks. A new United Kingdom (UK) surveillance sys-
tem operated by the National Health Service (NHS) examines
syndromes reported to NHS Direct, a national telephone
health advice service (1). NHS Direct is a nurse-led helpline
that provides the public with rapid access to professional health
advice and information about health, illness, and NHS (2).
NHS Direct is open 365 days/year and serves the entire popu-
lation of England and Wales. NHS Direct nurses use clinical
decision support software, the NHS Clinical Assessment Sys-
tem (NHS CAS), to respond to calls. NHS CAS contains >200
clinical algorithms that form tree-like structures of questions
relating to the symptoms of the person about whom the call is
made. The majority of calls result in a call outcome, either
advice for self-care, a routine doctor referral, an urgent doctor
referral, an emergency department (ED) referral, or a para-
medic dispatch. Data derived from NHS Direct can be of
value in disease surveillance.
When a deliberate release of a harmful agent causes an
illness with an extended, mild, prodromal phase, certain per-
sons are likely to contact NHS Direct before contacting any
other health service. These contacts provide an opportunity
to identify an increase in illness before it is identified by other
primary- or secondary-care services. The aim of the surveil-
lance system described here is to identify an increase in symp-
toms indicative of the early stages of illness caused by the
deliberate release of a biologic or chemical agent, or by com-
mon infections. This project builds on existing surveillance of
influenza-like-illness and gastrointestinal symptoms that uses
NHS Direct call data (3–5).
Methods
Daily call data relating to 10 syndromes (cold/“flu,” cough,
diarrhea, difficulty breathing, double vision, eye problems,
lumps, fever, rash, and vomiting) are received electronically
by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) from all 23 NHS
Direct sites in England and Wales. (Beginning April 2003,




















eye problems replaced food poisoning as a syndrome category.)
These data are analyzed daily by a surveillance team estab-
lished in November 2001 and consisting of HPA and NHS
Direct staff. The 10 syndromes were selected as indicative of
the early stages of illnesses caused by biologic or chemical
weapons. Data are categorized by NHS Direct site, symptom,
age group, and call outcome. NHS Direct nurses triage rather
than diagnose illness in callers.
Upper confidence limits (99.5% level) of calls for each syn-
drome, as a percentage of daily total calls, are constructed for
each NHS Direct site. These confidence limits are derived
from a standard formula for percentages (6) with the baseline
numbers of total calls and symptom calls adjusted for sea-
sonal effects (winter: December–February; spring: March–
May; summer: June–August; autumn: September–October).
A daily percentage of calls exceeding the 99.5% upper confi-
dence limit is termed an exceedance.
In addition to confidence-interval analyses, control charts
are constructed for five of the 10 syndromes (cold/“flu”, cough,
fever, diarrhea, and vomiting) at the 10 NHS Direct sites serv-
ing five major urban centers (London, Manchester, Leeds, Bir-
mingham, and Newcastle). Baselines for the control charts
are calculated by assuming that the number of syndromic calls
follows a Poisson distribution with the total number of calls
as an offset. A model is fitted to each site and each symptom
separately, using data from December 2001. Each model
always includes a public holiday and seasonal term. When
necessary, a day of the week (weekday, Saturday, or Sunday)
and a linear long-term trend factor are also fitted. Scaling is
performed to account for overdispersion.
A normal approximation is not used to calculate the 99.5%
upper control-chart limit of calls for each syndrome as it yields
a greater percentage of exceedances than would be expected
(i.e., >0.5%). Instead, a transformation to approximate nor-
mality with zero mean is performed and transformed back to
the original scale. For control charts, the following formula
for the 99.5% upper limit of syndromic calls is used:
where N is given by the expected value divided by 1 less than
the scale parameter; p is equal to the scale parameter minus 1;
and zα is the 100*(1–α)th centile of the normal distribution.
Ad-hoc choices of z are made to achieve the desired number
of purely random exceedances (0.5%). The upper 99.5%
control-chart limit of calls for each syndrome, as a percentage
of total calls, is calculated daily.
Exceedances in calls for any of the 10 syndromes are auto-
matically highlighted (for the confidence-interval and con-
trol-chart method) and assessed by the surveillance team
(stage 1). If no reasonable explanation for the exceedance can
be found, additional line listings of call details (including the
call identification [ID] number and the caller’s residential
postcode) are requested for the date of the exceedance and for
the current date (stage 2). The call ID number, which should
be a unique number, is used to identify duplicate call records.
Requesting calls for the current date (which will be complete
up to the hour the request is made) is critical for monitoring
what might be an evolving situation. If current call data indi-
cate persistent statistical excesses (i.e., exceeding the 99.5%
upper confidence limit) for a particular syndrome, a geographic
information system can be used to map call data, although
this procedure is not routine for all exceedances.
NHS Direct sites can export calls to other sites during peri-
ods of peak demand. A percentage of calls handled by NHS
Direct sites (usually <10%) might therefore originate from
outside their catchment areas. Catchment areas are based on
local telephone area codes.
When the surveillance team determines that information
provided by line listings necessitates further investigation
(stage 2), the team generates an alert by passing call informa-
tion to the relevant local or national public health teams for
follow-up (stage 3). If the exceedance is suspected to repre-
sent a serious public health threat, the NHS Direct medical
adviser can contact callers to obtain further clinical informa-
tion. Weekly bulletins summarizing NHS Direct call activity
are disseminated to relevant local and national health-
protection colleagues.
Results
When the surveillance of 10 syndromes began in December
2001, call data were collected from approximately one-half of
the total 23 NHS Direct sites. Subsequently, the mean number
of NHS Direct sites providing daily call data increased from 12
sites in December 2001 to all 23 during October 2003
(Figure 1). A sudden decrease in the number of sites providing
call data in July 2002 was attributable to surveillance staff ab-
sences. No constant differences in the level of data provision
existed between the regions.
During December 2001–February 2003, a total of 1,811
confidence-limit exceedances occurred (stage 1), of which 126
(7%) required further investigation (stage 2) and 16 (1%)
resulted in alerts (stage 3) (Table). Exceedance investigations
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Southern England
FIGURE 1. Number of NHS Direct sites providing daily call
data for syndromic surveillance — England and Wales,
December 2001–October 2003
TABLE. Number of exceedances* (stage 1), exceedances
investigated (stage 2), and alerts (stage 3), based on calls to
23 NHS Direct telephone advice line, by syndrome — England
and Wales, December 2001–February 2003
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
No. of Exceedances
Syndrome exceedances investigated Alerts†
Fever 328 23 4
Cough 279 4 0
Cold/“flu” 185 5 0
Vomiting 182 28 4
Double vision 180 2 0
Food poisoning 180 0 0
Lumps 142 14 1
Diarrhea 137 14 4
Difficulty breathing 123 22 2
Rash 75 13 1
Total 1,811 126 16
* An exceedance is a statistically significant excess of calls beyond the
99.5% upper confidence limit.
†Stage 3 exceedances have been described previously (1).
did not progress to alerts when 1) the observed increase in
calls was a single-day exceedance only (46% of stage 2 inves-
tigations), 2) duplicate call records caused the exceedance
(20%), or 3) the call data did not cluster geographically (15%).
An overview of the national daily numbers and percentages
of calls for four syndromes is provided (Figures 2 and 3). As
expected, a seasonal pattern of higher activity during the win-
ter emerged for certain syndromes (e.g., cold/“flu” and vom-
iting), both in the numbers and percentages of calls. The
numbers of calls for all 10 syndromes increased during
weekends and on public holidays, when many routine primary-
care services are closed. The percentage of calls regarding cer-
tain syndromes also increased during weekends (e.g., rash)
and on public holidays (e.g., cough and vomiting).
During early August 2002, daily exceedances of callers
reporting difficulty breathing occurred at eight of nine NHS
Direct sites within the Thames basin and East Anglia. These
exceedances accompanied a general increase in callers report-
ing difficulty breathing in eastern parts of Central and South-
ern England (Figure 4). This increase was preceded by elevated
ozone levels and thunderstorms in this part of England. The
timing and effect of these climatic and environmental condi-
tions on call data are being analyzed. This detection of a sud-
den increase in calls has also generated new operational links
between environmental health professionals in the Health Pro-
tection Agency and other central government departments.
In January 2003, traces of the chemical poison ricin were
found in a North London apartment. In response, the surveil-
lance team was asked to enhance symptom surveillance of call
data collected from the five NHS Direct sites in London. Data
were collected on four syndromes (Figure 5) and updated every
2 hours. Call data were also mapped by place of residence, as
this might have provided the first clue that a deliberate release
could have occurred at a particular location. NHS Direct data
and other data sources have demonstrated no evidence thus far
of any deliberate release of biologic or chemical agents within
the UK.
Conclusions
This syndromic surveillance system is the only such system
covering the entire population of England and Wales.
Although the majority of exceedances do not result in subse-
quent investigation, when action is taken, health-protection
teams are usually informed within 24–48 hours of calls
being received by NHS Direct. Only 2 years of data have been
collected, and the establishment of baselines and refinement of
statistical methodology continue. Although no deliberate
release of chemical or biologic agents has been detected, this
surveillance system has detected elevated levels of activity in
specific symptoms at both national and regional levels.
After an initial period in which duplicate call records led to
investigation of exceedances that later proved spurious, data
quality was improved. The surveillance now covers the entire
population of England and Wales and is conducted daily.
Although geographic locations of calls are available on request,
the geographic resolution of the initial daily analysis (to iden-
tify exceedances) is at a site level. This means localized, subsite-
level outbreaks might be overlooked. The surveillance team is
investigating ways to collect and analyze call data by smaller
geographic units.




















FIGURE 3. National daily percentages of NHS Direct calls for cold/“flu,” difficulty
breathing, vomiting, and rash
FIGURE 2. National daily numbers* of NHS Direct calls for cold/“flu,” difficulty breathing,
vomiting, and rash






















Consistent and timely data returns
have been achieved by concentrating on
collecting routine NHS Direct data
with minimal disruption to the data
providers’ work patterns and by ensur-
ing continual feedback to all staff within
the surveillance network. The annual
operating cost of the surveillance sys-
tem is <$200,000. Providing these sur-
veillance data is now an integral part of
NHS Direct’s objectives and is a prior-
ity within the service; this was essential
in January 2003 when real-time surveil-
lance was needed to address a perceived
threat of a ricin release. Analysis of the
surveillance data in that instance helped
to determine that no deliberate release
had occurred.
A recent government strategy docu-
ment announced a three-fold expansion
of NHS Direct call-handling capacity
over the next 3–4 years, with an equiva-
lent increase in call volumes also
expected (from 6 to 16 million calls/
year in England) (7). This volume com-
pares with approximately 14 million
visits/year to EDs in England (8) and
190 million consultations with pri-
mary-care physicians (9). The increase
in NHS Direct call volumes should
improve the representativeness of the
call data and the potential for early iden-
tification of disease outbreaks.
The value of surveillance of NHS
Direct data in complementing existing
surveillance for common infections
(e.g., influenza) is being established
(1,3,4). Whether the NHS Direct
syndromic surveillance system will ultimately provide early
warning of a chemical or biologic attack will only be demon-
strated if such an event occurs.
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Abstract
Introduction: The New York City (NYC) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has operated a syndromic
surveillance system based on emergency department (ED) chief-complaint data since November 2001. This system was created for
early detection of infectious-disease outbreaks, either natural or intentional. However, limited documentation exists regarding
epidemiologic field investigations conducted in response to syndromic surveillance signals.
Objective: DOHMH conducted field investigations to characterize syndromic surveillance signals by person, place, and time
and to determine whether signals represented true infectious-disease outbreaks.
Methods: A DOHMH physician reviews ED-based syndromic surveillance results daily to look for signals. When necessary, field
investigations are conducted and consist of a review of the patient line list, telephone interviews with hospital staff, chart reviews,
interviews with patients, and collection and testing of specimens.
Results: In November 2002, a series of citywide signals for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes, which coincided with institutional
outbreaks consistent with viral gastroenteritis, prompted DOHMH to send mass e-mail notification to NYC ED directors and
institute collection of stool specimens. Three of four specimens collected were positive for norovirus. In December 2002, DOHMH
investigated why an ED syndromic signal was not generated after 15 ill patients were transferred to a participating ED during a
gastrointestinal outbreak at a nursing home. Field investigation revealed varying chief complaints, multiple dates of ED visits,
and a coding error in a complementary DOHMH syndromic system, and confirmed a seasonal norovirus outbreak. During
March 2003, the system generated a 4-day citywide respiratory signal and a simultaneous 1-day hospital-level fever signal in a
predominantly Asian community. In those instances, epidemiologic investigation provided reassurance that severe acute respira-
tory syndrome was not present.
Conclusion: Detailed field investigations of syndromic signals can identify the etiology of signals and determine why a given
syndromic surveillance system failed to detect an outbreak captured through traditional surveillance. Validation of the utility of
syndromic surveillance to detect infectious-disease outbreaks is necessary to justify allocating resources for this new public health tool.
Introduction
The New York City (NYC) Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has operated a syndromic sur-
veillance system based on emergency department (ED) chief-
complaint data since November 2001. By November 2003,
44 of NYC’s 67 EDs participated in this system, thereby cap-
turing 80% of all NYC ED patient visits. This paper describes
three investigations of ED syndromic signals that required in-
depth fieldwork to characterize the syndromic signals by per-
son, place, and time and to determine whether the signals
represented true infectious-disease outbreaks.
Methods
Overview of the DOHMH ED Syndromic
Surveillance System
The methods used for obtaining ED data for syndromic
surveillance are described in detail elsewhere (1). Briefly, the
DOHMH syndromic surveillance system receives ED data
through daily electronic transmission of files containing free-
text chief complaint, age, sex, residential zip code, and date
and time of ED admission. A computer algorithm codes the
free-text chief complaint into one of four syndromes: respira-
tory, fever (includes influenza-like illness), diarrhea, and vom-
iting. Daily statistical analyses evaluate citywide temporal
trends and spatial clustering, by hospital and residential zip
code, for respiratory and fever syndromes in persons aged >13
years and for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes in patients of
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all ages. A signal is defined as a statistically significant increase
in ED visits for a syndrome over a predetermined baseline.
The temporal scan statistic (2), which compares the ratio of
visits for one of the four syndromes to visits for other reasons
(i.e., those that do not fall into an infectious-disease syndrome
category) during the previous 1, 2, or 3 days to a 14-day
baseline (2), is used for citywide analysis. A modified spatial
scan statistic and a 14-day baseline are used for spatial analy-
ses, adjusting for both purely temporal (e.g., a citywide
increase in syndrome visits) and purely spatial variation (e.g.,
consistently higher syndrome visits within a particular zip code)
(3). Significance is set at p<0.01, a level selected to manage
the number of epidemiologic investigations while minimiz-
ing the probability of missing a real event. The extent of an
investigation depends on the syndrome, the size and geogra-
phy of the signal, its overlap with other syndromes, signals
generated by complementary systems, and the current level of
concern (e.g., during certain high profile events).
Steps in Spatial Signal Investigations
An analyst and a medical epidemiologist review the output
daily and note any statistically significant citywide or spatial
signals. Signal investigations are conducted according to the
following priority: 1) spatial signals for fever and respiratory,
2) citywide signals for fever and respiratory, 3) spatial signals
for diarrhea and vomiting, and 4) citywide signals for diar-
rhea and vomiting. Compared with a citywide signal, a spa-
tial signal has limited geographic dimensions (i.e., >1
neighboring hospitals or zip codes) and a focused epidemio-
logic investigation. All spatial signals are investigated to vary-
ing degrees, depending on factors mentioned previously. A
line list of ED visits captured in the signal is reviewed for
duplicate entries and for typographic or coding errors.
Descriptive statistics are generated on age, sex, residential zip
code, and time of admission to examine patterns among the
patients. Chief-complaint data are subcategorized to further
uncover similarities among the patients.
Hospitals involved in the signal are then called to request
interim data and to assess the volume and severity of patients
visiting the ED during that time. ED staff are asked about the
syndrome of interest and about any other severe or unusual
clusters or similarities among patients. Speaking with hospi-
tal staff is a valuable component of a signal investigation; it
provides a direct assessment of current ED activity and height-
ens the clinician’s awareness of the specified syndrome. Speak-
ing with physicians who worked the previous day is often
helpful because they are usually more familiar with the ED
visits responsible for the signal.
Data from complementary surveillance systems (e.g.,
ambulance calls and pharmaceutical sales) are reviewed for any
signals occurring within the same syndrome category. Certain
hospitals also provide an interim 12-hour ED chief-complaint
log for the current day’s data, which is coded and reviewed to
evaluate whether the syndrome trend is continuing. If ongoing
illness exists, DOHMH might ask ED physicians to lower their
threshold for ordering certain diagnostic tests (e.g., blood cul-
tures, stool cultures, chest radiographs, or rapid influenza tests).
When necessary, patients are called at home to inquire about
their condition. If evidence indicates that the outbreak is con-
tinuing, DOHMH staff are sent to EDs to interview patients
(or their families), review charts of ED visits and hospital
admissions by using a standardized chart-abstraction tool, and
assist with collection and transport of specimens to the
DOHMH public health laboratories (PHL).
Results
During November 15, 2001–November 14, 2003, a total
of 142 citywide signals occurred on 111 surveillance days,
including 22 respiratory syndrome signals and 33 fever syn-
drome signals during peak influenza season, and 25 diarrhea
syndrome signals and 28 vomiting syndrome signals during
the autumn and winter viral gastroenteritis seasons. Hospital-
level signals included 51 signals for respiratory and fever syn-
dromes and 58 signals for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes.
At the zip-code level, 39 signals for respiratory and fever syn-
dromes and 50 for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes occurred.
The following section describes three in-depth epidemiologic
field investigations conducted in response either to a syndromic
surveillance signal or to the lack of a signal during an other-
wise reported outbreak.
Investigation 1
Background. In October 2002, a series of citywide signals
for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes coincided with institu-
tional outbreaks clinically consistent with acute viral gastro-
enteritis. A hospital-level spatial signal for diarrhea syndrome
involving two hospitals (A and B) occurred on both October
29 and 30 for both hospitals (Table 1).
Response. DOHMH sent an e-mail message to ED direc-
tors of hospitals participating in syndromic surveillance, alert-
ing them to the citywide increase in gastrointestinal illness
(GI) and asking them to lower their threshold for diagnostic
testing, collect viral stool specimens, and identify common
exposures or unusual circumstances among ED patients.
Hospitals A and B were involved in both days of this hospital-
level spatial signal. Infection-control nurses at both hospitals
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were contacted and patient line lists examined. Further analy-
ses determined that the citywide increase in GI primarily
affected young children (Figure). Staff were sent to Hospital
A’s pediatric ED to interview patients and collect stool speci-
mens (for bacterial, ova and parasite, and viral testing) to
determine an etiology. In addition, a health alert (http://
www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/cd/02md37.html) was sent to
hospitals and schools citywide via broadcast fax and e-mail.
Findings. At Hospital A, two stool specimens were obtained
on site and two collection kits were sent home with parents of
ED patients and later retrieved and delivered to PHL through
pre-arranged transportation. Three of the four specimens
collected were positive for norovirus.
Norovirus was widespread throughout multiple parts of the
United States, including New York City, during the winter of
2002. During November 2002–mid-January 2003, DOHMH
received reports of 66 outbreaks of gastroenteritis epidemio-
logically consistent with norovirus infection affecting approxi-
mately 1,700 persons. Outbreak settings were primarily
nursing homes and long-term care and
rehabilitation facilities but also included
hospitals, restaurants, a homeless shel-
ter, and a school. In all, 29 stool speci-
mens were tested, of which 19 (66%)
were positive for norovirus (4). No epi-
demiologic links among patients pre-
senting to Hospitals A and B were
uncovered during the investigation.
Thus, syndromic surveillance was an
early indicator of citywide GI consis-
tent with seasonal trends of norovirus.
Investigation 2
Background. In December 2002, the DOHMH epidemi-
ologist for foodborne illness received a call from a nursing-home
director reporting 80 (of 320) residents with GI. On Decem-
ber 1, 2002, 25 nursing-home residents were transported by
ambulance to four local hospital EDs. Although two of the
four hospitals were participants in NYC’s ED syndromic sur-
veillance system, one of which (Hospital G) received 15 of the
nursing home patients, NYC’s ED syndromic surveillance sys-
tem did not detect this GI cluster at Hospital G.
To investigate the system’s failure to signal, DOHMH con-
ducted a retrospective, age-specific (persons aged >60) spatial
analysis, which did detect a GI cluster. Five hospitals, including
Hospital G, were included in the cluster; however, none of the
15 cases transferred to Hospital G had been captured (Table 2).
Response. Hospital charts for the 15 patients reportedly
transferred to Hospital G by ambulance on December 1, 2002,
were requested for review, of which 13
(87%) were available. According to ED
records, only nine of these 13 patients
were treated at Hospital G’s ED on
December 1, 2002; the other four
patients were brought in on December
2 or 3, 2002. Chief complaints for two
of the nine patients were not for a gas-
trointestinal illness but for atrial fibril-
lation and syncope, which were either
the primary or only reason for the ED
visits. Chief complaints noted in the
medical records of the remaining seven
patients were consistent with gastroen-
teritis.
Because the nursing-home residents
were transferred by ambulance to the
EDs, DOHMH reviewed the emer-
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FIGURE. Weekly emergency department visits for vomiting and diarrhea syndrome,
by age group — New York City, October 2001–December 5, 2002
TABLE 1. Syndromic surveillance signals for diarrhea syndrome — New York City,
October 29–30, 2002
October 29 October 30
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Hospital cases cases RR* Excess cases cases RR Excess
A 10 4.3 2.3 6 9 4.0 2.3 5
B 12 5.2 2.3 7 7 2.7 2.6 4
C 1 0.3 3.3 1 — — — —
D — — — — 3 2.1 1.4 1
E — — — — 4 1.8 2.2 2
F — — — — 7 4.2 1.7 3
Total 23 9.8 2.3 14 30 14.8 2.0 15
* Relative risk.
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TABLE 2. Retrospective spatial analysis of diarrhea syndrome
among persons aged >60 years — New York City, December 1,
2002
Observed Expected
Hospital cases cases RR* Excess
G 0 0.3 0.0 0
H 2 0.4 5.0 2
I 1 0.3 3.3 1
J 2 0.1 20.0 2
K 2 0.2 10.0 2
Total 7 1.3 5.4 6
* Relative risk.
TABLE 4. Hospital- and zip-code–level spatial signals for fever
syndrome — New York City, March 16, 2003
Observed Expected
Signal location cases cases RR* Excess
Hospital
L 20 6.7 3.0 13
M 3 0.7 4.3 2
Total 23 7.4 3.1 15
Zip code
1 8 0.7 11.1 7
2 1 0.2 6.0 1
Total 9 0.9 10.1 8
* Relative risk.
TABLE 3. Citywide signals for respiratory and fever syndromes —
New York City, March 16–19, 2003
Observed Expected
Date of signal cases cases RR* Excess
Respiratory
3/16/03 364† 294 1.2 70
3/17/03 830§ 707 1.2 123
3/18/03 1,289¶ 1,084 1.2 205
3/19/03 1,259¶ 1,155 1.1 104
Fever
3/16/03 —** — — —
3/17/03 452¶ 381 1.2 71
3/18/03 490¶ 408 1.2 82





** No fever syndrome signal occurred on March 16, 2003.
ambulance-dispatch log, a complementary syndromic surveil-
lance system. The data provided by the ambulance-dispatch
log includes job number, date and time of call, call type, and
the EMS chief complaint. This information was obtained from
the ambulance call report, a copy of which was found in
patient ED charts.
A detailed review of the EMS database indicated that eight
of the nine patients were transferred by EMS from the nurs-
ing home to Hospital G’s ED on December 1, 2003; the other
patient was transported by private ambulance. Three EMS
call types were documented for these eight patients: sick,
unconscious, and multiple casualty incident. A single multiple
casualty incident call accounted for five of the patients trans-
ported to the hospital. None of the EMS call types were
related to GI.
Findings. The ED at Hospital G had incorrectly entered
the nonspecific EMS call types indicated on the ambulance
call report as the chief complaints instead of as the patients’
subjective complaints given to EMS providers. Thus, these
nonspecific call types, none of which indicated acute gastro-
enteritis, were received electronically by syndromic surveil-
lance, instead of the chief complaints noted in the medical
records. Therefore, critical information that would typically
be captured and coded into a key syndrome was lost. Mean-
while, a concurrent foodborne-outbreak investigation deter-
mined that 10 of 11 stool specimens collected from ill
nursing-home residents were positive for norovirus.
Investigation 3
Background. During March 2003, simultaneous citywide
respiratory (4 days) and fever (3 days) signals occurred
(Table 3). These signals coincided with the World Health
Organization’s global alert on March 12, 2003, about cases of
atypical pneumonia, an outbreak later determined to be
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
On March 16, 2003, a spatial signal for fever syndrome
occurred in a predominantly Asian community for both the
hospital (observed n = 23/expected n = 7.4; p = 0.001) and
zip code (observed n = 9/expected n = 0.9; p = 0.002) analy-
ses. Within the hospital signal, Hospital L (observed n = 20/
expected n = 6.7) appeared to be driving the cluster, with 13
excess cases compared with Hospital M (observed n = 3/
expected n = 0.7) (Table 4).
Response. DOHMH initiated an epidemiologic investiga-
tion on March 17, 2003. Patient line lists revealed that illness
was distributed among all adult age groups and that chief com-
plaints were consistent with influenza-like illness. ED staff
were interviewed about concerning cases, unusual trends or
clusters, and any travel histories, none of which were reported.
The hospital infection-control practitioner collected contact
information for patients with chief complaints consistent with
fever and respiratory syndromes and identified patients
admitted to the hospital. Patients treated in the ED for respi-
ratory or fever syndromes on March 16, 2003, were contacted
by telephone by a DOHMH physician on March 17, 2003.
Sixteen patients were called and five patients were interviewed.
All five reported improvement; one patient reported having
traveled through Frankfurt Airport but denied having trav-
eled to Asia, and one patient had visited the ED because of
increased media reports on SARS. The remaining 11 patients
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either had incorrect or disconnected telephone numbers or
did not respond after three attempts.
DOHMH staff visited Hospital L’s ED on March 17 and
18, 2003, to review medical records and to interview staff and
any patients (or their families) remaining in the ED who com-
plained of fever or respiratory problems. Hospital staff reported
no unusual clusters of illness or increase in patients complain-
ing of fever or influenza-like illness. Two ED patients’ fami-
lies were interviewed, none of which reported recent travel to
Asia. Sixteen medical records were reviewed, including those
of patients admitted to the hospital.
Findings. This investigation of a hospital-level spatial sig-
nal for fever syndrome and concurrent citywide 3-day fever
and 4-day respiratory syndrome signals did not uncover any
features indicative of an outbreak or importation of SARS.
No similarities in disease presentation, epidemiologic links,
or etiologic agents were identified. These negative findings
reassured the health department that no communitywide out-
break of febrile or respiratory illness related to SARS existed,
particularly because the trend did not continue. Whether these
signals represented an unusual statistical anomaly or focal com-
munity illness caused by one or more agents remains unknown.
Discussion
These field investigations illustrated both the difficulties of
and resources required in identifying the cause of temporal
and spatial aberrations in syndromic surveillance data.
Syndromic data are nonspecific by nature. For illnesses that
are self-limited and of short duration, resolving the syndrome
into an etiologic diagnosis is not usually of direct benefit to
the patient, not a priority for the clinician, and not always
feasible with current technology. The advantage of using
syndromic data for outbreak detection is timeliness. Experi-
ences to date indicate that this advantage might only be theo-
retical. The time required to conduct investigations and retrieve
diagnostic and epidemiologic information might negate the
advantage of timely data acquisition. The absence of sustained
syndromic signals is usually more reassuring that an outbreak
does not exist than the information obtained by an immedi-
ate investigation.
Using ED syndromic surveillance for outbreak detection
has certain limitations. Of the >40 spatial syndromic signals
investigated by DOHMH during 2002–2003, none have been
conclusively determined to be a discrete infectious-disease
outbreak. Similarly, none of the localized outbreaks reported
and investigated through traditional communicable disease
surveillance (e.g., nosocomial- or foodborne-outbreak inves-
tigations) have yielded a simultaneous syndromic surveillance
signal. This is a factor of both the difficulty of proving causal-
ity and the use of a sensitive but nonspecific detection system.
Outbreaks reported through traditional means rarely involve
sufficient ED visits and geographic localization to yield a
syndromic signal. Even when both of these factors are present,
the event might not be detected if complaint information is
inaccurately recorded in the medical record, as evidenced by
the second investigation described in this paper.
One advantage demonstrated by NYC’s ED syndromic sur-
veillance system has been its early detection of seasonal, wide-
spread disease trends attributed to norovirus and influenza
(1). These detections have enabled DOHMH to alert the
medical community proactively and distribute prevention in-
formation to providers and the public. The effect of these
measures has not yet been studied. Syndromic surveillance
can also provide reassurance that a large-scale outbreak does
not exist, as illustrated by the third investigation presented, in
which cases of fever/influenza and respiratory illness were
deemed unlikely to be SARS.
Using chief-complaint data instead of discharge diagnosis
or information from the clinical evaluation might result in a
more limited representation of patient illness; however, such
clinical information is difficult to code and not timely. NYC’s
system relies on ED visits, which are uncommon for adults
with mild or prodromal illness. More experience is needed
with these systems, including an evaluation of the systems’
performance in the presence of large outbreaks. Meanwhile,
DOHMH has learned useful lessons for conducting future
signal investigations (Box).
Conclusions
NYC’s ED syndromic surveillance system provides rapid
health information through timely electronic data collection
and automated spatio-temporal analyses. The system receives
data on 80% of daily ED visits citywide, which is representa-
tive of the population accessing care at city EDs.
Syndromic surveillance using ED chief complaint data has
proved useful as an adjunct system to enhance traditional dis-
ease reporting methods at the DOHMH. It provides timely
information on seasonal patterns of illness and disease trends
citywide, which will allow for prompt epidemiologic investi-
gation in the event of a significant deviation from baseline or
a suspicious signal. After a citywide outbreak is detected,
syndromic data might also provide information on the
epidemic’s pace and magnitude. However, the ability of
syndromic surveillance to detect outbreaks that are either lim-
ited or result in mild disease is as yet unproven. Given the
growing interest and investment in syndromic surveillance
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systems, continued evaluation of these systems is needed to
determine the most useful data sources, analytic methods, and
signal-investigation approaches.
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BOX. Lessons learned in conducting syndromic signal
investigations
Know the data
Knowing the expected range of values will help iden-
tify duplicate entries, syndrome miscodes, and pat-
terns that can assist in signal investigations.
Be prepared for the site visit
Call in advance, plan emergency department (ED)
visits to yield maximum information from chart
reviews and patient interviews, and consider patient
language and cultural factors.
Be flexible
Charts, log books, and review requests might be
lost or delayed.  Be prepared to interview staff and
patients currently in the ED and review charts on
admitted patients.
Plan for specimen collection
Specimen collection is time-consuming for health
department staff and not usually a priority for EDs.
Certain hospitals lack the ability to test for all patho-
gens, especially viral. A system for tracking speci-
mens is necessary but can be difficult for EDs to
implement. Although take-home kits can be useful
for collecting stool specimens, they require prepa-
ration of the collection kit, laboratory slips, and lan-
guage-sensitive instructions with health department
contact information. Arranging transportation of
specimens to the laboratory can increase the likeli-
hood that samples are collected.
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Abstract
Introduction: In January 2003, the Westchester County Department of Health (WCDH) began conducting electronic syndromic
surveillance of hospital emergency department (ED) chief complaints. Although methods for data collection and analysis used in
syndromic surveillance have been described previously, minimal information exists regarding the responses to and investigations of
signals detected by such systems. This paper describes WCDH’s experience in responding to syndromic surveillance signals during
the first 9 months after the system was implemented.
Objectives: The objectives of this analysis were to examine WCDH’s responses to signals detected by the county’s syndromic
surveillance system. Specific goals were to 1) review the actual complaints reported by hospital EDs to determine whether com-
plaint data were accurately identified and classified into syndrome categories, and provide feedback from this review to data
collection and analysis staff to refine text terms or filters used to identify and classify chief complaints; 2) develop procedures and
response algorithms for investigating signals; 3) determine whether signals correlated with reportable communicable diseases or
other incidents of public health significance requiring investigation and intervention; and 4) quantify the staffing resources and
time required to investigate signals.
Methods: During January 27–October 31, 2003, electronic files containing chief-complaint data from seven of the county’s 13
EDs were collected daily. Complaints were classified into syndrome categories and analyzed for statistically significant increases.
A line listing of each complaint comprising each signal detected was reviewed for exact complaint, number, location, patient
demographics, and requirement for hospital admission.
Results: A total of 59 signals were detected in eight syndrome categories: fever/influenza (11), respiratory (6), vomiting (11),
gastrointestinal illness/diarrhea (8), sepsis (7), rash (7), hemorrhagic events (3), and neurologic (6). Line-listing review indicated
that complaints routinely were incorrectly identified and included in syndrome categories and that as few as three complaints could
produce a signal. On the basis of hospital, geographic, age, or sex clustering of complaints, whether the complaint indicated a
reportable condition (e.g., meningitis) or potentially represented an unusual medical event, and whether rates of hospital admission
were consistent with medical conditions, 34 of 59 signals were determined to require further investigation (i.e., obtaining additional
information from ED staff or medical providers). Investigation did not identify any reportable communicable disease or other
incidents of public health significance that would have been missed by existing traditional surveillance systems. Nine staff members
spent 3 hours/week collectively investigating signals detected by syndromic surveillance.
Conclusions: Standardized sets of text terms used to identify and classify hospital ED chief complaints into syndrome categories
might require modification on the basis of hospital idiosyncrasies in recording chief complaints. Signal investigations could be
reasonably conducted by using local health department resources. Although no communicable disease events were identified, the
system provided baseline and timely objective data for hospital visits and improved communication among county health depart-
ment and hospital ED staff.
Introduction
Westchester County (2000 population: 923,459) is located
directly north of New York City and is served by 13 acute-
care hospitals with emergency departments (EDs). Existing
communicable disease surveillance systems include passive
surveillance based on notification by physicians or laborato-
ries of reportable communicable diseases and reports from
schools and health-care facilities. WCDH has routinely con-
ducted active surveillance for specific diseases or situations
(e.g., telephoning hospitals to identify possible cases of West
Nile virus after the advent of this disease in 1999). Increasing
concern about potential incidents of biologic terrorism has
highlighted the need for surveillance systems to permit the
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earliest possible detection of such an incident. Efforts to
develop an electronic syndromic surveillance system in
Westchester County were initiated before the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks; the system was implemented in Janu-
ary 2003. Although methods for data collection and analysis
used in syndromic surveillance systems have been described
previously (1,2), minimal information exists about the
responses to and investigations of signals detected by such
surveillance systems. This paper describes responses by WCDH
disease investigative staff to syndromic surveillance signals.




On the basis of similar systems developed and implemented
by other local health departments (2,4), WCDH implemented
an electronic syndromic surveillance system in January 2003
in four of the county’s 13 hospital EDs. By October 2003, the
system had been expanded to include seven hospitals. Data
from the seven EDs captured approximately 600 daily ED
visits, which represented approximately 70% of total daily ED
visits to all 13 county hospitals. Data collected on each
patient included the chief complaint for which the patient
was seeking medical attention, hospital name, patient age, sex,
medical record number, municipality and zip code of resi-
dence, ED visit date, and whether the patient was subsequently
discharged from the ED or admitted to the hospital. On the
basis of text search terms and syndrome categories developed
by other local health departments and CDC (5), chief com-
plaints were classified into eight syndrome categories: 1) fever/
influenza in patients aged >13 years, 2) respiratory complaints
in patients aged >13 years, 3) vomiting, 4) gastrointestinal
illness/diarrhea, 5) sepsis, 6) rash, 7) hemorrhagic events, and
8) neurologic events.
For each syndrome category, the number of complaints or
visits for each category was analyzed to identify any statisti-
cally significant increases in visits. The cumulative sum method
(CUSUM) was used for statistical analysis (1); three possible
signal types (C1, C2, or C3) could be generated for each of
the eight syndrome categories (3). A C1 signal was generated
when the number of visits from the previous day exceeded the
mean number of visits for the previous 7 days by 3 standard
deviations. A C2 signal was generated when the number of
visits from the previous day exceeded the mean number of
visits for the 7 days beginning 9 days before the day being
analyzed (excluding the mean number of visits for the 2 days
immediately preceding the day being analyzed to smooth the
data from any recent aberrations) by 3 standard deviations. A
C3 signal was generated when an increase in the number of
visits/day occurred on >1 of the 3 preceding consecutive days
(1, L. Hutwagner, M.S., CDC, personal communication,
2004). Each time a signal was detected, WCDH disease in-
vestigative staff were notified and provided with a line listing
of complaints comprising the signal and containing the data
elements listed previously.
Objectives
The objective of this analysis was to examine WCDH’s
responses to signals detected by a syndromic surveillance sys-
tem. Specific goals were as follows:
• review the actual complaints submitted by reporting hos-
pital EDs to determine whether complaints were accu-
rately identified and classified into syndrome categories;
• provide feedback from this review to data collection and
analysis staff to refine text terms or filters used to identify
and classify chief complaints into syndrome categories;
• develop procedures and response algorithms for investi-
gating signals;
• determine whether signals correlated with reportable com-
municable disease or other incidents of public health sig-
nificance requiring investigation and intervention; and
• quantify the staffing resources and time required to
investigate signals.
Methods and Results
Signals Detected and Initial Response
During January 27–October 31, 2003, electronic files con-
taining chief-complaint data from participating hospital EDs
were collected daily (four EDs in January, expanding to six
EDs in April and seven in July). On eight occasions, data trans-
fers were not received from the hospitals but were transmitted
the following day, and analyses were performed retrospectively.
During the 277-day study period, 59 statistically significant
increases or signals were detected on 57 separate days (two
signals occurred on 2 days) in eight different syndrome cat-
egories (Table). The number of complaints or visits required
to produce a signal varied by syndrome category. For the sep-
sis and neurologic categories, the number of complaints
required to generate a signal ranged from three to 10. For
other syndrome categories (e.g., gastrointestinal illness/
diarrhea and fever/influenza), the number of complaints
required to generate a signal ranged from 12 to 20.
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Each time a C1, C2, or C3 signal was generated in any of
the eight syndrome categories, disease-investigation staff
(including an infectious-diseases physician and a nonphysician
epidemiologist) reviewed a line listing of the individual com-
plaints comprising the signal. This line listing contained the
absolute number of visits comprising the signal, the chief-
complaint text for which the patient was seeking medical
attention, hospital name, patient age, sex, municipality and
zip code of residence, ED visit date, and whether the patient
was subsequently discharged from the ED or admitted to the
hospital. The number of complaints resulting in a signal and
thus contained in line listings varied by syndrome (range:
3–103).
Terms Used To Identify and Classify
Complaints into Syndrome Categories
By using a system developed by the New York City Depart-
ment of Health and Mental Hygiene (2,4), WCDH staff col-
lected data files from hospital EDs containing fields of free
text describing the patient’s chief complaint. These text fields
were searched for specific terms that were then used to classify
complaints by syndrome category. For example, terms used to
identify and classify ED visits into a fever/influenza syndrome
category included fever, temp, hot, and aches, among others.
Specific terms were also designated for exclusion from a syn-
drome category (e.g., chief complaints of nausea or vomiting
including the terms pregnant or pregnancy were excluded from
the vomiting syndrome category).
An infectious-diseases physician and a nonphysician epide-
miologist compared text terms used to identify and classify
complaints into syndrome categories with the actual text sub-
mitted by hospital EDs. Although they were not systemati-
cally quantified, the majority of terms used to identify and
classify complaints into syndrome categories and terms used
to exclude complaints from syndrome categories were deter-
mined to be correct. For example, the terms temp and hot
correctly identified and classified the majority of complaints
into a fever/influenza syndrome category, but such terms as
attempted suicide and gunshot were also identified and included
in the complaints for a fever/influenza syndrome category
because they each contain the text of interest (temp and hot)
within the larger text. Detection of the first 10–15 signals and
subsequent line-listing reviews of complaints comprising these
signals indicated that <3 complaints could result in a signal
(C1 or C2, as described previously) for certain syndrome cat-
egories, meaning that incorrect identification of a limited
number of complaints could result in a false-positive signal
and trigger additional investigation. During reviews of line
listings comprising signals, at least one term that could result
in a complaint being classified incorrectly into one of the syn-
drome categories was identified in every line listing. When-
ever this occurred, the data collection and analysis staff were
instructed to exclude such terms to prevent future false-
positive signals. Line-listing reviews also indicated that cer-
tain EDs recorded chief complaints by specifying complaints
that patients did not have (e.g., denies shortness of breath or
denies fever). As a result, certain chief-complaint terms
detected by the system did not represent true cases of a par-
ticular syndrome. With repeated reviews, the number of com-
plaints incorrectly identified or classified into syndrome
categories decreased. On the basis of this limited experience, a
standard set of text terms might not be universally applicable
for syndromic surveillance systems but might require modifi-
cations based on idiosyncrasies in the text or words used to
record chief complaints by individual hospital ED staff.
Investigation of Detected Signals
An algorithm was developed for responding to different types
of signals detected by the syndromic surveillance system
(Figure). In addition to determining whether patient visits
might have been incorrectly included in a syndrome category
in response to a C1, C2, or C3 signal, an infectious-diseases
physician and a nonphysician epidemiologist reviewed the line
listing of complaints comprising a signal to determine the need
for additional investigation based on any clustering by hospi-
TABLE. Number and types of signals generated by syndromic
surveillance, by syndrome — Westchester County, New York,
January 27–October 31, 2003
C1 and C2
Syndrome C1* only C2† only combined C3§ Total
Fever/influenza 2 2 6 1 11
Respiratory 0 2 4 0 6
Vomiting 4 2 5 0 11
Gastrointestinal/
diarrhea 1 0 5 2 8
Sepsis 3 2 2 0 7
Rash 1 3 3 0 7
Hemorrhagic 1 0 2 0 3
Neurologic 1 1 4 0 6
Total 13 12 31 3 59
Source: Hutwagner L, Thompson W, Seeman GM, Treadwell T. The
bioterrorism preparedness and response early aberration reporting system
(EARS). J Urban Health 2003;80(2 Suppl 1):i89–96; L. Hutwagner, M.S.,
CDC, personal communication, 2004.
* C1 signals occurred when the number of visits from the previous day
exceeded the mean number of visits for the previous 7 days by 3 standard
deviations.
† C2 signals occurred when the number of visits from the previous day
exceeded the mean number of visits for the 7 days beginning 9 days
before the day being analyzed (excludes the mean number of visits for
the 2 days immediately preceding the day being analyzed to smooth the
data from any recent aberrations) by 3 standard deviations.
§ C3 signals occurred when an increase in the number of visits/day occurred
on >1 of the 3 preceding consecutive days.
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FIGURE.  Syndromic surveillance signal response algorithm — Westchester County, New York
Source: Hutwagner L, Thompson W, Seeman GM, Treadwell T. The bioterrorism preparedness and response Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS).
J Urban Health 2003;80(2 Suppl 1):i89–96; L. Hutwagner, M.S., CDC, personal communication, 2004.
* C1 signals occurred when the number of visits from the previous day exceeded the mean number of visits for the previous 7 days by 3 standard deviations.
†
C2 signals occurred when the number of visits from the previous day exceeded the mean number of visits for the 7 days beginning 9 days before the day
being analyzed (excludes the mean number of visits for the 2 days immediately preceding the day being analyzed to smooth the data from any recent
aberrations) by 3 standard deviations.
§
C3 signals occurred when an increase in the number of visits/day occurred on >1 of the 3 preceding consecutive days.
tal, patient municipality or zip code of residence, age, or sex,
or whether the specific nature of a complaint was reportable
in New York State. The complaints comprising a signal
occurred in at least two to three hospitals and municipalities;
in no instances did all of the complaints originate from a single
hospital or municipality. To determine the need for further
investigation, staff also assessed complaints for their potential
to represent an unusual medical event and examined whether
hospital-admission rates were consistent with the medical con-
dition. For example, urosepsis in an elderly resident of a nurs-
ing home would be less an indication for further investigation
than altered mental status in a young adult requiring hospital
admission. Similarly, the percentage of visits requiring hospi-
tal admission varied depending on the complaint and the
absolute number of visits. Hospital-admission rates not con-
sistent with the medical condition were also an indication for
further investigation. For example, three or four complaints
or ED visits for seizures requiring hospital admission would
be less of an indication for further investigation than 70–80
visits for diarrhea, of which 25% required hospital admission.
No standard threshold percentage of visits requiring hospital
admission could be used to determine the need for additional
investigation; review and clinical judgment were required to
make this assessment.
If the line-listing review identified no obvious cases or clus-
ters of concern or cases potentially representing a reportable
or unusual medical event, disease-investigation staff awaited
results of the next day’s data analysis to determine whether
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the signal was sustained and whether investigation was needed.
If any cases or clustering of concern were noted, disease inves-
tigative staff obtained further information. On the basis of
the line-listing review, 29 of the 56 C1 or C2 signals detected
by syndromic surveillance required further investigation. All
C3 signals were investigated further. Follow-up investigation
was conducted by telephone calls to hospital ED physicians,
infection-control practitioners, or treating physicians and by
requesting facsimiles of relevant laboratory and diagnostic tests
results or medical records. The information obtained was suf-
ficient to assess each situation, and no on-site hospital ED
visits or chart reviews were conducted.
Because increases in ED visits in a given syndrome category
on a single day could result in a C1 or C2 signal but an
increase in ED visits in a given syndrome category on >1 of 3
consecutive days was required to generate a C3 signal, a C3
signal was believed to have an increased potential for an event
of concern. Therefore, in response to the three C3 signals
detected, all the investigative procedures described previously
were followed, but further investigation was conducted
regardless of the results of the line-listing review. WCDH staff
contacted ED and infection-control staff at all 13 hospitals to
notify them that the syndromic surveillance system had
detected an increase in a particular syndrome (e.g., gastrointes-
tinal illness/diarrhea) and to ask whether any increase in the
syndrome of interest had been noted during or since the time
encompassed by the most recent complaint data submitted,
or whether any concern existed. If hospital ED or infection-
control staff perceived no increases and expressed no concern,
they were asked to report any perceived increase in ED visits
for the syndrome of concern for the current day, and results
of data analysis of complaints for the subsequent day were
reviewed. Hospital staff perceived no increases or need for
concern after any of the three C3 signals. Had such increases
or concern been perceived, data collection and analysis staff
were instructed to request, from all hospital EDs participat-
ing in syndromic surveillance, electronic files containing chief-
complaint data encompassing the 12 hours subsequent to the
last routine file transfer. None of the three C3 signals
warranted this level of response.
Correlation of Signals with Reportable
Communicable Disease or Other
Incidents of Public Health Significance
After the response and investigation of syndromic surveil-
lance signals, no events of concern or that were detected
through other existing surveillance mechanisms were identi-
fied. On one occasion a complaint of encephalitis and on 11
occasions complaints of meningitis were noted on line list-
ings comprising a signal. Because all types of meningitis and
encephalitis are notifiable diseases in New York State and cases
of meningococcal meningitis usually require intervention (e.g.,
postexposure prophylaxis of contacts), these cases were inves-
tigated by contacting the treating physician or hospital staff.
In all cases, patients had received alternate diagnoses. Because
line listings were reviewed only when a signal was detected,
persons with meningitis might have reported to EDs on days
on which no signal was detected and therefore would not have
been detected through this mechanism. Although other clus-
ters or reportable events were detected through telephone calls
from medical providers or affected facilities during the
9-month period, the affected hospitals were not participating
in syndromic surveillance, making correlation impossible. No
cases of meningitis or other reportable diseases or events that
had not been detected through otherwise existing surveillance
mechanisms (typically telephone notification from hospital
ED staff, infection-control staff, or treating physician, or by a
New York State electronic laboratory reporting system) were
detected through syndromic surveillance.
Efforts Required for Signal Follow-Up
Nine disease-investigation staff members spent a portion of
their time responding to syndromic surveillance signals. An
infectious-disease physician and a communicable-disease epi-
demiologist routinely reviewed the line listings, and seven
public health nurses participated in follow-up investigations
as described previously. The time and effort required for these
activities varied depending on the number of signals received
on a given day (1–2 signals/day) and the number of com-
plaints on the line listing for each signal requiring additional
investigation (range: 1–10 complaints/signal). Staff were asked
to track for 1 month the time spent on follow-up. Signal and
line-listing reviews typically required approximately 15 min-
utes and were performed by a physician and an epidemiolo-
gist. Telephone calls to medical providers and reviews of
medical records received by facsimile for a single complaint
typically required 30 minutes, including the time needed to
reach and speak with a knowledgeable hospital staff member
or for such staff to obtain relevant information. On average,
disease-investigation staff collectively spent approximately 3
hours/week to investigate signals generated by the syndromic
surveillance system, not including time required by data col-
lection and analysis staff (3). Because information obtained
through telephone calls and review of faxed medical records
was sufficient to assess each of these situations, no on-site
hospital ED visits or chart reviews were necessary.
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Discussion and Conclusions
 The information presented in this paper is primarily
descriptive and encompasses only 9 months, during which
time only four to seven of 13 hospital EDs in the county par-
ticipated in syndromic surveillance. Despite these limitations,
the research identified areas that might benefit from further
evaluation, and Westchester County’s experiences might be
useful for others implementing syndromic surveillance.
Complaints identified by text terms developed for use in
syndromic surveillance (5) routinely were incorrectly identi-
fied and classified into syndrome categories of interest. Stan-
dardized text terms to identify and classify hospital ED chief
complaints into syndrome categories might not be broadly
applicable but might require modification because of hospital
idiosyncrasies in recording chief complaints. Assessment of
signals by medical or clinical professionals was required to
determine the need for further investigation.
The procedures used to assess and investigate syndromic
surveillance signals could be reasonably conducted by using
the resources of a local health department. No reportable or
other disease events or events that required further investiga-
tion or intervention in addition to those detected by existing
traditional surveillance systems were identified through the
59 syndromic surveillance signals detected and investigated
during this 9-month period. Because <3 complaints were
required to generate a signal, a limited number of incorrectly
identified complaints could result in a signal and trigger
additional investigation.
Further evaluation is required to establish the conditions in
which syndromic surveillance is most useful. A jurisdiction of
the size and complexity served by WCDH might represent
the smaller end of the spectrum in which such systems are
likely to be useful, and the disease events that occurred were
not the type of events intended to be detected by syndromic
surveillance.
Finally, the implementation of this system and investiga-
tion of detected signals provided additional benefits.
Communications, working relationships, and personal famil-
iarity among WCDH and hospital ED staff improved. ED
staff awareness that WCDH staff were available 24 hours/
day, 7 days/week as a resource increased. Physicians and hos-
pital staff expressed appreciation for feedback provided by
WCDH regarding potential disease activity of concern. A sub-
stantial number of the reportable or unusual events that oc-
curred during the 9-month study period were detected through
telephone calls from ED staff. This fact underscores the im-
portance to disease surveillance of communication with local
ED staff and indicates that syndromic surveillance should
complement and not replace traditional reporting and sur-
veillance systems. The system provided baseline and timely
objective data for hospital visits and might provide a basis for
future monitoring of other conditions of interest.
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Abstract
Public health departments and their clinical partners are moving ahead rapidly to implement systems for early detection of
disease outbreaks. In the urgency to develop useful early detection systems, information systems must adhere to certain standards to
facilitate sustainable, real-time delivery of important data and to make data available to the public health partners who verify,
investigate, and respond to outbreaks. To ensure this crucial interoperability, all information systems supported by federal funding
for state and local preparedness capacity are required to adhere to the Public Health Information Network standards.
Introduction
The 2003 National Syndromic Surveillance Conference
focused on design, development, and evaluation of systems
that can rapidly detect terrorism-related outbreaks as well as
naturally occurring epidemics. Public health departments and
their clinical partners understand the urgency to have systems
in place to support early detection and are moving ahead rap-
idly to implement systems that will provide early detection
functionality. These systems obtain data from multiple sources,
including traditional clinical-care delivery sites and clinical
laboratories, as well as less traditional health-monitoring data
sources (e.g., nurse call centers, over-the-counter retail sales,
work and school absenteeism data, veterinary health data, or
information from biologic-sensing devices). In their urgency
to develop early detection systems, system developers should
incorporate information-system standards to facilitate sustain-
able, real-time delivery of important data and to make data
available to the public health partners who verify, investigate,
and respond to outbreaks. To ensure this crucial inter-
operability, all information systems supported by federal fund-
ing for state and local preparedness capacity are required to
use set information-system standards (1).
Standards-based system development is critical for three
major reasons. First, the need for real-time information from
multiple sources can best be accomplished by standards-based
electronic messaging. Although individual custom interfaces
can be created with the myriad potentially useful data sources,
the cost of development would be prohibitive and the com-
plexity of developing and managing such an array of custom
interfaces would be formidable. The specification for stan-
dard Health Level 7 (HL7) (2) messages for early detection
data permits health departments to leverage integration-
broker technology and health-care delivery site information
technology (IT) capacity for creation and processing of these
standard HL7 electronic messages.
Second, the use of standards enables health departments to
leverage previous investments in their IT infrastructures. Sys-
tems to support public health capacity for outbreak manage-
ment, response, alerting, and information dissemination have
been under development since Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 invest-
ments in the Health Alert Network and FY 2000 funding for
the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
A detection system is most valuable when it can communi-
cate with those systems needed to investigate and respond to
an epidemic. The availability of standards-based shareable
directories, system security, and channels for bidirectional
secure communication can support public health agencies’
capacity to respond to outbreaks and provide key elements
for early detection systems.
Finally, a consistent standards-based approach limits the
burden on partners in the  clinical-care delivery sector. Health-
care providers and hospitals provide information to public
health agencies for early detection and routine surveillance as
part of their community responsibility. They are not compen-
sated for the cost of providing that information. By using stan-
dard formats and electronic reporting, public health agencies
can minimize the burden involved in reporting diseases and,
ideally, use information that is already available in electronic
format within the health-care delivery system.
Nationally, the importance of standards-based, interoperable
electronic health records to support objectives for quality and
safety within the health-care delivery system has been increas-
ingly recognized. The National Committee on Health and
Vital Statistics has recognized standards as an integral part of
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the National Health Information Infrastructure (3). The criti-
cal role of standards has also been endorsed by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services and the federal
government through the Consolidated Health Informatics
Initiative, a federal eGov initiative (4). Connecting for Health,
a broad-based consortium of foundations, provider organiza-
tions, systems developers, and government organizations, is
also pursuing this objective (5). These efforts have already iden-
tified and endorsed a number of relevant standards that can
be used in early detection systems for the interchange of data
between the clinical sector and public health.
To define how these broad standards can be implemented
in surveillance systems that support the specific needs of pub-
lic health practice, CDC and its state and local health depart-
ment partners have identified key specifications and functions
described as the Public Health Information Network (PHIN).
By identifying standards for technology, data, vocabulary, and
information security, PHIN is designed to enable the consis-
tent exchange of health, disease-tracking, and response data
among public health partners, to protect the security of these
data, and to ensure the network’s reliability in times of
national crisis.
PHIN addresses five major functional areas — detection
and monitoring, data analysis, knowledge management, alert-
ing, and response. To support these public health functions,
CDC and partners have developed specifications for nine IT
functions, identifying the key vocabulary and technical stan-
dards relevant for creation of PHIN (6). These nine functions
are as follows:
1. automated exchange of data between public health
partners;
2. use of electronic clinical data for event detection;
3. manual data entry for event detection and management;
4. specimen and lab result information management and
exchange;
5. management of possible case, contacts, and threat data;
6. analysis and visualization;
7. directories of public health and clinical personnel;
8. public health information dissemination and alerting; and
9. IT security and critical infrastructure protection.
Public Health Information Network —
Functions and Specifications
Relevant to Early Detection
Of the nine PHIN functions that should be incorporated
into commercially or locally developed early detection sys-
tems, the following six functions have particular relevance to
early detection:
• Automated exchange of data between public health
partners (No. 1) and use of the electronic clinical data
for event detection (No. 2). These standards address the
use of electronic messages to transmit data from a clinical
source over the Internet to the health department using
secure encryption. These messages can be generated
automatically on the basis of prior agreements by the trad-
ing partners regarding which data are potentially relevant
for public health. The use of electronic messaging pro-
vides near real-time transmission of data needed to sup-
port early detection. The format standard used for
messaging is HL7, one of the standards identified by the
National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, the
Consolidated Health Informatics eGov Initiative, and
Connecting for Health as the appropriate standard in this
area (2–5). PHIN also provides a process for developing
detailed specifications for early-detection message content.
• Analysis and visualization (No. 6). This standard gov-
erns the use of commercial applications for analysis and
visualization, which use industry standards for accessing
data from the database. This standard facilitates the use
of a validated aberration-detection algorithm in multiple,
diverse systems.
• Directories of public health and clinical personnel
(No. 7). Such directories are critical tools, both for iden-
tifying the persons (or positions) who need to receive and
transmit data, and to support role-based security to
ensure appropriate access to data and secure data against
unauthorized access. Because alerts frequently need to
travel between jurisdictions, a standards-based directory
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [LDAP], which
uses a public health directory data model developed jointly
by state, local, and federal partners as part of the PHIN
process) can facilitate exchange of information among,
for example, emergency-response personnel in adjacent
local jurisdictions and public health personnel at the state
level.
• Public health information dissemination and alerting
(No. 8). This function is essential for communicating and
responding to any outbreak identified by an early-
detection system. Public health partners must be able to
transmit and receive alerts in a timely fashion by appro-
priate mechanisms 24 hours/day, 7 days/week. The func-
tion might use e-mail or back-up modes (e.g., pagers and
telephones) for notification. In addition, specifications are
necessary to permit bidirectional, secure communications
among health officials using PHIN-compatible directo-
ries and security so that sensitive information can be
appropriately shared, discussed, and analyzed, An early-
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detection system needs to address how it will interface
with local and state secure-communications systems.
• IT security and critical infrastructure protection
(No. 9). Security specifications are an essential element
of early detection systems. Carefully planned approaches
to protect system security and continuity of operations
are needed to ensure that a system is available in the event
of an emergency. A state’s security strategy should be con-
sistent with the state’s approach to information-system
security, rather than requiring an anomalous approach,
such as implementation of two-factor authentication (i.e.,
use of two different modalities to ensure an individual is
authenticated [e.g., password and secure token, or pass-
word and digital certificate]).
Implementing Systems
Compliant with the Public Health
Information Network
PHIN’s specifications and functions are the building blocks
for interoperable standards-based systems. However, consid-
erable discussion has ensued about appropriate processes for
turning these relatively high-level specifications into function-
ing systems. The CDC Information Council, the official gov-
ernance body for CDC and its public health partners
(including Association of State and Territorial Health Offi-
cials, National Association of County and City Health Offi-
cials, Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists,
Association of Public Health Laboratories, and National
Association of Public Health Statistics and Information Sys-
tems) asked the Gartner Group, an experienced IT consulting
firm, to recommend implementation approaches for PHIN
specifications and functions, as well as processes for manag-
ing evolution of the architecture and data standards. In 2003,
the Gartner Group issued a report addressing the PHIN func-
tions and specifications and recommended approaches that
might accelerate their implementation (7). The study team
interviewed state and local health departments and examined
documents and design specifications at CDC. The final
report endorsed the PHIN standards and specifications as
appropriate for use in public health. It also noted that CDC’s
public health partners universally agreed to the vision and
overall direction of PHIN and emphasized that successful
implementation of PHIN is critically dependent upon the
commitment of CDC and its public health partners. The
report also identified areas needing further clarification or
expansion of the PHIN architecture.
For systems that are underway or still in development, the
Gartner Group recommended an evolutionary approach
toward PHIN compatibility. They recommended that appli-
cation development teams focus first on compatibility of the
data model with PHIN data standards and use of controlled
medical vocabularies. Doing so would permit creation of data
that can be easily aggregated at the national level by using
extensible markup language (XML) schema. They also rec-
ommended use of HL7 messaging format for transport and
security standards to share data securely between public health
partners and CDC. A third recommendation was to focus on
standards-based directory services (LDAP) to allow authorized
and controlled access. Finally, they recommended that CDC
provide tools (e.g., tools for secure message transport) built
on PHIN standards that could be made available to states and
their partners.
The Gartner study recommended that PHIN allow for
multiple solutions, particularly for those components that are
more technically challenging or new in the market (e.g., HL7
version 3.0, ebXML; http://www.hl7.org). However, they
emphasized that the goal of a live network should be main-
tained even as different solutions are implemented. They rec-
ommended PHIN standards be required for investments of
federal public health funding. Finally, they emphasized the
importance of security at all levels of state public health infra-
structure, recommending that states undertake independent
verification and validation studies to provide an independent
assessment of system security.
In addition to resources invested by states and local juris-
dictions, additional funds are available to support PHIN in
general and its use for early detection in particular. Since FY
1999, all 50 states have received funding through the Health
Alert Network for continuous broadband internet connectiv-
ity among states and local health departments. Certain states
have also used this funding to provide connections with
clinical-care delivery partners and emergency-management
partners. Since FY 2000, states have also received funding for
standards-based surveillance systems through NEDSS, which
implements the PHIN standards for clinical data exchange in
the area of clinical laboratory data and nationally notifiable
diseases. In FY 2002, the Public Health and Social Service
Emergency Fund awarded >$1 billion for state and local pub-
lic health preparedness capacity. A substantial portion of these
funds have been directed to investments in IT systems; both
CDC and the Health Resources Services Administration
(HRSA) require that all IT investments use the PHIN specifi-
cations and functions (1). In September 2003, the second
round of preparedness funding was awarded, which contin-
ued to require use of PHIN specifications and functions when
funding IT investments. By September 2003, HRSA grants
had increased to $498,000,000, directed toward enhancement
of hospital surge capacity to deal with terrorist events. This
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funding could be used, in part, to strengthen the communi-
cation and data interchange between hospital partners and
public health.
Consistent with the Gartner Group recommendations, CDC
has developed and made available tools to assist in developing
PHIN-compliant systems. The PHIN Messaging System is a
software program that supports standards-based, bidirectional,
interinstitutional message transport using the ebXML stan-
dard with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) encryption (8). It
provides a message-transport tool for point-to-point messag-
ing, thereby addressing the need for secure authentication and
authorization between sender and receiver as well as handling
encryption of the message payload.
In January 2004, CDC released a beta version of PHIN
Vocabulary Services, which provides access to >80 key stan-
dard reference tables, as well as supporting version control
and maintenance of those standard reference tables (9). This
tool should facilitate using controlled vocabularies in local
systems and support CDC-developed systems.
CDC has also published implementation guides that specify
data standards for the message format for data exchange mes-
sages (e.g., those dealing with electronic laboratory reporting,
test orders, and demographic information available from hos-
pital admission discharge transfer [ADT] systems) (10).
Finally, CDC has collaborated with partners from the U.S.
Department of Defense, U.S. Veterans Administration, the
private sector, Harvard University, University of Pittsburgh,
and state and local health departments to develop BioSense
(11). BioSense is an Internet-accessible secure system that per-
mits state or metropolitan-area users to visualize information
about their locality from different early-detection data sources.
It maps the data at a zip-code level and incorporates statistical
analyses to identify possible aberrations warranting further
investigation. Phase 1 of BioSense is in beta testing. It is
intended to be complementary with local efforts. In Phase 2,
BioSense will be able to incorporate local data-collection
efforts that use PHIN standards to provide a more complete
view of data sources relevant to a particular area.
Rapid detection of possible terrorist events is of consider-
able urgency. However, using a standards-based approach in
surveillance is critical, both to accomplish the early detection
objective and to facilitate rapid investigation of and response
to multiple events of public health importance. Investing wisely
by developing effective PHIN-compliant systems will have
enormous benefits for the health of the public.
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Abstract
Introduction: Public health agencies are developing the capacity to automatically acquire, integrate, and analyze clinical
information for disease surveillance. The design of such surveillance systems might benefit from the incorporation of advanced
architectures developed for biomedical data integration. Data integration is not unique to public health, and both informa-
tion technology and academic research should influence development of these systems.
Objectives: The goal of this paper is to describe the essential architectural components of a syndromic surveillance informa-
tion system and discuss existing and potential architectural approaches to data integration.
Methods: This paper examines the role of data elements, vocabulary standards, data extraction, transport and security,
transformation and normalization, and analysis data sets in developing disease-surveillance systems. It then discusses auto-
mated surveillance systems in the context of biomedical and computer science research in data integration, both to characterize
existing systems and to indicate potential avenues of investigation to build systems that support public health practice.
Results: The Public Health Information Network (PHIN) identifies best practices for essential architectural components of a
syndromic surveillance system. A schema for classifying biomedical data-integration software is useful for classifying present
approaches to syndromic surveillance and for describing architectural variation.
Conclusions: Public health informatics and computer science research in data-integration systems can supplement approaches
recommended by PHIN and provide information for future public health surveillance systems.
Introduction
Automated acquisition of routine health-care data has
enhanced public health surveillance capabilities. The 2003
National Syndromic Surveillance Conference featured model
syndromic surveillance systems, including New York City’s
emergency department (ED)-based syndromic surveillance sys-
tem (1), the Real-Time Outbreak Disease Surveillance system
(RODS) (2), the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early
Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) (3),
and other encounter-based systems. These systems use differ-
ent data sources, including ED and primary care outpatient
data (e.g., chief complaints or diagnoses), diagnosis-specific
aggregate data (National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance
Demonstration Project [4]), and laboratory and radiology data,
for early detection of disease outbreaks. Surveillance to detect
clinical syndromes, whether inferred by secondary use of clini-
cal data sources or directly coded by observers, is commonly
called syndromic surveillance.
Despite increasingly widespread development of syndromic
surveillance systems, continued efforts to understand differ-
ent data-analysis strategies, and ongoing discussion of strate-
gies to integrate syndromic surveillance into public health
practice, the cost-benefit ratio of syndromic surveillance
remains uncertain. Recommendations from the 2001 Ameri-
can Medical Informatics Association meeting stated that “pub-
lic health informatics must create an information architecture
that includes a longitudinal, person-based, integrated data
repository…similar to the National Electronic Disease Sur-
veillance System (NEDSS) model” (5). NEDSS has evolved
into a prominent component of the Public Health Informatics
Network (PHIN) initiative (6,7). A recent review of PHIN
(8) concluded that “the PHIN vision must continue to broaden
beyond the structured data obtained from surveillance sys-
tems and labs to include syndromic data from clinics, ERs,
doctor’s offices, pharmacies…,” indicating that surveillance
based on integration of heterogeneous data will become cen-
tral to public health practice.
Implementing syndromic surveillance based on automated
acquisition of clinical data requires both the development of
secure, reliable information systems and the use of those sys-
tems in public health practice. The information technology (IT)
activities include system design and integration and develop-
ment of tools for data acquisition and analysis. Effective use of
syndromic surveillance depends not only on IT activities but
also on the system’s integration with public health practices for
outbreak detection, investigation, and response management.
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Data modeling and data integration are integral IT compo-
nents of syndromic surveillance information systems. Data
modeling activities are those related to structure and content,
and entail identifying relevant clinical variables; understand-
ing both the vocabularies and coding schemes used to record
these variables; and establishing procedures for clustering,
re-coding, normalizing, or otherwise preparing data for analy-
sis. Data integration activities are those related to movement
and processing of data before their analysis or visualization,
and entail acquiring, transforming, storing, and delivering
information securely and reliably. Approaches to data model-
ing and integration and the trade-offs between different imple-
mentation technologies constrain the choice of system
architectures.
This paper reviews these components in the context of
basic and applied research in data integration, on the basis of
an evolutionary model used to describe the development of
biomedical informatics (9). This model provides a framework
for reviewing architectures used for automated public health
surveillance, both to classify them and to discuss the strengths,
weaknesses, and roles of different research approaches.
Data Model Components
Limited development of syndromic surveillance systems,
including the RODS and Syndromic Surveillance Informa-
tion Collection (SSIC) systems (10), occurred before the
anthrax outbreak in fall 2001. However, the 2001 terrorist
attacks precipitated an increase in syndromic surveillance
development, and implementation since then has balanced
standardization with expediency. To implement systems rap-
idly before another terrorist attack, developers built systems
tailored to readily available data. However, promulgation of
national standards (e.g., PHIN) has emphasized the need for
standardization of data types collected and of vocabularies used
for individual data elements.
Data Elements
Two important data-element considerations are 1) the com-
position of the extracted data set and 2) the level of identifica-
tion of the data. A 2001 review of data elements collected for
surveillance by 10 different systems identified striking simi-
larities (11). The majority of systems described at the 2003
NSSC continue to use data elements identified by that review.
These systems collect data for patient ED or primary care vis-
its and typically include age, sex, visit date and time, a mea-
sure of chief complaint and/or diagnosis, and a geographic
measure; however, data elements and coding schemes vary
among systems. Chief complaints or diagnoses, clustered into
syndrome groupings, are used as variables for analysis, and
both demographic and geographic variables are used to stratify
the data. In contrast to the simple data model used by the
majority of syndromic surveillance systems, the PHIN Logi-
cal Data Model provides a rich, detailed, object-oriented view
of health-care data (12), encouraging both standardization and
more granular data collection.
Public health agencies have legal authority to collect (the
minimum necessary) data for surveillance, “without [patient]
authorization, for the purpose of preventing or controlling
disease, injury, or disability…” (13). However, certain barri-
ers to provider data reporting have been identified, including
regulatory issues, fit with business model, use of IT resources,
public relations, accounting for public health disclosures, and
release of competitive data (14). Despite certain states’ legal
authority to collect identified data, multiple system develop-
ers have chosen to collect either de-identified or minimally
identified data to reduce these practical barriers. Although a
masked or encrypted identifier can address these concerns while
maintaining data quality, this approach was challenged by the
final interpretation of the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (15). Con-
cern has been expressed about the effect of this interpretation
on medical and public health research (16).
Standard Vocabulary Usage
Standards for exchange of public health data arose from the
need to combine heterogeneous data (i.e., comparable clini-
cal information from different sources that is expressed by
using different formats and coding schemes). PHIN specifies
the ability to translate and manipulate Logical Observation
Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC®), Systematized
Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED®), International Clas-
sification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9), and current pro-
cedural terminology (CPT®) codes and to map local, legacy,
or proprietary codes into these standards (Table). PHIN speci-
fies LOINC as the vocabulary for laboratory reporting in con-
junction with the PHIN notifiable-condition–mapping tables
(17), which map LOINC and SNOMED codes to reportable
conditions. Unlike laboratory reporting, syndromic surveil-
lance systems might use local vocabularies and lack a fully
developed transformation capability. Hospitals use different
standard coding schemes, and transformation will become
increasingly important as the scale of these systems increases.
Analysis Data Model
Aggregating data for analysis is also a challenge. Systems
commonly use ICD-9 codes or chief-complaint data to cat-
egorize illnesses into syndrome groups. Different ICD-9 clus-
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TABLE. Vocabularies referenced by the Public Health Information Network
Acronym Title Description
UMLS National Library of Medicine’s Unified Medical Language Meta vocabulary collection that includes ICD-9, LOINC, CPT, and
System® soon SNOMED
SNOMED Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine — Clinical Nomenclature copyrighted by the College of American Pathologists;
Terms (SNOMED CT®) includes diseases, clinical findings, etiologies, procedures, and outcomes
ICD-9 International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision Overlaps with SNOMED in diseases, events, and findings
LOINC® Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC) Overlaps with SNOMED on findings and measures
CPT Current Procedural Terminology Overlaps with SNOMED in procedures/interventions concept; not as
granular as LOINC; also designed for use in insurance data exchange
X12N 277 Claim status codes Similar to CPT but focused for insurance claims; not specific enough
 for clinical reporting
tering schemes exist, including a collaborative effort of CDC
and other agencies (18). Assigning chief complaints to syn-
drome groups has been implemented in different ways,
including by Bayesian classification (19) and text substring
searches (2), and is still being studied. Current algorithms and
statistical approaches to detection have been implemented
either by using standard statistical software packages or as part
of the surveillance system. In either case, the information-
system architecture should support preparation of an analysis
data set by using a model appropriate to its intended use, the
secure delivery of the data to the algorithm, and the data
analysis and results presentation itself.
Data-Integration Components
Data integration is characterized by five functions: data
extraction, secure data transport, transformation, normaliza-
tion, and creation of an analysis data set or view. Systems use
different approaches to perform these functions; PHIN cites
multiple best practices.
Data Extraction
Data extraction refers to acquiring a data set from the source
system. Query-based systems extract data through periodic
execution of local queries or reports. IT staff responsible for the
source system often develop these queries and run them auto-
matically. In certain circumstances, queries against the source sys-
tem are executed directly by the surveillance system. Message- or
event-based systems send a message to the surveillance system
whenever something of interest occurs in the source system. Typi-
cally, this stream of messages contains either the entire message
set, or a filtered subset, of an electronic data interchange between
hospital systems. These messages are commonly in Health Level
7 (HL7) format (20) and often can be rerouted by using the
hospitals’ HL7 interface engine or message switchboard. PHIN
refers to a series of standards, including HL7 2.x and 3.0, to
describe the appropriate formatting for data sent from a source
system to public health authorities. However, both query-based
and message-based data are consistent with PHIN.
Transport and Security
Public health surveillance data typically travel through the
Internet. Although the chance of data either being intercepted
or spoofed is low, certain techniques can ensure encryption of
the message and protection of participants’ identities (21). Files
can be encrypted and signed by using a standard (e.g., Pretty
Good Privacy [PGP]), transferred through a virtual private net-
work (VPN), or transmitted by using a file transfer protocol
(FTP) over a securely encrypted channel. PHIN specifies the
PHIN Messaging System (PHINMS), which is based on ebXML
standard for bidirectional data transport. Symmetric public key
encryption (PKI), in which both parties use X.509 certificates,
offers both high-quality channel encryption and authentica-
tion of both sides of the conversation and is used by PHINMS.
PHIN also recommends annual security evaluation.
Transformation and Normalization
Data arriving from different source systems can be in dif-
ferent formats, and coding schemes used for individual data
elements might need to be reconciled. Transformation of syn-
tax and normalization of semantics must be organized and
well-documented. The complexity of these steps is a direct
result of the variance among the source systems. A trade-off
exists between the complexity of programming needed to
manage these transformations and the complexity of the
human relationships needed to ensure that formats are syn-
chronized among separate institutions. Certain systems rep-
resent data by using extensible markup language (XML), thus
allowing data to be manipulated through standard transfor-
mation parsers. PHIN specifies use of XML and the need for
a data-translation capability, without specifying software
packages or platforms.
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Analysis Set Creation and Delivery
Finally, integrated and normalized data need to be presented
for analysis. The performance of detection algorithms is
being researched, and the needs of different detection algo-
rithms vary (22). Even when using a specific algorithm, users
might not know whether to count each patient as a single
data point or allow multiple data points for a patient who
meets criteria for multiple syndromes. A flexible query system
can present multiple analysis sets either to a human or to an
automated detection algorithm. PHIN calls for the capability
to analyze, display, report, and map data. These features are
implemented in the model systems, but not always with
comparable algorithms.
Architectures for Data Integration
The challenges of integrating data from heterogeneous
sources into a single analysis set are not unique to public health
surveillance. Decision support in business endeavors often
depends on integrating and analyzing diverse data sets. Clini-
cal practice increasingly requires this capability, as patient
information is often widely distributed and patient care
requires access to information at other institutions. This need
to access distributed information is central to automated public
health surveillance.
Three generations of data-integration techniques in biomedi-
cal informatics have been described (10). The simplest
approach to data integration is to build a large-source system
containing all data needed to satisfy a query. As data have
multiplied, along with their diversity, uses, and ownership
considerations, new integration approaches have been devel-
oped. Second-generation models integrate data from multiple
sources at a central location. This technology is almost
universal in public health surveillance systems. A third-
generation approach is emerging that involves constructing
relations between data sources so that they appear integrated
to the surveillance user, even though the data remain at their
original location, subject to the control of their original owner.
Distinct models for this third-generation approach exist;
research in this area has only recently been applied to public
health surveillance.
First-Generation Integration
Surveillance based on first-generation systems is not practi-
cal unless a single information system contains sufficient data
to represent the population of interest. A slight enhancement
is the manual combination of data from multiple noninte-
grated sources. This is often a first step in local public health
surveillance. A health department might receive files contain-
ing surveillance reports and combine them manually by using
a spreadsheet program, desktop database, or statistical data
management package. This approach is straightforward but
can result in data fields with cryptic, local meanings and in
data elements represented in a combination of nonuniform
coding schemes from different sources.
Second-Generation Integration
Second-generation integration has been characterized as the
consolidation of data through enterprise information archi-
tecture (10). One sophisticated second-generation approach
is data warehousing, characterized as “historical, summarized,
and consolidated data… targeted for decision support” (23).
Data warehousing systems are common in business and widely
available in health care. Their characteristics closely match
those desired for public health surveillance, although data are
less timely than desired. Warehouse data are typically historic;
although historic data can be useful for research and for
developing event-detection algorithms, ongoing surveillance
requires current data. At present, the common model for
automated public health surveillance systems is a data ware-
house with frequent updates (although the term warehouse is
not typically used in syndromic surveillance literature).
Although multiple approaches to data warehousing exist,
all approaches are implemented through construction of a
centralized database that is optimized for resource-intensive
queries against a substantial portion of data. Data from other
sources are typically imported to the central warehouse data-
base after a query is sent from the central database to the source
database. A lag associated with periodic imports from the clini-
cal database(s) into the warehouse is commonplace and has
been noted in multiple query-based public health surveillance
systems (2,4,5,11). Another limitation of this model is that a
global schema, or data structure, is required, and a change
in this schema typically requires changes in the import
procedures from each source system.
One variant of this approach is for data sources to run local
queries and transmit resulting data on a schedule. A second
variant involves filtering the electronic data interchange mes-
sages used to transfer data between components of an enter-
prise clinical information system and storing data contained
therein. These data are usually formatted according to the HL7
standard. This approach can improve data timeliness substan-
tially, and the uniformity of HL7 encoding might simplify soft-
ware development. However, substantial variation is permitted
within the standard, and HL7-message decoding often requires
customization. Moreover, this approach requires a consistent
global schema and the mapping of that schema into multiple
local variations. This approach is exemplified by RODS (2).
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Third-Generation Integration
The need for future information systems to support auto-
mated information acquisition processes for decision-making
activities was identified over a decade ago (24). To achieve
this automation, an approach based on so-called mediators
(i.e., software agents that translate a query from a global for-
mat to an appropriate local format for a specific database) was
proposed. This model, in which queries are run against dis-
tributed, in-situ data, can be classified as a third-generation
data-integration system.
Contemporary approaches to third-generation systems
include federated databases, mediated query systems, and peer-
to-peer data sharing. These approaches share an apparent
integration of information that remains housed in multiple
source systems. Although these systems might be more com-
plex to build than earlier generation systems, they share the
advantage that data are queried from their original location,
which improves accuracy and decreases lag. Additionally, light-
weight queries can be run routinely for surveillance purposes
with less performance impact on the source system. More richly
detailed underlying data might be equally available for
focused investigations. However, early third-generation
approaches expose the source system to performance degra-
dation from additional queries and require that the source
system be online to process a query. Ongoing research is aimed
at minimizing these shortcomings and strengthening the
approaches’ advantages.
Federated databases are an association of independent data-
bases that allow queries from a single source but have no com-
mon schema or organization (25). The lack of a common
schema means that any application must contain the local
schema for every database it wishes to query. This is efficient
because the queries generated require no translation for the
source systems, but each new data source added to the system
might require a change in each application accessing data from
the federation. A number of federated-database models exist;
these differ in the locus and degree of centralized control over
access to the system (26). The Kleisli system is one federated-
database approach for integrating bioinformatics data, in which
a set of drivers provides access to various heterogeneous
databases (27).
One proposed mediator query model has been implemented
in biomedical applications, which again provide integrated
access to online genetic databases (24). Examples include the
Biomediator (28) and transparent access to multiple bioinfor-
matics information sources (TAMBIS) (29) systems. Medi-
ated schema models offer real-time queries directly against
source systems, combined with the single global schema of a
data warehouse. This greatly simplifies application writing, as
authors need to understand only the single common schema.
This model has not yet been implemented in public health
surveillance.
Perhaps the best-known applications of peer-to-peer communi-
cation are music- and file-sharing services (e.g., Napster and
Gnutella). These services use somewhat different peer-to-peer
models, using a common schema but maintaining their common
index information in either a centralized or distributed fashion,
respectively. This peer-to-peer file-sharing model, extended to
include peered communication among intelligent data-sharing
agents, has been described as a peer-data–management system (30).
Although third-generation systems are not widespread in
public health surveillance, these models are promising. First,
whether executed through a mediated schema or against a
series of autonomous peer agents, the queries in these systems
run directly against the source data. Timeliness and accuracy
are ensured, and performance concerns can be mitigated by
different strategies. These architectures are suitable to run against
both modern and legacy databases, transparently presenting an
integrated view of both. The intelligence built into each par-
ticipant of a peer-data–management system lends itself to sup-
porting queries that can dynamically configure themselves
against the available data sources when they are run. Finally,
local control over data sources, which is inherent in both peer-
data–management systems and the mediated-schema approach,
might enable owners of data at any level to provide access and
detail appropriate to different stakeholders and in different
situations while maintaining control of their own data.
Conclusions
In response to the threat of biologic terrorism, information-
system–based public health surveillance has evolved rapidly.
Second- and third-generation approaches offer the greatest
utility for public health surveillance, and research is critical to
the continued advancement of surveillance systems, especially
third-generation systems.
Future research on surveillance architectures should explore
combinations of methods. For example, a data warehouse that
provides the data consolidation, rich historic record, compre-
hensible data structure, and ability to query the entire corpus
of data at the local public health jurisdiction might be com-
bined with a third-generation model for sharing of situation-
dependent views of those data. The nature of this integration
will be driven by issues of data ownership and privacy, as well
as by an evolving understanding of the optimal data for vari-
ous uses. Broad-scale application of these systems will also
require policy development to address concerns of privacy and
proprietary data. Public health agencies should partner with
universities and research organizations to shape the agenda
for data-integration research. At the same time, academics need
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public health partners to ensure that research questions are
grounded in relevant problems.
In addition, public health agencies must rely on proven tech-
nologies for their operational needs. This implies working with
information system vendors to take advantage of data-integration
solutions and to ensure those solutions meet public health needs.
As has been the case in clinical informatics, where data used for
outcomes research are also useful for chronic disease management,
quality assurance, health services research, and other purposes, sur-
veillance systems likely will evolve to enhance public and environ-
mental health practice and management. Public health leaders
should pay attention to how these data-integration models scale in
other domains; links with the research community will prove help-
ful. Although public health agencies must serve an immediate
operational role in national security, aggressive research is required
to extend the frontiers of data integration to ensure success.
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Abstract
The need for enhanced biologic surveillance has led to the search for new sources of data. Beginning in September 2001,
Emergency Medical Associates (EMA) of New Jersey, an emergency physician group practice, undertook a series of surveillance
projects in collaboration with state and federal agencies. This paper examines EMA’s motivations and concerns and discusses the
collaborative opportunities available to data suppliers for syndromic surveillance. Motivations for supplying data included altru-
ism and public service, previous involvement in terrorism and disaster preparedness, academic research interests, and the oppor-
tunity to find added value in the group’s existing information systems. Concerns and barriers included cost, maintaining patient
confidentiality, and challenges in interacting with the public health community. The extensive and carefully maintained elec-
tronic medical record enabled EMA to conduct multiple studies in collaboration with state and federal agencies. The electronic
medical record provides useful data that might be more sensitive and specific in detecting outbreaks than the
patient-chief–complaint data more commonly used for surveillance. EMA’s experience also indicates that opportunities exist for
the public health community to work with emergency physicians and emergency physician groups as suppliers of data. Such
collaborations not only are useful for syndromic surveillance systems but also can help build relations that might facilitate a
response to an actual biologic attack.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subse-
quent release through the mail of Bacillus anthracis have
increased awareness of the risk for biologic attack. The 2003
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak also dem-
onstrated the threat of emerging infectious diseases. Certain
types of biologic attacks or emerging infectious disease out-
breaks might initially present with nonspecific symptoms
across a large population. At this stage of disease, a pathologic
diagnosis might not be possible, although the symptoms might
fall into a definable syndrome. Syndromic surveillance uses
available data sources to detect such outbreaks at the earliest
possible stage so early action can be taken to mitigate the
effects and spread of disease.
Researchers are evaluating the early detection potential of
such data sources as pharmacy sales, school and work absen-
teeism, and emergency department (ED) patient chief com-
plaints. This paper discusses a less commonly used source of
ED data — clinical data from an electronic medical record
maintained by an emergency physician group practice. Such
data can be made available in real time and can include
detailed patient demographics, electronic versions of physi-
cians’ notes, physicians’ choice of charting templates, labora-
tory test results, and clinical diagnoses. This paper discusses
the motivations and concerns of an emergency medicine group
as a data provider and examines opportunities for collabora-
tion between the public health and emergency medical com-
munities. It also describes how these data have been used for
research in syndromic surveillance and how data from an elec-
tronic medical record might be used for enhanced real-time
surveillance.
Practice Setting and Available
Data Types
Emergency Medical Associates of New Jersey (EMA) is an
emergency physician group practice that is fully owned by the
practicing physicians and is constituted as a professional asso-
ciation. EMA contracts with hospitals to provide physician
and physician-assistant coverage for 16 EDs in central and
southern New Jersey and in New York State, with a combined
volume of approximately 2,000 patients/day. The hospitals
are a mixture of community hospitals and teaching hospitals,
and group members function as faculty for two emergency
medicine residencies. The practice receives an estimated one
third of all ED visits in the northern half of New Jersey.
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Patient visits are recorded by using the group’s proprietary
clinical software, EDIMS™ (Emergency Department Infor-
mation Manager System). The software is integrated with the
hospital’s patient registration system and stores patient demo-
graphic information. It also tracks patient location and status
during ED visits and records physicians’ notes through a sys-
tem of charting templates.
All data are uploaded electronically to EMA’s central office
in Livingston, New Jersey. Reports are generated by a propri-
etary reporting system, eMars™ (Emergency Medicine Analy-
sis and Reporting System). These reports are routinely used
to monitor billing and ED operations. All data are maintained
in an Oracle™ database. Full clinical data, including physi-
cians’ electronic notes, are available from January 1996 to
present. Billing data, including International Classification of
Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) billing codes, are available
from January 1988 to present.
Surveillance after the
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks
Before September 11, 2001, the primary research use of the
eMars database had been for epidemiologic studies of emer-
gency medicine conducted by the group’s physicians (1–4),
who had minimal interest in biologic surveillance. Any inter-
est in disaster management and multiple casualty incidents
was concentrated on internal and external disaster plans.
This changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center (WTC) in downtown Manhattan on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. On that day, the group’s emergency physi-
cians waited at their EDs or at disaster staging sites near the
WTC for a potential onslaught of patients that never materi-
alized. Because the threat of an associated biologic attack
seemed real, physicians at each ED scrambled to prepare their
decontamination equipment and gather information about
illnesses that might result from such an attack. They under-
stood that daily life had changed fundamentally and that
emergency physicians needed to rethink aspects of disaster
preparedness, especially the need to detect and respond to a
biologic attack.
Although the WTC attack did not include a release of a
biologic agent, it was soon followed by the mailborne release
of B. anthracis. Over the following months, a substantial num-
ber of patients reported to EDs to “get checked for anthrax.”
EMA’s 16 hospitals treated as many as 62 patients/day (repre-
senting 3.5% of all visits groupwide) requesting a test for
exposure to B. anthracis and often requesting prophylactic
medications. These patients were expecting expert, reliable
advice. The ED physician’s sense of responsibility was rein-
forced when an emergency physician was sued for failing to
detect one of the first cases of anthrax. Emergency physicians
already knew that the ED needed to be prepared to respond
to a mass-casualty biologic attack and now realized that they
could be held legally liable for not detecting an attack in its
earliest phases.
Difficulty of Detecting Changes
in Illness Patterns
Surveillance for sentinel cases would rely on astute observa-
tion by the ED physician. The New Jersey Department of
Health and CDC websites were helpful in establishing diag-
nostic criteria and reporting mechanisms. The majority of
emergency physicians would likely identify a sentinel case of
anthrax if the features were typical. However, physicians also
realized that in a biologic attack, a person might report ini-
tially in a nonspecific way. In addition to looking for a senti-
nel case, physicians were also advised by CDC to look for
“illness patterns and diagnostic clues that might indicate an
unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with intentional
release of a biologic agent” (5).
The individual emergency physician, working in isolation,
might have difficulty detecting a subtle increase in patients
reporting with a given nonspecific symptom. Emergency phy-
sicians see patients with a diverse group of illnesses whose
incidence varies widely. On any given day, emergency physi-
cians expect a greater than usual disease incidence of one or
more conditions on the basis of chance alone. For example, at
the end of a work shift, a physician might not report seeing
three cases of diarrheal illness during that shift even though
the average is only one case. A substantial change in case mix
over a 24-hour period that would be obvious from examining
aggregate data from multiple physicians might appear as ran-
dom variation to an individual physician seeing only a subset
of those patients.
Individual physicians face difficulties in identifying out-
breaks. For example, in December 2002, two EMA physi-
cians examined EMA’s ED volume data to determine whether
the data indicated a seasonal gastroenteritis outbreak, which
they believed had started 2 weeks earlier. The data revealed
that the outbreak had actually begun 6 weeks earlier (Figure).
An ED physician might need to work multiple shifts over a
week or more to notice an aberration (e.g., a doubling or tri-
pling of the average number of gastroenteritis cases). The dif-
ficulty of outbreak detection is even greater when an individual
physician is looking for multiple disease patterns simulta-
neously.
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Syndromic surveillance of aggregate visit data is an important
component of preparedness. A biologic attack might cause a sud-
den increase in the volume of patients with a specific set of symp-
toms that would be invisible to an individual physician but
apparent to analysts using combined data in real time. This might
activate heightened surveillance for sentinel cases. In addition,
even if an attack was first detected by other means, having rapid
access to information about patient volumes could help deter-
mine the appropriate response and allocation of resources.
Motivations for Participating
in Syndromic Surveillance
EMA was motivated to become involved in syndromic sur-
veillance for multiple reasons. An initial motivator was that
syndromic surveillance represented an opportunity for doing
research needed to validate its effectiveness. EMA’s academic
physicians had conducted epidemiologic research by using the
billing and clinical databases for >15 years; the same methods
could be adapted for research into syndromic surveillance. In
particular, EMA’s well-maintained and clinically rich database
and substantial patient volume would facilitate the study of
questions difficult to research in other settings. By collaborat-
ing with other agencies, especially public health, EMA physi-
cians might be able to make a contribution to this new field.
The opportunity for public service was another motivator.
EMA hospitals cover approximately one third of all ED visits
in central and northern New Jersey. Therefore, the group might
be able to contribute directly to syndromic surveillance
efforts locally. The availability of real-time clinical informa-
tion from the electronic medical record might offer a unique
ability to track and respond to outbreaks.
Another motivator for the group’s administrators was that
involvement in syndromic surveillance might enhance the
group’s image in the marketplace. By participating in impor-
tant public health efforts, EMA’s physician group might be
perceived as being at the forefront of the specialty in this new
area. Such projects might also be a way to demonstrate the
added value of the group’s information management systems.
Finally, emergency physicians have a personal vested inter-
est in early detection of outbreaks. As illustrated by the 2003
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, emer-
gency and hospital personnel can become infected at the ini-
tial stages of an outbreak, and health-care personnel can be
disproportionately affected overall. Any advance warning could
help emergency physicians augment infection-control proce-
dures at the earliest possible time.
Potential Barriers to Participating
in Biologic Surveillance
One difficulty with implementing any project in an ED
setting is the environment’s unpredictable and often chaotic
nature. However, the clinical systems in place gather data that
can be obtained passively without making further demands
on personnel.
Costs were also a concern. To an extent, EMA’s robust re-
porting system, used to produce regular reports for billing,
financial management, and operations management and to
track physician productivity, could be readily adapted to
syndromic surveillance. Because the needed data were already
being gathered for other purposes, the expense of generating
reports for research would be minimal. The larger expense
would come from improving system infrastructure to accom-
modate the real-time gathering of data. Data are collected daily,
but certain data reporting is delayed up to 3 days to ensure its
completion on site. Implementing real-time reporting would
require system enhancements to enable the necessary fields to
be uploaded immediately. Another cost might be the need to
reformat data in a standardized format to share with local,
state, and national agencies.
Initial costs for generating reports for research purposes were
accommodated through the EMA Research Foundation.
Improvements in real-time gathering of data were included in
an upgrade of EMA’s data collection systems. Recently, EMA
initiated Internet-based reporting of syndromic trends to EMA
physicians as part of a program to facilitate communications
and operations within the group using Internet-based tech-
nology.
Patient confidentiality and compliance with the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
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was another concern. Fortunately, EMA’s billing and infor-
mation systems personnel are well-versed in HIPAA require-
ments and experienced in sharing de-identified subsets of data
for billing and reporting purposes. However, large-scale bio-
logic surveillance of the ED population could be perceived as
invasive of privacy. This problem might be reduced in a group
medical practice in which clinical follow-up and quality con-
trol activities are part of everyday operations. Patients are
often contacted the day after an ED visit to ensure follow-up
with physicians’ instructions and to monitor patient outcomes.
Biologic surveillance for unusual clusters or trends is a rea-
sonable extension of ongoing medical services. All individual
identifying information stays within the practice.
A more substantial barrier is potential resistance within the
public health community. Syndromic surveillance is a new
field that requires research and validation. Responding to alerts
from a syndromic surveillance system might burden the pub-
lic health infrastructure. Pursuing syndromic surveillance
would be futile without the interest of the public health com-
munity. Ultimately, EMA identified ample opportunities to
collaborate with public health agencies.
Research Projects
and Collaborations
EMA’s initial research effort into syndromic surveillance was
to determine whether the existing database could track known
seasonal disease outbreaks. A set of nine ICD-9 code syndrome
groupings were developed and used to filter the database. This
enabled creation of time-series graphs for each syndrome group
over a period of years (6). The data were encouraging in that
they depicted seasonal variation for nearly all of the syndrome
groups. The seasonal influenza epidemic was identified, as were
annual spikes appearing to correlate with the seasonal rotavirus
epidemic in children. Seasonal variations in asthma were also
identified.
EMA first collaborated with the New York State Depart-
ment of Health (NYSDOH) to study biologic surveillance
methods based on patient chief complaints. By applying meth-
ods adapted from the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene to the EMA database, the group was
able to demonstrate key seasonal illness patterns, particularly
the influenza season, by using a chief-complaint methodol-
ogy (7). The system’s ability to track the influenza season lent
credence to its ability to detect other types of outbreaks.
As part of a syndromic surveillance working group, EMA
also supplied data for a study of syndromic definitions and
ICD-9 code groupings (8). The working group included mem-
bers of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Electronic Surveil-
lance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based
Epidemics (ESSENCE) project, CDC, Harvard-Pilgrim
Health Care, and EMA. EMA’s contribution was to supply
ED data that could be used to test different choices of ICD-9
groupings. In addition to providing raw data, participating
EMA personnel were able to interpret the data in the ED set-
ting. The data allowed the working group to identify ICD-9
codes commonly used in the ED and differentiate them from
codes that are less commonly used but might be better mark-
ers of biologic terrorism. This provided a rationale for strati-
fying codes within a syndrome, so that, if desired, the more
common but less specific codes could easily be removed to
search for a signal among the less common but more specific
codes.
Having studied the existing ICD-9 and chief-complaint
methods, EMA and NYSDOH were then able to compare
the sensitivity and specificity of the two methods by using a
single database (9). This study examined the chief-complaint
method for respiratory syndrome by using the ICD-9 method
as the criterion standard (9). Two results emerged. First, a sub-
stantial difference between the syndrome definitions used for
the two methods was noted; although the study initially found
poor sensitivity (31%) for chief complaints as compared with
ICD-9 codes, sensitivity improved substantially when the
methods were adjusted to more closely reflect similar syndrome
definitions (sensitivity: 53%). Second, a difference existed
between the information captured in the chief complaint and
the information captured in the ICD-9 code that could not
be resolved. For example, a patient with a chief complaint in
the respiratory syndrome (e.g., cough) might easily be assigned
an ICD-9 code in a different syndrome (e.g., fever), and vice
versa.
These studies were facilitated by the fact that the existing
corporate database, originally developed for billing and clini-
cal purposes, was able to provide a large data set with consis-
tent capture of ICD-9 codes and clinical information. Also,
the existing data-analysis methods, originally used for corpo-
rate analysis, proved a good match for the needs of syndromic
surveillance.
Unique data sources within EMA’s electronic medical record
were also explored. For example, in EMA’s system, the physi-
cian chooses one of approximately 450 charting templates at
the time he or she sees the patient. Thus, the physician’s choice
of charting template is available in real time before the patient
leaves the ED. Because the choice of charting template
embodies the physician’s clinical judgment, a high level of
agreement can exist between the physician’s choice of chart-
ing template and the final ICD-9 coding of the patient. Com-
parison of the two methods using the Kappa statistic
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determined approximately perfect agreement for the asthma,
chest pain, and headache filters; excellent agreement for the
skin, any gastrointestinal, and diarrhea filters; and moderate
agreement for the respiratory and fever filters. (10). These
results indicate that the physician’s choice of charting tem-
plate might be useful for real-time biologic surveillance when
available in an electronic medical record system.
Ongoing Role for Biologic
Surveillance Within EMA’s
Group Practice
Biologic surveillance reports are now included with other
daily, weekly, and monthly reports generated by eMars. These
reports provide statistics on the incidence of illness within the
practice, categorized by syndrome (e.g., gastrointestinal, res-
piratory, or febrile illness). The statistics are based on chief-
complaints, ICD-9 codes, and physician’s choice of charting
templates. Reports are circulated to the practice’s physicians
through group e-mail and posted on the group’s website.
Anecdotal feedback from physicians indicates that they
appreciate these biologic surveillance reports because they pro-
vide early warning of disease outbreaks. For example, by know-
ing that the influenza season had begun, physicians were able
to apprise themselves of the latest recommendations and
options for influenza treatment and prophylaxis. A lively dis-
cussion ensued about the possible use of neuraminidase
inhibitors for patients reporting to the ED with influenza-
like symptoms and for their caretakers. In another example,
when reports revealed that the annual pediatric gastroenteri-
tis epidemic had begun, EMA’s pediatric emergency physi-
cians were able to adjust their treatment of affected children.
For children whose pattern of illness matched the pattern
expected for the seasonal epidemic, physicians felt more com-
fortable proceeding with fewer laboratory tests and trusting
their clinical impressions. This reduced time, expense, and
patient discomfort.
Conclusion
EMA has successfully used its corporate database for col-
laborative studies with public health agencies. Such efforts
represent only a limited portion of similar projects completed
or underway in the emergency medicine community, as mul-
tiple publications have documented (11–20). Emergency phy-
sicians are active in disaster management and terrorism
preparedness locally as well as at county, state, and federal
levels. Emergency physicians are not only involved in passive
surveillance but also have participated in active surveillance
(e.g., the drop-in SARS surveillance system implemented
recently in Milwaukee [21]).
The partnerships that result from collaborative biologic sur-
veillance projects might be more important than the projects
themselves. Because the nature of a future terrorist attack can-
not be anticipated, developing collaborative relationships now
will enhance the ability of public health authorities to respond
flexibly and effectively should such an attack occur.
EMA’s experience indicates that opportunities exist for the
public health community to work with emergency physician
groups as data providers. Such collaborations are useful not
only for syndromic surveillance but can also help build rela-
tions that might be useful when responding to an actual bio-
logic attack.
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Abstract
Introduction: On March 15, 2003, CDC requested health-care and public health agencies to conduct surveillance for severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The SARS Surveillance Project (SARS-SP) was established to rapidly implement
multiregional SARS surveillance in emergency departments (EDs) by using existing Internet-based tools.
Objectives: The objectives of SARS-SP were to 1) disseminate and update SARS screening forms for ED triage, 2) establish
surveillance for SARS syndrome elements by using Regional Emergency Medicine Internet (REMI), 3) expand surveillance to
multiple regions, and 4) evaluate the usefulness of Internet tools for agile surveillance during a rapidly emerging global epidemic.
Methods: SARS-SP developed, distributed, and updated an Internet-based triage form to identify patients for infection
control and public health reporting. EDs then were invited to report visit frequencies with various SARS syndrome elements
to local public health authorities by using the REMI Internet application (first in one metropolitan area, and later in four).
After pilot-testing in one metropolitan area, the surveillance system was implemented in three others.
Results: Active syndromic surveillance was established by health departments in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Denver, Colorado;
Akron, Ohio; and Fort Worth, Texas. A total of 27 EDs reported syndrome frequencies from >146,000 patient encounters.
Conclusions: ED and public health partners reported being satisfied with the system, confirming the usefulness of Internet
tools in the rapid establishment of multiregion syndromic surveillance during an emerging global epidemic.
Introduction
On March 15, 2003, CDC urgently requested health-care
and public health agencies to conduct surveillance for severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (1), a pneumonia later
attributed to a newly discovered coronavirus (SARS-CoV).
SARS had spread rapidly by air travel to three continents and
appeared to be highly infectious to health-care workers and
patients in health-care settings (1). The cause of SARS was
then unknown, and diagnostic tests were lacking. Basic epi-
demiologic facts (e.g., the range of clinical symptomatology,
whether persons with mild or asymptomatic infection could
transmit disease, and the range of possible routes of infection)
were unknown. Minimal assurance could be given that SARS
was not already circulating in the United States. As a result,
public health systems had to deploy complex, rapidly chang-
ing measures to protect health-care facilities and to take an
agile approach to surveillance.
Frontlines of Medicine (http://www.frontlinesmed.org) is a
collaborative of emergency medicine, public health, and
informatics professionals organized to enable better public
health surveillance of emergency department (ED) informa-
tion (2). Frontlines of Medicine created the SARS Surveil-
lance Project (SARS-SP) workgroup to develop, disseminate,
and update a practical screening (case-finding) form for
potential SARS patients in EDs. The form was used to mea-
sure daily ED volumes of SARS syndrome elements. These
counts were transmitted and assembled regionally by using
EMSystem® Regional Emergency Medicine Internet (REMI).*
Because EMSystem was in use in 26 cities (Figure 1),
syndromic surveillance developed in one city was presumed
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to be portable to multiple urban areas
quickly and inexpensively.
The objectives of SARS-SP were to 1)
create, disseminate, and update SARS
screening forms for ED triage, 2) con-
duct SARS surveillance by using REMI,
3) expand surveillance to multiple
regions, and 4) evaluate the usefulness
of Internet tools for agile surveillance
during a rapidly emerging global epi-
demic. SARS triage forms and surveil-
lance were field-tested in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The form was then distrib-
uted over the Internet, and three other
urban regions initiated surveillance.
Methods
Case-Finding Triage Forms
A single-page screening form was created for ED triage per-
sonnel (available at http://www.frontlinesmed.org/SARS-SP).
The form was designed to 1) identify patients requiring
immediate infection control and public health notification
(case finding) and 2) facilitate counting and reporting to public
health officials the number of daily visits featuring SARS syn-
drome elements for time-trend surveillance. Three check boxes
recorded the presence or absence of the following elements of
the SARS case definition (hereafter referred to as “SARS ele-
ments”): fever (history or finding of temperature >38ºC); res-
piratory findings (i.e., cough, shortness of breath, difficulty
breathing, pneumonia, or respiratory distress syndrome); and
either recent travel to locations associated with SARS trans-
mission or contact with a suspected SARS patient (hereafter
referred to as “SARS risks”). Pulse oximetry <95% was
recorded separately.
Screening was originally recommended only for patients with
fever; later, after CDC recommended assessing patients for
possible SARS on the basis of either fever or respiratory symp-
toms, triage personnel were instructed to screen patients with
either complaint. The screening form encouraged ED staff to
telephone the local public health authority immediately for
any patient with the triad of fever, respiratory findings, and
SARS risks.
On March 17, 2003, forms were distributed to Milwaukee
EDs via REMI. On March 30, revised forms were posted
online and the national membership of the American College
of Emergency Physicians was notified by e-mail of the screen-
ing form website. Persons downloading forms were invited to
enter an e-mail address to receive notification of updated forms
and to participate in the voluntary syndromic surveillance
effort. Screening forms were revised twice (and registered
users notified) to matching changing CDC recommendations.
Syndromic Surveillance
The Milwaukee Health Department (MHD) invited local
EDs to report daily visit totals and the numbers of screened
patients sorted by mutually exclusive combinations of SARS
elements (e.g., fever only, fever with respiratory findings only,
respiratory findings with SARS risks only, etc.). Because little
was then known of the clinical spectrum of SARS infection,
surveillance was performed for each clinical element so that
health authorities could be alerted to rising rates of febrile or
respiratory illness even if patients failed to meet CDC criteria
for SARS diagnosis (Figure 2). The reporting system was simi-
lar to that employed in Milwaukee the previous summer dur-
ing the 2002 Major League Baseball All-Star Game using
EMSystem (4,5).
Detailed instructions were e-mailed to ED managers and
mounted on REMI for reference, with a follow-up confer-
ence call. MHD staff provided assistance as needed. Desig-
nated ED staff collected all screening forms for 24-hour periods
and sorted them into mutually exclusive sets of SARS ele-
ments. REMI automatically reminded EDs daily to enter the
previous day’s totals on a screen designed for that purpose.
Only authorized staff could enter or view surveillance data.
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FIGURE 2. Workflow for the SARS Surveillance Project




































Only visit counts were entered into REMI; no personally iden-
tifiable health information was transmitted. Triage personnel
stamped each form with patient identification and retained
completed forms in case public health investigation of a par-
ticular patient was needed. If REMI reports included visits with
the triad of fever, respiratory illness, and SARS risks, public
health officials could ask the ED to identify the patient.
During nationwide dissemination, those who downloaded
screening forms were asked if they would conduct syndromic
surveillance. If ED staff expressed interest, the state or local
public health agency offered assistance. If EMSystem was not
already in use in the area, local interface screens, log-on
accounts, server accounts, data storage, and 24-hour/day tech-
nical assistance were offered at no charge to EDs and health
departments, using existing EMSystem infrastructure.
Participating public health staff used password-protected
accounts to download daily jurisdiction-specific data from REMI
as a tab-delimited spreadsheet. Each health department had
exclusive access to its local data and controlled how it was ana-
lyzed and acted on. Milwaukee data were also downloaded
remotely at CDC for analysis with the Early Aberration Report-
ing System (EARS) to test the feasibility of remote analysis (6).
Surveys
Participating health department surveillance coordinators
provided summary statistics and impressions of the project.
In July 2003, surveys were also sent to nurse managers at the
13 participating Milwaukee-area EDs.
Results
During May–September 2003, a total of >500 SARS-SP
website hits were logged, and 257 persons requested e-mail
notification of screening-form changes. Much smaller num-
bers visited the site after receiving e-mail notification of
revised forms. The total number of EDs or clinics that used
the screening form is not known.
During March 19–June 25, 2003, a total of 13 Milwaukee-
area EDs participated in syndromic surveillance of 105,669
visits. Three other metropolitan areas (Denver, Colorado;
Akron, Ohio; and Fort Worth, Texas) established ED
syndromic surveillance with reporting to health authorities.
During April 23–May 31, 2003, nine EDs in Denver, Colo-
rado, that already used REMI sent surveillance information
on 16,997 encounters to the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment (CDPHE). During May 1–June 1,
2003, three EDs in Akron, Ohio, reported information from
12,939 encounters to the Akron Health Department (AHD).
Neither the hospitals nor AHD had previously used REMI.
During May 12–October 12, 2003, two hospitals in Fort
Worth, Texas, that already used REMI reported on 10,941
encounters to Tarrant County Public Health (TCPH), with
surveillance continuing beyond October. EDs in eight other
cities expressed interest in daily syndromic surveillance, but
efforts to recruit a public health agency failed in seven. The
eighth city initiated a surveillance pilot in fall 2003.
Only one person in all four cities ultimately met the CDC
criteria for possible SARS, and no confirmed cases were
reported. Thus, neither case-finding sensitivity nor specificity
can be measured. During March 15–October 1, 2003, three
of the four jurisdictions investigated 42 potential SARS cases,
of which 22 (52%) were prompted by the triage form. In
Milwaukee, five investigations originated from telephone calls
about positive ED triage forms; four originated from REMI
electronic reports; and five originated outside EDs. All 13
investigations by CDPHE began with REMI reports. All 15
TCPH investigations began before initiation of SARS-SP sur-
veillance and originated from nonmedical settings (e.g. from
airlines). No patient investigated for possible SARS visited a
participating ED but failed detection by the screening form.
The median percentage of surveillance period days for which
participating EDs reported syndrome frequencies electroni-
cally by using REMI was 89% (range: 52%–100%). The most
common data-quality problems cited by public health sur-
veillance coordinators were nonreporting, reports lacking
total ED visit census, and errors in the date of surveillance;
telephone calls were sufficient to resolve these concerns. In
Milwaukee, questions and data-quality concerns required fre-
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FIGURE 3. Daily emergency department (ED) visits by patients with three severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) elements
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Note: The upper graph displays crude counts, counts as a percentage of all ED visits, and counts displayed as a 7-day moving average. The lower graph
displays standard scores of the crude counts (cumulative mean minus daily count divided by the standard deviation).
quent calls (7–9 daily) to and from EDs early in the project
but only 1–2 calls by the end.
Resources did not permit on-site chart review to validate
the accuracy of SARS element frequency reporting. Also, the
standard ED record would not necessarily collect SARS risk
history (travel or contact) and thus is not an ideal standard
for comparison.
Each city performed its own analyses of syndromic time-
series data. Cross-city analysis was not performed. In Mil-
waukee, staff graphed time series of SARS elements as crude
counts, proportions of total ED census, and standard scores
(i.e., the difference of daily counts from the cumulative mean,
divided by the standard deviation) to display significant aber-
rations from the mean (Figure 3). The overall incidence rate
of ED visits with each SARS element varied widely between
cities, which is not surprising given the different geographic
areas and date ranges of surveillance. Local surveillance-
period incidence rates of ED patients reporting fever plus res-
piratory illness ranged from 0.33% in Akron to 1.4% in
Denver. Two cities (Milwaukee and Fort Worth) investigated
increasing syndrome trends; in both cases, telephone queries
and record reviews by ED staff proved sufficient to exclude
SARS as the cause.
During March 22–April 20, 2003, CDC easily downloaded
daily Milwaukee data for EARS analysis, but these files did not
include corrections made by local public health staff after tele-
phone contact with EDs. Permitting online correction of data
files on REMI would enable more accurate remote analysis.
Six of 13 participating Milwaukee ED managers returned
nonanonymous surveys. Four of six believed SARS screening
was performed as requested during all shifts. On a five-point
scale (“strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “neutral,” “some-
what disagree,” and “strongly disagree,”) five of six managers
at least somewhat agreed they felt more secure knowing screen-
ing was being performed and also that screening increased the
index of suspicion for SARS in their ED (one response to
each item was neutral). Four at least somewhat agreed that
data tabulation and data entry were easy (with one respon-
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dent neutral and the other somewhat disagreeing to both
items). The average estimate for the time to complete
the form at triage was 2.6 minutes (range: 1–5 minutes;
median: 3 minutes), and the average estimate for daily tabula-
tion and reporting was 17 minutes (range: 5–45 minutes;
median: 15 minutes). These compared favorably with esti-
mated time spent on syndromic surveillance during the 2002
All-Star Game project, further validating that surveillance from
the controlled confines of the triage desk was more manage-
able. Two managers had participated in syndromic surveil-
lance during the previous summer; both strongly agreed that
triage-based surveillance was superior, and both at least some-
what agreed that prior experience with REMI surveillance
facilitated the rapid start-up of SARS surveillance.
The four public health surveillance coordinators all reported
that they were glad they had participated and were interested
in similar surveillance opportunities. Queried on ways to
improve the system, two coordinators stated that they wished
they had recruited additional EDs to participate, and two stated
that they desired better communications between public health
agencies and ED staff.
Discussion
 SARS traveled extremely quickly, and new information
about the disease evolved at a similar pace. SARS-SP, a rapidly
organized, voluntary response, leveraged three capabilities to
help clinicians and health officials keep pace: 1) interdiscipli-
nary collaboration between emergency medicine, public health,
and informatics; 2) an always-on, secure REMI network used
in >24 metropolitan areas, and 3) rapid Internet information
dissemination to clinicians. These were applied to two critical
tasks: 1) helping ED staff detect possible SARS cases (case-
finding) so they could protect patients, staff, and the commu-
nity and 2) establishing syndromic surveillance to warn local
health officials if illness consistent with SARS was increasing
in their communities. The latter was deployed because CDC’s
surveillance focused on identifying known or suspected SARS
risks but might not alert authorities to illness from unsus-
pected SARS contact (e.g., from asymptomatic transmission
or unreported cases).
Ready-to-use screening forms helped busy ED staff to con-
sistently meet complex, rapidly changing CDC guidance. ED
triage (through which every patient passes early in an ED visit)
was selected for case-finding and syndromic surveillance on
the basis of ED workflow and previous experience. The 2002
All-Star Game surveillance project determined that relying on
treating staff to record syndrome data produced poor-quality
surveillance data and substantial staff-time demands (4,5). In
contrast, triage nurses equipped with a well-crafted case-
finding form could consistently “Screen—Isolate—Call Pub-
lic Health.” Although the sample size was limited, ED
managers in Milwaukee reported higher satisfaction, greater
confidence in data collection, and more reasonable time de-
mands from triage-based surveillance than from the earlier
2002 All-Star Game surveillance program.
Paper-based forms have important limitations. Manual data
check-off, tabulation, and entry each multiply the risk of data
error and consume staff time. However, surveillance methods
relying exclusively on mined data from existing registration,
discharge, or other routine data sets would miss relevant
information (e.g., recent travel), and they would not provide
a real-time alert to ED personnel to implement infection con-
trol, diagnostic testing, and public health reporting. There-
fore, data mining alone does not replace intelligent tools at
the point of service for agile surveillance and response. Ide-
ally, future triage information systems could be modified rap-
idly to collect and analyze newly important information (e.g.,
travel) alongside other routinely collected data (e.g., chief com-
plaints) as part of routine workflow. The right combinations
of data would automatically alert staff and public health
authorities of a potential case while data for ongoing syndromic
surveillance are collected with no additional human effort.
Intelligent, programmable, and interoperable electronic medi-
cal record systems, linked through clinical networks such as
REMI, could result in automated yet agile surveillance.
Milwaukee had used REMI previously to facilitate drop-in
ED surveillance. Resulting experience and relationships helped
MHD rapidly implement SARS surveillance. EDs in other
cities appeared more prone to participate when they already
used REMI in their day-to-day work (as was the case in 24 of
the 27 participating EDs). Staff used the same application for
surveillance that they used daily for other purposes, eliminat-
ing the need for new hardware and simplifying training. By
contrast, public health agencies that were unfamiliar with the
REMI application appeared more reluctant to participate.
Existing experience, servers, and 24-hour technical assis-
tance capability that already supported the REMI system were
leveraged to support rapid, multiregional surveillance. The
project demonstrated that remote CDC specialists could use
aberration analysis on remote REMI data. Ideally, such data
should be quality-checked locally before analysis.
Rapid dissemination and updating of the screening form
was enabled by ACEP’s membership e-mail list and Internet
tools. Because SARS-SP anticipated rapid evolution of case
definitions, clinicians were encouraged to subscribe for
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updates. However, not surprisingly, busy clinicians often failed
to return for updated forms after downloading the original
form. Ideally, REMI-networked clinical information systems
would automatically incorporate updates and eliminate
outdated tools from the point of service.
EDs in 12 urban areas expressed willingness to submit
syndromic surveillance information to public health authori-
ties, but only four health departments participated. The Coun-
cil of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and the National
Association of County and City Health Officials did not pro-
mote the project among their members because it lacked for-
mal CDC endorsement. Such endorsement might be a
precondition to participation, particularly in a fast-moving
emergency with competing time demands.
Although this was a successful proof of concept of multi-
regional REMI-enabled surveillance, it had limitations. First,
sensitivity and specificity of the triage screening and report-
ing cannot be calculated without SARS cases. Second, data
were not validated by chart review. Third, ED records do not
routinely record all information (e.g., travel) solicited. Finally,
the system emphasized sensitivity over specificity.
With sufficient proportion of EDs involved, a sharp or sus-
tained increase in community incidence of febrile and respi-
ratory illness would likely be detected. Stamping and storing
complete screening forms simplified rapid public health
investigation. Because all four health departments reported
being satisfied that they had participated in the surveillance
project, it appears that a low positive predictive value for SARS
was nevertheless practically manageable. Surveillance did not
exhaust the patience of either EDs or public health agencies
in springtime, but the outcome might have been different if
the incidence rate of influenza and other common respiratory
viruses were rising rather than falling.
Conclusion
SARS syndromic surveillance was rapidly established under
emergency conditions by a loose network of collaborators
using the tools available. It was handicapped by the lack of a
legal or practical framework for sharing surveillance informa-
tion across jurisdictions, and resources did not allow rigorous
evaluation of the system’s performance. Nevertheless, the ability
to share surveillance tools across communities in a rapidly
evolving outbreak illustrates how networked tools (e.g.,
REMI), which now reach >18% of the nation’s EDs, have
become practical instruments for agile surveillance across
multiple regions. This is enhanced when clinicians and public
health agencies are familiar with the applications from regular
use. State and federal public health involvement might elicit
participation by more agencies and could exploit untapped
potential of these applications, such as integrating data
across multiple regions and employing more sophisticated
aberration algorithms.
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Abstract
The development of syndromic surveillance systems to detect potential terrorist-related outbreaks has the potential to be a useful
public health surveillance activity. However, the perception of how the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule applies to the disclosure of certain public health information might affect the ability of state and local health
departments to implement syndromic surveillance systems within their jurisdictions. To assess this effect, a multiple-question survey
asked respondents to share their experiences regarding patient confidentiality and HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements when imple-
menting syndromic surveillance systems. This assessment summarizes the results of a national survey of state terrorism-preparedness
coordinators and state epidemiologists and reflects the authors’ and others’ experiences with implementation.
Introduction
State and local public health authorities use reports of diag-
nosed diseases or clinical syndromes to monitor disease or con-
dition patterns (1). Syndromic surveillance refers to the
systematic gathering and analysis of prediagnostic health data
to rapidly detect clusters of symptoms and health complaints
that might indicate an infectious-disease outbreak or other
public health threat (2). Examples include electronic moni-
toring of routinely collected syndromic data (e.g., fever, gas-
trointestinal illness, or respiratory complaints in emergency
departments) and time-sensitive data collection at regional
hospitals before, during, or after major public events (e.g.,
Super Bowl, Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games, or political
conventions).
Although certain syndromic surveillance activities use
nonidentifiable data, the majority of systems require individu-
ally identifiable health data to permit rapid and efficient
investigation of signals and follow-up with affected persons.
As a result, syndromic surveillance systems often require medi-
cal providers or others to disclose identifiable health informa-
tion to state, tribal, or local public health agencies; these data
are typically shared with federal public health authorities in a
nonidentifiable format. Multiple legal concerns arise from such
data practices, including questions about systems’ underlying
legal authority and the relevance of health information pri-
vacy regulations pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule or other
health information privacy laws.
These legal concerns include the questions of 1) whether
state statutory authorization for disease reporting applies to
syndromic data; 2) the perceived effect of HIPAA’s require-
ment that covered entities account for disclosures to public
health agencies; 3) the effect of HIPAA requirements on
investigating signals of possible outbreaks; and 4) the cost to
reporting organizations or public health agencies of establish-
ing a flow of syndromic data (3). In particular, public health
professionals are concerned about whether potential report-
ing organizations might be incorrectly citing the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule to justify their refusal to disclose syndromic health
data to public health agencies.
To examine these concerns, researchers e-mailed a survey to
state epidemiologists and terrorism-preparedness coordinators,
asking about the effect of privacy concerns on their ability to
establish and conduct syndromic surveillance. Because little
has been published on this topic, the survey instrument was
designed to be exploratory and hypothesis-generating rather
than hypothesis-testing. After asking initial questions to
determine the status of a state’s or city’s syndromic surveil-
lance system, the instrument used open-ended questions to
capture anecdotal remarks and perceptions regarding barriers
to the implementation of syndromic surveillance systems. The
survey targeted the 50 states, four localities, and eight territo-
ries that are current recipients of CDC cooperative agreements
on public health response and terrorism preparedness (4).
Responses from county-level entities with syndromic surveil-




 A survey instrument was developed to assess the impact of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule on syndromic surveillance within
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states. After hypothesis-generating conversations with repre-
sentatives from two states and one city (Connecticut, Ken-
tucky, and New York City) that have implemented syndromic
surveillance systems and with staff of the CDC Division of
Public Health Surveillance and Informatics, a multiple-ques-
tion survey was designed. With funding from CDC coopera-
tive agreements for terrorism preparedness and response,
multiple states have explored the implementation of syndromic
surveillance systems under the surveillance and epidemiology
capacity section (Focus Area B) of these cooperative agree-
ments (4). All states, the District of Columbia, the three larg-
est U.S. municipalities (Los Angeles County, New York City,
and Chicago), and eight U.S. territories have received Focus
Area B funding. Persons identified as Focus Area B leaders are
tasked with operational oversight and implementation of criti-
cal capacities and benchmarks pertaining to surveillance and
epidemiologic initiatives. The survey was distributed electroni-
cally on October 15, 2003, to each identified Focus Area B
leader (N = 58) in each jurisdiction awarded resources under
this cooperative agreement. The survey was also e-mailed to
all 50 state epidemiologists to gather information from the
four states without an identified Focus Area B leader, as well
as to gain additional perspectives from others who might be
involved in state-level syndromic surveillance activities.
Responses were requested by October 21, 2003, to provide
preliminary data for the National Syndromic Surveillance
Conference at the New York Academy of Medicine on
October 24, 2003.
Statistical Analysis
The survey design provided nine categorical questions with
open-ended response options allowing for anecdotal remarks.
Two investigators coded each response. If classification of a
given response was questionable, the investigators evaluated
the response separately and then compared results. In the event
of a disparity, a third party evaluated the response and deter-
mined its final category. All analyses were performed by using
data exported to S-PLUS® 2000 statistical software (5).
Because the sampling frame was primarily intended to be
the recipients of CDC terrorism-preparedness cooperative
agreements (50 states, four localities, and eight territories),
the most relevant response rate seemed to be the percentage
of grantees who had a syndromic surveillance system either
under development or in operation. However, the denomina-
tor for that rate was unknown, because the total number of
CDC terrorism-preparedness grantees that already had or were
developing a syndromic system was not known. To estimate
that denominator, knowledgeable consultants (two terrorism
consultants from the Council of State and Territorial Epide-
miologists and a CDC surveillance program staff member)
were asked to help generate a list of known states with such
systems. The resulting estimate of 40 states, localities, and
territories with syndromic surveillance systems (either under
development or in operation) provided the denominator used
to determine the survey coverage rate.
Results
Of the 48 Focus Area B leaders who received the survey, as
verified by documented successful transmission of the e-mail,
33 responses were received from 32 states, cities, and counties
and one territory (Table). Of the 32 responses from states,
cities, and counties, two states reported a state-level perspec-
tive along with a city-level perspective from a jurisdiction per-
forming a pilot project. One state provided three separate
county-level perspectives reflecting three distinct syndromic
surveillance projects; these were combined with the state
response to form a single response for each state when
tabulating the coverage rate. Thus, total responses from the
62 states, localities, and territories with CDC terrorism-
preparedness cooperative agreements were 29. Because not all
states, localities, or territories have active syndromic surveil-
lance systems, the consensus estimate of the total state, local-
ity, and territory grantees with active syndromic systems was
40, which yields a coverage rate for this survey of 74.4%. Each
respondent was given the option to report anonymously or be
identified by jurisdiction. Of the 33 responses received, a
majority of respondents (54.6%) requested anonymity in
reporting.
To capture the nature of the responses to each question,
examples are provided here. Responses to specific questions
often addressed additional concerns to those raised by that
question; to avoid subjectively imposing the investigators’
views, such responses are reported here in conjunction with
the question with which they initially appeared, even if the
response seemed more relevant to another question.
When compared with those respondents who identified “no
problems” in the implementation of a syndromic surveillance
system, more than one half (54.2%) reported either “some”
or “substantial” problems caused by real or perceived patient-
confidentiality concerns and HIPAA Privacy Rule require-
ments. For example, one respondent stated, “Even our routine
investigations encounter roadblocks. Many people in the
trenches don’t know enough about HIPAA and do not give
information beyond the minimum necessary. This hampers
all disease surveillance activities.” Another reported, “Almost
every hospital we approached raised issues of compliance with
HIPAA. Discussions led to what is a minimum data set.” Of
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TABLE. Results of survey examining the effect of privacy regulations on jurisdictions’ ability to establish and conduct syndromic
surveillance — state, city, and territorial terrorism-preparedness coordinators and state epidemiologists, 2003
Question No. of respondents %
Status of a syndromic surveillance system? 33
Active system 16 48.5
Currently implementing (i.e., recruiting reporting partners) 4 12.1
Considering or planning a system 10 30.3
Not considering implementing a system 3 9.1
Experience in dealing with patient confidentiality concerns and HIPAA requirements? 24
Substantial problems 3 12.5
Some problems 10 41.7
No problems 11 45.8
Issues arising from the perception that syndromic reporting is not the same as disease reporting




Has consideration been given to adding syndromic surveillance indicators to state reporting statutes or regulations? 33
Yes 11 33.3
No 22 66.7
Regarding syndromic surveillance systems, have concerns originated from the HIPAA requirement to account
for (i.e., track) disclosures to public health agencies? 31
Yes 7 22.6
No 24 77.4
Issues arising from the need to investigate signals generated by the syndromic data flow? 30
Yes 13 43.3
No 17 56.7
Issues around providers’ fears that participating in syndromic surveillance would cause a negative public
perception (i.e., marked as higher risk)? 32
Yes 0 0
No 32 100.0
Issues regarding providers’ costs incurred by providing syndromic data to public health? 32
Yes 11 34.4
No 21 65.6
How are the costs of participation in syndromic surveillance addressed? 11*
Provider responsibility (to use grant-funded sources) 6 54.5
Public health responsibility (to use grant-funded sources) 2 18.2
Joint responsibility 3 27.3
Concerns about adequate security of data transmission or storage at the health department? 32
Yes 5 15.6
No 27 84.4
* Of those reporting active syndromic surveillance systems (n = 16).
those respondents who indicated “no problems” in the imple-
mentation, responses included the following: “Our syndromic
surveillance system collects aggregate data, so this has not been
as much of an issue for us as it has been for many other states.
In fact, of the more than 600 sites participating in our
syndromic surveillance system last year, less than two dozen
commented or asked about confidentiality concerns and
HIPAA requirements.”
One survey question asked whether any concerns had arisen
from the perception that syndromic reporting is not the same
as disease reporting and might not be mandated by state stat-
ute. A similar percentage of respondents reported that such
concerns were present (51.5%) or nonexistent (45.5%). Con-
cerns included the following: “As we create more and more
notifiable disease conditions, the medical community is
increasingly resistant to accept without question.” The ques-
tion of whether syndromic surveillance was legally mandated
yielded such responses as, “Reporting of diseases was both
mandated and considered to be a more accurate surveillance
tool, which caused many to feel it was unnecessary to ask people
to also report syndromic information.”
Respondents were then asked whether they had considered
adding syndromic surveillance indicators to state reporting
statutes. A majority (66.7%) indicated this was not being con-
sidered. Among the rationales given was that adding syndromic
surveillance to a mandated reporting list would be problem-
atic because generally accepted methods and content for
syndromic surveillance systems have not yet been established
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and because its effectiveness is still in question. Of respon-
dents who reported that adding syndromic surveillance indi-
cators was not being considered, 33% indicated that until
clearer indicators are identified, the use of currently mandated
reporting of clinical criteria (e.g., “clusters of extraordinary
occurrence of illness” and “clusters of unusual illness”) could
apply to syndromic surveillance indicators. In addition, 54%
of state-level respondents noted that, in the event of a recog-
nized threat, their state health director is authorized to
request that syndromic surveillance be conducted for a
renewable period of time on the basis of an identified clinical
presentation (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]).
The survey also asked whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule
requirement to account for disclosures to public health agen-
cies was an obstacle to conducting syndromic surveillance. Of
those responding, 22.6% reported concerns originating from
this requirement. A majority of respondents indicated that
their data were exchanged in limited data sets or aggregate
form (e.g., emergency department [ED] visits or admission
numbers), which do not require an accounting of disclosures.
Twenty-three percent of respondents replied that the account-
ing requirement would be a concern if more detailed data
were to be obtained. One respondent’s jurisdiction had
decided to collect only a limited data set, partly because of
patient confidentiality concerns, and partly because the juris-
diction “rarely identified notifiable conditions via syndromic
surveillance, and would end up having to call the hospital
back for patient follow-up.” Respondents expressed concerns
about their syndromic surveillance system’s ability to provide
meaningful data when using only a limited data set. “Provid-
ers are cautious and it is not clear what we could provide to
reassure them that a general accounting rather than transaction-
specific accounting would work.”
The burden on local health departments of investigating
signals generated by syndromic surveillance systems was also
explored. A majority of respondents (56.7%) indicated that,
in cases where signals were identified, facility staff did not
raise concerns about cost or feasibility. However, 43.3% of
respondents reported concerns regarding the investigation of
a signal. Responses included the following: “Since we are no
longer collecting patient identifiers, the only way we can fol-
low up with hospitals is by asking them to trace back the
patient(s) who were seen at the date(s) and time(s) of interest.
Perhaps because we rarely make such requests, we have not
had problems with compliance.”
The benefit of collecting individual patient records was evi-
dent from five respondents, who reported that the investiga-
tion of signals quickly showed that individually identifiable
patient records are needed to trace information. As one
respondent indicated, “We now have these and it is an
immense improvement, saving considerable time for both
investigators and providers.”
The survey also asked whether providers feared participa-
tion in syndromic surveillance would harm their public per-
ception or increase their vulnerability to a terrorist attack. All
respondents indicated that providers had a positive outlook
towards participating in syndromic surveillance. A total of
30% noted that they enhance community security by looking
for unusual patterns that might not normally be observed.
The majority of states reported that their hospital staff view
participation in syndromic surveillance positively and as an
indication of readiness. One state respondent indicated that
staff at certain health-care facilities view syndromic surveil-
lance as helping them meet internal requirements. One
respondent reported, “Most of our hospitals want to partici-
pate and say it is helpful for them to see a summary of who
has been to the ED the previous day.”
Two survey questions examined concerns regarding the costs
of syndromic surveillance. In the first question, a majority of
respondents (65.6%) reported no issues associated with pro-
viders’ costs of providing data. Thirty-seven percent of respon-
dents identified initial problems regarding cost and have taken
steps to reduce the burden on health-care facilities, including
applying for federal grants for rural facilities and providing
computers and Internet service by contracting with the
facilities for data access and programmer time. Twenty-one
percent reported using resources from the CDC terrorism-
preparedness cooperative agreements and the Health Resource
Services Administration (HRSA) Bioterrorism Hospital Pre-
paredness Program for these activities. However, 14% expressed
concern about setting a precedent of paying hospitals for their
participation in the syndromic surveillance system. Certain
respondents also acknowledged that not assisting hospitals with
implementation might place an undue burden on facilities
that do not have the information technology (IT) capacity to
provide needed data. A total of 21% are establishing stipends
to compensate hospital’s IT departments for expenses incurred
on behalf of their participation.
Of those states that reported an active syndromic surveil-
lance system (n = 16), 54% require the hospital to cover the
costs of participation, whereas 45% either pay for initial costs
outright or share costs with health-care facilities. The major-
ity of respondents recommended federal sources for covering
the costs of program initiation.
The survey’s final question addressed concerns about the
security of data once they arrive at the health department. A
substantial majority (84.4%) of respondents reported no
security concerns from syndromic surveillance system partici-
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pants, in part because of measures taken to ensure secure trans-
mission (e.g., virtual private networks from a secure state file
transfer protocol (FTP) site to the data sources) and off-
system data-archiving protocols. For those collecting data with-
out name-specific or identifiable data, security was of little
concern to source participants.
Discussion
This was the first known survey on this topic targeted to state
terrorism-preparedness managers and state epidemiologists. The
survey attempted to assess the effect of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
on the implementation of syndromic surveillance systems.
Weaknesses of this survey include the limited response rate, the
uncertain representativeness of the 33 responding jurisdictions
(28 state or city and one territory cooperative-agreement
recipients), and the limited time allotted for respondents to poll
staff about problems with confidentiality or data access.
Denominator data to account for all syndromic surveillance
systems in the United States are difficult to quantify; therefore,
the denominator estimate might not be accurate.
The study is based on qualitative judgments of senior man-
agers responsible for syndromic surveillance systems, many of
which were initiated by using CDC funding. However, sub-
stantial attempts were made to notify Focus Area B leaders
and state epidemiologists for all states and terrorism-
preparedness–funded localities to act as an information-
gathering conduit for this survey. The state points-of-contact
are likely to be closely involved with development of syndromic
surveillance systems, on the basis of their involvement in imple-
menting routine disease surveillance systems and the initia-
tives supported by CDC terrorism-preparedness grants.
Accordingly, the authors believe that few managers of large
syndromic surveillance systems were unaware of the survey.
As the only known attempt to gather representative data on
these issues, this study provided new information on matters
of importance and identified areas for future research.
Ten percent of survey respondents also indicated that they
request only limited data sets to more easily obtain permis-
sion and participation from covered entities. This can result
in delays in investigating signals and, in certain cases, out-
right refusals of access to data on patient visits generating the
signals. When signal investigations are substantially delayed,
the syndromic surveillance system’s value decreases. The added
burden of retracing data to determine a signal’s origin might
hinder a timely response to an emerging situation.
One source of covered entities’ reported reluctance to pro-
vide data appears to be the perceived requirement that they
account for all disclosures for public health purposes under
the Privacy Rule; this concern was reported by 22.6% of
respondents. This problem persists despite favorable interpre-
tations on the use of simplified “routine accounting” processes
under the Rule, as discussed in CDC guidance and through
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of Civil Rights (OCR). Respondents from two states indi-
cated that attorneys or risk managers for health departments
and certain covered entities do not deem OCR authoritative
enough to require a change in their data-release policies. In
addition, perception about the scope of HIPAA was reported
to be a substantial source of concern to state and local partici-
pants at the National Center for Vital and Health Statistics
Privacy Subcommittee’s hearings on the impact of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule on public health (6). Incorrect interpretations of
health departments’ existing legal authority and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule might cause substantial delays, extra work, and
obstacles to obtaining necessary data for various surveillance
systems, including syndromic surveillance.
OCR should disseminate clearer statements detailing how
covered entities can use simplified accounting methods for
routine disclosures to public health agencies and their con-
tractual partners, pursuant to syndromic surveillance report-
ing requirements. The narrow perception of the accounting
requirement and the view that it places an intolerable burden
on covered entities might negatively impact the performance
of syndromic surveillance systems within the United States,
while accomplishing little to protect individual privacy where
the existence of the disclosures underlying these public health
practices are readily known.
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Abstract
Introduction: A nonparametric surveillance system was constructed for early detection of influenza outbreaks. The
system uses weekly data on the number of influenza cases.
Objectives: For this analysis, a nonparametric method of surveillance was compared with the likelihood ratio method,
which is optimal because it yields a minimal expected delay for a fixed false-alert probability. The evaluation was
conducted by using probability of successful detection within a specified time and predictive value at different time
points. The optimal surveillance method requires knowledge of the parametric model for the given process (i.e., the
influenza cycle). Influenza cycles differ in shape and amplitude from one season to the next. Therefore, finding a
parametric model based on influenza data from previous seasons is difficult. Also, using data from previous seasons
might lead to misspecification of the cycles.
Methods: In the nonparametric method, the influenza cycles were estimated under monotonicity restrictions (i.e.,
monotonically increasing during the outbreak and monotonically decreasing during the outbreak’s decline). The sur-
veillance system was evaluated in a theoretical simulation study. The performance of the nonparametric method was
compared with that of the optimal method. The effect of a misspecification of the parametric model was also studied.
Results: For most surveillance methods, the probability of successful detection of an influenza outbreak within 1 week
depends on when the outbreak began relative to the start of the surveillance. The predictive value depends on when the
alert is generated (Table).
Conclusions: The nonparametric method has lower detection probability then the optimal method when the
outbreak begins immediately after surveillance is started. However, the nonparametric method avoids misspecifications.
A parametric method with a misspecification results in poor detection probability for early outbreaks and low predic-
tive value for late alerts.
TABLE. Probability of successful detection of an outbreak within 1 week (by start date of
outbreak) and predictive value (by time of alert) for three surveillance methods
Probability of successful detection Predictive value
Start of oubreak (week) Time of alert (week)
Method 2 15 2 15
Optimal 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.76
Nonparametric 0.23 0.48 0.53 0.76
Parametric, misspecified 0.09 0.83 0.98 0.59
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Abstract
Introduction: School absenteeism data might serve as an early indicator of disease outbreaks. However, before
resources are committed to prospective surveillance, absenteeism data should be evaluated.
Objectives: This study evaluated the usefulness of school absenteeism data for early outbreak detection.
Methods: Data obtained from the New York City Department of Education on 1.2 million students (1,160 schools)
for the 2001–02 academic year consisted of the number of students registered and absent by grade, school, and day.
Reason for absence is not routinely collected. Citywide trends were examined separately for elementary and secondary
students. Linear regression models predicted the expected percentage absent after controlling for day of week and pre-
or post-holidays. Geographic clustering was assessed by the spatial scan statistic.
Results: Average daily absenteeism was higher among secondary students (13.7%) than elementary students (7.6%).
No sustained increase in absenteeism was associated with the peak of the 2001–02 influenza A season (this period
overlapped with winter break). A 2-week increase in absenteeism in March among elementary school children corre-
sponded with peak influenza B season. Spatial analysis detected 790 clusters of absenteeism at p<0.01 (where only two
clusters would have been expected by chance alone). Two of these clusters occurred during a previously reported
gastrointestinal outbreak at one school.
Conclusions: A multiday, citywide increase in absenteeism among elementary students coincided with peak influenza
B activity, but school absenteeism data were not useful for detecting the influenza A season. Although the system was
able to detect one known localized gastrointestinal outbreak, this cluster did not stand out among other major clusters.
Information on reason for absence and improved analytic methods might make absenteeism data more useful for early
outbreak detection.
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Abstract
Introduction: The outbreak detection performance of a syndromic surveillance system can be measured in terms of its
ability to detect signal (disease outbreak) against background noise (normal variation of baseline disease within a
region). However, because a limited number of persons have been infected with agents of biologic terrorism, such data
are virtually nonexistent. Therefore, simulation is necessary. One approach to evaluation is to present detection algo-
rithms with semisynthetic data sets. These data sets contain simulated signal superimposed on real background noise.
Objectives: The Children’s Hospital Informatics Program (CHIP) Cluster Generator automates the creation of spatio-
temporal patient cluster data to help evaluate epidemic-detection software. The spatio-temporal data can then be used
to analyze the sensitivity and specificity of spatial or temporal detection algorithms.
Methods: A software tool (available at http://www.chip.org/biosurv/resources.htm) was created to generate artificial out-
breaks of spatially clustered cases and inject them into background noise. Each cluster is defined by a controlled feature set.
Parameters (e.g., outbreak magnitude, duration, temporal progression, and location) can be varied by the user.
Results: The open-source program
accepts a valid set of patient test clus-
ter parameters and creates geospatial
patient test data for a single cluster
or a series of clusters. The tool auto-
mates the creation of valid patient
data sets for rigorous testing of out-
break-detection algorithms. The
tool outputs either single-patient
clusters or series of patient clusters
as files containing patient longitude
and latitude coordinates. When used
with geographic information system
software, these clusters can be dis-
played on a map (Figure). In test-
ing, all generated clusters were
properly created within the param-
eters set at program execution. The
cluster generator is in use for rigor-
ous testing of outbreak-detection al-
gorithms.
Conclusions: Automated genera-
tion of semisynthetic data sets fa-
cilitates evaluation of public health
surveillance systems for early detec-
tion of outbreaks.
FIGURE. Creation of a series of four system-generated outbreak clusters
centered in Cambridge, Massachusetts (with the angle varied)
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Abstract
Introduction: In January 2003, Westchester County Department of Health (WCDOH) launched its Community
Health Electronic Surveillance System (CHESS). CHESS receives daily data electronically from multiple hospital
information systems, automatically analyzes data to detect elevated levels in each syndrome category, and generates
electronic reports of results.
Objectives: This article describes the construction and implementation of an automated syndromic surveillance sys-
tem in Westchester County.
Methods: WCDOH and multiple health-care providers reached agreement for daily acquisition, encryption, and
transmission of data files. Providers were not required to use a standard file format. When files are not received by a
specified time, the system automatically e-mails reminders to providers. Files of varying formats, based on scripts
written individually for each provider, are automatically detected, decrypted, and loaded into the main database.
CHESS was adapted from the syndromic surveillance methods developed by the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene and CDC.
Results: CHESS analyzes data from a majority of the county’s 12 emergency departments. Analysis and reporting are
scheduled at given daily intervals and results are automatically e-mailed to WCDOH staff for appropriate action.
Conclusions: CHESS is advanced in the surveillance arena for its flexibility in accepting data from providers in
varying file formats and its automation of internal processing and communication of results, allowing for ongoing
system refinements. WCDOH has demonstrated the possibility of creating a local syndromic surveillance system that
minimizes reporting burden on providers and maximizes use of internal resources and technical support.
Vol. 53 / Supplement MMWR 233
Change-Point Detection Using Directional Derivatives
Allan B. Clark, A. Lawson
University of South Carolina School of Public Health, Columbia, SC
Corresponding author: Andrew B. Lawson, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Norman J. Arnold School of Public Health,
800 Sumter St., Columbia, SC 29208. Telephone: 803-777-6647; Fax: 803-777-2524; E-mail: alawson@gwm.sc.edu.
Abstract
Introduction: Individual-level disease maps, which estimate the risk for disease across a geographic region, usually are
based on observing a set of spatial locations of cases and controls. This study examined the extension of where cases and
controls form a space-time point process (locations and dates) and focused on assessing whether the intensity of cases
changed across time.
Objectives: The objectives of the study were to develop a method for detecting changes in individual-level disease
maps. The method was applied to a data set of birth abnormalities in the United Kingdom, which included locations
and times of all the live (singleton) births and abnormalities during a 5-year period.
Methods: The change in intensity across time was measured through the directional derivative, with respect to time, of
the geotemporal surface. This can be estimated nonparametrically and is used to check for both sudden and gradual
changes over time.
Results: The results do not demonstrate the descriptive ability of an approach that relies on a map of changes in risk.
The directional derivative was computed at 10 update points, corresponding to when data were available, and sum-
mary statistics were produced (Table). Isolated departures from constant risk were indicated, but the measure aggre-
gated over a map did not demonstrate any change.
Conclusions: A directional derivative approach might yield optimal answers and is worthy of further research. The
example data (Table) demonstrate that isolated changes are occurring, but data aggregated over a map did not indicate
any change. Therefore, the geography of the problem should be considered, but an analysis that is aggregated over
geography should not be performed.
TABLE. Summary statistics of directional derivative at each time point
Update point
Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Minimum –0.02 –0.08 –0.05 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.06 –0.05 0 –0.07
Mean 0 0.01 0 0 –0.01 0 0 0 0.01 –0.01
Median 0 0.01 0.01 0 –0.01 0 0 0 0.01 –0.01
Maximum 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01
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Abstract
Introduction: Although syndromic surveillance is often performed by tracking patterns of International Classification
of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes, ICD-9 codes are frequently not available in real time. In certain practice
settings, the physician’s choice of charting template (PCCT) is available in real time and therefore might have an
advantage for use in syndromic surveillance.
Objectives: This study quantified the level of overlap among patients selected by PCCT and ICD-9 code.
Methods: A retrospective analysis was conducted of a database of patient visits in 15 New Jersey emergency depart-
ments during January 1999–October 2002. Two investigators reviewed all ICD-9 codes and PCCTs used during this
period and chose by consensus those relevant to each of nine syndromes. For each syndrome, counts were generated of
patient visits selected by ICD-9 code and by PCCT. The kappa statistic was then used to characterize the level of
agreement between the two techniques. Sensitivity and specificity of the PCCT method were calculated by using the
ICD-9 code as a criterion standard.
Results: The database contained 1,729,866 patient visits. Kappa calculations indicated near perfect agreement for
asthma (0.82), chest pain (0.81), and headache (0.82) syndromes (Table). Excellent agreement was determined for skin
(0.6), any gastrointestinal (0.74), and diarrhea (0.69) syndromes. Calculations indicated moderate agreement for respi-
ratory (0.52) and fever (0.49) syndromes and only fair agreement for weak (0.34) syndrome.
Conclusions: Moderate to near perfect agreement between ICD-9 code and PCCT was determined for eight of the
nine syndromes examined. PCCT might be useful for real-time syndromic surveillance using electronic medical records.
TABLE. Agreement (kappa), sensitivity, and specificity for physician’s choice of charting template versus ICD-9 code in
15 emergency department databases, by syndrome — New Jersey, January 1999–October 2002
Syndrome Kappa Interpretation of kappa* Sensitivity† Specificity†
Headache 0.82 Near perfect 0.80 1.00
Asthma 0.82 Near perfect 0.81 1.00
Chest pain 0.81 Near perfect 0.83 0.99
Any gastrointestinal 0.74 Excellent 0.79 0.97
Diarrhea 0.69 Excellent 0.81 0.99
Skin 0.60 Excellent 0.60 0.99
Respiratory 0.52 Moderate 0.47 0.97
Fever 0.49 Moderate 0.44 0.98
Weak 0.34 Fair 0.40 0.98
* Based on a commonly used interpretation of kappa.
†
Sensitivity and specificity of physician’s choice of charting template using ICD-9 method as the criterion standard.
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Abstract
Introduction: Because over-the-counter medications (OTCs) are commonly taken before patients seek medical care,
OTC sales data might serve as an early indicator of communitywide illness. Since August 2002, the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has tracked OTC sales from New York City pharmacies to
enhance detection of natural and intentional infectious disease outbreaks.
Objectives: First-year surveillance results on OTC sales were summarized and compared with results from an
emergency department (ED) syndromic surveillance system.
Methods: A file containing the number of OTC units sold the previous day, by drug name and retail store, is transmit-
ted to DOHMH daily from a central pharmacy database. The influenza-like illness (ILI) drug category includes cough
and influenza medications whose sales correlate strongly with annual influenza epidemics. The antidiarrheal drug
category includes generic and brand-name loperamide. Citywide trends are evaluated by using a linear regression
model, controlling for seasonality, day of week, promotional sales, and temperature and are compared with ED data.
Spatial clustering by store is evaluated by using the spatial scan statistic (SaTScan™ software, available at http://
www.satscan.org).
Results: Citywide ILI drug sales were highest during annual influenza epidemics and elevated during the spring and fall
allergy seasons, similar to trends in the ED system (Figure). Loperamide sales peaked during influenza season but did not
increase substantially during the
November 2002 viral gastroen-
teritis season. A spike in lopera-
mide sales occurred after the
August 2003 New York City
blackout. Spatial signals for ILI
sales occurred on 277 of 365
days.
Conclusions: The effect of aller-
gies and asthma on respiratory
illness should be considered when
interpreting trends in OTC sales
for ILI. Loperamide sales were
not a useful indicator of a large
2002 norovirus outbreak
detected by ED surveillance. Spa-
tial cluster analysis was sensitive
to variability in sales data by store
and has not proven useful. OTC
sales indicate correlation with
other syndromic surveillance
systems, but methods require
refinement.
FIGURE. Sales of over-the-counter (OTC) influenza-like illness (ILI) medications
per 10,000 population and ratio of emergency department (ED) fever/influenza
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Abstract
Introduction: New Hampshire is one of the only states in the United States that uses Vital Records Vision 2000, a
system in which death certificates are filed electronically with the Division of Vital Records within 24 hours of being
signed by a physician. The average time between date of death until certificates are filed with the state is 2.37 days. A
surveillance coordinator reviews death certificates daily.
Objectives: This surveillance system is designed to detect clusters of deaths, deaths considered unusual, and deaths
relevant to public health.
Methods: A query was developed that details >50 illnesses potentially related to terrorism. When an unusual death or
cluster of deaths is found, the surveillance coordinator contacts the health-care provider to obtain more information.
The state’s communicable disease control unit investigates if warranted.
Results: Three unusual deaths were identified in 2003. None had been reported to public health authorities. Two
previously healthy young persons were hospitalized with undiagnosed pulmonary infections, one for 7 days and the
other for 11 days, before death. Specimens from both patients were retrieved and sent to CDC for further testing. In
addition, infectious encephalitis was listed as the cause of death for an older patient suspected of having West Nile
virus; specimens were obtained and sent to the New Hampshire Public Health Laboratory, where West Nile virus was
ruled out. In addition, a review of death-record data for the period 1997–2002 demonstrates a consistent trend in
pneumonia deaths over time (Figure).
Conclusions: Death certificate surveillance is able to 1) identify deaths that should have been, but were not, reported
to public health agencies; 2) confirm the presence or absence of cluster deaths; 3) provide timely information on deaths
statewide; and 4) provide information on seasonal trends in disease and death.
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Abstract
Introduction: West Nile virus infection appeared diffusely in Illinois in 2002, with >800 cases and 63 deaths. This
number of confirmed cases was the highest in the nation and resulted in triple the number of deaths of any other state.
Objectives: This study used a passive syndromic surveillance model to analyze emergency department (ED) patient
chief complaints of fever and headache, influenza-related symptoms, and viral syndrome, and correlate these data with
known West Nile virus cases and with the epidemic curve of confirmed cases in northern Illinois.
Methods: A passive syndromic surveillance system using a computerized patient log was implemented. A retrospective
cohort study used structured query language (SQL) queries to search for patient chief complaints of fever and head-
ache, influenza-related symptoms, or viral syndrome. Positive matches were compiled in a graphical and geographic
database.
Results: SQL queries revealed a biphasic distribution, with a first peak corresponding to influenza cases during the
second week of February and a second unexpected peak during the second week of September 2002 (Figure). Geocoding
and frequency analysis matched the confirmed outbreak. A majority of these patients were discharged, and no deaths
occurred. IgM serology was positive in 5% of cases. Statistical analysis determined no significant differences in distri-
bution and a coefficient of determination of 0.67.
Conclusion: Passive syndromic surveillance systems can retrospectively detect West Nile virus infection. The system
was able to detect an increase in syndromic cases in the ED during a confirmed outbreak of West Nile virus. Further
study is needed to quantify this effect. Serologic confirmation will also aid in validation.
FIGURE. Emergency department (ED) visits for viral syndrome, by week — one
health-care system, Evanston, Illinois, 2002
Note: The first peak (weeks 4–10) in ED visits for viral syndrome was attributable to an anticipated
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Abstract
Introduction: Syndromic surveillance systems are being explored to determine their capacity to detect outbreaks,
including those caused by biologic or chemical terrorism. However, few systems have been validated.
Objectives: This study evaluated a syndromic surveillance system by comparing syndrome categorization in the emer-
gency department (ED) with medical chart review.
Methods: During October 27–November 18, 2001, a surveillance form was completed for each ED visit at 15 partici-
pating Arizona hospitals. One of 10 clinical syndromes or “none” was selected per patient to best represent the patient’s
primary condition. Medical records were reviewed for a weighted, random sample of 16,886 available forms. ED chief
complaints and discharge diagnoses were abstracted as standards to compare with surveillance forms. Clinicians
assessed concordance between the selected syndromes and standards.
Results: Of 1,956 patient records from six selected hospitals, 1,646 (85%) indicated either one syndrome or none, and
313 (15%) were blank. Overall, system concordance was 71% and 85% when using chief complaint and ED discharge
diagnosis, respectively. Discharge diagnosis outperformed chief complaint in the overall system (+14%) and within
syndromes (range: 0%–65%). Concordance of respiratory tract infection with fever for chief complaint was low (27%)
compared with its concordance with ED discharge diagnosis (83%). Similarly, concordance of chief complaint was low
for sepsis (6%), rash with fever (24%), and myalgia with fever (40%).
Conclusions: This ED-based syndromic surveillance system was able to classify patients into an appropriate syndrome
category rapidly and with accuracy. However, syndromic surveillance systems might perform better when based on ED
discharge diagnosis in addition to or instead of chief complaint.
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Abstract
Introduction: CDC and the American Association of Poison Control Centers are using the Toxic Exposure Surveillance
System (TESS) to improve public health surveillance of health hazards associated with chemical exposures. TESS is a
national real-time surveillance database that records all human exposures to potentially toxic substances reported to U.S.
poison control centers.
Objectives: TESS is used to facilitate early detection of illness associated with a chemical release by monitoring daily
clinical effects reported to the database.
Methods: Computer-generated surveillance is conducted daily on each clinical effect (n = 131). The frequency of each
clinical effect during a 24-hour interval is compared with a historic baseline. The historic baseline is defined as the mean
frequency for each clinical effect during the 2-week period surrounding the 247-hour interval, during the preceding 3
years. An aberration is identified when the observed number of cases with a given clinical effect exceeds the expected limit
(historic baseline plus 2 standard deviations). Cases identified through this system are evaluated, and respective poison
control centers are contacted when unusual patterns in location, substance, or outcome are noted.
Results: Aberrations have identified clusters of clinical effects occurring within a 24-hour period. Further investigation
has identified clusters with a single etiology (e.g., 16 cases of severe gastrointestinal illness from intentional tampering of
coffee with arsenic at a church picnic).
Conclusions: Detection of these aberrations indicates that conducting surveillance by using TESS can identify illnesses
resulting from intentional or unintentional chemical releases that occur at a single site or, potentially, across multiple
locations.
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Abstract
In preparation for the Salt Lake 2002 Olympic Winter Games, Utah established legal authority for syndromic surveil-
lance by enacting an administrative rule based on current communicable disease reporting authority. That rule required
designated emergency centers to report data on patients seen the previous day for whom diagnostic information indicated
the presence of >1 of 11 tracked syndromes. Data could be reported by emergency centers or collected by public health
personnel.
Concurrently, the Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act was passed during Utah’s 2002 legislative session. That
Act gave the Utah Department of Health (UDOH) authority to designate diseases, conditions, or syndromes as “report-
able emergency illness and health condition(s)” under subsequent administrative rule. UDOH is working to enact admin-
istrative rules that specify details of syndromic reporting based on that authority.
The Act authorizes voluntary reporting under normal circumstances and mandatory reporting upon declaration of a
public health emergency. That approach was chosen to avoid imposing an unacceptable burden on facilities that lack
technical infrastructure to report electronically. However, voluntary reporting poses the risk that providers will not partici-
pate for fear of being exposed to legal and public relations problems. Furthermore, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule has led certain providers to require a specific legal mandate to report.
Other challenges under this approach are that current Utah law does not authorize collection of protected health infor-
mation for patients not determined to have one of the defined syndromes, data that are needed to permit normalization
for statistical analysis. Another concern is whether records should be processed to identify syndromes at the health-care
facility, necessitating greater technical investment at each facility, or at the public health entity, requiring at least temporary
disclosure to the public health entity of records not meeting the syndrome-reporting criteria.
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Abstract
Introduction: Medics deployed with U.S. troops routinely collect disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) data to provide early
outbreak detection and identify adverse trends. Robust statistics are available to analyze surveillance data; however, these
methods often require extensive historic data, are computationally difficult, and can be confusing to inexperienced users.
Methods: A modified current-past experience graph (CPEG) and statistical process control charts (SPCCs) were
developed to track DNBI trends among deployed service members. The CPEG method compares weekly counts for 16
DNBI categories with expected values from the previous 4 weeks by using the Poisson function normal approximation.
These are transformed to z-scores and charted with color codes to indicate when a value exceeds threshold limits,
corresponding to the 99th percentile. The u-bar method (i.e., a statistical process control method that also relies on
Poisson approximation) is used to produce SPCC, comparing observed rates with the average from the previous 20
weeks for each DNBI category. Although the necessary calculations could be performed by hand, spreadsheet tem-
plates were produced for field use. Stata® statistical software is used routinely to automate the process and provide
graphs to customers over the Internet.
Results: These charts have been used to monitor DNBI reports from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom since their inception. A typical CPEG chart shows significant increases in the respiratory and unex-
plained fever categories (Figure). The CPEG and SPCC methods are complementary. CPEG summarizes all data on a
single chart and is highly sensitive. SPCC provides more detail and underscores long-term trends.
Conclusions: Customers find CPEG and SPCC useful because they summarize a substantial amount of information
and are readily understood by nonmedical commanders.
FIGURE. Observed versus expected case counts of 16 categories of disease and
nonbattle injury (DNBI) among deployed U.S. military service members, as depicted






















* Statistically significant excesses.
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Abstract
Introduction: The initial symptoms of diseases resulting from biologic terrorism are likely to appear as respiratory
illness (RI) or gastrointestinal illness (GI). Increased counts of RI- or GI-related International Classification of Diseases,
Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes in a syndromic surveillance system might indicate an outbreak. Only a limited number
of syndromic surveillance systems analyze data for temporal and geographic disease clustering simultaneously.
Objectives: A comprehensive syndromic surveillance system was created through analysis of emergency department
(ED) data by using both time-series (TSS) and geographically based syndromic surveillance (GSS) models.
Methods: Minnesota Department of Health receives patient-encounter data from the Hennepin County Medical
Center (HCMC) ED via secure file transfer protocol (FTP) file daily. TSS uses a regression model adjusted for day-of-
week and seasonal effects. Autocorrelation and cumulative sum analysis of predictive residuals detects unexpected
increases of ICD-9 counts. The GSS model is an adapted mixed models approach. Daily counts are compared with
historic data by using the binomial probability mass function. Analyses were performed for HCMC ED patients
reporting during January 2001–August 2003 (32 months). The ED treats approximately 100,000 patients annually.
Results: RI counts exceeded threshold 31 times under TSS and 30 times under GSS, matching on five dates (9%). GI
counts exceeded threshold 35 times under TSS and 16 times under GSS, matching on four dates (9%) (Figure).
Conclusions: Unmatched dates resulted from the differing statistical approaches of each model. Signals detected
under TSS indicate temporal clustering; signals detected under GSS indicate spatial clustering. These combined analy-
ses allow observation of disease patterns by examining concurrent temporal and geographic effects. A signal detected by
using TSS or GSS can initiate further examination of encounter data, including chart reviews by medical facility staff.



















FIGURE. Unique signals detected under temporal and
geographic syndromic surveillance models — Hennepin
County Medical Center Emergency Department, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, January 1, 2001–August 31, 2003
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Abstract
Introduction: A technique is presented for simultaneously detecting, localizing, and estimating time of attacks with
biologic agents or other infectious sources that have a distinct spatial-temporal point pattern. The proposed technique
uses high-quality individual location histories coupled with self-reported health status to search for areas where a high
density of currently ill persons had congregated in the past. The increased infection rate associated with this detection
is indicative of a possible infectious outbreak.
Objective: The system, named BACTrack (Biological Attack Correlation Tracker), was assessed through simulation
and analysis to determine achievable sensitivity relative to attack size, infection rate, and participating population.
Method: A sample cohort of the general population was simulated to continuously record their location histories and
to report the onset of illness. Developments in location-based cellular phone services enable simplified automation of
these functions. Detection was performed by dividing the surveillance area into space-time regions, determining the
ratio of ill persons to total population within each region, and flagging regions that exceeded an adaptive threshold on
the basis of the statistical variation of the background illness.
Results: A Bacillus anthracis attack affecting 1,100 persons in a city of 150,000 population was simulated. Detection,
location, and time of attack were determined with 90% probability 1.5 days after appearance of initial symptoms. The
simulation was conducted with health status data with that reflected only whether the person was healthy or ill.
Conclusion: The results demonstrate an ability to operate on poor-quality symptom information. Early detection is
made possible by using early diffuse symptoms, efficient data collection, and the signal-processing gain that results
from performing location correlation at the time of the attack.
* This work was sponsored under Air Force Contract F19628-00-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are
those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Air Force.
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Abstract
Introduction: Approximately 20 million persons reside within southern California. Each county and city health
department in southern California has approached syndromic surveillance somewhat independently and is at different
stages of development.
Objectives: The Southern California Regional Surveillance Summit was held June 16, 2003, to enable professionals to
share capacities and best practices and to assess the potential for regional collaboration.
Methods: Using terrorism-preparedness funds, San Diego County sponsored a summit of county and city health
department representatives. Selected counties presented their syndromic surveillance efforts. Roundtable discussions
were held regarding data sources, aberration-detection algorithms, model syndromic surveillance systems and informa-
tion technology interfaces, and evaluation of signals and alerts. Roundtable discussions were summarized and next
steps explored. A compendium was developed for all participants.
Results: With representation from 12 California counties, the state of California, U.S./Mexico Border Health, and the
U.S. Navy, all participants described a level of syndromic surveillance. Potential data sources were prioritized, mean-
ingful methods identified, and the potential for regional collaboration outlined. Across southern California, syndromic
surveillance capacity varied substantially, with certain regions using real-time data-capture systems and state-of-the-art
aberration-detection methods, whereas others face shortages in staffing, insufficient access to data sources, or lack of
formal evaluation techniques.
Conclusions: The summit enabled professionals from county and city health departments to exchange information,
highlight lessons learned, and explore the potential for future collaboration. It was an important step toward a
multijurisdictional effort of using surveillance for early disease detection.
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Abstract
Introduction: Timely and sensitive outbreak detection is a high priority of syndromic surveillance. Early detection
enables officials to allocate limited public health resources to contain outbreaks and thereby decrease morbidity and
mortality.
Objectives: This study retrospectively evaluated Taiwan’s respiratory syndromic surveillance system (RSSS), established in
July 2000, for its ability to detect severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Methods: Reporting through RSSS was encouraged for patients aged >5 years with unexplained cough, respiratory
distress, pulmonary edema, or other severe symptoms. Their specimens were collected for laboratory testing of
suspected etiologic agents.
Results: Among 112 reported acute respiratory syndrome cases during January 1–August 5, 2003, etiologic agents
were identified for 26 cases, and only four SARS cases and one case co-infected with SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS Co-V) and Mycoplasma were detected. Only five (0.75%) of 664 probable SARS cases were captured through
RSSS. The first SARS case, reported on March 14, 2003, was not detected by RSSS, reflecting the system’s low sensitivity.
RSSS did not detect a SARS case until March 17, 2003, after awareness had been raised by media reports.
Conclusions: Because RSSS was both insensitive and rarely used before the SARS outbreak, and because public health
administrators urgently needed daily updated case numbers and laboratory results, Taiwan instituted an Internet-based
reporting and a day-to-day medical follow-up form immediately after the peak of hospital-associated SARS. Emer-
gency department-based syndromic surveillance was established in July 2003, and different hospital data sets are being
integrated into the system to facilitate detection of future outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases.
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Abstract
Introduction: In cooperation with CDC and the Florida Department of Health’s Bureau of Epidemiology, the
Hillsborough County Health Department (HCHD) first participated in syndromic surveillance during the 2001
Super Bowl. Ongoing syndromic surveillance was implemented in November 2001. Nine hospital emergency
departments (EDs) in the county report syndromes daily.
Objectives: The Syndromic Tracking and Reporting System (STARS) augments HCHD’s traditional disease reporting
by acquiring near real-time syndromic data from hospital EDs. STARS is designed to detect terrorism-related and
naturally occurring outbreaks in which affected persons seek ED care.
Methods: Seven different syndromes are monitored by ED physicians. ED staff then enter limited patient information
and the appropriate syndrome into an Internet-based system. The data are housed at HCHD and analyzed by using
CDC’s Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) software, which detects statistical aberrations. A decision matrix is
used to decide which aberrations require follow-up by HCHD’s epidemiology staff.
Results: Statistical aberrations have been investigated periodically. On March 24, 2003, STARS detected 20 reported
cases of diarrhea/gastroenteritis syndrome from one hospital. This spike in the data was flagged by EARS statistical
aberration software. Follow-up investigation revealed that 14 of 20 affected persons had chronic conditions that were
not of infectious disease concern, and no outbreak was determined to have occurred.
Conclusions: The system worked as intended. Studies are under way to evaluate data quality and assess the validity and
sensitivity of STARS.
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Abstract
Introduction: Emphasis on development of syndromic surveillance programs by public health administrators has
resulted in proliferation of public-private partnerships for data provision. However, serious concerns arise from these
partnerships that require consideration of the motivations and concerns of providers and an understanding of the
challenges stemming from working with data from these sources.
Objectives: The paper provides an overview of selected data-source types, concerns relating to partnerships with data
providers, and challenges of working with shared data.
Methods: The authors conducted a study based on their experience in working with private-sector data providers, of
different data types and provider partnerships. The study focused on the benefits of working with data providers,
concerns and motivations of data providers, reasons for participating in data-sharing partnerships, and technical and
legal problems of data sharing.
Results: Benefits of working with data providers include substantial-sized samples, broad geographic coverage, timeli-
ness of data, and passive data collection. Problems arising from working with data providers include complexity of data
extraction, need to protect patient privacy and confidentiality, resource requirements, limited financial benefits, con-
cerns about public opinion, and duplicative data requests. Reasons for provider participation include commercial
benefit, limited resource requirements, and corporate goodwill. Other challenges for data recipients include data pro-
cessing, quality control, storage requirements, and lack of available, proven analytic techniques for data interpretation.
Conclusions: Substantial sample size, timeliness, and passive collection can be gained by using certain types of data.
However, to attain these advantages, end-users should be prepared to address the concerns of data providers and cope














FIGURE. Potential data access points within a network
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Abstract
Introduction: Implementing new surveillance for biologic terrorism is becoming an essential function of local public
health departments. Although syndromic surveillance systems can be implemented by multiple methods (including
commercially available products), one model might be particularly well-suited to public health. CDC’s Early Aberra-
tion Reporting System (EARS) is a syndromic surveillance system that uses aberration-detection models to identify
deviations in current data when compared with a historic mean. The Knox County Tennessee Health Department
(KCHD) is using a 7-day seamless surveillance system based on the EARS program that incorporates multiple data
sources, automated data transfer via file transfer protocol (FTP), scheduled batch analysis, and remote access to surveil-
lance data.
Objectives: KCHD developed a 10-step process for designing a syndromic surveillance system, from implementation
to automation.
Methods: The steps are as follows:
1. Contact CDC staff to discuss acquisition of EARS programs.
2. Assess infrastructure to implement EARS.
3. Engage stakeholders.
4. Identify staff and assign specific tasks.
5. Select syndromes or symptoms to monitor.
6. Establish daily data exchange.
7. Develop automation routines for data transfer via FTP and for importing data into SAS.
8. Schedule EARS analysis programs as a batch job.
9. Establish a review and response protocol.
10. Develop plans for long-term collaboration and system expansion, including evaluation.
Results: By following these 10 steps, KCHD has made substantial progress toward implementing a multifaceted,
seamless, 7-day syndromic surveillance system.
Conclusions: Public health departments can use these 10 steps as a framework for developing local syndromic surveil-
lance systems.
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Abstract
Introduction: Site-based biosurveillance presents multiple opportunities for data collection that might not be available in
less permissive environments.
Objectives: This study examined the potential for using site-based biosurveillance — the monitoring of a geographically
contained site (e.g., work site, university campus, or military base) — to detect disease outbreaks.
Methods: Available data sources were catalogued, and an initial characterization of those data sources with respect to their
value for disease surveillance was performed. A system (EpiSPIRE) for managing surveillance data (both site and regional)
and outbreak-detection algorithms was also developed (Figure). The study was conducted at the IBM T.J. Watson
Research Center, which is located at two sites 10 miles apart: Yorktown Heights, New York, and Hawthorne, New York.
Data collection started in late 2001. Physician office-visit data for respiratory illness in the Westchester County area was
supplied by Surveillance Data, Inc., for use in evaluating the site data sources.
Results: Two site data sources were identified as most promising: 1) a survey of self-assessed health and 2) phone calls to
medically related phone numbers. Absenteeism, Internet queries, cafeteria sales, and traffic data, though less promising,
are worthy of further study. Cough counting and utility usage appear to have less value for site surveillance.
* This work is supported by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under AFRL
Contract No. F30602–01–C–0184. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the AFRL or DARPA.
FIGURE. Data sources examined by the EpiSPIRE site-based biosurveillance system —
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Abstract
Introduction: Syndromic surveillance systems are increasingly commonplace, as multiple states and CDC have begun
using them for potentially timelier and more sensitive outbreak detection. Although different nontraditional indicators
are being used to achieve earlier detection, optimally sensitive systems should capture data from civilian, military, and
veteran populations.
Objectives: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory are
participating in the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Services Installation Pilot Project (JSIPP). This project targets
nine military installations as model sites for integrated surveillance, protection, and response. Under the force-protec-
tion component, sites will acquire chemical and biologic detection capabilities and emergency-response equipment.
Sites will also receive an upgraded version of the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Commu-
nity-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE IV).
Methods: ESSENCE IV was developed for pilot testing at JSIPP sites. Military outpatient and prescription data will
be integrated with civilian International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) claims, emergency depart-
ment chief complaints, and outpatient Veterans Affairs data from surrounding communities. Other enhancements
include a new user interface, a geographic information system for mapping disease distribution and spatial clusters,
and new temporal signal detection methods.
Results: The challenge of integrating military and civilian data is engaging appropriate personnel from both jurisdic-
tions. For JSIPP, military preventive medicine and civilian public health will jointly define data-sharing agreements
and standard operating procedures. Workshops will be held to establish alert-response protocols.
Conclusions: This program can serve as an example for establishing joint surveillance across military and civilian
borders.
* The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the U.S Army or the U.S. Department of Defense.
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Abstract
Introduction: After a massive blackout in New York City on August 14, 2003, a larger number of patients than
expected visited city emergency departments (EDs) for diarrhea.
Objective: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene conducted a case-control study to determine
risk factors for diarrheal illness among patients who visited EDs after the blackout.
Methods: Subjects were selected from patients who visited EDs participating in syndromic surveillance during August
16–18, 2003. All persons with diarrhea syndrome were designated case-patients. Control patients were a stratified
random sample of patients with other syndromes. Structured telephone interviews were used to collect information
about exposures between the blackout and symptom onset. Patients whose symptom onset occurred before the black-
out were excluded.
Results: Of 759 subjects selected, 287 (38%) were reached and eligible, agreed to participate, and reported their age.
Approximately 68% of study participants reported consuming chicken, meat, seafood, dairy products, or deli meat
between the time of the blackout and symptom onset. Although case-patients (n = 58) and control patients (n = 100)
aged <13 years indicated no differences in food consumption, more case-patients (n = 58) than control patients
(n = 71) aged >13 years ate seafood (odds ratio [OR] = 4.8; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.6–14.1) or meat
(OR = 2.7, 95% CI = 1.2–6.1) after the blackout. No differences existed in percentage of case- and control patients
who discarded foods after the blackout. Overall, 67% of patients heard messages recommending the discarding of
food; the most common sources for those messages were television (35%) and radio (28%).
Conclusions: Without refrigeration, meat and seafood spoil quickly. Diarrheal illness among adults in this study was
associated with consumption of meat and seafood and might have been associated with food spoilage after the black-
out. Syndromic surveillance was essential for detecting the increase in diarrhea after the blackout and for framing the
study to investigate this increase.
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Abstract
Introduction: A public health situation awareness system is proposed that 1) uses explicit representation of surveil-
lance concepts based on the user’s cognitive model, and 2) is optimized for efficacy of performance and relevance to the
process and task, rather than for ontic accuracy of syndrome definitions.
Objectives: The goal of this effort is to develop a prototype knowledge-based system that demonstrates the utility of
knowledge-intensive approaches in 1) integrating heterogeneous information (e.g., patient triage data, pharmacy sales
data, and school absenteeism data); 2) eliminating the effects of incomplete and poor-quality surveillance data; 3)
reducing uncertainty in syndrome and aberration detection; and 4) enabling visualization of complex information
structures in surveillance settings, particularly in the context of biologic terrorism preparedness.
Methods: For this approach, explicit domain knowledge is the foundation for interpreting public health data, as
opposed to conventional systems for which statistical methods are central. The system uses the Resource Definition
Framework (i.e., a framework for representing information that enables machines and humans to communicate) and
expressive language (i.e., Web Ontology Language [OWL]) to explicate human knowledge into machine-interpretable
and computable problem-solving modules that can guide users and computer systems in sifting through relevant data
to detect outbreaks.
Results: A prototype knowledge-based system for early detection of outbreaks of influenza, which has a complex
natural pattern and is a potential agent for biologic terrorism, is being developed. A model has been developed (using
OWL ontology language) to enable case detection for respiratory illness syndromes caused by weaponized influenza. A
knowledge-based system to integrate relevant health data from nine community hospitals has also been developed.
Conclusions: Preliminary data from this effort will evaluate the utility of knowledge-based approaches in information
integration, syndrome and aberration detection, information visualization, and cross-domain investigation of root
causes of events.
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Abstract
Introduction: International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes and patient chief complaints have
both been advocated for use in syndromic surveillance of emergency department (ED) visits.
Objectives: The objective of this analysis was to determine whether two algorithms, one based on ICD-9 codes and the
other on patient chief complaints, identified similar patterns and patient populations for respiratory illness. An
attempt was also made to improve agreement by equalizing and expanding syndrome definitions.
Methods: Retrospective analysis was performed for consecutive visits to 15 New Jersey EDs. The Electronic Surveil-
lance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) project supplied a then-current
version of its ICD-9 algorithm. The New York State Department of Health extended a chief-complaint algorithm
originally developed by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and also made modifications to
ESSENCE ICD-9 code groupings. A time-series graph was generated, and a correlation coefficient was calculated.
Agreement between the two algorithms was examined in three stages: 1) initial chief complaint and ICD-9 algorithms,
2) after modifying the algorithms to match more closely, and 3) after expanding both algorithms to include fever.
Results: A total of 2,250,922 visits were used to compare seasonal variations as measured by the two methods (Figure).
High correlation existed between the two algorithms (r = 0.90; p<0.01). A subset of 174,520 visits was examined; for
stages 1, 2, and 3, respectively, agreement by kappa statistic was 0.28 (fair), 0.42 (moderate), and 0.56 (moderate);
sensitivity was 0.31, 0.53, and 0.71; and specificity was 0.94, 0.91, and 0.90.
Conclusions: ICD-9 and chief-complaint algorithms for respiratory syndrome identified similar patterns of illness.
The level of agreement was improved both by equalizing and by expanding the syndrome definitions.
FIGURE. Patient visits to 15 emergency departments for respiratory syndrome, by
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Abstract
Introduction: During the period surrounding the Salt Lake 2002 Olympic Winter Games, Utah’s health departments
conducted syndromic surveillance for potential early identification of natural or terrorist-introduced communicable
disease outbreaks.
Objectives: For minimal onsite intrusion and protection of patient confidentiality, electronic data from 19 urgent-care
facilities were routed to public health authorities by using a computer program that mapped free-text chief complaints
from patient registrations into selected syndromes. After the Games, the system’s usefulness for determining five syn-
drome categories was evaluated.
Methods: During January 15–March 23, 2002, syndromes were monitored as daily counts and proportions of total
visits. Changes in occurrence over time were tracked by statistical process control charts. Findings were compared with
other public health surveillance streams (e.g., influenza surveillance). Classification validity was examined by compar-
ing five syndromes initially identified through chief-complaint data with a reference standard of International Classifi-
cation of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) discharge diagnoses. Sensitivity, specificity, predictive values, and likelihood
ratios were measured.
Results: Respiratory syndrome changes paralleled influenza seasonality. Occurrence of other syndromes remained rela-
tively constant. The predictive value of classification by chief complaint varied substantially among syndromes (Table).
Conclusions: Syndromic surveillance findings provided reassurance that no unexpected communicable disease out-
breaks occurred. Validity measures for respiratory, gastrointestinal, and rash syndromes appear sufficiently promising to
warrant additional investigation of this approach’s value for detecting outbreaks manifesting as these syndromes. Effec-
tive syndrome classification by free-text chief complaint requires knowledge of disease presentations, local information
systems, and linguistic conventions used by registration clerks.
TABLE. Comparison of keyword-based chief-complaint (CC) classification system with ICD-9* discharge diagnosis
classification system for patient visits to 19 urgent-care facilities during the period surrounding the Salt Lake 2002
Olympic Winter Games — Utah, January 15–March 23, 2002
Syndrome (n = 59,404)
Measure Respiratory Gastroenteritis Rash Neurologic Botulinic
CC total counts 15,514 2,293 1,721 697 143
Proportion of visits (%) 26.1 3.9 2.9 1.2 0.24
ICD-9 total counts 30,061 946 1,056 7 62
Proportion of visits (%) 50.6 1.6 1.8 0.01 0.10
Sensitivity 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.14 0.097
Specificity 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.998
Predictive value positive 0.81 0.19 0.33 0.001 0.04
Predictive value negative 0.60 0.99 0.99 0.9999 0.999
Positive likelihood ratio 4 15 27 12 42
* International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision.
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Abstract
Introduction: The spatial scan statistic is a commonly used statistical test for detecting significant disease clusters.
However, the time needed to compute the scan statistic increases as the square of the number of data points M, making
the test computationally infeasible for large data sets (M >100,000). One solution is to aggregate data points to a
uniform grid — when the grid is dense, the scan statistic can be computed substantially faster, with complexity
instead of O(M 2). However, even this approach can require multiple days to compute when M is large.
Because disease clusters must be found in minutes rather than days for real-time detection, a more efficient algorithm
is needed.
Objectives: Given a grid of squares, where each square has an associated count (number of disease cases) and underly-
ing population, the goal is to quickly find the region with the maximum value of the scan statistic (the most significant
disease cluster).
Methods: A multiresolution algorithm is proposed that partitions the grid into overlapping regions, bounds the maxi-
mum score of each region, and prunes regions that cannot contain the most significant cluster. This method enables
users to search across all possible regions while examining only a fraction of the regions. This reduces complexity to
O(M) for dense test regions. As in the original scan statistic, randomization testing is used to calculate the statistical
significance (p-value) of the detected cluster. (For additional details, see the full paper at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/
~neill/papers/sss-techreport.pdf.)
Results: The algorithm was tested on seven data sets (M ≈ 200,000), including western Pennsylvania emergency
department data. The algorithm identified the most significant disease clusters in 20–130 minutes, 20–150 times
faster than exhaustive search (Table).
Conclusions: The algorithm results in substantial speedups as compared with exhaustive search, making real-time
detection of disease clusters computationally feasible. This algorithm is being applied toward automatic real-time
detection of outbreaks.
TABLE. Performance of a multiresolution algorithm for detection of spatial
disease clusters, as compared with exhaustive search
Time Speedup
Data set (1,000 replications) versus exhaustive*
Standard, large test region 17 minutes, 3 seconds 154x
Standard, small test region 29 minutes, 51 seconds 88x
City, large test region 21 minutes, 26 seconds 122x
City, small test region 131 minutes, 44 seconds 20x
High variance, large region 17 minutes, 21 seconds 151x
High variance, small region 34 minutes, 55 seconds 75x
Emergency department 46 minutes, 42 seconds 85x
* Speedup is defined as the run time of exhaustive search divided by the run time of the
algorithm. For example, a 10x speedup means that the algorithm finds the most significant
disease cluster in 1/10 the time of exhaustive search.
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Abstract
Introduction: Surveillance systems should detect outbreaks that become evident when cases cluster geographically.
Identifying an illness with an abnormal spatial pattern of disease requires a stable model of what is normal, adjusting
for underlying population density.
Objectives: Observations indicate that the distribution of all pairwise interpoint distances among patients in the
catchment area of a hospital is stable over time. This study sought to demonstrate that baseline spatial distributions can
be established.
Methods: Emergency department visits made during 2 years at two urban academic medical centers (one a pediatric
hospital) were classified into syndromes according to chief complaints and International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision codes. Distances between all pairs of patient addresses were calculated. The number of visits and the distance
distributions for respiratory and gastrointestinal syndrome at each hospital, by season, were determined.
Results: For respiratory syndrome at one hospital, the number of visits ranged from a summer low of 1,932 to a winter
high of 4,457 (mean: 3,203; standard deviation: 795). Variability and seasonal effects were present. By contrast, the
interpoint-distance distributions were characterized by remarkable similarity over time without seasonal effects. When
individual distance distributions for each season for 3 years are plotted, they overlap to substantially, demonstrating
their stability. This same pattern of results was identified for respiratory visits at one hospital and gastrointestinal visits
at both hospitals.
Conclusions: Empirical and parametric methods that rely on detecting differences between interpoint-distance distri-
butions have been described previously. Although the number of cases varies substantially over time, a stable geo-
graphic baseline can be established against which clusters can be detected. Therefore, syndromic surveillance is enhanced
when location is incorporated into a system that can detect outbreaks in space, even when the number of cases is too
small to generate alerts on the basis of frequency.
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Abstract
Introduction: A critical problem of surveillance systems is the trade-off between true and false detections. Integration
of different monitors and information from exogenous sources can increase the true-detection rate by limiting the
false-detection rate.
Objective: The authors introduce a probabilistic architecture able to achieve a substantial detection rate while keeping
false detections low.
Methods: The architecture is a Bayesian network that encodes probabilistic information through a directed graph. The
nodes and arrows represent variables and stochastic dependencies quantified by probability distributions. The integra-
tion of two systems for syndromic surveillance at a pediatric and adult hospital is illustrated by using a respiratory
illness outbreak (Figure). Empirical evaluations have demonstrated that true and false-alert rates are affected by influ-
enza epidemics, by air quality as measured by pollen level, and by whether the alert day is a holiday. The network
integrates the sources of information to compute the probability of an outbreak (given that one or both systems
generate alerts) and what is known about the other variables. The probability tables quantifying the network were
obtained from data contaminated with different simulated outbreaks. The integrator was validated on 84 simulated
outbreaks.
Results and Conclusions: This study
indicates that the integration of the two
monitoring systems with exogenous infor-
mation has a 73% true-detection rate with
an 8% false-detection rate in limited out-
breaks (i.e., an average of four ill persons/
day), and 97% true-detection rate with
10% false-detection rate in more substan-
tial outbreaks (i.e., an average of eight ill
persons/day).
* This work was supported by the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation (Grant 2002-12-1).
FIGURE. Integration of two monitoring systems of syndromic data
(nodes Respiratory_Syndrome_Young and Respiratory_Syndrome_
Adult) with exogenous variables that provide information about an
influenza epidemic (node Epidemic), air quality (node Pollen_Level),
and whether the alert day is a holiday (node Holiday).
Note: The figure illustrates that if one of the two systems generates an alert during a
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Abstract
Introduction: Taiwan’s clinical syndromic surveillance system faced substantial challenges during the 2003 outbreak
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Objectives: This study aimed to evaluate the feasibility of syndromic surveillance for health-care workers and delineate
obstacles to the reporting process.
Methods: Six months after the SARS outbreak, self-administered, structured questionnaires were mailed to 270 Tai-
wan health-care workers at medical centers, community hospitals, and other health-care facilities. The questionnaire
gathered information about demographics, difficulties in reporting, reasons for delayed reporting or underreporting,
and types of information health-care workers expected for feedback. Chi-square and paired t-tests were used for data
analysis.
Results: A total of 229 completed questionnaires (84.8%) were analyzed. Respondents cited the following problems in
reporting SARS cases: waiting for laboratory data (48%), ambiguous clinical presentations (45%), and protection of
patient privacy (45%). Health-care workers in medical centers expressed greater concern about rigorous control from
hospital authorities but had less difficulty in arranging consultations and were less influenced by mass media. By
contrast, health-care workers in community hospitals waited longer for treatment responses, had more consultation
regarding confusing laboratory results, and experienced more pressure from patients and their relatives not to report
their illnesses. Respondents cited a need for improved guidelines, recommendations, standard operating procedures,
and the effectiveness of prevention and control measures.
Conclusions: Future SARS surveillance in Taiwan requires simplified case definitions with different levels of confir-
mation, built-in mechanisms to prevent release of confidential information, enhanced infection-control training, timely
communication of appropriate feedback information; and enhanced use of information technology to simplify the
reporting process and integrate different data sets.
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Abstract
Introduction: Although syndromic surveillance typically involves monitoring of traditional clinical data sources (e.g.,
emergency department visits), monitoring nontraditional sources might also provide information about community
health. This study demonstrated that parking use data from a medical center parking facility reflected an unusual
increase in regional outpatient visits for respiratory illness associated with a well-publicized public health event.
Objective: This study aimed to determine whether a nontraditional source (i.e., parking facility use data) reflected a
sudden communitywide surge in health-care facility use associated with widespread news coverage of an unexpected
local cluster of respiratory illness-related deaths among children.
Methods: Two data sources were collected and compared for the period in which the cluster occurred: 1) daily parking
facility use data from a parking structure serving a medical center complex and 2) regional counts of outpatient
respiratory visits to military treatment facilities made by military members and their families. Daily localized forecasts
of expected parking use and outpatient visits were generated on the basis of recent historic counts to reduce cyclic
influences (e.g., day-of-week effects). Daily variations in parking and clinic volume and differences between actual
volume and forecast vol-
ume were analyzed for sta-
tistical significance.
Results: A statistically sig-
nificant increase in actual
parking facility use com-
pared with expected use
was identified, coincident
with both the statistically
significant increase in ac-
tual outpatient respiratory
visits compared with fore-
cast visits and with the pe-
riod of local news reporting
on the cluster of deaths
(February 23–25, 2003)
(Figure). No other varia-
tions in the parking or out-
patient-visit data during




surveillance efforts can be
supported by standard ana-
lytic and statistical exami-
nation of nonclinical,
real-world data.
FIGURE. Observed versus expected parking facility use and observed versus expected
outpatient respiratory visits associated with a cluster of childhood respiratory illness
deaths — one community, January 19–April 29, 2003
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Abstract
Introduction: Influenza-associated outcomes have been used to test and validate alternative aberration-detection meth-
ods, yet a limited number of studies have examined the effects of using different outcomes with varying levels of
sensitivity and specificity for influenza.
Objectives: Influenza aberration-detection models developed by CDC were applied to daily death outcomes by using
city-level mortality data.
Methods: Influenza surveillance data were obtained from the World Health Organization, and city-level mortality
data were obtained from CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. Deaths were categorized by International Clas-
sification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) and Tenth Revision (ICD-10) codes. Age-specific log-linear regression
models were used to identify influenza-associated aberrations in death outcomes.
Results: For pneumonia and influenza deaths, the models accounted for 49% and 83% of the variance for persons
aged <65 years and persons aged >65 years, respectively. Influenza accounted for 4.4% of the variance among persons
aged <65 and 8.2% of the variance among persons aged >65. Seasonal variation accounted for the greatest percentage
of explained variance for pneumonia and influenza deaths; day-of-week, holiday, and post-holiday variables accounted
for <1% of the explained variance. For respiratory and circulatory deaths, the models accounted for 89% of the
variance in outcome both for persons aged <65 and persons aged >65. Influenza accounted for 1.2% of the variance
among persons aged < 65 and 6% of the variance among persons aged >65. Seasonal variation accounted for substan-
tially less of the explained variance in death outcome for persons aged <65; time trends accounted for substantially
more of the variation when compared with models applied to persons aged >65.
Conclusions: Substantial differences were identified in the signal-to-noise ratios by influenza-associated death out-
comes. Certain confounders (e.g., age, time, and season) are key factors when identifying influenza-associated aberrations.
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Abstract
Introduction: Interest in statistical methods for public health surveillance has increased in recent years.
Objectives: Different space-time models for counts of disease were compared to assess their ability to detect changes in
risk patterns across space and time.
Methods: Space-time models for estimating disease risk should be able to describe the overall space-time behavior of a
disease and should also be sensitive to changes in its spatio-temporal structure. For this study, the observed count of
disease cases in a region was assumed to be a Poisson variable. Logarithms of relative risk parameters were assumed to
follow normal distributions with mean that incorporated potential risk factors and variance matrix that incorporated
the possibility of spatial dependence (e.g., correlation induced by unmeasured variables). Space-time models in differ-
ent scenarios representing possible changes in risk patterns over space and time were fitted.
Results: As a goodness of fit measure, the deviance information criterion was used. It demonstrated statistically signifi-
cant increases in the years in which changes in risk were generated. Analysis of the p-value surface, residuals, and
surveillance residuals (difference between observed data for 1 year and data expected under a model when fitted for
previous years) proved that an unusual event happened in the counties and years with changes; therefore, those data
were not representative of what was expected under the model. Where no changes in risk were generated, the p-values
indicated that the model produced an optimal fit.
Conclusions: Although existing methods can be used for disease surveillance, additional methods that are more sensi-
tive to the sequential nature of the surveillance task are needed.
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Abstract
Introduction: The Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS) is a national, real-time surveillance database that
includes all human exposures reported to participating U.S. poison control centers since 1985. More than36 million
human poison exposures have occurred since December 2002. The database is continuously updated, with
approximately 6,500 new human exposure cases added daily.
Objectives: This paper describes TESS and the current toxicosurveillance methods being applied to TESS for earliest
possible identification of potential instances of chemical terrorism and other events of potential public health
importance that require additional investigation.
Methods: Poisoning cases are managed and entered into TESS by poison-information specialists at each U.S. poison
control center. The specialists collect data as part of triage and case management and code these data according to stan-
dardized definitions. Approximately 44% of cases receive follow-up, allowing for determination of the clinical course and
outcome of the exposure. TESS searches for aberrations in hourly case volume for each poison control center and for daily
frequency of clinical effects. Multiple surveillance case definitions and queries for presence of specific substances are used
to identify possible sentinel cases for review. Query results are interpreted by clinical toxicologists, and individual cases
producing signals are reviewed for clinical and surveillance significance. Reporting poison control centers are contacted
for additional information as needed.
Results: Daily total case counts demon-
strate the effect of the anthrax-related
events of October–November 2001 on
poison center case volume, with an
increase in both information and human
exposure cases (Figure). An increase in
calls to the New York City Poison Con-
trol Center regarding food poisoning and
what to do with spoiled food after the
power blackout of August 2003 dem-
onstrated the potential for TESS data to
identify local changes in specific call types
that might not be recognized in national
data. TESS surveillance detected the
malicious contamination of coffee with
arsenic in Maine.  Local and federal
chemical and biologic terrorism-
preparedness exercises have also gener-
ated surveillance signals.
Conclusions: TESS adds a real-time set
of toxicity data to national, regional,
and local surveillance that can rapidly
identify local and national events of
public health importance, including
intentional chemical attacks.
FIGURE. Time series of information calls, human exposure reports, and total
cases received by U.S. poison control centers, as reported to the Toxic Exposure
Surveillance System — United States, January 1, 2000–September 1, 2003
Note: The increase in volume during October and November 2002 reflects the increase in
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Abstract
Introduction: This paper extends the algorithm outlined in an earlier version of this paper by detecting anomalous
patterns in health-care data while accounting for temporal trends in the data (e.g., fluctuations caused by day-of-week
effects and seasonal variations in temperature and weather).
Objectives: What’s Strange About Recent Events (WSARE) 2.0 compared the distribution of recent data against a
baseline distribution obtained from raw historic data. However, this baseline is affected by different fluctuations in the
data (e.g., day-of-week effects and seasonal variations). Creating the baseline distribution without taking such trends
into account can lead to unacceptably high false-positive counts and slow detection times.
Methods: This paper replaces the baseline method of WSARE 2.0 with a Bayesian network, which produces the
baseline distribution by taking the joint probability distribution of the data and conditioning on attributes that are
responsible for the trends.
Results: WSARE 3.0 is evaluated on a simulator that contains different temporal trends. Annotated results on real
emergency department data are also included.
Conclusions: WSARE 3.0 is able to detect outbreaks in simulated data with almost the earliest possible detection time
while keeping a low false-positive count.
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Abstract
Introduction: Practical use of electronic disease surveillance systems is in the public health domain. Academia and the
private sector have provided multiple surveillance options. The onus lies with public health to determine which system
best supports the current infrastructure. Traditionally, public health has not had the capacity for such systems.
Objectives: A process was established to evaluate multiple electronic surveillance products for a population of >1.6
million persons. The geographic area encompasses 16 local health jurisdictions within eight southwestern Ohio coun-
ties consisting of urban, suburban, and rural populations.
Methods: Seven viable surveillance systems were identified through an Internet search. Members researched selected
systems according to published criteria for evaluation of electronic disease surveillance systems, including vendor,
validation, flexibility, expandability, operation, timeliness, reliability, notification, usability, security, compatibility,
and supportability. Systems were rated by group consensus as acceptable (1) or unacceptable (0) on each of the criteria.
A total score was assigned. Scores were adjusted (+1, 0, or –1) according to feasibility of local implementation on the
basis of need for physical and human resources.
Results: Total adjusted scores ranged from 2 to 12 (Table). The Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance system
was identified as superior and most feasible for local implementation.
Conclusions: Use of a group process to research the feasibility of using syndromic surveillance in local health jurisdic-
tions increased the group’s knowledge about the benefits of early warning indicators and facilitated discussion on viable
systems.
TABLE. Rating of syndromic surveillance systems by a group of local health
department representatives
Syndromic surveillance Criteria Total
system score* Adjustment score
A 10 0 10
B 9 -1 8
C 5 0 5
D 9 +1 10
E 9 -1 8
F 2 0 2
G 11 +1 12
* Systems were rated by group consensus as acceptable (1) or unacceptable (0) on each of
the following criteria: vendor, validation, flexibility, expandability, operation, timeliness,
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